HISTORY OF CIVILIZATIONS OF CENTRAL ASIA

Volume IV
The age of achievement:
A.D. 750 to the end of the fifteenth century
Part One: The historical, social and economic setting

UNESCO Publishing
### Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>PREFACE</strong></td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>DESCRIPTION OF THE PROJECT</strong></td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE</strong></td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(in alphabetical order)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE (since 1993)</strong></td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MEMBERS OF THE READING COMMITTEE</strong></td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS</strong></td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>INTRODUCTION</strong></td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>MUHAMMAD SEYFEYDINOVICH ASIMOV (ÂSIMI) IN PIAM MEMORIAM</strong></td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 **CENTRAL ASIA UNDER THE UMAYYADS**                                   | 27   |
| THE APPEARANCE OF THE ARABS IN CENTRAL ASIA UNDER THE UMAYYADS AND THE | 28   |
| ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAM                                                 |      |
| Central Asia on the eve of the Arab incursions                         | 28   |
| The appearance of the Arabs                                            | 29   |
| **CENTRAL ASIA UNDER THE EARLY ÂABBASIDS**                            | 30   |
| The course of the ÂAbbasid revolution and its significance             | 30   |
| The aftermath of the ÂAbbasid revolution and the fall of Abû Muslim     | 36   |
| The consolidation of ÂAbbasid power                                   | 39   |
| Political, social and sectarian dissent in the early ÂAbbasid period   | 41   |
| The achievement of a degree of stability under al-Ma’mûn               | 45   |
# Contents

## 2 Sectarian and National Movements
- The Kharijite movement ........................................... 48
- Currents of Shi'ism: the Kaysāniyya and the Hāshimiyya .......... 51
- Heterodox Muslim and neo-Mazdakite movements: al-Muqanna, Bābak, and others ........................................... 53
- The later development of Shi'ism: the Twelvers, the Zaydīs and the Ismā'īlis ........................................... 57
- The beginnings of the disintegration of the Ābbāsid caliphate in the east ........................................... 63

## 3 The States of the Oghuz
- The Oghuz ................................................................ 66
- The Kimek ................................................................ 74
- The Kïpchak ................................................................ 77

## 4 The Samanid State
- The creation of the Samanid state ........................................... 84
- The system of government ........................................... 86
- The nature of political authority under the Samanids ................. 87
- Agriculture ................................................................ 88
- Mining ................................................................ 89
- Crafts ................................................................ 90
- Domestic and external trade ........................................... 90
- Material culture ........................................... 92
- Intellectual life ........................................... 93
- Central Asia and the Ismā'īli movement ........................................... 100
- The ethnic composition of the Samanid state and the creation of an Eastern Persian-Tajik ethnic identity ........................................... 101

## 5 The Ghaznavids
- The prehistory of the Ghaznavids ........................................... 103
- The Establishment of Sebüktegin in Ghazna ........................................... 104
- The succession of Mahmūd ........................................... 106
- The zenith of the empire under Mahmūd ........................................... 107
- Maš'ūd and the Seljuqs ........................................... 113
- The nature and structure of the Ghaznavid state ........................................... 117
- Cultural and intellectual life ........................................... 121
- Agriculture and trade ........................................... 122
# Table of Contents

## 6 The Karakhanids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sources for Karakhanid history</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The conquest of Transoxania by the Karakhanids: the division into appanages</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The two Karakhanid Khanates; the policy of Ibrāhīm b. Nasr Tamghach Khan</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Karakhanids, Seljuqs and Kara Khitay</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Karakhanids and the Khwarazm Shah Muhammad b. Tekish</td>
<td>141</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iqtāʾs and the structure of the state</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Towns and trade</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 7 The Seljuqs and the Khwarazm Shahs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The origins of the Seljus and the establishment of Seljuk power in the Islamic lands up to 1055</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The consolidation of the Seljuq sultanate in Iran</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical survey</td>
<td>161</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The structure of the Seljuq state in the east</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The eastern Seljuq sultanate (1118–57) and the rise and florescence of the Khwarazm Shahs of Anūshtegin’s line up to the appearance of the Mongols (1097–1219)</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Historical survey</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The structure of the eastern Seljuq state</td>
<td>178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The structure of the Khwarazmian state</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 8 The Ghurids

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The region of Ghur and the beginnings of Islamization</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rise of the Ghurids as an independent power</td>
<td>185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The apogee of the Ghurid sultanate</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Bamiyan amirate</td>
<td>189</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Ghurid sultanate as a world power</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political and social organization of the Ghurid state</td>
<td>191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural developments</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## 9 The Uighurs, the Kyrgyz and the Tangut (Eighth to the Thirteenth Century)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Uighurs in Mongolia and the Kyrgyz</td>
<td>196</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Uighur Kingdom of Kocho</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tangut Hsi Hsia Kingdom (982–1227)</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
10 THE WESTERN HIMALAYAN STATES
The Trakhān dynasty of Gilgit ................................. 222
The Maglot ruling family of Nager .......................... 225
The Ayash ruling family of Hunza ............................ 225
The Kator royal family of Chitral ............................ 225
Baltistan ....................................................... 225
Relations with Tibet, Kashgharia and the trans-Pamir regions .... 227
Relations with Kashmir ...................................... 227
Long-term socio-economic developments ...................... 228
Socio-religious developments ................................ 231

11 THE KITAN AND THE KARA KHITAY ........................ 232
The rise of the Kitan ........................................... 232
The rise of the Kara Khitay .................................... 239

12 THE MONGOLS AND THEIR STATE IN THE TWELFTH TO THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY 248
The socio-economic and political situation .................... 249
Chinggis Khan and the founding of the Mongol state ............. 251
Chinggis Khan’s campaigns of conquest: The foundation of the Mongol empire ..... 257
The Mongol empire during the reign of Chinggis Khan’s successors .......... 259
The Yüan empire of the Mongols and its fall .................... 264

13 CENTRAL ASIA UNDER THE RULE OF SUCCESSORS 265

14 THE DELHI SULTANATE ............................. 273
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SULTANATE IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY AND THE NATURE OF THE NEW STRUCTURES IN INDIA ....................... 274
Background ................................................... 274
Qutb al-Dīn Aybak (1206–10) .................................. 275
Shams al-Dīn Ilutmish (1210–36) ............................... 275
Nāsir al-Dīn Mahmūd (1246–66) and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban (Ulugh Khān) (1266–87) ................. 276
The end of Turkish supremacy ................................ 277
Jalāl al-Dīn Fīrūz Khaljī (1290–6) and ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī (1296–1316) ... 277
Income levels among the ruling and scholarly élites ............... 281
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agrarian conditions in the fourteenth century</td>
<td>282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The political structure of the state</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social and economic developments</td>
<td>283</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE DELHI SULTANATE, 1316–1526</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Tughluqids (1320–1412)</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sayyids (1414–51)</td>
<td>291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Lödís (1451–1526)</td>
<td>293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 THE REGIONS OF SIND, BALUCHISTAN, MULTAN AND KASHMIR:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SETTING</td>
<td>297</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE RULERS OF SIND, BALUCHISTAN AND MULTAN (750–1500)</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The ‘Abbasid period and the Fatimid interlude (mid-eighth to the end of the tenth century)</td>
<td>298</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Period of the Ghaznavid and Ghurid Sultanates (eleventh and twelfth centuries)</td>
<td>301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The era of the local independent states</td>
<td>304</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KASHMIR UNDER THE SULTANS OF THE SHĀH MĪR DYNASTY</td>
<td>310</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 CENTRAL ASIA TIMUR 1370</td>
<td>323</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Formation of Timur’s empire</td>
<td>325</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Sarbadar movement</td>
<td>326</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balkh and Samarkand under Timur</td>
<td>327</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reorganization of Timur’s army</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timur’s military campaigns</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-economic conditions under Timur</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban development, crafts and trade</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relations with west European rulers</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The succession struggle</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 THE TIMURID STATES IN THE FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The aftermath of Timur’s death</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The rule of Ulugh Beg</td>
<td>351</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The power struggle following Shāh Rukh’s death</td>
<td>353</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The realm divides</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture, livestock and hunting</td>
<td>356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Landownership and taxation</td>
<td>357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Towns, handicrafts and trade</td>
<td>361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Revolts</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Dasht-i Kïpchak at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>of the sixteenth</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 18 POPULAR MOVEMENTS, RELIGIOUS TRENDS AND SUFI INFLUENCE ON THE MASSES IN THE POST-ABBASID PERIOD

- Religious groups of the Middle East in early Islamic times           | 367  |
- The rise of Sufism and the Sufi orders in Central Asia               | 370  |
- Socio-religious and politico-religious movements                     | 376  |
- Sufi orders in India                                                 | 379  |
- The Mahdawî movement                                                | 382  |

### 19 SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: FOOD AND CLOTHING IN EASTERN IRAN AND CENTRAL ASIA

- THE EASTERN ISLAMIC LANDS, FROM IRAN TO THE FRONTIERS WITH CHINA     | 383  |
- Food and diet                                                        | 384  |
- Dress                                                                 | 388  |
- MONGOLIA                                                             | 390  |
- Shelter, crafts and dress                                            | 390  |
- Food and diet                                                        | 393  |

### 20 COINAGE AND THE MONETARY SYSTEM

- CENTRAL ASIA                                                         | 395  |
- Coinage and the circulation of money from the eighth to the tenth century | 396  |
- Coinage and the circulation of money from the eleventh century to the beginning of the thirteenth | 403  |
- Coinage and the circulation of money under the Mongols (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) | 408  |
- Coinage and the circulation of money in Transoxania under Timur and the Timurids (late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) | 412  |
- AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND NORTHERN INDIA                             | 417  |

### CONCLUSION

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>425</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### MAPS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>426</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDEX</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>History of civilizations of Central Asia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
History of Civilizations of Central Asia

The age of achievement:
A.D. 750 to the end of the fifteenth century

Volume IV

Part One
The historical, social and economic setting

Editors: M. S. Asimov and C. E. Bosworth

Multiple History Series
UNESCO Publishing
One of the purposes of UNESCO, as proclaimed in its Constitution, is ‘to develop and to increase the means of communication between... peoples and to employ these means for the purposes of mutual understanding and a truer and more perfect knowledge of each other’s lives’. The *History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind*, published in 1968, was a major early response on the part of UNESCO to the task of enabling the peoples of the world to have a keener sense of their collective destiny by highlighting their individual contributions to the history of humanity. This universal history – itself now undergoing a fundamental revision – has been followed by a number of regional projects, including the *General History of Africa* and the planned volumes on Latin America, the Caribbean and on aspects of Islamic culture. The *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* is an integral part of this wider enterprise.

It is appropriate that the second of UNESCO’s regional histories should be concerned with Central Asia. For, like Africa, Central Asia is a region whose cultural heritage has tended to be excluded from the main focus of historical attention. Yet from time immemorial the area has served as the generator of population movements within the Eurasian land-mass. The history of the ancient and medieval worlds, in particular, was shaped to an important extent by the succession of peoples that arose out of the steppe, desert, oases and mountain ranges of this vast area extending from the Caspian Sea to the high plateaux of Mongolia. From the Cimmerians mentioned in Homer’s *Odyssey*, the Scythians described by Herodotus, the Hsiung-nu whose incursions led the emperors of China to build the Great Wall, the sixth-century Türks who extended their empire to the boundaries of Byzantium, the Kitan who gave their name to ancient Cathay, through to the Mongols who erupted into world history in the thirteenth century under Genghis Khan, the nomadic horsemen of Central Asia helped to define the limits and test the mettle of the great civilizations of Europe and Asia.
Nor is it sufficient to identify the peoples of Central Asia simply with nomadic cultures. This is to ignore the complex symbiosis within Central Asia itself between nomadism and settlement, between pastoralists and agriculturalists. It is to overlook above all the burgeoning of the great cities of Central Asia such as Samarkand, Bukhara and Khiva, which established themselves in the late Middle Ages as outstanding centres of intellectual inquiry and artistic creation. The seminal writings of the philosopher-scientist Avicenna (a native of Bukhara) and the timeless masterpieces of Timurid architecture epitomize the flowering of medieval culture in the steppes and deserts of Central Asia.

The civilizations of Central Asia did not, of course, develop in a vacuum. The impact of Islam was pervasive and fundamental. The great civilizations on the periphery of the Eurasian continent likewise exerted an important influence on these lands. For some 1,500 years this arid inland sea – far removed from the earth’s true oceans – was crucial as the route along which merchandise (notably silk) and ideas flowed between China, India, Iran and Europe. The influence of Iran – although the core of its civilization lies in South-West Asia – was particularly strong, to the extent that it is sometimes difficult to establish a clear boundary between the civilization of the Iranian motherland and that of the outlying lands of Central Asia.

To the rich variety of peoples of Central Asia was thus added a multiplicity of external influences. For century after century, the region experienced the influx of foreign art and ideas, colliding and merging with the indigenous patterns of Central Asia. Migrations and the recurrent shock of military invasion, mingling and displacing peoples and cultures, combined to maintain the vast region in flux.

The systole and diastole of population movements down the ages add to the difficulty of delimiting a region whose topology alone does not prescribe clear boundaries. Thus, when, at the nineteenth session of its General Conference, UNESCO decided to embark on a History of Civilizations of Central Asia the first problem to be resolved was to define the scope of the region concerned. Subsequently, at a UNESCO meeting held in 1978, it was agreed that the study on Central Asia should deal with the civilizations of Afghanistan, north-eastern Iran, Pakistan, northern India, western China, Mongolia and the former Soviet Central Asian republics. The appellation ‘Central Asia’, as employed in this History, refers to this area, which corresponds to a clearly discernible cultural and historical reality.

UNESCO’s call to specialists, and particularly to scholars native to the region, to participate in the undertaking met with a wide and generous response. The project was deemed by academics to be an excellent opportunity to draw back the curtain that had veiled Central Asia for so long. However, none were in any doubt as to the huge dimensions of the task.
An ad hoc International Scientific Committee was formed in 1980 to plan and prepare the work, which it was agreed should cover, in six volumes, the history of Central Asia from earliest times to the present day. The Committee’s initial task was to decide where pre-eminence should be given in the very wide canvas before it. In due course, a proper balance was struck and teams of editors and authors were selected.

The preparation of the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* is now well advanced. The best resources of research and archaeology have been used to make the work as thorough as possible, and countless annals consulted in major centres throughout the region. It is my sincere wish that this, the fourth volume, and those that follow will bring instruction and pleasure to readers all over the world.

It remains for me to thank the President, Rapporteur and members of the International Scientific Committee, and the editors, authors and teams of specialists who have collaborated to shed new light on Central Asia with this detailed account of its vital and stirring past. I am sure it will prove a notable contribution to the study and mutual appreciation of the cultures that are the common heritage of mankind.
The General Conference of UNESCO, at its nineteenth session (Nairobi, October, November 1976), adopted the resolution which authorized the Director-General to undertake, among other activities aimed at promoting appreciation and respect for cultural identity, a new project on the preparation of a History of Civilizations of Central Asia. This project was a natural consequence of a pilot project on the study of Central Asia which was approved during the fourteenth session of the UNESCO General Conference in November 1966.

The purpose of this pilot project, as it was formulated in the UNESCO programme, was to make better known the civilizations of the peoples living in the regions of Central Asia through studies of their archaeology, history, languages and literature. At its initial stage, the participating Member States included Afghanistan, India, Iran, Pakistan and the former Soviet Union. Later, Mongolia and China joined the UNESCO Central Asian project, thus enlarging the area to cover the cultures of Mongolia and the western regions of China.

In this work, Central Asia should be understood as a cultural entity developed in the course of the long history of civilizations of peoples of the region and the above delimitation should not be taken as rigid boundaries either now or in the future.

In the absence of any existing survey of such large scope which could have served as a model, UNESCO has had to proceed by stages in this difficult task of presenting an integrated narrative of complex historical events from earliest times to the present day.

The first stage was designed to obtain better knowledge of the civilizations of Central Asia by encouraging archaeological and historical research and the study of literature and the history of science. A new project was therefore launched to promote studies in five major domains: the archaeology and the history of the Kushan empire, the history of the arts of Central Asia, the contribution of the peoples of Central Asia to the development of science, the history of ideas and philosophy, and the literatures of Central Asia.

An International Association for the Study of Cultures of Central Asia (IASCCA), a non-governmental scholarly organization, was founded on the initiative of the Tajik scholar
B. Gafurov in 1973, assembling scholars of the area for the co-ordination of interdisciplinary studies of their own cultures and the promotion of regional and international co-operation.

Created under the auspices of UNESCO, the new Association became, from the very beginning of its activity, the principal consultative body of UNESCO in the implementation of its programme on the study of Central Asian cultures and the preparation of a History of Civilizations of Central Asia.

The second stage concentrated on the modern aspects of Central Asian civilizations and the eastward extension of the geographical boundaries of research in the new programme. A series of international scholarly conferences and symposia were organized in the countries of the area to promote studies on Central Asian cultures.

Two meetings of experts, held in 1978 and 1979 at UNESCO Headquarters, concluded that the project launched in 1967 for the study of cultures of Central Asia had led to considerable progress in research and contributed to strengthening existing institutions in the countries of the region. The experts consequently advised the Secretariat on the methodology and the preparation of the History. On the basis of its recommendations it was decided that this publication should consist of six volumes covering chronologically the whole history of Central Asian civilizations ranging from their very inception up to the present. Furthermore, the experts recommended that the experience acquired by UNESCO during the preparation of the History of the Scientific and Cultural Development of Mankind and of the General History of Africa should also be taken into account by those responsible for the drafting of the History. As to its presentation, they supported the opinion expressed by the UNESCO Secretariat that the publication, while being a scholarly work, should be accessible to a general readership.

Since history constitutes an uninterrupted sequence of events, it was decided not to give undue emphasis to any specific date. Events preceding or subsequent to those indicated here are dealt with in each volume whenever their inclusion is justified by the requirements of scholarship.

The third and final stage consisted of setting up in August 1980 an International Scientific Committee of nineteen members, who sit in a personal capacity, to take responsibility for the preparation of the History. The Committee thus created included two scholars from each of the seven Central Asian countries – Afghanistan, China, India, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia and the former USSR – and five experts from other countries – Hungary, Japan, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States of America.

The Committee’s first session was held at UNESCO Headquarters in December 1980. Real work on the preparation of the publication of the History of Civilizations of Central
Asia started, in fact, in 1981. It was decided that scholars selected by virtue of their qualifications and achievements relating to Central Asian history and culture should ensure the objective presentation, and also the high scientific and intellectual standard, of this History.

Members of the International Scientific Committee decided that the new project should correspond to the noble aims and principles of UNESCO and thereby should contribute to the promotion of mutual understanding and peace between nations. The Committee followed the recommendation of the experts delineating for the purpose of this work the geographical area of Central Asia to reflect the common historical and cultural experience.

The first session of the International Committee decided most of the principal matters concerning the implementation of this complex project, beginning with the drafting of plans and defining the objectives and methods of work of the Committee itself.

The Bureau of the International Scientific Committee consists of a president, four vice-presidents and a rapporteur. The Bureau’s task is to supervise the execution of the project between the sessions of the International Scientific Committee. The reading committee, consisting of four members, was created in 1986 to revise and finalize the manuscripts after editing Volumes I and II. Another reading committee was constituted in 1989 for Volumes III and IV.

The authors and editors are scholars from the present twelve countries of Central Asia and experts from other regions. Thus, this work is the result of the regional and of the international collaboration of scholars within the framework of the programme of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).

The International Scientific Committee and myself express particular gratitude to Mrs Irene Iskender-Mochiri for her arduous and selfless work in preparing the volumes for the press.

It is our sincere hope that the publication of the fourth volume of the History of Civilizations of Central Asia will be a further step towards the promotion of the cultural identity of the peoples of Central Asia, strengthening their common cultural heritage and, consequently, will foster a better understanding among the peoples of the world.
MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE
(in alphabetical order)

Dr F. R. Allchin (United Kingdom)
† Professor M. S. Asimov (Tajikistan)
President
Editor of Volume IV (Parts One and Two)
Dr N. A. Baloch (Pakistan)
Professor M. Bastani Parizi (Islamic Republic of Iran)
Professor Sh. Bira (Mongolia)
Professor A. H. Dani (Pakistan)
Editor of Volume I
† Professor K. Enoki (Japan)
Professor G. F. Etemad (Afghanistan)
Co-editor of Volume II
Professor J. Harmatta (Hungary)
Editor of Volume II
Professor Liu Cunkuan (People’s Republic of China)
Dr L. I. Miroshnikov (Russian Federation)
Professor S. Natsagdorj (Mongolia)
† Professor B. N. Puri (India)
Co-editor of Volume II
Professor M. H. Z. Safi (Afghanistan)
Professor A. Sayili (Turkey)
Dr R. Shabani Samghabadi (Islamic Republic of Iran)
Co-editor of Volume III
Professor D. Sinor (United States of America)
† Professor B. K. Thapar (India)
Professor Zhang Guang-da (People’s Republic of China)
Co-editor of Volume III
MEMBERS OF THE INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC COMMITTEE (since 1993)

Professor C. Adle
(Islamic Republic of Iran)
President and Editor of Volume V

Professor D. AlimoVA
(Uzbekistan)

Professor M. Annanepesov
(Turkmenistan)

† Professor M. S. Asimov
(Tajikistan)
President and Editor of Volume IV
(Parts One and Two)

Professor K. Baipakov
(Kazakhstan)
Co-editor of Volume V

Professor Sh. Bira
(Mongolia)

Professor A. H. Dani
(Pakistan)
Editor of Volume I

Professor R. Farhadi
(Afghanistan)

Professor H.-P. Francfort
(France)

Professor I. Habib
(India)
Editor of Volume V

Dr L. Miroshnikov
(Russian Federation)

Professor M. Shukurov
(Tajikistan)

Professor D. Sinor
(United States of America)

Dr A. Tabyshalieva
(Kyrgyz Republic)

Professor I. Togan
(Turkey)

Professor H. Umemura
(Japan)

Professor Wu Yungui
(People’s Republic of China)
MEMBERS OF THE READING COMMITTEE

Professor R. N. Frye  
(United States of America)

Professor J. Harmatta  
(Hungary)

Professor D. Sinor  
(United States of America)
LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

S. G. AGAJANOV
Varyg street, 2, n° 52
Moscow
Russian Federation

B. AKHMEDOV
Aybek street, 34
Tashkent 700019
Uzbekistan

K. Z. ASHRAFYAN
Institute of Oriental Studies
Ul. Rozhdestvenka 12
Moscow 103777
Russian Federation

N. A. BALOCH
12 Sind University (old campus)
Hyderabad, Sind
Pakistan

Sh. BIRA
International Association for Mongol Studies
Central P.O. Box 941
Ulan Bator-11
Mongolia

O. G. BOLSHAKOV
Institute of Oriental Studies
Dvortsovaya Naberezhnaya, 18

C. E. BOSWORTH
The University of Manchester
Department of Middle Eastern Studies
Manchester M13 9PL
United Kingdom

F. DAFTARY
77 Hamilton Terrace
London NW8
United Kingdom

A. H. DANI
Dani House
no. 17, st no. 10
Shalimar 8/3 Islamabad
Pakistan

E. A. DAVIDOVICH
Ul. Veshnjakovskaja
Dom 6, korp 3, kv 124
Moscow 111402
Russian Federation

R.N. Frye
Tower Hill Road
Brimfield, MA 01010
United States of America

191041 St. Petersburg
Russian Federation
GENG SHIMIN
2-Department of Minority Languages
Central Institute for Nationalities
27, Baishiqiao Road
Beijing
People’s Republic of China

N. KASAI
College of Theology and Islamic Education
University of Tehran
Tehran
Islamic Republic of Iran

Y. I. KYCHANOV
Institute of Oriental Studies
Dvortsoyavaya Naberezhnaya, 18
191041 St. Petersburg
Russian Federation

R. G. MUKMINOVA
Uzbek Academy of Sciences
Tashkent
Uzbekistan

S. NATSAGDORJ
Mongolian Academy of Sciences
Ulan Bator
Mongolia

N. N. NEGMATOV
Institute of History

Tajik Academy of Sciences
Prospekt Lenin 33
Dushanbe 7340025
Tajikistan

K. A. NIZAMI
A. Q. RAFIQI
73 Balgarden
Srinagar, Kashmir
India

RIAZUL ISLAM
C-1, staff Town,
University of Karachi
Karachi 75270
Pakistan

A. SEVIM
Dil, Tarih-Goğrafya Fakültesi
Tarih Bölümü
Ankara
Turkey

D. SINOR
Distinguished Professor Emeritus
Department of Central Eurasian Studies
Goodbody Hall 157
Bloomington, Indiana 47405–2401
United States of America
Volume IV of this History covers some eight centuries, a.d. 750–1500, centuries during which the new faith of Islam arose, first in Arabia, and then gradually spread eastwards and northwards, affecting, over a long period of time, much of Central Asia, the southern fringes of Siberia and the eastern regions of China, competing in these areas with older-established faiths. These were also centuries in which nomadic and military empires arose in the heart of Asia and then impinged on the history of adjacent, well-established civilizations and cultures – China, India, Islamic Western Asia and Christian eastern and central Europe – to an unparalleled extent.

Previous ethnic and expansionist movements originating in Inner Asia, such as the Kushans in northern India, and the Huns and Avars in post-Roman eastern and central Europe, had been limited in their impact. But the expansion of hitherto little-known peoples of what is now the Mongolian region and the lands around Lake Baikal – first the Türks, then the Kitans and finally the Mongols – was of a wider, international significance. In the case of the Mongols, it affected two continents, Asia and Europe. The boundaries of T’ang China held firm against the first Eastern Türk empire, although with the disappearance of that Chinese dynasty in the tenth century, the way was open for the Kitans to establish themselves in northern China. They were initially regarded by the Chinese as yet another Barbarian dynasty, but speedily, as usually happened in such cases, became Sinicized. They were also to have an impact on the Central Asian steppelands (in what became known as Turkistan and in Moghulistan to its north) as the Kara Khitay dynasty of the Islamic sources of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries.

The westwards migrations, from the later tenth century onwards, of Turkic tribal nomads were to have long-term effects on the ethnic and social composition of the ‘northern tier’ of the Middle East, i.e. the lands running westwards from Afghanistan through Iran to Anatolia. Regions which had been Iranian in population and language since the time of the Indo-Aryan migrations eastwards into Central Asia in the second millennium B.C. now felt the impact of Turkicization. The process mainly affected Transoxania and Khwarazm,
although even here, in the cities and towns and in the villages, especially of the valleys and mountainous uplands running eastwards to the Pamirs and the T’ien Shan mountains, the Iranian Tajiks preserved much of their language and culture. Hence the New Persian language of the Tajiks, together with some modern remnants of the Middle Persian Sogdian language, provide the cultural and ethnic raison d’être for the Republic of Tajikistan, although there remain Tajiks outside the boundaries of this modern republic. Substantial lands further west, such as Azerbaijan, parts of Fars and, above all, Anatolia, likewise became Turkicized, although the history of these regions lies outside the scope of this History.

Turkish and, to a much lesser extent, Mongol military expansion south of the Oxus river into what is now Afghanistan and northern India was also to have lasting political effects on these regions. The establishment of the line of Ghaznavid sultans, who were originally of Turkish slave origin, in eastern Afghanistan was the catalyst for several centuries of expansion of Turkish and Afghan power, lured by the riches of the northern Indian plains. Hence military dynasties of Turkish ethnic origin came to rule as far north in the subcontinent as Kashmir, as far east as Bengal and Assam, and as far south as the Deccan. But since this was a question of the imposition of military aristocracies over alien populations, the ethnic and linguistic composition of Afghanistan and India was not substantially affected save in those districts of northern Afghanistan which adjoined the upper Oxus.

The changes brought about by the movements of Turkish peoples were accelerated by the Mongol invasions of the thirteenth century, which had an immediate and cataclysmic effect on the economic and social organization of the lands which they overran. In the case of China, the discontinuity was speedily repaired as the Mongol Yuan dynasty and their followers were absorbed into the traditional local society and into the enveloping religious patterns and culture of China. Inner Asia itself benefited from the religious and cultural ferment stirred up by transcontinental movements of peoples, soldiers, administrators, merchants, men of religion, and so on. The region had always been content to absorb influences from the surrounding higher civilizations. Within the confederations of the early Turks and then of the Mongols, various faiths of both East and West found an honoured place at the side of the indigenous animism of the shamans. Buddhist monks could travel westwards into Transoxania, northern and eastern Afghanistan and northern India in the earlier period, while much of our knowledge of the Mongols in their homeland and northern China stems from the accounts of Western friars and envoys like William of Rubruck and travellers like Marco Polo. In the long run, however, it was Lamaist Buddhism which established itself in the Mongolian region and in Tibet, and Islam among the Turkish peoples of Transoxania, southern Siberia and East Turkistan or Xinjiang. Earlier faiths such as
Manichaeism and Nestorian Christianity, which had flourished in some parts of the region, disappeared well before the end of our period, i.e. before c. 1500.

In Transoxania and the northern regions of the Islamic Middle East, the effects of the Mongol invasions were sharply felt in such fields as social organization and land tenure, and the pastoralization of many parts of Iran and Anatolia was accentuated. It should be remembered, however, that much of the Islamic world, including the Arabian peninsula, most of Syria and all of Egypt and North Africa, was unaffected by the Mongols. In the demonology of modern Arab writers attempting to explain the increasing rigidity of Islamic religion and civilization from this time onwards, the effects of the Turkish and Mongol invasions loom large; but in fact, the natural resilience of the Middle Eastern and Central Asian cultures soon reasserted itself, and in respect of demographic and economic decline, the effects of the Black Death were probably more lasting. It was in eastern Europe, above all in Russia, that the constituting of the Turco-Mongol Golden Horde in the Kipchak and south Russian steppes was to have a major, enduring influence on the course of the region’s history and, in particular, on the development of the Grand Duchy of Muscovy, the nucleus of the future Russian empire.

A special feature of the form of Islam popular in Central Asia was the prominence of Sufi mysticism, for much of the work of conversion among the Turkish tribes coming into the Islamic world had been accomplished by dervish missionaries. Adherence to certain of the Sufi brotherhoods, such as the Yasawiyah and, at a later date, the Naqshbandiyyah, became especially characteristic of Central Asian Islam. The popularity of the latter tariqa (Sufi order) spread to northern India, so that the Naqshbandiyyah eventually took their place, at the side of the Qadiriyyah, the Chishtiyyah and the Suhrawardiyyah, as the dominant Sufi orders in the subcontinent.

The rich religious and intellectual background of Central Asian scholars and literary men helped the region to make a characteristic and significant contribution to world civilization; these intellectual and cultural achievements will be examined in Part Two of Volume IV.

Some word of explanation is necessary concerning the vicissitudes of the editing of Part One of Volume IV. The original Editor was Professor Muhammad S. Asimov of the Tajik SSR, now Tajikistan, with Professor Yar Muhammad Khan of Pakistan as Co-Editor. Professor Yar Muhammad Khan died at an early stage and I myself was invited to act as Editor. Some of the contributors for the chapters had already been commissioned, but several others had to be chosen subsequently. Unfortunately, Professor Asimov was assassinated in Dushanbe in an apparently unmotivated killing in July 1996 and the actual editing of the chapters and the checking of translations, several from Russian and other languages, has
devolved on myself. This I could never have done without the unstinting help and cooperation of Mme Irène Iskender-Mochiri of UNESCO, who has acted as Secretary and Co-ordinator of the whole project; the present book owes a great debt to her energy and dedication.
MUHAMMAD SEYFEYDINOVICh ASIMOV (ĀSIMI) IN PIAM MEMORIAM

R. N. Frye

On 29 July 1996 Professor Asimov was shot in the head by an unknown assailant as he left his home in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. He died instantly, leaving a gap in the ranks of his country’s intellectual leaders, as well as in the International Scientific Committee which initiated the project for the *History of Civilizations of Central Asia* (Asimov was one of the editors of Volume IV). He was also a Co-editor of Volume IV of the *History of Humanity*. In short, Asimov was UNESCO’s most active contact in Central Asia. He made many friends in Paris and contributed greatly to the success of these two major projects.

I first met Muhammad Asimov in Dushanbe in 1965, just after he became President of the Academy of Sciences of Tajikistan, and talked to him many times afterwards. His kindly mien and willingness to help others, even an American, was unusual at that time of stress between the great powers. After the departure of Bobojan Gafurov to Moscow to head the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR, Asimov became the leader of cultural and intellectual pursuits in Tajikistan, and the representative of Tajikistan in all-Soviet and international meetings.

Asimov was born on 25 August 1920 in Khujand and studied physics at the University of Samarkand. But his interest and studies took him into fields of philosophy and history and other facets of culture. He had a distinguished career, the details of which cannot be elaborated here, except to mention a few items. He was Minister of Education of the Government of Tajikistan in 1962, and, as already noted, President of the Academy of Sciences until his retirement in 1991. He received the Nehru Prize for his contribution to friendship among peoples in 1980. In 1990 he was the founder of Payvand, a cultural organization for scholarly relations between Persian-speaking peoples in which he was active until his death.

Asimov was a kindly man who refrained from the attacks on colleagues that are characteristic of some scholars. He was active in intellectual pursuits until his death and he was a great help to those working on the projects of UNESCO. He will be sorely missed by his friends and associates.
CENTRAL ASIA UNDER THE Umayyads AND THE EARLY ČABBASIDS*

C. E. Bosworth and O. G. Bolshakov

Contents

THE APPEARANCE OF THE ARABS IN CENTRAL ASIA UNDER THE Umayyads AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAM .................. 28
Central Asia on the eve of the Arab incursions ........................ 28
The appearance of the Arabs ............................................. 29
CENTRAL ASIA UNDER THE EARLY ČABBASIDS .................... 30
The course of the ČAbbasid revolution and its significance .......... 30
The aftermath of the ČAbbasid revolution and the fall of Abū Muslim ........ 36
The consolidation of ČAbbasid power .................................. 39
Political, social and sectarian dissent in the early ČAbbasid period .... 41
The achievement of a degree of stability under al-Maʾmūn .......... 45

* See Map 1, pp. 426–7.
Part One

THE APPEARANCE OF THE ARABS IN CENTRAL ASIA UNDER THE UMAYYADS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ISLAM

(C. E. Bosworth)

Central Asia on the eve of the Arab incursions

Central Asia in the early seventh century was, ethnically, still largely an Iranian land whose people used various Middle Iranian languages. In Transoxania there was a network of Sogdian city-states whose people used the Sogdian language, but there was possibly some knowledge in the main towns at least of the Middle Persian Parthian language, because of the strong cultural influence of the adjacent, powerful Sasanian empire. However, Sogdian survived for at least two or three more centuries, especially in the countryside and in mountainous areas, with such modern descendants as Yaghnobi. In Bactria, the provinces along the upper Oxus river, now part of the Republic of Tajikistan and northern Afghanistan, political control was exercised by epigoni of the Hephthalites. North of the Hindu Kush, such a leader of the Hephthalites (in Arabic sources, Hayātila) as Tarkhān Nīzak was to put up a strenuous though ultimately unsuccessful resistance to the incoming Muslim Arabs. In Khwarazm, an ancient Iranian civilization still flourished under the indigenous dynasty of Afrighid Khwarazm Shahs, whose names, but not their chronology, are known to us from the native scholar al-Birūnī’s Kitāb al-Āthār al-bāqiya [Chronology of Ancient Nations], known to modern scholars as the Chronology and written in c. 1000–1003. Along the northern fringes of Transoxania, and in the deserts surrounding the oasis region of Khwarazm, were Turkish tribes of the south-western group, such as Karluk, Kimek, Kïpchak and Oghuz, and these were probably already infiltrating into the settled, agricultural lands of Transoxania and Ferghana.

From the religious point of view, no single faith was dominant throughout the region. In East Turkistan, the Tarim basin and its fringes, the Indo-Iranian culture of such centres as Khotan and Kocho was still vital, although soon to yield to the Uighur Türks, and
this culture was still dominated by Buddhism. Likewise, Buddhism was strong in Bactria; Balkh, and its famed monastery of Nawa Vihara (Arabized as Naw Bahār), was a major centre of the faith. But Buddhist influence in Sogdia had been waning for some time and when the Chinese Buddhist pilgrim Hsüan-tsang arrived at Samarkand c. 630, he found Buddhism there in full decline, and Zoroastrianism, backed by the military and cultural prestige of the Sasanian empire, in the ascendant. Christianity was also strong, however, with Nestorians, Jacobites and Melkites all represented in Transoxania and Khwarazm. There was a Christian bishop at Merv in 334 and probably one in Samarkand by the sixth century. Manichaeanism and other dualist faiths were represented, with the followers of Mani finding a particularly favourable reception among the Uighurs in East Turkistan; and neo-Mazdakites are mentioned also in Samarkand.

Watered by such rivers as the Zarafshan, the Amu Darya (Oxus) and the Syr Darya (Jaxartes) and their tributaries, the regions of Transoxania and Khwarazm were fertile, flourishing agricultural areas. The adventurous merchants of their cities carried on long-distance trade through Inner Eurasia, so that we know of the existence of Sogdian trading colonies as far east as northern China and Khwarazmian ones as far west as southern Russia.

The appearance of the Arabs

Having overthrown the Sasanian empire, the Arabs first crossed the Oxus in 653–4 during the caliphate of ʿUthmān (644–56), but such vital crossing-points as Amul-i Shatt and Tirmidh (Termez) were not secured until some time later; only then was it strategically wise for the Arab commanders to commit large bodies of troops for raids across the river. Hence it was not until 674, under the first Umayyad caliph Muʿawiya I (661–80), that his general ʿUbayd Allāh b. Ziyād crossed the Oxus and defeated the forces of the Bukhār Khudāt, the local Sogdian ruler of Bukhara. Civil warfare and an anti-caliph who set himself up in rivalry to the Umayyads held back Arab progress; the Sogdian city-states, meanwhile, sent fruitless embassies to Peking to induce the Chinese emperor, who claimed a vague suzerainty over Central Asia, to intervene.

It was the Arab general Qutayba b. Muslim al-Bāhili, governor of Khurasan and the East from 705 to 715, who first established a firm Arab hold in the lands beyond the Oxus. He conquered Bukhara and Paykand in 706–9; he made Tarkhān and then Ghūrak, the rulers of Samarkand, his vassals and he built mosques and introduced the practices of Islam into these cities; he repelled invasions in 707 and 712 by the Kaghan of the Eastern Türks, whose help had been called in by the alarmed Sogdian princes; he fought and in 710
killed the Hephthalite leader Tarkhān Nīzak in Tukharistan, the district of Bactria south of the middle Oxus; he campaigned in the middle Syr Darya lands; and he twice invaded Khwarazm in 712, killing the local shah and inflicting considerable damage on the fabric of local Khwarazmian culture, without however securing any significant foothold for Islam.

After Qutayba’s recall and death in 715, however, Arab fortunes suffered sharp reverses over the following two decades or so. In 728 the Kagan of the Türgesh (Western Türks) inflicted a crushing defeat on Arab troops who had invaded Ferghana (the so-called ‘Day of Thirst’) and allied with the Sogdian princes, so that by that year, of their former possessions across the Oxus the Arabs held only Samarkand and Dabusiyya. The Arab and Muslim position was not re-established until the appointment to Khurasan of another governor of genius, Nasr b. Sāyyār al-Kīnānī (738–48). He alleviated the discontent of the local peoples who had converted to Islam but were still forced to pay the jizya (poll tax) to the Arab treasury; he conciliated the rebel in Bactria and Transoxania, al-Ḥārith b. Surayj; and he penetrated into Ferghana again. But his successes were negatived by the growing danger to Umayyad control in the eastern provinces of the caliphate, stemming from the propagandist, missionary movement (dāʿ wa) of ʿAbū Muslim al-Khurāsānī and other pro-ʿAbbasid leaders from among the Arab settlers in Khurasan. Nasr b. Sāyyār was forced to abandon the eastern provinces of the caliphate by 748 and, retreating westwards, he was killed by the advancing ʿAbbasid army (see Part Two below).

Part Two

CENTRAL ASIA UNDER THE EARLY ʿABBASIDS

(O. G. Bolshakov)

The course of the ʿAbbasid revolution and its significance

In the 740s the Umayyad caliphate was in the throes of a deep internal crisis. To the discontent of the subject population, who did not enjoy the same rights as the Arabs and were unable to acquire them even by adopting Islam, was added the growing dissatisfaction of the Arabs themselves with Umayyad rule. That dissatisfaction shattered the unity which
had secured their dominion over a vast territory almost twice as large as the Roman empire at the zenith of its power.

The various strands in the anti-Umayyad movements in Muslim society itself may be subsumed under two main groupings: the egalitarian Kharijites and the Shiʿite charismatic tendency. The Kharijites fought to re-establish the original state of equality between members of the Muslim community; they also opposed social disparities and the inherited power of the caliphs who, they believed, should be chosen by the community from among suitable candidates irrespective of their origins. All of these views were summarized in a slogan calling for a return to the Qurʾan and the way of the Prophet. The Shiʿites, however, wished hereditary power to be vested in the family of the Prophet, meaning the descendants of ʿAlī, who, in their belief, embodied the divine grace inherited from Muhammad and transmitted from one divinely chosen head of the community, the imam, to the next.

The Umayyads managed to quell the uncoordinated rebellions of the Kharijites and Shiʿites so long as the bulk of the Arab population remained aware of its common interests, but the gradual build-up of resentment at the actions of individual caliphs and their governors, the rivalry between individual tribes and the memories of old conflicts divided them into a multitude of hostile groups unrelated to either social or religious doctrines. The detonator of the explosion which destroyed the Umayyad caliphate was provided by Khurasan, where all of these contradictions could be seen at their most acute.

In the year 744 the caliph al-Walīd II was killed, ushering in a period of internecine strife. There were three caliphs in the space of seven months. Provincial governors were unable to keep up with political changes and tried to take advantage of the situation; the Kharijite movement was everywhere on the increase. The caliph Marwān II, who came to power at the end of 744, succeeded in pacifying the heart of the empire, Syria and Iraq. In Kufa the Shiʿites swore an oath of allegiance to ʿAbd Allāh b. Muʿāwiya (the great-grandson of the Prophet’s cousin) as caliph; after a hard struggle he was expelled from Iraq but found support in Iran.

In Khurasan a pre-existing enmity between two groupings of Arabs increased against the background of this political instability: the northern Arab tribal grouping of the Mudar (Tamīm, Qays and Kināna) and the southern Arab tribes (Yemenis), who were joined by the northern Arab group of Rabīʿa. This was an ancient rivalry involving an ever-growing number of grievances.

The governor of Khurasan at that time was Nasr b. Sayyār, a member of a small tribe, the Layth, from the Mudar group. Although this old warrior was a skilled politician, he was unable to reconcile the opposing sides, partly because he himself had played a part in several armed conflicts in over half a century of activity. In the summer of 744
Abbasid revolution and its significance

Nasr b. Sayyâr, fearing that the internecine strife might spread to Khurasan, incarcerated the leader of the southern Arab grouping, Judayêb. Ali al-Kirmâni. Judayê managed to escape from prison in the citadel of Merv and took refuge in the settlement of his tribe, protected by 3,000 loyal troops. Although Nasr did not pursue him, the Merv oasis was pervaded by an atmosphere of armed conflict that the least spark could ignite into open war.

This situation was exploited by the Abbasids, the descendants of the Prophet’s uncle Abbâs, to spread their propaganda. The Abbasid movement had sprung up in the 720s, when the Alid imam Abd Allâh b. Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya bequeathed his secret organization before his death to Abbâs’s great-grandson Muhammad. He allegedly passed on to him a ‘green scroll’ said to contain a secret meaning entrusted to Ali by the Prophet together with the right to the imamate. Great care was taken to ensure that this organization, based in Kufa, was kept secret: only the most trusted individuals met the imam, usually in Mecca during the pilgrimage, when such meetings could not arouse suspicion. Propaganda was conducted on behalf of an unnamed imam ‘from the Prophet’s family pleasing to Allah’. This anonymity widened potential support, as such a description of the imam corresponded to the expectations of the Shi’ites. Many propagandists sent to Khurasan died, but no one was able to betray the name of the imam as they did not know for whom they were canvassing support. Moreover, the Imam Muhammad restrained his supporters from premature action, awaiting a favourable moment. The Imam Muhammad died in 743 before that moment arrived. He was succeeded by his son Ibrâhîm.

At the height of the disturbances caused by the murder of al-Walîd II, the head of the Abbasid organization Abû Salama al-Khallâl appeared in Khurasan, with instructions from the new imam. After spending four months in Khurasan, Abû Salama returned safely to the imam with money that had been collected in the region. As Ibrâhîm took a liking to the intelligent slave accompanying him, Abû Salama made a gift of him to the imam. Ibrâhîm freed the slave, making him his confidant and giving him the name Abd al-Rahmân and the kunya (patronymic) of Abû Muslim. In 745 Abû Muslim arrived in Khurasan and Merv as the imam’s plenipotentiary representative.

In the meantime, the situation in Khurasan had become even more involved and tense. In the spring of 745 the leader of the Kharijites of Khurasan, al-Hârith b. Surayj, who had been pardoned by the caliph, returned from the ‘land of the Turks’ with a detachment of battle-hardened troops. Nasr b. Sayyâr attempted to win him over with rich gifts and promises of high office, but the inflexible Kharijite responded that he required nothing and would support whoever promised to follow the Qur’an and the way of the Prophet.
Al-Hārith’s stance drew many supporters to him and he became a potent political force in Merv.

At the end of March, al-Hārith attacked Nasr b. Sayyār with the support of Juday al-Kirmānī, and together they managed to expel Nasr from Merv to Nishapur. The victors immediately began to settle accounts with each other, and before a month had gone by, al-Hārith was killed in a battle with Juday. After establishing a firm hold in Merv, Juday decided to deal a final blow to Nasr. In a battle near Merv al-Rudh, Juday was defeated, but Nasr lacked the forces to defeat his rival decisively. The stalemate near Merv al-Rudh continued into the winter. Juday’s son Alī sent him a detachment of 1,000 men with supplies and clothing, but supporters of Nasr attacked him on the way and looted the baggage train. On learning of this, the inhabitants of Merv rebelled against Alī. Juday had no other option but to seek a reconciliation with Nasr. At the beginning of 746 the rivals returned to Merv.

At that time Abū Muslim was in western Khurasan. The Imam Ibrāhīm decided that the long-awaited moment had finally arrived (particularly since all of the caliph’s forces were engaged in crushing rebellions in Iraq and southern Iran) and ordered Abū Muslim to prepare a rising in the Merv oasis. Another tragedy developed there: the son of al-Hārith killed Juday al-Kirmānī at Nasr’s instigation. This further exacerbated relationships between the northern and the southern Arab tribes (the latter were led by Alī, the son of Juday al-Kirmānī).

The head of the Abbasid organization in Merv, Sulaymān b. Kathīr, gave Abū Muslim a hostile reception, but a majority submitted without question to the order of the imam. At the end of April 747 he dispatched messages throughout Khurasan calling for the start of the rebellion. On 25 Ramadan (9 June) 747, two black banners (the colour of the Abbasids) sent by the imam were raised in the settlement of Safizanj and the rebels clothed themselves in black. By the time of the feast at the end of the Ramadan fast, 4,000 men had assembled under the banners of Abū Muslim. Calls for the overthrow of the Umayyad tyrants, and the transfer of power to a caliph from the Prophet’s family who would follow the Qur’an and the way of the Prophet, drew a great variety of malcontents and opposition groups to Abū Muslim: from Shi‘ites and Kharijites to local dihqāns (landowners) and to slaves who had been promised their freedom. The slaves, however, were dispatched to a special camp and not issued with arms.

Nasr b. Sayyār did not at first realize which was the greater of the dangers facing him. Instead of nipping the rebellion in the bud, he continued his struggle against Alī al-Kirmānī and the new leader of the Kharijites, Shaybān, who had appeared in Merv. A small cavalry detachment which was dispatched against Abū Muslim was defeated and its
commander taken prisoner. Abū Muslim rapidly seized the initiative; capturing a village, he blocked Nasr’s path to Nishapur, and his emissaries stirred up rebellion in Merv al-Rudh, Amul and Zamma, Talaqan and Nasa. But he did not attack Nasr, proposing instead that he join the movement and promising to hand over its leadership. When Nasr rejected this proposal, Abū Muslim enlisted the support of ʿAlī al-Kirmānī. Nasr turned to the section of the Arab population that had not so far been involved in internecine strife, appealing to them to defend Islam and the Arabs against heathens, slaves and the Arab rabble. This call was well received; Nasr was joined by Shaybān and there were desertions from Abū Muslim’s camp. But Nasr still did not attack Abū Muslim, who neutralized Nasr’s efforts by demonstrating his piety in every possible way. As a result, he managed to split Nasr and Shaybān and to attract new supporters.

Finding himself in a hopeless situation, Nasr made a desperate appeal to the caliph, Marwān II, for help but the governor of Iraq, Ibn Hubayra, who was hostile to Nasr, intercepted all his messages. Abū Muslim now decided to attack. He moved his forces up to Merv and, after waiting until a battle had begun between Nasr and ʿAlī, entered the town without any opposition on 14 or 15 February 748. Abandoning his family to their fate, Nasr fled from Merv to Nishapur with a small escort and began to assemble his forces there. Shaybān also refused to swear allegiance to Abū Muslim and departed for Sarakhs. Abū Muslim dispatched the army of Qahtaba b. Humayd against them. Qahtaba routed Shaybān and then defeated a 2,000-strong force under the son of Nasr b. Sayyār near Tus. The road to Nishapur was open and Nasr was obliged to retreat westwards to Simnan.

It was only then that the caliph realized the danger threatening him. On his orders, a Syrian army was summoned from southern Persia, where it had crushed a rebellion led by ʿAbd Allāh b. Muʿawiya. But instead of blocking the road from Khurasan to Iraq, its commander marched further north to Gurgan. Qahtaba surrounded this force and defeated it one month later. Nasr fled further west and died in Sava as Qahtaba entered Rayy. At the same time, another of Abū Muslim’s commanders, Abū Dāwūd, took control of Balkh and the whole of Tukharistan after several battles.

Qahtaba remained in Rayy for five months. The governor of Iraq, Ibn Hubayra, used this time to assemble troops. In the spring of 749 Qahtaba’s path was blocked by large forces of the Syrian army which had been stationed in Isfahan and Nihavand. Qahtaba and his main force defeated the Isfahan contingent, while his son besieged the army at Nihavand. On 26 June 749 the Nihavand garrison surrendered after a four-months’ siege. Ibn Hubayra assembled some 53,000 troops and pitched camp at Jalula, awaiting Qahtaba’s attack; at the same time, an army from Syria advanced through northern Kurdistan (Shahrazur), threatening Qahtaba from the rear. His defeat seemed certain, but by means of a diversionary
movement he succeeded in luring Ibn Hubayra out of the fortified encampment and placing him in an unfavourable position. Ibn Hubayra was thus unable to organize any resistance to the āAbbasid army on its advance to Kufa, in spite of the fact that Qahtaba was killed in a chance skirmish, leaving the army without its talented commander.

The Umayyads’ only consolation was that they had discovered the name of the āAbbasid imam and were able to arrest him. But the Imam Ibrâhîm’s arrest came too late to change the situation. The āAbbasid army was unstoppable in its advance on Kufa, which it entered on 29 August 749. Ibrâhîm was killed on the order of the caliph, but had managed to pass on the message that in the event of his death the imamate would pass to his brother, Abû ’l-āAbbâs Ābd Allâh. Abû ’l-āAbbâs (who was later proclaimed caliph, with the title al-Sâffâh) arrived secretly in Kufa with a group of relatives and an escort. For six weeks Abû Salama concealed the imam’s abode, intending to come to an agreement with one of the Ālids and pass on to them the fruits of victory. When all those who had put themselves forward as claimants refused to take power, and the imam’s arrival became known to some of the people from Khurasan, Abû Salama organized a ceremony at which allegiance was sworn to the new caliph on 28 November 749. In his first speech he promised to establish peace and justice and, as a first indication of the advent of a new era, he increased the troops’ pay.

Marwân II made one further attempt to halt the advance of the āAbbasid army, assuming personal command of a large force which went to meet it. In a decisive battle on the banks of the Greater Zab, Marwân was utterly defeated. He retreated to Syria but found no support there either. Continuing to retreat before the āAbbasid army, Marwân eventually reached Upper Egypt, where he was killed at Busir (July–August 750).

The establishment of āAbbasid rule disappointed many of those who had participated in the movement which had brought them to power. The Shi’ites and Kharijites soon realized that their slogans had been exploited by the āAbbasids to conceal their true aims. The universal prosperity which had been expected did not materialize, and the promised justice and reconciliation within the community took the form of repression and executions. The new rulers were especially harsh in dealing with the Umayyads. All the men of the family unlucky enough to fall into the victors’ hands were killed, and even the dead did not escape punishment: the remains of almost all of them were disinterred.
After the victors’ enemies came the turn of their comrades-in-arms: those who had shown disrespect at some time or who simply proved embarrassing by virtue of the fact that the new rulers were indebted to them for their accession to power. Abū Muslim began to take reprisals against them immediately after his victory. The first casualties were Āli al-Kirmānī and his sons; at a word from Abu ‘l-Abbās, an assassin was dispatched to deal with Abū Salama; Sulaymān b. Kathīr also met a violent end.

The Shi‘ites, who had been recent allies in the struggle against the Umayyads, responded by organizing uprisings. In the spring of 751 in Bukhara, one of the strongholds of Arab power in Transoxania, a rebellion was mounted by the Shi‘ite Sharīk (or Shurayk) b. Shaykh, who declared that he had not followed the family of Muhammad in order to shed blood and break the law. He was supported by some 30,000 men. Ziyād b. Sālih, who was sent to crush the uprising, could not have dealt with the rebels without the aid of the local ruler, the Bukhār Khudāt, and the Bukharan dhīqāns.

The position of the local Iranian nobility was ambiguous. Some, like the Bukhār Khudāt, became faithful supporters of the new dynasty which had promised to give them equal rights with the Arabs if they accepted Islam; others exploited the internecine strife in the Arab camp to restore their independence. These were assisted by the intervention of the Chinese, whose policy towards the West was active in those years. In 748, when Abū Muslim’s forces were pursuing Nasr b. Sayyār, Chinese forces seized and destroyed the town of Suyab, the headquarters of the Kaghan of the ‘yellow’ Türgesh. At the same time, the commander-in-chief of the Western Regions, Kao-hsien-chih, was subjugating minor principalities in the Pamirs and the upper reaches of the Indus. Two years later he appeared in the eastern part of Transoxania, having been called to the assistance of the Ikhshid of Ferghana against the ruler of Chach (later, Tashkent). The ruler of Chach was taken prisoner, sent to the imperial court and executed. His son turned to the Arabs for assistance. In response, Abū Muslim sent Ziyād b. Sālih to him while he himself established his base in Samarkand. The Arab army advanced to Talas or Taraz (modern Jambul) where it was besieged, but on receiving reinforcements from Abū Muslim, went over to active operations. In July 751 it encountered a Chinese army of 30,000 men. The outcome of the battle was decided by the rising of the Karluk in the rear of Kao-hsien-chih. Attacked on two sides, the Chinese force was annihilated and its commander, surrounded by bodyguards, fought his way with difficulty through the mass of fugitives. The Arabs found themselves in possession of a substantial booty and a large number of prisoners, among whom were
skilled silk-weavers and paper-makers. The weavers were sent to the caliph’s textile workshops in Kufa, while the paper-makers remained in Samarkand to establish a paper-making industry which subsequently played a major role in the development of book production in the Muslim world.

At the same time, Abū Muslim subdued Sogdiana by fire and the sword, while the governor of Balkh, Khālid b. Ibrāhīm, invaded Khuttal (whose ruler fled to Ferghana and thence to China) and then marched north to Kish, where he defeated and killed its ruler. Abū Muslim became the absolute ruler of Khurasan and Transoxania, having at his disposal a loyal army such as not even the caliph controlled. He had become a danger. The caliph instigated a rising by Ziyād b. Sālih, who had become the governor of Bukhara and Sogdiana, but a majority of commanders remained loyal to Abū Muslim. Ziyād fled but died at the hands of a dihqān with whom he had sought shelter. Vexed by this failure, the caliph’s brother, Abū Ja‘far, determined to kill Abū Muslim at his next audience.

An opportunity to dispose of the ‘custodian of the dynasty’, as the Abbasids referred to Abū Muslim, presented itself in the year 754, when Abū Ja‘far al-Mansūr became caliph on the death of Abu ‘l-Abbās al-Saffāh and fate willed that Abū Muslim should again demonstrate his loyalty by crushing a revolt organized by the uncle of the new caliph. Al-Mansūr ordered the surrender of the booty acquired in the course of the operation and when Abū Muslim arrived to seek an explanation, the caliph ordered him to be killed.

The troops accompanying Abū Muslim accepted the news of his execution after receiving 1,000 dirhams each. There was a different reaction in Khurasan, however. The Zoroastrian Sunbād rose to avenge Abū Muslim’s death. The rebellion encompassed all of northern Persia from Nishapur to Rayy. After 70 days, it was brutally repressed and women and children were killed as well as men, a circumstance which indicates that the rebellion was a popular one and not simply an army revolt. Such large forces had to be employed in crushing it that the customary summer campaign against Byzantium in Anatolia was not conducted that year.

The reaction of the population of Khurasan to the murder of Abū Muslim demonstrated the complex nature of the movement that he had led. Originating in Arab-Muslim circles, it had won the support of substantial numbers of people of differing social status, religious conviction and ethnic attachment. Whether they had accepted Islam superficially or through inner conviction, they infused it with the ideas that were dominant in their native environment. In the doctrines of the radical Shi‘ites (ghulāt) concerning the imamate, there is already an idea foreign to the original ethos of Islam, i.e. the incarnation of a divine emanation and its possible transfer by inheritance. In some sectarian groups, reverence for the imam came to resemble the worship of a human being as a god, something which is
fundamentally incompatible with Islam. Thus the Rāwandiyya (to which Abū Muslim is thought to have belonged) were so convinced of the divinity of al-Mansūr that the commander of his guard appeared to them to be the Archangel Jibrīl (Gabriel). Such behaviour so discredited the caliph in the eyes of orthodox Muslims that when members of the sect surrounded his palace at Qasr Ibn Hubayra in Iraq in order to worship him, he ordered their dispersal and, in the event of resistance, their slaughter.

Such ideas were often combined with a belief in the transmigration of souls. This could mean the incarnation not just of the divine spirit but of the spirit of any revered individual. Thus the idea of the imamate became separated from its essential ingredient: the inheritance of the right to rule the Muslim community within the family of Ālī. Abū Muslim also became the object of this type of worship. The Rizāmiyya, who worshipped Abu ’l-Abbās, considered that Abū Muslim had become the imam after his death, disagreeing only on the identity of Abū Muslim’s successor. Some refused to accept his death and awaited his return (the sect of the Abū Muslimiyya), and this encouraged the appearance of leaders of popular movements following Abū Muslim.

Some medieval sources and, after them, some modern researchers, have linked the name of Abū Muslim with the movement of the ‘wearers of white’ (Arabic, al-mubayyida; Persian, safīd-jāmagān), a neo-Mazdakite sect whose distinctive feature was white clothes (or a white banner) as a symbol of purity or else in opposition to the colour black espoused by the Ābāsid dynasty. Their doctrine contained a call for equality of social status and property within the community and also a belief in reincarnation. However, as we shall attempt to demonstrate below, there is no convincing evidence of their link with the Abū Muslimiyya. Certainly, the fact that medieval authors lumped a number of beliefs and groups together under the title of al-mubayyida on the basis of their external appearance, without having any idea as to the content of their doctrine, does not inspire confidence in this identification.

On all the evidence, Abū Muslim was an orthodox Muslim (or at least appeared so to his entourage) but, as we have seen, the first person who sought to avenge him was a Zoroastrian priest. Another member of his movement, Is’hāq the Turk, who had organized a revolt at roughly the same time, described himself as a follower of Zoroaster, who would soon appear to the world and establish justice. In 757 Abū Muslim’s commander, together with his successor Khālid b. Ibrāhīm, were killed by followers of Is’hāq. The next governor, Ābd al-Jabbār, who had punished a group of Shī‘ites for trying to enlist support for the descendants of Ālī, himself raised a revolt one year later and formed an alliance with the ‘wearers of white’, who were led by Barāz-banda.
The consolidation of ךAbbasid power

In spite of isolated rebellions and revolts, ךAbbasid power was consolidated in Khurasan and Transoxania to such an extent that Arab troops (from Ferghana?) are stated in the Chinese sources to have helped to crush a rebellion in China during those years (757–8). The Türgesh, who tried to win Transoxania from the Arabs for nearly twenty years, weakened their position through constant internecine strife and were supplanted by the Karluk, who in 766 seized control of the Türgesh pasturelands in Semirechye.

One of the most important factors in the stabilization of the situation in Transoxania was the new attitude of the local dihqāns towards the Muslim authorities. The advent of the ךAbbasids was more than the replacement of one dynasty by another: it brought about major alterations in the social and military structure of the caliphate. In the first place, it meant an erosion of the Arabs’ dominant social position and the introduction of equal political rights for all Muslims, Arab and non-Arab alike. Some Iranians were even convinced that the ךAbbasids intended to eradicate the Arabs in Khurasan; this seemed the only possible explanation for the order allegedly given to Abū Muslim by the Imam Ibrāhim to kill all the Arabs there. (There is no evidence that this order was in fact given.) All that can be said is that in Syria and Jazira (Upper Mesopotamia), the army from Khurasan treated the local Arabs, who provided support for the Umayyads, as enemies. According to a Christian historian of the end of the eighth century, the ‘Persians’ slaughtered the Arabs like lambs.

The change in the situation was reflected in different ways in those regions which had been a part of the caliphate for a century and in those which had only recently been incorporated into it, such as Transoxania. In Iran, much of the local nobility and many local officials had already adopted Islam and had been absorbed into the new state prior to the accession of the ךAbbasids. They immediately provided support for the new dynasty. In Transoxania, as we have seen, the first response to the overthrow of the Umayyads was the restoration of independence. The defeat of the Chinese, on whose assistance many local rulers of Transoxania counted, and the harsh reprisals carried out against unruly dihqāns, obliged the leading dihqāns to seek a reconciliation with the new dynasty and to become its loyal vassals.

By this time, many leading positions in the government structure were already occupied by people from Khurasan by right of precedence as ‘sons of the ךAbbasid revolution’ and also because of their experience of work in a bureaucracy, which the Transoxanian landowners lacked, managing their small domains in a patriarchal manner. Arabs continued to occupy high posts in the army, whereas Iranians or Tajiks gained the upper hand in the civil administration. From the earliest years of Abu ’l-ךAbbās’s reign, the most important
department, the \textit{diwān al-kharāj} (concerned with taxation and land tenure), was headed by Khalīd b. Barmak, the son of the former chief priest of a Buddhist temple in Balkh. He also became, in effect, the first vizier in the history of the caliphate. This high administrative post was possibly influenced by the Sasanian administrative tradition and may have constituted a revival of the institution of the vizier (\textit{buzurg farmāndār}) or it may, on the other hand, have been an indigenous development within the Arab ministerial tradition. With the evolution of the post of vizier under the caliphate, genuine state budgets began to be drawn up for the first time, and offices sprang up for various departments with extensive staffs of officials who engaged in correspondence with the provinces and prepared estimates and accounts. An influential stratum of officialdom, the Irano-Islamic class of secretaries (Arabic, \textit{kuttāb}, Persian \textit{dabīrān}), was formed which considered itself as the main support of the state. Their knowledge of the complex system of the \textit{kharāj} (land tax), which took account not only of the quality of the land but of the produce of the crops sown, made the officials of the \textit{diwān al-kharāj} the guardians of knowledge which was inaccessible to the uninitiated and was passed on by inheritance.

The choice of site for the new capital was an indication of the ābāssids’ break with the Umayyad tradition of looking towards Syria and the culture of the Mediterranean. Al-Mansūr (754–75) inspected several sites, all in Iraq, before settling on the little village of Baghdad on the western bank of the Tigris 30 km upstream from the former Sasanian capital of Ctesiphon. The foundations of the new residence, which received the official appellation of Madīnāt al-Salām (City of Peace), were laid in the year 762. Baghdad at once became an international city. The 30,000-strong army of al-Mansūr which lodged in the city contained detachments from every part of Iran and, in particular, from Khurasan. The builders of Baghdad, some of whom remained in the city after it was built, represented all the countries of the Near East. The local population, who spoke Aramaic and some Persian, was mixed with Arabs from Kufa, Basra and Wasit. Some districts which were called after different areas of Transoxania accommodated troops from those areas. A new Muslim culture gradually took shape in this ethnic cauldron, thereafter solidifying in different language traditions.

When compared with the luxury with which the ābāssids and their large retinue surrounded themselves, the way of life of the Umayyads seemed almost ascetic; the expenditure of the caliph’s court was equivalent to the entire tax revenue from a large region. The finance department diligently sought means of increasing the income from taxes. The cadasters were reviewed and taxation was increased in a number of areas of the Near East. There are no indications, however, that similar measures were adopted in Khurasan and Transoxania during the initial period of ābāssid rule, although the collection of taxes
must have given rise to problems. In most regions of Khurasan and Transoxania, the amount of taxation for districts was determined by agreements which specified only the overall amount of the tribute, the levying of individual taxation being the duty of the local landowners. As more inhabitants of an area adopted Islam, the potential for the collection of the jizya was reduced, and the extent of the commercial duties levied on Muslim traders and craftsmen was restricted. Payment of the fraction which could not be collected from them was imposed on non-Muslims. Additional requisitions could be added to those amounts at the request of the authorities. This policy created a divided society, not between Arabs and non-Arabs as before but between Muslims and non-Muslims. Another reason for the new wave of tension was the rupture of the stereotype of social thinking that had maintained the stability of social relations. The Islamic world had changed in a single generation; everything was now new, unfamiliar and unstable. The seeds of popular rebellions with the most extreme slogans were easily sown in such a situation.

Political, social and sectarian dissent in the early 8th Abbasid period

This dissent was early and most clearly demonstrated in the four-year peasant war conducted by Ḥāshim b. Ḥakīm, nicknamed al-Muqanna (The Veiled One), who came from a family connected with Abū Muslim’s movement. He himself had taken part in the rebellion of Abū Muslim supporting the view of Abū Muslim as the imam. After the rebellion was defeated, al-Muqanna found himself in a Baghdad prison, from which he escaped to his homeland, reaching a village near Merv. There he began to preach that he thenceforth embodied the divine spirit which had been incarnate in Abraham, Jesus, Muhammad and Abū Muslim. His fellow countrymen reacted with the usual scepticism to such revelations from someone who was well known to them, refusing to take him seriously. Al-Muqanna found more receptive ears for his propaganda, however, in Transoxania, where there was much discontent, for the reasons indicated above. The presence of a colony of Manichaeans in Samarkand may have provided a breeding-ground for neo-Mazdakite ideas, and the doctrine of transmigration may well have found a response also in the southern regions of Transoxania, where Buddhist temples had stood in the recent past.

By the spring of 776 the agitators dispatched by al-Muqanna to spread the word had raised a rebellion in the region of Kish (modern Kitab and Shahr-i Sabz). Ḥāshim then moved to the region, establishing himself in an inaccessible mountain fortress somewhere in the upper reaches of the Kashka Darya. At that time the ‘wearers of white’ had seized two small towns in the Bukhara oasis. Al-Muqanna had supporters in Samarkand, which
also joined the rebels. Jibrāʾil b. Yahyā, who had been sent by the caliph al-Mahdī (755-85) to crush the rebellion, spent four months trying unsuccessfully to deal with the ‘wearers of white’, and then moved on to Samarkand, which he succeeded in occupying. This partial success did not basically alter the position of the rebels; in the year 777 they occupied the entire valley of the Kashka Darya with the exception of a few towns, extending their power southwards to Termez, where they inflicted a significant defeat on government forces and occupied Samarkand with the support of the Turkish Karluk.

The governor of Khurasan was unable to be of much assistance to the local authorities as he was occupied in crushing the revolt of Yūsuf al-Barm in Fushanj. Only after the latter was defeated did the new governor, Muʿadh b. Muslim, manage, in the spring of 778, to reach Transoxania with a large army. By the end of the year the rebels had been pushed back to the region of Kish, but the onset of winter brought military operations to a halt. The effectiveness of action by the government forces was hampered by rivalry between the governor and the commander of the army, al-Harashī, who did not appreciate the governor’s interference. Muʿadh eventually retired from the fray and al-Harashī was left to deal with al-Muqanna alone. He tried to storm the latter’s fortress but was beaten off. He then threw all his forces against Nevaket (the site of Kamay-tepe 40 km south-west of Shahr-i Sabz), which was defended by the brother of al-Muqanna. Only when the defenders had thrown themselves upon his mercy was al-Harashī able to proceed to a siege of the fortress, which dragged on for nearly a year. Exhausted by the lengthy siege, the supporters of al-Muqanna defending the lower part of the fortress entered into negotiations with al-Harashī, surrendered it and were pardoned. Al-Muqanna remained in the citadel with his immediate retinue, and when he saw that the position was hopeless, committed suicide, after first poisoning his wife and killing his favourite slave. In order to preserve the image of a prophet who had risen to heaven, al-Muqanna ordered those who remained alive to burn his body, but they did not do this properly: on discovering the charred remains, the victors cut off the head and sent it to the caliph.

Muslim historians always recall that al-Muqanna declared himself to be an incarnation of the divinity but they never mention the social aspects of his teachings. They ascribe to him the abolition of property and the introduction of promiscuity, but there is no information on the division of the property of the rich or the persecution of the dihqāns. His movement was obviously not aimed at the landowning classes. It was anti-Islamic in tendency, bringing together all of the forces in Transoxania that were discontented with the new dynasty in a final attempt to remove it and return to the old way of life. This may explain why, out of eleven names of supporters of al-Muqanna, only two were Muslim names. The rejection of al-Muqanna’s ideas by most of the towns confirms the hypothesis
that the bulk of the rebels were peasants and inhabitants of remote mountain regions in the upper reaches of the Kashka Darya where the old beliefs still persisted.

The fierce, four-year war had a harmful effect on the economic situation in Transoxania. Samarkand, which had changed hands three times, must have suffered no less than during its worst period in the 730s. This is probably one reason why debased silver dirhams associated with the names of the governors Musayyab b. Zuhayr (Musayyabī) and Ghitrīf b. Ātā’ (Ghitrīfī) started to be minted in Transoxania (see below, Chapter 20).

The rebellion of al-Muqannaī marked a clear divide between two periods in the history of Transoxania. Its defeat signified the definitive triumph of Islam. Major changes had taken place in the country in the thirty years between the revolt of Abū Muslim and the defeat of al-Muqannaī. The dihqāns had lost political power. As early as 760 the Ikhshīd of Sogdiana had stopped minting his own money, at roughly the same time as the Bukhār Khudāt. The Ikhshīd of Sogdiana disappeared from the historical stage, whereas the Bukhār Khudāt retained some semblance of power. After the execution of the Bukhār Khudāt for his support of the ‘wearers of white’, however, his descendants became common landowners. Minor dihqāns became ordinary subjects.

In the towns that had been city-states headed by dihqāns, pride of place was occupied by the Muslim military-administrative élite which bought up the land and palaces of the dihqāns; this process can be quite clearly traced in Bukhara. Small towns where the dihqāns had lived were, with the loss of the latter’s political role, transformed into villages, whereas tradesmen and craftsmen gathered in the large towns to be near the wealthy customers who received salaries from the new authorities.

By that time it was either Arabic that was most widely used there or else the New Persian language brought by the Iranians, who had already become Muslim and been integrated into the new state system. The use of Sogdian was becoming an anachronism; it remained a language of local usage only, of no use in Baghdad to those who hoped to make a name for themselves at the court of the caliph.

The suppression of the rebellion of al-Muqannaī enabled the ʿAbbasids to start extending their dominion beyond the Syr Darya, an area under the sway of the Karluk, whose control extended as far as Kashghar at that time. At the beginning of his reign, al-Mahdi sent troops to Ferghana, but the areas beyond the river were cut off from the caliphate by a revolt and the Karluk invaded the region of Samarkand. Possibly al-Mahdi demanded after the revolt that the rulers of those regions accept his authority. But that account is suspect, since it is difficult to believe that the king of Tibet declared his obedience to the caliph as the Arab author asserts. In the year 791 the Uighurs defeated the Karluk near Besh-balīk, and Ghitrīf b. Ātā’ seized the opportunity to send troops to expel the Karluk from
Ferghana. Fadl b. Yahyā al-Barmakī, who replaced him, secured from the Afshīn (local ruler) of Ferghana recognition of his status as a vassal of the caliph. At the same time he sent troops against the Kabul Shah. His forces carried out a raid, seizing a great deal of booty, and returned to Sistan. Fadl b. Yahyā, himself an Iranian, managed to find a common language with the local dihqāns and raised a large militia during his governorship which he called the ābāsīd militia. A part of this militia was sent to serve in Baghdad.

Al-Muqanā’s rebellion obliged the governors of Khurasan to introduce order in the spheres of tax assessment and water use. Fadl b. Sulaymān al-Tūsī (783–7) lowered the level of the kharāj, which had been raised under the previous governor al-Musayyab, and he eliminated misuse of water by the élite, who had seized extra shares of water in the Merv oasis in order to water their fields. The use of water in other areas was also regulated. Fadl b. Sulaymān’s governorship also witnessed the start of the work, which continued until the year 830, of building a wall around the entire Bukhara oasis.

This period of relative well-being for Khurasan came to an end with the arrival of the new caliphal governor, ālī b. āsā b. Māhān, who mercilessly looted the country entrusted to his care. The complaints sent to Hārūn al-Rashīd (786–809) remained unanswered, as the caliph’s closest counsellors had been bribed with gifts from ālī b. āsā. Yahyā al-Barmakī attempted to open the ruler’s eyes to ālī’s abuses, but the caliph was blinded by the richness of the gifts that he received from the governor. Rebellions broke out in the regions under the authority of ālī b. āsā in response to his abuses. In 797 in Sistan there was a revolt of the Kharijites led by a local landowner, Hamza b. Ādhārak or ābd Allāh, who traced his origins back to the legendary Iranian King Tahmāsp. The son of ālī b. āsā who was sent to deal with him was defeated. Other attempts to suppress the rebellion also proved unsuccessful. Only the capital of Sistan, Zaranj, remained in the hands of the Kharijites, who did not recognize the authority of the caliph and therefore paid him no taxes (see below, Chapter 2).

At the same time (in 799) Abu ʾl-Hāsib Wuhayb b. ābd Allāh raised a revolt in Nasa (near present-day Ashgabat). The rebels took possession of a considerable area of Khurasan and even reached Merv, where the residence of ālī b. āsā was located. It was not until 802 that ālī b. āsā managed to defeat and kill Abu ʾl-Hāsib Wuhayb. An even more dangerous rebellion occurred in the year 805. It was led by Rāfī b. al-Layth, allegedly the grandson of Nasr b. Sayyār. At first, it involved no more than a romantic scandal; Rāfī decided to marry a married woman illegally, was arrested, fled and, in order to be able to
marry, raised a rebellion among the ‘ayyārs\(^1\) of Samarkand. The townspeople, who were incensed by ʿAlī’s oppression, willingly supported him. With their assistance he defeated the forces under the command of ʿAlī’s son which had been sent against him. The people of Samarkand were supported by all of Transoxania.

Hārūn al-Rashīd eventually came to accept the complaints levelled against ʿAlī b. ʿĪsā and dispatched a new governor, who arrested him and launched a war against Rāfī\(^2\). Having witnessed the failure of all attempts to put down the rebellion, the caliph decided to lead the struggle against it in person, but died in Tus on the way to Merv in 809.

The achievement of a degree of stability under al-Maʿmūn

On Hārūn al-Rashīd’s death, the caliphate was divided de facto into a western half, ruled over by the caliph al-Amīn (809–13), and an eastern half whose governor was his brother al-Maʿmūn. The latter adopted the simplest solution, lowering the kharāj by one-quarter and opening talks with Rāfī\(^2\). On receiving a pardon and having been appointed governor of Transoxania, Rāfī\(^2\) surrendered and the rebellion petered out after the reduction in the kharāj. Many landowners from Khurasan took part in the suppression of the rebellion, leading their own military detachments. Among them were four brothers of the Samanid family from the region of Balkh who, ten years later, were rewarded for their loyal service to al-Maʿmūn (by then, caliph: 813–33) by being awarded lifelong control of what were to become the appanages of Ferghana, Chach and Herat, thus establishing the Samanid dynasty in Transoxania.

Under the rule of al-Maʿmūn (in 813 the forces of al-Maʿmūn overthrew and killed al-Amin, but al-Maʿmūn remained in Merv for a further five years), the gradual decentralization of the caliphate began. Al-Maʿmūn was the son of Hārūn al-Rashīd by an Iranian slave girl, and therefore close to the Iranian élite which was in control of the administration and the army. His residence in Merv further strengthened his close relationship with the area. It was to members of the Khurasanian élite that he entrusted the administration of extensive provinces. Thus in 821 Tāhir b. al-Husayn was appointed governor of all Persia. On his death, he was succeeded by his son and the Tahirid governors controlled the region for some fifty years.

The empire of the ʿAbbasids, with its diverse ethnic and religious composition, maintained its unity primarily by force of arms, thanks to a huge army whose maintenance

\(^1\) Members of armed young fraternities among the townspeople, found in several cities of the eastern Iranian lands and regions as far west as Syria at this and in subsequent periods (see below, Chapter 18)
absorbed the greater part of the budget. Under the Abbasids, the all-Arab forces which had directly established the authority of the conquering people were replaced by a professional army and by the militia of the Persian *dihqāns* supporting the dynasty who gradually supplanted the Arab tribal levies, thereafter recruited only for major campaigns. Lacking the support of any ethnic or social group (only the senior officials were genuinely loyal to the empire, but they served the state machine rather than the caliph), the caliphs were obliged to look for an armed force which would release them from reliance on overly independent military commanders or the forces from Khurasan. This force was a guard of professional slave soldiers (*ghilmān*, *mamālīk*, plurals of *ghulām*, *mamlūk*). Slaves had been employed as bodyguards even under the first caliphs, but it was only at the end of al-Ma’mūn’s rule that they became the nucleus of the caliph’s army, when his successor al-Mu’tasim (833–42) purchased 3,000 Turkish *ghilmān*. Surrounded by the *ghilmān*, later caliphs eventually became playthings in the hands of their own slaves.

The incorporation of Khurasan and Transoxania into the caliphate assisted their integration into the wider Islamic world, increasing commercial and cultural exchange. The intensive development of the Transoxanian towns and the growth of their populations from the end of the eighth century onwards was a consequence of this. The formation of the new Iranian-Muslim culture had, however, some negative effects. In the area of written culture a considerable proportion of the literary heritage in Middle Persian, Khwarazmian and Sogdian was lost as was, in the visual arts, a rich tradition of monumental painting.
The protest movements touched upon above in Chapter 1 (Part Two) will now be considered in greater detail. Islam heralded a new social order, under whose banner all believers belonging to different races or classes would theoretically enjoy equality. However, during the earliest centuries of Islam when the Islamic empire was really an ‘Arab kingdom’, the Iranians, Central Asians and other non-Arab peoples who had converted to Islam in growing numbers as mawāli, or ‘clients’ of an Arab lord or clan, had in practice acquired an inferior socio-economic and racial status compared to Arab Muslims, though the mawāli themselves fared better than the empire’s non-Muslim subjects, the ahl al-dhimma (‘people of the book’). The mawāli, for instance, paid special taxes, often similar to the jīzāya (poll

* See Map 1.
tax) and the kharāj (land tax) levied on the Zoroastrians and other non-Muslim subjects, taxes which were never paid by the Arab Muslims.

From an early date, the stage was thus set for prolonged antagonism between the Arab rulers and their Iranian and other non-Arab subjects in the eastern Islamic lands. Indeed, the superficially Islamized peoples of the Iranian lands – especially in the remote eastern provinces of Khurasan and Transoxania (called by the early Arab geographers and historians, Mā wārāʾ al-nahr, or ‘the land beyond the river [Oxus]’), situated far from the caliphal centres of power in Syria and Iraq – did not submit readily to Arab rule or even to Islam for quite some time. Different religio-political currents of thought and sectarian movements, often leading to popular insurrections, persisted until the early ʿAbbasid and later times in Central Asia, Khurasan and other regions of the Iranian lands. They all expressed opposition to the established caliphate, while many of the region’s movements manifested anti-Arab or even anti-Islamic sentiment, rooted in Zoroastrianism, Mazdakism and other Iranian traditions.

The Kharijite movement

It was under such circumstances that Kharijism found some early following in Iran. More importantly, the Iranian lands lent support to the ʿAlid cause and to Shiʿism, which had itself originated as an Arab party opposed to the established caliphate. All the major branches of the Shiʿites, namely the Kaysāniyya, Imāmiyya, Zaydiyya and Ismaʿiliyya, had acquired communities of followers by the ninth century in different parts of the Iranian lands. Other sectarian groups, engaging in armed revolts, were specific to Transoxania, Khurasan, Azerbaijan and a few other areas of Iran. The doctrines of these rather obscure groups, designated generically as the Khurramiyya, were based on syncretistic currents of thought which aimed to amalgamate indigenous Iranian religious traditions with aspects of Islamic teaching, while these Khurrami groups basically remained anti-Arab and anti-Muslim. The activities of many of these insurrectional groups, frequently supported by the peasantry, were also rooted in specific socio-economic grievances of the villagers and the smallholders against the dihqāns (large landowners) who had assimilated themselves more readily into the new Arabo-Islamic system, and often acted as the provincial caliphal agents as well. From the second half of the ninth century, when the ʿAbbasids began to lose their firm central control over the outlying lands of the caliphate, Iranian ‘national’ sentiment (if this rather modern concept may be applied in a medieval Islamic context) found more successful channels of expression in the activities of certain dynasties, starting with
the Saffarids, which successfully challenged the hegemony of the ābābsids and began to reassess Iranian identity and culture, especially in the Samanid period (see below).

There is little reliable information on most of these sectarian and revolutionary movements, mainly because very few contemporary sources, including the genuine literatures of the sectarians themselves, have survived from this early formative period in Islam. The later Muslim authors, including the historians and the early heresiographers such as al-Ashʿarī (d. 935), al-Baghdādī (d. 1037) and Ibn Hazm (d. 1064), who wrote about several aspects of these religio-political movements, were mostly Sunnis defending the legitimacy of the historical caliphate and the orthodoxy of Sunnī Islam. As a result, they treated all of these opposition movements as heterodoxies or heresies. On the other hand, al-Nawbakhtī and al-Qummī, the earliest Shiʿite heresiographers who wrote during the final decades of the ninth century and were better informed than the Sunni authors about the internal divisions of Shiʿism, belonged to the Imāmī branch and as such were inclined to misrepresent or refute the claims of the other Shiʿite groups. Indeed, these groups and movements have to be studied mainly on the basis of hostile and ill-informed sources, which freely attribute strange extremist ideas and antinomian practices to the sectarians. As a result, some of the teachings of these sectarians, especially the doctrines of the Khurramī groups, may never be clarified. There are also disagreements among contemporary scholars regarding the precise social composition and economic bases of some of these sectarian movements, though much progress has been made in recent times. It is with these reservations in mind that we shall now take a closer look at the major sectarian movements of the Iranian lands, especially Khurasan, and Transoxania during the late Umayyad and early ābābsid periods.

Kharijism, the first schismatic movement in Islam, originated in Iraq in connection with the prolonged conflict between ālī b. Abī Tālib (656–61) and Muḥāfiya (661–80). The Kharijite rebels formed a separate Muslim community and stressed Islamic egalitarianism in their doctrinal position, holding that any Muslim believer who was morally and religiously meritorious, including even a black slave, could be elected as the imām, or leader, of the Muslim community. The egalitarianism of the Kharijites proved particularly appealing to the Persian and other mawālī. Indeed, some of the anti-Arab sentiment of the Iranians found expression in their revolutionary movement, which was also opposed to the caliphates of the Umayyads and ābābsids. The fundamentalist Kharijite insistence on the correct Islamic conduct, however, led to a pronounced factionalism within the Kharijite community itself, resulting in numerous Kharijite branches and sub-sects.

From early Umayyad times, Iraqi Kharijites began to seek refuge in Persia, spreading their doctrines in different regions of the Iranian lands, especially in Sistan where
Kharijism remained the main sectarian movement for quite some time. By the second civil war, Kharijism had become firmly established in Persia, where different Kharijite communities embarked on a prolonged programme of anti-caliphal insurrectional activities.

Initially, Kharijism in the Iranian lands was primarily related to the activities of the most radical Azāriqa branch of the movement. The Azāriqa, who held that the killing of the women and children of non-Kharijite Muslims was licit, had established several communities in Fars and Kerman as early as 686. Later, the Kharijite movement was reorganized in Iran by Ibn Ajarrad, who may have been from Balkh. Little is known about the activities of Ibn Ajarrad, who founded the Ajārida branch of Kharijism. Heresiographers name some fifteen sub-sects of the Ajārida, which were specific to Iran and were more moderate in their views and policies than the Azāriqa.

The various Ajārida sub-sects were particularly active, from 724, in Sistan and other eastern regions, where this form of Kharijism acquired some indigenous foundations. The Thaʿalība, one of the major sub-sects of the Ajārida, contributed to the revolutionary turmoil of Khurasan during the late Umayyad period, also lending temporary support there to Abū Muslim. Subsequently, several Thaʿalība splinter groups survived for some time in and around Juzjan.

In the meantime, Sistan had continued to be the main Kharijite stronghold of the Ajārida in eastern Persia. It was in Sistan that in 795 the major Kharijite revolt of Hamza b. ʿAdharak (or ʿAbd Allāh) al-Khārijī unfolded. Hamza, the descendant of a noble Persian dibqān and the founder of the Hamziyya sub-sector of the Ajārida, started his rebellious activities in Zarang, the capital of Sistan. Responding to the financial grievances of the Sistani villagers, Hamza successfully urged them not to pay the kharaj and other taxes due to the ʿAbbasid caliph; he also had a number of caliphal tax-collectors killed in the region. Hamza mobilized his followers into a large army and conducted anti-ʿAbbasid raids for some thirty years until his death in 828.

Hamza al-Khārijī was succeeded by others in the leadership of his movement. The Hamziyya and other Ajārida sub-sects continued their rebellious activities in eastern Persia until around the middle of the ninth century, when Yaʿqūb b. Layth and his successor in the Saffarid dynasty broke the military power of the Kharijite rebels and ended their

---

1 For an excellent survey of early Kharijism in Persia and the relevant sources, see Madelung, 1988, pp. 54–76.
4 The fullest account of this Kharijite revolt is contained in the anonymous Tārīkh-i Sīstān [History of Sistan], 1976, pp. 123–43. See also Bosworth, 1968, pp. 87–104.
importance as a sectarian movement. Nevertheless, scattered Kharijite communities survived for about a century longer in Sistan, Khurasan and other eastern Iranian lands. The Ibādiyya – representing the moderate branch of Kharijism, which eventually found its largest popular following in eastern Arabia and among the Berbers of North Africa – also acquired some support in the east, mainly in Khurasan, during the late Umayyad and early ʿAbbasid periods. However, these early Ibādi groups of the Iranian lands were oriented, unlike the Ajārīda, towards Iraq; and they do not seem to have been involved in any rebellious activities.

Currents of Shiʿism: the Kaysāniyya and the Ḥāshimiyya

Of the various religio-political opposition movements in Islam, Shiʿism produced the most lasting impact on the sectarian topography of the Persian lands, although the supremacy of Sunni orthodoxy remained effectively unchallenged there through the ʿAbbasid and later times. Shiʿism originated as an Arab party (ṣhiʿa) opposed to the established caliphate. It upheld the rights of the Prophet’s cousin and son-in-law, ʿAlī b. Abī Tālib, and then mainly those of the ʿAlid members of the Prophet’s family (ahl al-bayt), to the leadership of the Muslim community. Representing a unified and exclusively Arab party during its first half century, Shiʿism entered a new phase of its formative period with the Kufan revolt of al-Mukhtār, which was launched in 685 on behalf of ʿAlī’s son Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya. Al-Mukhtār’s proclamation of this ʿAlid as the Mahdī (the divinely guided saviour imam who would establish justice on earth and deliver the oppressed from injustice) proved very appealing to the discontented mawālī, who were drawn in increasing numbers into the Shiʿite movement. The mawālī, especially the early ghulāt (extremists) among them, introduced many ideas rooted in their Irano-Zoroastrian and other non-Islamic traditions into Shiʿism, which left a lasting imprint on the movement’s doctrinal development.

The Shiʿite movement of al-Mukhtār, which survived him and the demise of his revolt in 687, became generally known as the Kaysāniyya, accounting for the overwhelming majority of the Shiʿites until the success of the ʿAbbasid revolution. When Ibn al-Hanafiyya died in 700, the Kaysāniyya split into several groups, each having its own imam and developing its own doctrines. The bulk of the Kaysāniyya now acknowledged the imamate of Abū Hāshim ʿAbd Allāh, the eldest son of Ibn al-Hanafiyya. This Kaysānī majoritarian sub-sect, known as the Ḥāshimiyya, was the earliest Shiʿite group whose teachings and revolutionary stance were disseminated in Persia, especially in Khurasan where it found adherents among the province’s mawālī as well as Arab settlers.
On Abū Hāshim’s death, the Ḥāshimiyya themselves split into several groups. Two of these groups had a major impact on the Iranian lands. One of the main factions of the Ḥāshimiyya recognized the imamate of ʿAbd Allāh b. Muʿāwiya, a great-grandson of ʿAlī’s brother, Jaʿfar b. ʿAbī Tālib. Ibn Muʿāwiya acquired many followers in the western and southern parts of Persia after the collapse of his Kufan revolt in 744. Receiving broad popular support from the Persian mawālī, Kharījites and other groups, Ibn Muʿāwiya established himself at Istakhr, from where he ruled for a few years over Fars and other parts of Persia. Ibn Muʿāwiya was eventually defeated by the Umayyads in 748; he then sought refuge in Khurasan and was killed in Abū Muslim’s prison.⁵

The sectarian followers of Ibn Muʿāwiya, known as the Harbiyya and later as the Janāḥiyya, expounded many extremist and gnostic ideas, which have been attributed mainly to one ʿAbd Allāh b. al-Harb. The heresiographers, indeed, ascribe a prominent role to this enigmatic personality for introducing some key doctrines into Kaysānī thought, including the pre-existence of souls as shadows (azilla), the transmigration of souls (tanāṣukh al-arwāḥ) and a cyclical history of eras (adwār) and aeons (akwār). Some of the ideas of the Harbiyya–Janāḥiyya were adopted by other early Shiʿite ghulāt groups, and they were also expounded by some of the Khurramiyya groups.⁶ It is indeed possible that the Harbiyya–Janāḥiyya supporters of Ibn Muʿāwiya in western Iran may have been partially recruited from among the local neo- Mazdakites, who provided the backbone of the Khurramiyya movement in the Iranian lands.

In the meantime, the main faction of the Ḥāshimiyya had recognized the ʿAbbasid Muhammad b. ʿAlī, the great-grandson of the Prophet’s uncle al-ʿAbbās, as Abū Hāshim’s successor to the imamate. They held that Abū Hāshim had personally bequeathed his rights to the imamate to this ʿAbbasid relative. In this way, the ʿAbbasids inherited the party and the propaganda organization of the Ḥāshimiyya, which became the main instrument of the ʿAbbasid movement, and eventually of the overthrow of the Umayyads. The Ḥāshimiyya-ʿAbbāsiyya party, too, influenced the syncretic doctrines of the Iranian Khurramiyya, while the murder of Abū Muslim in 755 sparked off a long period of insurrectional activity by a host of Khurramī groups in Transoxania, Khurasan and other Iranian lands.

Heterodox Muslim and neo-Mazdakite movements: al-Muqanna, Bābak, and others

A few obscure sectarian movements, with possible Khurramiyya connections, sprang up in Khurasan in the milieu of the early ʿAbbasid daʿwa (missionary movement) during the final decades of the Umayyad period. Around 729 a daʿī (propagandist) named ʿAmmār b. Yazid and nicknamed Khidāsh was sent to Nishapur and Merv to head a new ʿAbbasid daʿwa organization in Khurasan. Khidāsh expounded extremist doctrines and was eventually repudiated by the ʿAbbasid imam, Muhammad b. ʿAlī; he was arrested and executed in 736. However, Khidāsh had acquired followers of his own, known as the Khidāsh-iyya, who held that the imamate had passed to him from the time of his repudiation by the ʿAbbasids; they also denied Khidāsh’s death. Some heresiographers report that Khidāsh taught the doctrines of the Khurramiyya and also permitted promiscuity; and they, in fact, identify the Khidāshiyya with the Khurramiyya of Khurasan.\(^7\) The matter is unclear, but it is possible that some of the Khidāshiyya may have been recruited from among the neo-Mazdakites of Khurasan.

There also appeared at this time the movement of Bihāfarīd the Magian, who was a native of Zuzan and had a Zoroastrian background. Setting himself up, possibly as a new prophet, at Khwaf, to the south of Nishapur, Bihāfarīd rejected many of the practices of his contemporary Zoroastrians and preached syncretistic doctrines based on a type of ‘reformed’ Zoroastrianism and on certain aspects of Islam. He also revived Persian, and the sources attribute a book to him written in that language. His ideas and social programmes proved attractive to the peasantry, who rallied to his side, enabling Bihāfarīd to launch a revolt around 747 in northern Khurasan. Bihāfarīd’s innovative ideas soon became intolerable to the leaders of the traditional Zoroastrian establishment, who complained about his heresy to Abū Muslim. They emphasized that Bihāfarīd was destroying both Zoroastrianism and Islam. Abū Muslim had Bihāfarīd captured in the mountains of Badhghis and brought to Nishapur, where he and many of his followers, known as the Bihāfarīdiyya, were put to death in 749. However, the Bihāfarīdiyya, who continued to expect Bihāfarīd’s return, survived in Khurasan until at least the end of the tenth century.\(^8\)

It was Abū Muslim al-Khurāsānī himself who had the greatest influence on a number of sects and their rebellions in the Persian lands which can be designated specifically as Khurramiyya or Khurramdīniyya. It did not take the ʿAbbasids long after their victory to

---


disclaim all connections with their Shi'ite and extremist Kaysānī (Hāshimiyya–Abbāsiyya) antecedents. Indeed, soon after establishing their own caliphate in 749, the Abbāsids became upholders of Sunni orthodoxy, persecuting the Shi'ites and their Alid leaders. They also turned against those dā'īs and revolutionary commanders who had brought them to power, including especially Abū Muslim, the founder of the Khurasanian army and the chief architect of the Abbāsid victory. The treacherous murder of Abū Muslim in 755, on the orders of the caliph al-Mansūr, provided a unique impetus for the religio-political activities of a number of syncretic Khurramī sects.

Many aspects of these Khurramī sects and their rebellious activities, which unfolded during early Abbāsid times in many parts of the Persian lands and in Transoxania, remain shrouded in obscurity. However, modern scholarship has generally corroborated theme-medieval Muslim authors’ identification of the Khurramiyya of early Islamic times with the neo-Mazdakites – these were the remnants of the earlier Mazdakiyya who had supported the socio-religious revolutionary movement of Mazdak for reforming Zoroastrianism in Sasanian Iran during the reign of Kavād (488–531).

By early Abbāsid times, there were still many Zoroastrian and neo-Mazdakite communities scattered throughout many parts of Central Asia and the Iranian lands, especially in the inaccessible mountain regions and the countryside of Khurasan, Tabaristan and Azerbaijan. A common feature of these dissident religious groups, comprised mainly of the peasantry and the lower social strata, was their anti-Arab feeling or Iranian ‘national’ sentiment. Thus they provided a suitable recruiting ground for all types of popular protest movements; and they were particularly recruited into the conglomeration of religio-political sects known as the Khurramiyya. The Khurramī groups were also receptive to syncretistic influences; and, in Islamic Iran and Central Asia, they were especially influenced by certain extremist and messianic doctrines taught by the Shi'ite ghulāt belonging to the Harbiyya–Janāhiyya and Hāshimiyya–Abbāsiyya parties of the Kaysānīyya. As a result, Islamic teachings of an extremist nature came to be fused with Iranian dualistic traditions and anti-Arab motifs, giving the Khurramiyya sectarian movement its distinctive (Irano-Islamic) syncretic nature. The protests of the Khurramī groups, which resisted assimilation into Sunni Islam, were also rooted in conflicts of class interests and in economic difficulties. The sectarians had particular grievances against the existing tax system, especially the assessment and collection of land taxes, as well as the local landowning class of dihqāns who had assimilated more readily into the emerging Arabo-Islamic socio-economic system of the caliphate and often shared many of the privileges of the ruling class.

The widest allegiance among the (neo-Mazdakite) Khurramī communities of the Iranian lands and Transoxama was gained by Abū Muslim. He acquired followers of his own,
known as the Abū Muslimiyya or Muslimiyya, who split into several groups over time. Abū Muslim evidently gained numerous neo-Mazdakite adherents during his lifetime; and many heresiographers indeed identify the Khurramiyya with the Abū Muslimiyya, who recognized Abū Muslim as their imam, prophet, or even an incarnation of the divine spirit. As the symbol of Iranian self-assertion against Arab domination, Abū Muslim became the figurehead of the Khurramiyya and his murder led to extended Khurramī revolts.9

Khurasan was the first region of Khurramī revolts after Abū Muslim’s murder; these revolts frequently involved the idea of avenging Abū Muslim’s death. Some of the Abū Muslimiyya–Khurramiyya there now denied that their leader was dead and began to expect his return to establish justice in the world. Others affirmed his death and held that the imamate had now passed from Abū Muslim to his daughter Fātimah. Later, Fātimah’s son Mutahhar came to be recognized as the imam and Mahdī by some of the Khurramiyya. In 755 the Zoroastrian Sunbād (Sindbad), a former associate of Abū Muslim, launched the first of these popular Khurramī revolts against the āAbbasids, as reported by many Muslim historians. Sunbād led an army of Khurramī rebels from his base at Nishapur to Rayy, where his following increased substantially. He also received some support in Qumis and the Tabaristan highlands. This rebellion was suppressed after seventy days by an āAbbasid army, but the Sunbādhiyya movement survived for some time.

According to the later Seljuq author Nizâm al-Mulk, the Sunbādhiyya comprised Mazdakites, Zoroastrians and Shiʿites. He also implausibly reports that Sunbād aimed to destroy the Kaʿba. The sources attribute various anti-Islamic and anti-Arab motives to Sunbād, who evidently predicted the end of the Arab empire, also holding that AbūMuslim would return together with Mazdak and the Mahdī. Sunbād’s revolt and movement, based on religious syncretism and the anti-Arab sentiment of the Iranians and receiving the popular support of the peasantry, set the basic pattern for the activities of other Khurramī groups.

From early on, Khurramī rebellious activities and syncretic doctrines spread from Khurasan to Transoxania. Isʿhāq the Turk, who may have been one of Abū Muslim’s dāʿīs operating among the Central Asian Turks, was the leader of the first of such sectarian movements in Transoxania which, like that of Sunbād, bore the twin label of Abū Muslimiyya and Khurramiyya. He, too, predicted the return of both Abū Muslim and Zoroaster, and used religious syncretism to unify disparate anti-āAbbasid groups. Subsequently, Isʿhāq’s movement acquired a militant character in Central Asia under the leadership of one Barāzbanda.

9 The classic treatment of the Khurramī sects and revolts remains that of the late Sadighi, 1938; see also Amoretti, 1975, especially pp. 481–2, 494–519; Daniel, 1979, pp. 125–56; Madelung, 1988, pp. 1–2, 63–5.
Around the year 766 another anti-Abbasid revolt of a sectarian nature, with obscure religious motives, started on the eastern fringes of Khurasan. Led by one Ustādhsīs (Ustādh Sīs), who may have claimed prophethood, the revolt received its main support from the villagers. From its initial base in the mountainous district of Badghis (now in north-western Afghanistan), where Ustādhsīs was joined by some of the Bihāfarānīyya, the insurrection spread rapidly to the regions of Herat and Sistan, receiving further reinforcement from the Sistan Kharijites. This revolt was repressed after a few years by the veteran Abbasid general Khāzim b. Khuzayma, who killed some 70,000 of the rebels. Ustādhsīs himself was captured in the mountains of Badghis and sent to Baghdad, where he was executed on al-Mansūr’s order.

The most famous of these early anti-Abbasid movements of the Khurramiyya in Khurasan and Transoxania was that of al-Muqanna, whose followers were commonly designated as the ‘wearers of white’ (see above, Chapter 1, Part Two). The fullest account of al-Muqanna and his movement was given by Narshakhī, the renowned local historian of Bukhara. Suffice it to say that all the doctrines attributed to al-Muqanna by the here siographers and other Muslim authors (of course, these are universally hostile to him) are generally anti-Islamic. According to al-Bīrūnī, al-Muqanna even enjoined his followers to observe the laws and institutions of Mazdak. The movement of al-Muqanna survived in Transoxania after the suppression of his revolt in 779, and the Mubayyida continued to await the return of al-Muqanna until the twelfth century.

The Khurramiyya movement had adherents in other parts of the Iranian lands, outside Khurasan and Transoxania. In 778 the neo-Mazdakite Muham-mira, or ‘wearers of red’, of Gurgan revolted, in alliance with the local Khurramī supporters of Abū Muslim, claiming that Abū Muslim was still alive. Led by a grandson of Abū Muslim, they advanced as far as Rayy before the rebellion was suppressed by an army dispatched by the governor of Tabaristan. Later, in the reign of Hārūn al-Rashīd (786–809), the Khurramiyya launched insurrections in Isfahan and other localities in central Persia.

The activities of the Khurramiyya reached their peak in the movement of Bābak al-Khurramī, whose protracted rebellion based in north-western Iran seriously threatened the stability of the Abbasid caliphate. As the leader of the Khurramiyya of Azerbaijan, succeeding Jāwīdān b. Shahrak, Bābak consolidated his position in the mountainous district of Badhdh, which served as his headquarters. Bābak then mobilized his largely rural Khurramī following into a formidable fighting force and started his revolt around the year 816. This revolt, lasting for more than twenty years, soon spread from Azerbaijan to the western and central parts of Iran. Numerous Abbasid campaigns against Bābak proved futile, until success was attained by the general Afshin, appointed for this purpose in 835 as
The later development of Shi'ism: the Twelvers, the Zaydis and the Isma'ilis

Even after the failure of the major Khurrami revolts of early 'Abbasid times, scattered Khurrami communities engaging in lesser and sporadic insurrections survived until later 'Abbasid times in various parts of Iran, especially in Azerbaijan, Tabaristan and Khurasan. It is possible that, during the ninth century, some of the Khurramiyya joined the revolutionary movement of the Isma'ilis, particularly in Khurasan and Transoxania. Despite the claims of Nizam al-Mulk and other Sunni authors hostile towards the Isma'ilis, however, Isma'ilism should not be viewed as a continuation of the neo-Mazdakite Khurramiyya, although the two movements shared a common enmity towards the 'Abbasids. Needless to say, as Shi'ite Muslims, the Isma'iliyah could not subscribe to the anti-Arab, and more importantly, anti-Islamic teachings of the Khurramiyya.

Indeed, Shi'ism provided another type (like Kharijism, an Islamic type) of opposition to the established caliphate. By 760 the remnants of the radical Kaysaniyya, who had earlier

---

been mainly aborted in the ʿAbbasid daʿwa (see above, Chapter 1), had either disintegrated or had joined the Imāmiyya branch of Shiʿism, which had earlier been greatly overshadowed by the Kaysāniyya movement. The Imāmiyya, who traced the imamate through a Husaynid Fatimid line of imams in the progeny of al-Husayn b. ʿAlī, began to acquire prominence under the leadership of the Imam Jaʿfar al-Sādiq (d. 765), who firmly established Imāmī Shiʿism as a distinctive religious community on a quiescent basis.

Prescribing taqiyya (the precautionary dissimulation of religious beliefs), Jaʿfar al-Sādiq further taught that the sinless and infallible Shiʿite imam did not have to rise against the unjust rulers of the time, as believed by the early Kufan Shiʿa and the contemporary Kaysāniyya and Zaydiyya, even though the caliphate too belonged by divine right to the Shiʿite imam. Refrainment from all anti-regime activity became the hallmark of the politically moderate Imāmiyya, later designated as the Ithnā ʿAshariyya or the Twelvers.

The legitimist Imāmiyya branch of Shiʿism, with its anti-revolutionary quietism, had already spread from its original Kufan stronghold to the garrison town of Qum, in central Persia, in the time of Jaʿfar al-Sādiq, marking the initiation of the Imāmiyya sectarian movement in the Iranian world. An Arab clan of the Kufan Ashʿārīra, or colonists, had settled in Qum in the later Umayyad period, and by the end of the eighth century the local descendants of these Ashāʿira had become ardent Imāmī Shiʿites. Thus Imāmī Shiʿism was introduced to Persia by the Arab Ashāʿira, who dominated the religious scene in Qum for some three centuries. Madelung has skilfully described the subsequent development of early Imāmī Shiʿism in the Iranian world. Qum remained solidly Imāmī and became the chief centre of Imāmī traditionalism in the ninth century. Later, the theological school of Qum played an important role in the development of Twelver Shiʿism. Qum also influenced the development of Imāmī (Twelver) communities in other parts of central Persia during the ninth century, notably at Rayy, which remained the second most important Imāmī city there until the Mongol times.

In Khurasan, Imāmī Shiʿism spread during the ninth century. An Imāmī community already existed in Tus when ʿAlī al-Ridā, the eighth imam of the Twelver Shiʿa, died and was buried there in 818. The ʿAbbasid caliph al-Maʿmūn (813–33) had appointed ʿAlū al-Ridī as his heir apparent as part of his conciliatory policies towards the Shiʿites and the ʿAlids. Moreover, Nishapur became one of the earliest centres of Imāmī thought in the eastern Iranian lands, due mainly to the activities of al-Fadl b. Shādhān, a learned Imāmī traditionalist, jurist and theologian who died around 873. In Transoxania, the Imāmiyya were present from the later ninth century; and by the early tenth century, Imāmī thought

11 Madelung, 1988, pp. 77 et seq.
of a somewhat independent nature was propagated in Central Asia, from Samarkand, by Muhammad b. Mas'ūd al-ʿAyyāshī.

The Ispahbadiyya Bawandids of Tabaristan were the first Iranian dynasty to adhere to Imāmī Shiʿism from the middle of the eleventh century. However, the Iranian Imāmiyya found greater protectors in the Buyids, who were originally Zaydīs but in later times perhaps leaned towards Imāmī Shiʿism. By the end of the Buyids’ tutelage of the ʿAbbasids in the eleventh century, small Imāmī (Iṭnā ʿAsharī) communities of minority status were widely dispersed throughout the Iranian lands and Central Asia. Mainstream Imāmī Shiʿism achieved its greatest success in the predominantly Sunni Iranian lands when, in 1501, it was imposed as the official creed on Safavid Iran, while Sunni orthodoxy continued to prevail in Central Asia.

The Zaydiyya, another major branch of Shiʿism, appeared as a sectarian movement in the Iranian world during early ʿAbbasid times, though its impact there proved to be somewhat marginal. Zaydi Shiʿism arose from an anti-Umayyad revolt that Zayd b. ʿAlī, an uncle of Jaʿfar al-Sādiq, had staged at Kufa in 740. The supporters of this abortive revolt, the earliest Zaydiyya, retained the politically militant but religiously moderate stance of the early Kufan Shiʿa. Thus the Zaydiyya, by contrast to the Imāmiyya, developed into a revolutionary movement and the pretenders to the Zaydī imamate were expected to rise, sword in hand, against the illegitimate rulers of the time.

The earliest activities of the Zaydiyya in the eastern lands, including the insurrection of Zayd’s son Yahyā (d. 743) in Khurasan, did not lead to any lasting sectarian results. The later spread of Zaydī Shiʿism in northern Iran was greatly helped by the emigration of a number of ʿAlids to the coastal region along the southern shores of the Caspian Sea, where they sought refuge from ʿAbbasid persecution both in the coastal lowlands and in the mountains. In early ʿAbbasid times, Tabaristan (Mazandaran), the most populous of the Caspian provinces, was inhabited mainly by the Daylamites, who had not yet converted to Islam. And it was in Ruyan and other areas of western Tabaristan that Zaydī Shiʿism, based on ʿAlid rule and Daylamite aspirations for autonomy, began to spread from around the middle of the ninth century. Many of this region’s ʿAlid rulers in time came to be acknowledged as imams and ʿāli by the Caspian Zaydī community, which developed independently of the Zaydī community of Yemen, another major stronghold of Zaydism.12

In 864 the people of western Tabaristan revolted against the fiscal exactions of the Tahirid governors of the eastern lands, and they invited the Hasanid al-Hasan b. Zayd (d. 884) from Rayy to become their leader. Al-Hasan soon seized all of Tabaristan and

12 More than any other modern scholar, Madelung has investigated the Caspian Zaydī community in a number of studies; see Madelung, 1965, pp. 153–220; 1988, pp. 86–92; EIr, 1980, pp. 181 et seq.
established Zaydi Āli rule in the Caspian provinces, adopting the title of \textit{al-dārī ila'l-haqq} (He Who Summons to the Truth). The subsequent attempts of the Ābbasids and the Tahirids to regain Tabaristan were repelled by al-Hasan with the local help of the Daylamites. However, al-Hasan’s brother and successor, Muhammad b. Zayd, was killed in 900 in a battle with the Sunni Samanids, who temporarily extended their rule over the region.

In 914 Zaydi Āli rule was restored in Tabaristan by the Husaynid al-Hasan b. Ālī al-Utrūsh, known as al-Nāsir li 'l-Haqq. Al-Nāsir converted to Zaydism large numbers of people who had not yet even embraced Islam; and, with their support, he reconquered Tabaristan from the Samanids. Al-Nāsir came to form a distinct community of the Caspian Zaydiyya, known as the Nāsiriyya. These were separate from the Qāsimiyya adherents of the school of the Medinan Zaydi imam al-Qāsim b. Ibrāhīm (d. 860), whose teachings had earlier been transmitted to northern Iran. The division of the Caspian Zaydi community into the Gilite Nāsiriyya and the Daylamite Qāsimiyya proved permanent, also splitting Āli rule into two branches there. The Iranian Zaydiyya had their golden age under the Buyids, who patronized the Zaydi Āliids of the Caspian provinces. It was also under the Buyids that Rayy became an important centre of Zaydi learning. Zaydism does not seem to have had any lasting success in Central Asia, while in Khurasan it acquired some temporary support among the Āliids of Bayhaq. Indeed, the Caspian provinces remained the main Iranian stronghold of Zaydi Shi'ism. By the early Safavid decades, the surviving Zaydi communities of that region, too, had all gone over to Twelver Shi'ism.

Isma'iliism, another major and revolutionary branch of the Shi'ī, had a greater and more far-reaching impact on the Iranian lands than the Zaydiyya movement, though its success there was ultimately checked by Sunni orthodoxy assisted by the arrival of the all-conquering Mongols. The Isma'iliyya, retrieving much of the revolutionary zeal of the earlier Kaysāniyya and Khurramiyya, split off from the rest of the Imāmiyya on the question of the Imam Ja'far al-Sādiq’s succession. Led by a line of imams descended from al-Sādiq’s eldest son Isma'īl, the Isma'īli \textit{dā'wa} was organized as a secret and revolutionary Shi'īte movement bent on uprooting the Ābbasids.

The central leadership of the early Isma'īli movement soon came to be based for a while in Khuzistan, in south-western Iran, from where \textit{dā'īs} were dispatched to various localities. The efforts of these central leaders to transform the original Isma'īli splinter groups into a greatly expanded and united movement began to bear fruit around 873. It was at that time that numerous Isma'īli \textit{dā'īs} began to appear in many regions of the Arab and Iranian worlds; and their converts soon attracted the attention of the Ābbasids and Muslim society at large as the Carmathians or Qarāmīta, named after Hamdān Qarmat, the chief local leader of the movement in southern Iraq. However, the name Qarmatī came to
be applied indiscriminately also to the Isma'ili communities outside Iraq. At that time, the Isma'ili da'wa was preached in the name of the absent Muhammad b. Ismā'īl b. Ja'far al-Sādiq, the seventh Isma'ili imam, whose return as the eschatological Mahdī was eagerly awaited.

The Isma'ili da'wa was extended during the 870s to the Iranian lands. And there, the da'wa was initially established in Jibal or western Iran. Khalaf al-Halaj, the first da'i of Jibal, set up his headquarters at Rayy, from where the da'wa spread to Qum, Kashan and other areas of central Iran under Khalaf’s successors. Meanwhile, the da'wa had become active in Fars and southern Iran under the supervision of Hamdān Qarmat and his chief assistant, Ābū Ābd Allāh al-Khādīm. The da'wa was officially taken to Khurasan during the first decade of the tenth century, although earlier it had been introduced there on the personal initiative of Ghiyāth, one of the chief da'is of Jibal. Ābū Ābd Allāh al-Khādīm, the first chief da'i of Khurasan, established his regional headquarters at Nishapur. The third da'i of Khurasan, al-Husayn b. Alī al-Marwazī, who had earlier been a prominent commander in the service of the Samanids, transferred the regional seat of the da'wa to Merv al-Rudh, also spreading Isma'iliism to Talaqan, Herat, Gharchistan, Ghur and other eastern areas. Al-Marwazī’s successor, Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Nasafī (al-Nakhshabī), a native of the Central Asian district of Nakhshab, settled in Bukhara and spread the da'wa throughout Transoxania, also penetrating briefly the inner circles of the Samanid court. Al-Nasafī, a brilliant philosopher, was also responsible for introducing a form of Neoplatonism into Qarmatī-Ismə'īli thought.

In the Iranian lands, the Isma'ili da'wa was originally addressed to the rural population, and the first da'is in Jibal concentrated their efforts on the villagers around Rayy. By contrast to their positive response to the neo-Mazdakite Khurramiyya movement, however, the peasantry of the Iranian lands was not attracted in large numbers to the Shi'ite Islamic message of the Isma'īlīs during the ninth century. The early realization of the movement’s failure to acquire a large popular following which could be led in open revolt against the local authorities, as had been the case in the Arab lands where villagers and tribesmen had converted to Isma'īlism in large numbers, led to a new da'wa policy for the Iranian world. According to this policy, implemented especially in Khurasan and Transoxania, the da'is henceforth directed their efforts towards the élite and the ruling classes. This policy, too, failed to have any lasting success, although Ābū Hātim al-Rāzī (d. 934), the fifth da'i of Jibal, did manage temporarily to win the allegiance of several amirs and rulers of Jibal and the Caspian region; and, in Khurasan and Transoxania, numerous notables were converted.

including the commander al-Marwazī, who himself became a chief local dāʾī there. The brief success of this policy in Central Asia reached its climax in the conversion of the Samanid amir, Nasr II (914–43), and his vizier through the efforts of the dāʾī al-Nasafī. This success could not be tolerated, however, by the Sunni ʿulamāʾ (religious scholars) and their Turkish military allies in the Samanid state. They reacted by deposing Nasr II, under whose son and successor, Nūḥ I (943–54), al-Nasafī and his chief associates were executed in 943 and their followers massacred.

Meanwhile, the unified Ismaʿīlī movement had experienced a major schism in 899. It was at that time that the movement's central leader, ʿAbd Allāh (ʿUbayd Allāh) al-Mahdī, the future founder of the Fatimid caliphate, openly claimed the Ismaʿīlī imamate for himself and his predecessors, the same central leaders who had organized and led the movement after Muhammad b. Ismāʿīl. ʿAbd Allāh also explained that the movement had hitherto been spread on the basis of Muhammad b. Ismāʿīl’s role as Mahdī merely to protect the true identity of the central leaders who were continuously sought by the ʿAbbasids. The declarations of ʿAbd Allāh split the movement into two factions. One faction, later designated as Fatimid Ismaʿīlīs, accepted ʿAbd Allāh’s claims, upholding continuity in the Ismaʿīlī imamate. A dissident faction, based in Bahrain and southern Iraq and lacking a united leadership, refused to recognize ʿAbd Allāh and his predecessors, as well as his successors on the Fatimid throne, as imams; they retained their original belief in the role of Muhammad b. Ismāʿīl as Mahdī. Henceforth, the term Qarāmites came to be generally applied to these dissident sectarians, who never recognized the Fatimid caliphs as their imams.14 Within the Iranian lands, the Ismaʿīlīs of Jibal mainly joined the Qarmatī faction, which had adherents also in Azerbaijan and western Persia. In Khurasan and Transoxania, both wings came to be represented, though the Qarmatīs predominated until the middle of the eleventh century. The dāʾīs al-Rāzī and al-Nasafī, who engaged in a complex scholarly discourse, were Qarmatīs. These dāʾīs of the Iranian lands, and Abū Yaʿqub al-Sijistānī who later led the daʿwa in Khurasan and his native Sistan, played an important part in developing the Ismaʿīlī-Qarmatī thought of this early period, which left a lasting influence on the intellectual activities of the later Ismaʿīlīs.

By the final decades of the eleventh century, the Qarmatī communities of the Iranian lands had either disintegrated or joined the Fatimid Ismaʿīlī daʿwa. In 1094 the Persian Ismaʿīlīs became the main supporters of the Nizāriyya branch of Ismaʿīlīsm, severing all ties with the Mustaʿliyya branch, which continued to be led by the Fatimid caliphs. The Nizāri Ismaʿīlīs of the Iranian lands were soon organized by Hasan-i Sabbāh into a revolutionary force with numerous inaccessible mountain strongholds, reminiscent of the

---

strategy adopted by some of the earlier Khurrami groups. Being opposed to the alien rule of the Seljuq Turks, the Iranian Nizari groups launched an armed revolt against the Seljuq sultanate and succeeded in asserting their control over various parts of Iran, especially in Daylaman and Kuhistan in south-eastern Khurasan, until they too, like the Abbasids, became victims of the Mongol invasions and irrevocably lost their political power in 1256.

The beginnings of the disintegration of the Abbasid caliphate in the east

Unlike the Hashimiya–Abbasiyya sectarian movement which succeeded in supplanting Umayyad rule, none of the other religio-political movements of the eighth and ninth centuries discussed here could successfully challenge the hegemony of the Abbasids in the eastern lands of the caliphate. Moreover, none of the early anti-Abbasid insurrections resulted in the separation of any territory from the caliphal domains for any extended period of time. As a result, the territorial integrity of the Abbasid caliphate remained intact until after the middle of the ninth century. In the meantime, important developments were taking place, both at the centre of caliphal power in Iraq and in the provincial peripheries, which eventually brought about the fragmentation of the Abbasid caliphate. It was under such circumstances that independent dynasties, devoid of any specific religious affiliation, starting with the Saffarids, appeared in the eastern Iranian lands, also initiating the revival of Iranian sentiment and culture.

For almost seven decades after the establishment of the Abbasid dynasty, Iran was governed by various eastern governors appointed from Iraq. These governors remained unswervingly loyal to the caliph at Baghdad, citing his name on coins and in the khutba (Friday worship oration) and sending him taxes and tributes. Starting with the appointment in 821 of Tahir b. al-Husayn, four generations of the Tahirid family ruled for some fifty years from Khurasan as governors of the lands east of Iraq. Many Tahirids also held office in Iraq itself. Contrary to the views of some modern scholars, however, the Tahirids cannot be regarded as the first autonomous dynasty of the Iranian world in their time. As Bosworth has explained in many of his studies, the Tahirids, too, remained loyal servants of the Abbasids, respecting the constitutional rights of the caliphate. They were also highly Arabized in culture and outlook, like many other landowning aristocratic Persians who had fully assimilated into the Arabo-Islamic culture of the period. Nevertheless, it may be admitted that the hereditary rule of the Tahirids, who were of Persian dihqan origins and tolerated the Persian language in their entourage, did at least indirectly encourage

15 For instance, Bosworth, 1975.
the resurgence of Persian language and culture in their entourage. It was an altogether different matter with the Saffarids, the next dynasty to appear on the political scene in the eastern Iranian world.

As a result of the problems created by the Turkish slave soldiers and their commanders who had come to play an increasingly important role in the central affairs of the caliphate, especially during the anarchy of the Samarra period, caliphal control over the outlying provinces had become seriously weakened by the middle of the ninth century. This allowed new political powers, based on military force, to assert themselves on the fringes of the caliphate. It was also at this time that Zaydī ēAlid rule was established in Tabaristan, and the Ismāʿīlīs and the Zanj (black slaves) launched their insurrectional activities in Iraq itself. But the Saffarids, based in Sistan, were the first of such major military powers to appear in the Iranian world, establishing a dynasty and separating vast territories from the ēAbbasid domains. The disintegration of the ēAbbasid caliphate and the rise of independent dynasties, which revived Iranian ‘national’ sentiment, had now begun.

Yaʿqūb b. Layth (867–79), known as al-Saffār (The Coppersmith), who founded the Saffarid dynasty, was of plebeian origins and lacked specific religious convictions, though he was accused of Kharijite leanings; the later author Nizām al-Mulk depicts him also (on dubious grounds) as a crypto-Ismāʿīlī. He had gradually risen to a leading position in the ēayyār16 bands of Sistan, which drove out the Tahirid amir. In 861 Yaʿqūb himself was proclaimed amir of Sistan. He thereupon proceeded to consolidate his position within the province before conducting a number of military campaigns in what is now Afghanistan and against the Kharijites. Subsequently, Yaʿqūb directed his attention against the caliphal territories in Iran. In 873 he entered Nishapur and ended Tahirid rule in Khurasan; then he seized Fars in 875 and came close to taking Baghdad itself. Yaʿqūb died in 879 in Khuzistan. Saffarid power reached its zenith under Yaʿqūb’s brother and successor, ēAmr (879–900). ēAmr was eventually defeated, in 900, in Transoxania by the Samanids and sent to Iraq where he was executed. Henceforth, the authority and the territories of the Saffarids diminished rapidly, eventually becoming largely restricted to Sistan.

Another development of great importance that occurred during the final decades of the ninth century was the revival of New Persian literature and culture, initiated through the efforts of Yaʿqūb b. Layth and his brother ēAmr, who had court poets composing Persian verse for the first time since the Arab invasion of Iran. Soon, the plebeian Saffarids were also equipped with a royal Iranian genealogy. The early Saffarids, indeed, pioneered the renaissance of a specifically Irano-Islamic culture based on the ‘national’ aspirations of

---

16 See Chapter 1, note 1.
the Islamized Iranians, who had continued to be aware of their Iranian identity and culture during the centuries of Arab domination.\(^\text{17}\)

The \(^e\)Abbasids survived as the spiritual heads of the Islamic world, over which they no longer exercised any political control. The rise of the Buyids in western Iran and in Iraq, and their subsequent internal and dynastic strife, permitted the formation of a number of Turkish dynasties in the east; dynasties like the Ghaznavids, the Karakhanids and, most significantly, the Seljuqs, who now established their own rule over the Iranian lands. When the Seljuqs entered Baghdad in 1055, ostensibly to liberate the \(^\text{e}\)Abbasid caliph from the Shi‘ite Buyids’ tutelage, a new Turkish period had started in the Islamic history of the Iranian world. The Seljuqs became the new champions of Sunni orthodoxy and sought caliphal approval in order to legitimize their own rule. Thus the \(^e\)Abbasids were once again permitted to survive.

The appearance of Turkish dynasties in the eleventh century also checked the rapid resurgence of Persian culture. This renaissance had, however, become irrevocable by that time. Nāṣir-i Khusraw, the renowned Isma‘ili philosopher and dā‘ī of Khurasan and Badakhshan during the late eleventh century, composed all his works in Persian. He is also ranked among the foremost Persian poets. Moreover, the highly Islamized Iranian Nizārīs of the Alamut period, from early in the 1090s, adopted Persian as the language of their religious writings, an unprecedented choice for a medieval Shi‘ite community. Indeed, the antecedents of the anti-Seljuq revolt of the Iranian Nizārīs can be traced not only to the Shi‘ite and anti-\(^e\)Abbasid movement of the earlier Isma‘ilis but also to the Iranian ‘national’ elements fostered by the Saffarids and other Iranian dynasties. The Turkish rulers themselves were soon influenced by aspects of Persian culture; thus the learned vizier Nizām al-Mulk composed his Siyāsat-nāma [Book of Statecraft] for the Great Seljuq sultan Malik Shāh in Persian. The Seljuqs were superseded by other dynasties in the Iranian world, whereas the \(^e\)Abbasid caliphate enjoyed a revival of power and survived in Baghdad until 1258, mainly due to the importance of the caliph’s moral authority for Sunni Muslims. Yet in the end, the \(^e\)Abbasids of Baghdad, too, succumbed to the all-conquering pagan Mongols.

THE STATES OF THE OGHUZ,
THE KIMEK AND THE KİPCHAK*

S. G. Agajanov

Contents

The Oghuz ................................................................. 66
The Kimek ................................................................. 74
The Kıpchak ............................................................... 77

The Oghuz

During the ninth and tenth centuries, the nomadic Turkic Oghuz tribes formed a principal-
ity on the middle and lower reaches of the Syr Darya (Jaxartes), in the Aral Sea region and
the area of the northern Caspian. There are a number of obscure points in the history of the
formation of the Oghuz people and principality in western Central Asia and Kazakhstan.
The late S. P. Tolstov considered the home of the Oghuz to be the deserts and steppes of the
Aral Sea region. In his view, they had lived there in ancient times before migrating from
western to eastern Central Asia.¹ In spite of its originality, however, this viewpoint did not
gain general acceptance.

Research in recent decades points to the conclusion that the Oghuz in western Central
Asia originally came from the eastern T’ien Shan region. Oghuz historical tales relate that
the headquarters of their supreme ruler or leader was at one time situated on the shores of
Lake Issyk-kül. According to different versions of this legend, there was strife among the
Oghuz caused by the hostile relations between their ruler and his son, Oghuz Khan. In his

¹ See Maps 1 and 2.
¹ Tolstov, 1948.
account of this old legend, the Persian historian Rashīd al-Dīn, who lived at the end of the thirteenth and the beginning of the fourteenth century, wrote that after a lengthy struggle, Oghuz Khan seized his father’s lands in the district of Talas. Oghuz Khan then managed to subdue a large number of lands and regions, including Almalïk and Alatagh. The Oghuz subsequently launched major campaigns to the west and appeared on the borders of Transoxania and Khwarazm, from where they penetrated to the lower reaches of the Itil (Volga). The new Oghuz capital, the town of Yengi-kent, was built in the regions which they had conquered, on the lower Syr Darya.²

The historical traditions of the Oghuz, which go back to the early Middle Ages, include a number of legendary episodes and superimpositions from a later period. On the whole, however, they clearly reflect the main thrust of their migrations from east to west. In the course of these migrations, which took the form of predatory incursions and wars, they reached the borders of Europe. The movements of the Oghuz covered a vast area from Semirechye and the western T’ien Shan to the Aral Sea and the northern Caspian.³

Study of the medieval sources by scholars shows that the migrations of the Oghuz began as early as the eighth century. In 742, following the decline and fall of the Kaghanate of the Western Türks, considerable changes occurred in the history of Central Asia. A confederation was formed of Turkic tribes – the Basmil, the Uighurs and the Karluk – whose leaders shared political power. The leader of the Basmil bestowed upon himself the ancient Turkic title of Kaghan, while the leaders of the Uighurs and the Karluk acquired the title of Yabghu. In the year 744, however, the Uighurs and the Karluk combined to defeat the forces of the Basmil. The head of the Uighur tribes then became the supreme Kaghan, while the leader of the Karluk retained the title of Yabghu. More than twenty years later, in 766, the Karluk left eastern Central Asia and conquered Semirechye.⁴ The Oghuz tribes of western Central Asia also played a part in these tumultuous events. The Karluk conquest of the western T’ien Shan led to a conflict with the Oghuz of the Issyk-köl region. In the course of this struggle for power, many of the Oghuz apparently moved to the southwestern regions of western Central Asia. To judge by some of the archaeological evidence, the Oghuz crossed the middle reaches of the Syr Darya and the foothills of the Karatau in this migration.⁵ From there they gradually began to penetrate to the Aral steppes and the northern shores of the Caspian. In the first half of the ninth century there are references to the presence of the Oghuz on the boundaries of Khurasan, where they carried out armed raids. Local governors of the Tahirid family were obliged to construct fortified

² Kononov, 1958, pp. 39, 41; Mīrkhwānd, 1841; Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 410–12; Neṣrī, 1949, pp. 9, 10.
⁵ Levina, 1972.
outposts (ribâts) in the region. Abd Allâh b. Tâhir (828–44) had similar fortifications built in Dihistan and Farawa in the area of present-day Turkmenistan. By that time, Oghuz leaders had already achieved political hegemony in the Aral Sea region, and at the end of the ninth century, the borders of their domains stretched, according to Byzantine sources, as far as the River Ural.

According to the Byzantine emperor Constantine Porphyrogenitus, the Oghuz formed an alliance with the Khazars in c. 893–8 and defeated the Pechenegs, who lived between the Volga and the Ural rivers. Most of the Pechenegs were driven from the areas in which they had long been established; only a few of them wished to remain there and settled with the people known as the Ghuzz (Oghuz). The fierce encounter between the Oghuz and the Pechenegs described by Constantine was the culmination of a struggle which had started at an earlier date. The leaders of the Oghuz, who were present on the borders of Transoxania during the second half of the eighth century, initially combined with certain of the Karluk and Kimek and attacked the Pecheneg-Kangars. The Pechenegs apparently headed a tribal alliance which also included the Pechina, the Nukarda and the Bajgird. Unfortunately, the sources provide practically no information about these peoples, most of whom were probably Turkic, while others may have been Finno-Ugrian. One of the above-mentioned tribes, the Bajgird, may be identified with elements of the modern Bashkirs. The legends of the Bashkir tribes, the Buryazn, the Tangaur and the Usergan, recount that they originally lived in the valley of the Syr Darya and in the Aral Sea region. Some ethnographers believe that they left those regions in the eighth and ninth centuries and settled in the foothills of the southern Urals and the Ural region.

The tenth-century Arab geographer and traveller, al-Masâudi, tells us that the Pechenegs, the Pechina, the Nukarda and the Bajgird occupied the steppe around the Aral Sea. The Oghuz, together with some of the Karluk and the Kimek, engaged in a bloody struggle against the Pecheneg confederation. The Pechenegs, Pechina, Nukarda and Bajgird, unable to withstand the pressure of their enemies, left the Aral Sea region and moved down into Asia Minor. Around 932–3 these four Turkic tribes entered the confines of the Byzantine empire. Judging by all the evidence, the events described by al-Masâudi must have taken place between the middle and the end of the ninth century.

The wars between the Oghuz and the Pecheneg-Kangars with their allies were long and hard-fought. Turkmen folk-tales tell of the savage battles between the Oghuz and the It-Bejene people, whom scholars believe to be the Pechenegs. The leaders of the Oghuz

6 Al-Baladhuri, 1932, p. 320.
7 Kuseev and Shitova, 1963, p. 15.
9 Agajanov, 1969, p. 129.
tribe of the Salïr or Salur played an active part in this struggle. Before the clash with the Pechenegs, they occupied the foothills of Kazykurt and the upper reaches of the Badam river along the middle reaches of the Syr Darya. In the struggle of the Salïr with the It-Bejene people, success went now to one side and now to the other, with attacks being launched by both. It eventually ended with the victory of the Oghuz, who occupied the lower reaches of the Syr Darya and the Aral Sea region. Those of the Pechenegs who remained after their defeat at the end of the ninth century were assimilated by the Salïr and other Oghuz tribes.

In their fierce struggle against the Pechenegs, the Oghuz leaders depended for assistance on some of the neighbouring Turkic tribes. Most of these tribes were Karluk from western Semirechye and Kimek from central Kazakhstan. The Kimek tribes allied with the Oghuz acquired some pastureland in the steppes of the Aral Sea region and the northern Caspian. Apparently, these groups were in the course of time gradually assimilated into the Oghuz people.

The next act in the bitter warfare between the Oghuz and the Pecheneg confederation was played out at the end of the ninth century and the beginning of the tenth. As indicated above, the Oghuz leaders inflicted a decisive defeat on the Pechenegs and seized their lands on the lower reaches of the Volga and the Ural rivers. In this dogged fighting, they enlisted the support of the Khazar Kaghanate, which had hostile relations with the Pechenegs. These historical events, which were accompanied by the mass migration of nomadic tribes, ended with the arrival of the Oghuz on the borders of Europe and Asia.

The tenacious struggle against the Pecheneg confederation, waged over a period of many years by the Oghuz, enabled them to consolidate their position around the most powerful tribal leaders. For a long time, political power was held by the leaders of the Salïr, one of the largest Oghuz tribes. The formation of the Oghuz principality in the steppes probably began as early as the eighth century, after the destruction of the Kaghanate of the Western Türks. However, the process can scarcely have been completed by the year 766. The first reliable references to the Oghuz state are provided by Arab sources at the end of the ninth century and the beginning of the tenth; according to al-Ya’qūbī, the Oghuz had their own separate dominion (mamlaka) side-by-side with other Turkic tribes.10 Similar accounts may be found in the writings of Ibn al-Faqīh, who lists the Oghuz among the ‘kingly’ peoples.11 Al-Ya’qūbī wrote his historical and geographic work in the year 891 and Ibn al-Faqīh completed his work in 903. It is therefore possible that the rise of the

---

10 Al-Yaqubī, 1892, p. 295.
11 Ibn al-Faqīh, p. 168.
Oghuz principality, with its capital in Yengi-kent on the lower reaches of the Syr Darya, also dates from roughly this period.

The formation of the Oghuz principality occurred at the same time as the development of an essentially new ethnic grouping. The core of the Oghuz confederation was originally constituted by the so-called Ok Tughra Oghuz. According to historical traditions, there were initially 10,000 families in all. Subsequently, however, their numbers were swelled by other newly arrived and local ethnic components. In addition to the Pecheneg-Kangars and other steppe tribes, they also incorporated Alans and Asï who had settled on the steppes from the Aral Sea to the eastern shores of the Caspian. These last were of Indo-European origin; they had adopted Turkic ways as a result of mixing with the Pechenegs.

The Oghuz also incorporated Turkic elements from Semirechye. These were chiefly Khalaj, groups of Karluk and other western Turkic peoples. They included elements of the Yughra and the Charuk who had previously inhabited the valley of the Chu and the Talas. The Yaruklugh, who are referred to as one of the Oghuz tribes in the eleventh century, were probably descendants of the Charuk.

Individual components of the eastern Turkic peoples of the steppes also played a part in the formation of the Oghuz. Chief among these were the Imek-Kimek tribes, the Bayundur, the Imur and the Kay, most of whom inhabited the area between the rivers Ob and Irtysh. They were probably subdivisions of those tribes which had become the allies of the Oghuz leaders in their struggle against the Pecheneg-Kangar grouping. Finding themselves far to the west after the victory over the Pechenegs, they were eventually incorporated into the Oghuz.

The Oghuz were made up of a number of tribes composed of a large number of clans. Mahmūd al-Kāshgharī, the author of an eleventh-century Arabic-Turkish dictionary, asserts that they had originally consisted of twenty-four tribes. Later authors, however, including

---

12 The precise significance of this expression remains unclear, but three main lexical components can be identified. The first is the widely known term *ok* which literally means ‘arrow’ (or, in a broader sense, ‘branch’, ‘clan’, ‘tribe’). The second component, *tughra*, occurred in the language of the Oghuz in the eleventh century, meaning ‘the seal of the khan, the monogram or decree of the khan’. The third component is a common designation, probably with an ethnic content, for the entire grouping or tribal grouping. It is worth pointing out that the monogram of the Seljuk dynasty (of Oghuz origin), which was also known as *tughra*, depicted a bow and arrows. The symbolic content of the monogram was based on the notion of the bow as a symbol of kingly power and of the arrows as a sign of dependency and submission of the junior to the power of the senior. Hence it may be supposed that Ok Tughra Oghuz was the designation of a grouping of tribes and clans whose distinguishing symbol was the image of an arrow. In other words, it was an ethnopolitical union subject to leaders or rulers who enjoyed (or aspired to) the supreme prerogatives of kingly power.

13 Rashīd al-Dīn, pp. 410–12.

14 Al-Bīrūnī, 1966, pp. 95, 96.

Marwazī, speak only of twelve Oghuz tribes. The divergence between the sources may be explained by the division of the Oghuz into two exogamous groups, the Buzuk and the Uchuk, which were incorporated in the right and left wings respectively of their forces. Each group consisted of twenty-four tribes and was in turn divided into two equal parts. The Buzuk belonged to the right wing, the ‘elders’, whereas the Uchuk belonged to the ‘younger’ tribes of the left wing. The elders enjoyed great privileges, particularly in connection with the election of the Khan, or supreme ruler.

The tribal and clan divisions of the Oghuz were known as boy, kök and oba. The term boy usually denoted the tribe whereas oba and kök were applied to clan divisions. Oghuz clans and tribes formed part of larger tribal groupings referred to as il. In medieval Arabic-Turkish glossaries, this term normally has the meaning of ‘people’ or ‘political grouping’. According to al-Kāshgārī, in the eleventh century the Oghuz consisted of the following tribes: Kmik, Bayundur, Yiva, Salīr, Afshar, Bektili, Bukduz, Bayat, Yazgīr, Imur, Karabulak, Alka-bulak, Igdīr, Uregir, Tutırka, Ula-yondulug, Tüğer, Jebni, Bejene, Yavuldar and Yaruklug. Various of these tribal names are still to be found among the Turkmen people today.

From the ninth to the eleventh century, Oghuz tribes inhabited the vast area of western Central Asia and what is now Kazakhstan. Their encampments were scattered along the Irgiz, the Ural, the Emba, the Uil and on the right bank of Lake Aralsor. Isolated groups reached the southern shore of Lake Balkhash to the east, where they held the impregnable fortress of Gorguz. The Oghuz also inhabited the Aral Sea region, the valley of the Syr Darya, the foothills of the Karatau and the Chu valley, but they did not always constitute a majority of the population. Their numbers were greatest in the Aral Sea region, on the eastern and northern shores of the Caspian and the lower reaches of the Syr Darya. They bordered on settled agricultural regions in Khwarazm, Transoxama and Khurasan. In the tenth century, the steppe stretching westward from the Khazar lands and the deserts of the northern Caspian, the central, Zaunguzsk and south-eastern Karakum and the Kyzyl Kum, were known as the Oghuz desert. Their camps and fortresses stretched as far west as the southern Urals and the lower Volga. Moving along the Urals and as far as the left bank of the Volga, the Oghuz tribes bordered on the lands of the Bashkirs and the Burtas.

The political and economic centre of the Oghuz principality was Yengikent, the ‘new settlement’. The town lay not far from the developed, cultivated oases of Khwarazm and Transoxania, and also lay on the path of major caravan routes through the Kimek steppes.

16 Marwazī, 1942, p. 29.
to the valley of the Sarysu, Kengir and Ishim, and the towns on the middle reaches of the Syr Darya and the southern Urals.

Like most other nomadic groupings, that of the Oghuz was not monolithic. Al-Idrīsī testifies to the presence of several ‘princes’ or ‘kings’ among the Oghuz. At the time, they had an overall supreme ruler who bore the title of Yabghu. The power of the Yabghu was hereditary, although he was formally considered to be ‘elected’ to the kingship. According to the account given by the tenth-century Arab traveller Ibn Fadlān, the Oghuz chose their rulers and decided other matters at popular assemblies. Such assemblies were nevertheless rarely held and it was the council of the nobility (känkäsh) which played the chief role in everyday life. The Oghuz rulers were chosen from the leading paternal lines (urug) according to the unwritten rules of customary law (töre). This was based on the privileged access to power of the oldest member of the clan.

The Yabghus had their own heirs who bore the title of Inal. Tutors (atabegs) were appointed for the education of these heirs. The wives of the Oghuz rulers bore the honorary title of Khātūn and played an important role in court life. The Yabghu had co-rulers or substitutes with the title of Kölerkin who wielded great authority. They participated in the resolution of complex disputes, acting as supreme arbiters. The commander-in-chief of the troops played an important role in Oghuz society. This commander (sü-bashī) had a military council, and the Oghuz sō-bashī frequently meddled in tribal politics, at times openly opposing the Yabghu. Between the ninth and the eleventh century, the Oghuz principality had only the most primitive administrative machinery. There were officials, including tax-collectors who collected tribute from the nomadic and settled populations. The Khan’s collectors had their own mounted detachments which employed military force to collect taxes in the event of a refusal to pay. Most of the Oghuz were simple nomads, referred to as er, meaning ‘person’, ‘man’, ‘warrior’. An er was a full member of society and not a slave (kul) or bondsman (kïrnak). An important role in the social and political life of the Oghuz was played by the Khans and Iliks who governed the tribal units. They possessed their own guards, who consisted of young, privileged slaves (ghulām, oglan). The next rung on the social ladder was occupied by the Beg, whose power was transmitted on a hereditary basis. There were various categories of Begs among the Oghuz, the most important of whom were the Ulug Begs and the Begler Begs. The Ulug Begs controlled the clan and tribal associations, whereas the Begler Begs commanded the right and left wings of the army.

The political grouping of the Syr Darya Yabghus played a noteworthy part in the political and military history of Inner Eurasia. The Oghuz conducted frequent campaigns and raids against neighbouring regions, such as Khwarazm, Transoxania, Khurasan and Volga Bulgharia, but there were also peaceful trading relations. The nomadic Oghuz acquired herds of horses and other livestock in the neighbouring agricultural lands. They also sold and exchanged skins, wool, pelts and other goods in the local markets, buying in return chiefly grain, handicrafts and other products.

The appearance of the Oghuz in the historical arena of western Central Asia and eastern Europe changed the balance of forces in western Inner Eurasia. In 965 a military treaty was concluded by the Oghuz Yabghu and the Russian prince Svyatoslav against the Khazars; a consequence of this military-political alliance was the destruction of the Khazar state, which had been a rival of ancient Rus.21

It would appear that Khwarazm also played a part in these events, providing military assistance to the Khazar Kaghanate. Medieval Arab historians refer to the successes of the Khazars and their Khwarazmian allies. The Khwarazmian armies managed to drive out the ‘Turks’ who had invaded the Khazar lands. However, a conflict soon broke out between the allies, allegedly because of the Khazars’ refusal to accept Islam. Miskawayh speaks of an attack launched on the land of the Khazars by the army of the Rus. Judging by the fact that the same date is given in the Arab and ancient Russian manuscripts, the account must refer to the struggle of the Oghuz in alliance with a Russian force against the Khazar Kaghanate.22

The defeat of the Khazars in 965 was preceded by a lengthy struggle with the Oghuz. Clashes between the Oghuz and the Khazars began on the western approaches to the Mangïshlak peninsula. The Khazars barred the access of the Oghuz to the rich, open Don and Black Sea steppes. The international trading routes controlled by them, which ran from western Central Asia and the Volga region to eastern Europe, also held a great attraction for the Oghuz. All these factors determined the Yabghu’s policy of establishing an alliance with ancient Rus against the Khazar Kaghanate.

The defeat of the Khazar Kaghanate contributed to the growing military influence of the Oghuz, whose political importance in eastern Europe was greatly strengthened after the defeat of Volga Bulgharia. In 985 Prince Vladimir conducted a joint campaign with the Oghuz against the Bulghars; according to ancient Russian chronicles, the prince’s force

21 Tolstov, 1948; Dunlop, 1954.
22 Miskawayh, 1921, p. 209; Ibn al-Athîr, 1870, p. 418.
The Kimek sailed along the Kama in boats while their allies (*torki*) rode along the bank on their horses.\(^{23}\)

At the end of the tenth century and the beginning of the eleventh, the Oghuz political grouping started to decline. The main reason for this was the rebellion among the bulk of the nomadic population, which began during the reign of \(^{c}\)Alî Khan (who came to power around the middle or at the beginning of the second half of the tenth century) and was in reaction to oppression by officials and the attempted introduction of a system of regular taxation.

Discontent with the fiscal policy of the Yabghu was exploited by leaders of the tribes in the Seljuq group, who migrated in the middle of the tenth century from the middle to the lower reaches of the Syr Darya in the area of Jand and who led the rebellion against the Oghuz rulers of Yengi-kent. They suffered a major defeat, however, and moved away from the Aral Sea region to Transoxania and thence to Khwarazm and Khurasan. The defeat of the Seljuq leaders at the head of these popular ‘disturbances’ helped to bolster the power of Shâh Malik, the son and successor of \(^{c}\)Alî Khan. In 1041 the Oghuz Yabghu assembled a large army and seized neighbouring Khwarazm. Two years later, however, he fell into the hands of the Seljuq leaders who had occupied northern Khurasan and western Iran. The long struggle against the movement of rebellion and the clashes and war with the Seljuqs undermined the Oghuz from within: in the middle of the eleventh century, the Oghuz principality collapsed under the assault of the Kïpchak, who had invaded the Aral Sea and the northern Caspian regions.\(^{24}\)

The Kimek

These Kïpchak, who put an end to the Syr Darya Yabghus, were a western branch of the Kimek tribal confederation. The Kïpchak cannot be completely identified with the Kimek (Yemek), however, as their common origin was already in the distant past. During the eighth century or at the beginning of the ninth, the Kïpchak entered the Kimek tribal grouping.\(^{25}\) The Kimek federation was originally composed of seven tribes: the Imur, Imak, Tatar, Bayundur, Kïpchak, Nilkar and Ajlad. Originally from the steppes of eastern Central Asia, they migrated to the territory of present-day Kazakhstan. The migration of the bulk of these tribes (or their constituent clans) took place after the defeat of the Uighur Kaghanate in Mongolia, in the year 840, by the Kyrgyz of the Yenisei. Apparently some of

\(^{23}\) Povest’ vremennych let, 1950, p. 257.
them, in particular the Imur and the Bayundur, joined the Kimek tribal confederation while others were absorbed into the Oghuz.

The main area in which the Kimek initially resettled was the Irtysh river steppes. Up to the middle of the eighth century, they lived with the Turkic tribes of the southern Altai and the Tarbagatay to the south and the Kyrgyz of the Yenisei to the east. At some time during the second half of the eighth century or at the beginning of the ninth, the Kimek clans and several tribes moved to north-eastern Semirechye and the foothills of the Dzhungar range, while at the same time, the Kïpchak tribes of the Irtysh migrated southwards and westwards.26

From the ninth to the eleventh century, the Kimek were more densely concentrated in the basin of the middle Irtysh and in north-eastern Semirechye. Individual Kimek groups and a large proportion of the Kïpchak occupied the steppes of central Kazakhstan and the northern Lake Balkhash region, extending as far west as the Aral Sea region and the southern Urals. On the middle reaches of the Syr Darya, they roamed the area of Sawran and the town of Turkistan, while their eastern borders stretched to the Tarbagatay mountains and the Dzhungarian Alatau.

Up to the middle of the seventh century, the Kimek, along with other steppe peoples, had been part of the Kaghanate of the Western Türks. After its collapse in 656, they gradually developed into an independent tribal confederation. This process received considerable impetus during the ninth century from the fall of the Uighur Kaghanate. The head of the Kimek, who had previously held the modest title of shad tutuk, was subsequently called the Kaghan. According to Arab and Persian writers of the ninth to the twelfth century, the Kaghan enjoyed considerable power,27 appointing the leaders of tribes, referred to in the sources as mulâk (kings). According to al-Idrîsî, power in the clan of the Kimek rulers was transmitted on a hereditary basis. The supreme ruler, the Kaghan, had eleven ‘stewards’ whose duties were also transmitted from father to son,28 and he and his court nobles resided in a capital situated in the valley of the Irtysh. Al-Idrîsî records that the Kaghan possessed his own officials, a hâjib (palace chamberlain) and a vizier, the head of the administration, and that the Kimek nobility wore costly garments made of red and yellow silk.29

The Kimek principality, formed at the end of the ninth century and the beginning of the tenth, was divided into a number of domains like the later ulus. The rulers of these appanages, who were the descendants of hereditary tribal rulers, received their lands from

26 References to the resettlement of the Kimek and Kïpchak tribes may be found in the work of Ibn al-Faqîh, in the Hudûd al-`alam, and in the writings of Gardîzî and al-Idrîsî; the latter provides the corresponding maps.
27 Hudûd al-`alam, 1930, p. 68.
28 Ibid., p. 18.
29 Al-Idrîsî, pp. 68 et seq.
the Kghan in return for military service. Each domain supplied mounted and infantry detachments for campaigns or in the event of a sudden attack. Although the leaders of these groupings were subject to the Kghan, the most powerful of them were semi-independent ‘kings’. Like the supreme ruler, they also had fortress-residences which were usually located in elevated positions. There they maintained contingents of their forces and stored their treasures and food supplies.

Some Kimek groups moved for the winter to the steppes between the Ural and the Emba and spent the summer as nomads in the area of the Irtysh, especially when there were severe winters in what is now eastern and central Kazakhstan. Some of the Oghuz also moved to pastures in the Kimek country near Lake Mankur, probably in the foothills of the Alatau. Like the Kipchak and the Oghuz, the Kimek bred horses, sheep, goats, oxen, cows and camels. Sheep, in particular, played an important part in their economy. Al-Idrīsī, describing the life of the nomads, writes that they ‘used fat instead of vegetable oil and tallow for lighting’. The horses of the steppe-dwellers were noted for their hardiness and their ability to adapt to the harsh conditions of the arid zone. Gardīzī refers to the huge herds of horses raised by the Kimek, and Al-Idrīsī notes that the nomads preferred horsemeat to beef or mutton and made koumiss (a drink of fermented mares’ milk).

The Kimek also possessed cattle, i.e. cows and oxen; these tended to be owned by semi-sedentary elements, although oxen were also used as draught animals. The steppe-dwellers usually harnessed them to carts on which they placed their yurts (wooden-framed tents covered with felt). Like the Oghuz and the Kipchak, the Kimek hunted furry animals such as the fox, marten and beaver, and further took the pelts of sable, ermine and predators like tigers and snow leopards. The fur and hides of wild animals and the meat and skins of domestic livestock were sold or exchanged at points adjacent to the settled lands in the south.

The Kimek engaged to some extent in agriculture, but those involved must have been semi-sedentary and settled groups. Al-Idrīsī, describing this section of the Turkic population, writes that although they were ‘nomadic, they till the soil, sow and harvest’. They settled on the land for various reasons, but chiefly on account of cattle plague in hard winters, outbreaks of epizootic disease or when the cattle were driven off by hostile tribes. The semi-sedentary groups of the Kimek and other steppe peoples mainly sowed millet, although al-Idrīsī reports that they also grew wheat, barley and even rice. According to Fakhr al-Dīn Mubārakshāh, the settled Turkic population also tended vegetable gardens

30 Al-Idrīsī, pp. 68 et seq.
31 Bartol’d, 1973, Vol. 8, pp. 28, 45; al-Idrīsī, pp. 69 et seq.
32 Al-Idrīsī, p. 69.
33 Ibid., pp. 66, 69.
and even vineyards, yet agriculture must have been underdeveloped and could scarcely have met their own needs.

In addition to raising cattle, hunting and agriculture, the Kimek, like the Oghuz and the Kipchak, practised certain crafts. The skins of domestic animals were used to make various types of footwear, vessels, quivers, bow covers and horses’ harness. The women made felt from wool, wove clothes and produced felt in large pieces and pile-less rugs. Furs were also used for clothes. The manufacture of weapons such as bows, quivers, arrows and spears occupied an important place among household crafts. According to al-Idrīsī again, the Kimek and the Oghuz were skilled in iron-working and knew how to make beautiful, refined ornaments from gold and silver; the Kimek ruler wore a golden crown and clothes sewn with golden thread.

In the ninth and tenth centuries, the Kimek state was one of the strongest nomadic powers in Central Asia, but it gradually began to decline when the system of semi-independent domains sapped the authority of the Kaghans, so that the Kimek tribal entity collapsed, unable to withstand the pressure of neighbouring nomadic peoples.

The Kipchak

The history of this period is rich in major events that have not been sufficiently investigated. Minorsky, Bartol’d and others have linked these events with the external policy of the Liao empire in northern China, that of the probably Mongol Kitan. Drawing on the accounts of Marwazi and other medieval writers, they take the view that Kitan expansion was responsible for provoking a chain reaction of migration among the peoples of Inner Asia. This wave of migration began in eastern Central Asia and in the Far East with the movement of the Kun tribe, which had been attacked by the Kay people. The displaced Kun invaded the lands of the Sari tribe, which some scholars believe to have been a group of the Kipchak. Apparently, this wave of migrations affected the Kimek tribes of the Irtysh and north-eastern Semirechye and further drew in the Kipchak, who had pressed against the neighbouring Oghuz in the Aral Sea region, the northern Caspian and on the lower Volga, so that the Kipchak invaded the basin of the lower Syr Darya and seized the region between the Volga and the Ural rivers.

Medieval sources contain scant information on the early history of the Kipchak tribes. The ethnonym is first encountered in the seventh century, when the people were living on the upper reaches of the Irtysh and the adjacent steppes of what is now eastern Kazakhstan.

34 Fakhr al-Dīn Mubārakshāh, 1927, p. 41.
35 Al-Idrīsī, pp. 68 et seq.
and the southern Altai. In the tenth century, part of the Kïpchak population was to be found in areas of central Kazakhstan and to the north of the Aral Sea on the north-eastern edges of the Kara Kum, reaching western Siberia in the east.\(^36\)

Initially, the Kïpchak were subject to the Kimek Kaghans, but gradually formed an independent ethno-political grouping. By the middle of the eleventh century, hegemony in the steppes of western Central Asia, Kazakhstan and the lower Volga region had passed to the Kïpchak after they defeated the Oghuz and seized their lands. Their advance was also directed towards the borders of Khwarazm and the lower Oxus region. According to the Ghaznavid historian Bayhaq¯ì, the Kïpchak, Yigrak and Kujat settled in the steppes bordering on Khwarazm.\(^37\) Judging by several historical reports, the Yigrak (Igrak) were a part of the Oghuz who had gradually become integrated with the Kïpchak. The origin of the Kujat is unclear, although they may have been one of the eastern Turkic tribes incorporated in the Kïpchak. In the middle of the eleventh century, during the Khwarazmian struggle for political independence from the Ghaznavids, the Kïpchak, Yigrak and Kujat were drawn into the service of the Khwarazm Shahs as auxiliaries, with the Kïpchak leaders acquiring particular prominence in the Khwarazmian army.\(^38\)

Towards the end of the eleventh century, the Kïpchak appear on the map of al-K ¯ashgar¯ì as inhabitants of the Aral Sea and the northern Caspian regions, occupying this region alternately with the Oghuz tribes whom they had subjugated. The south-eastern borders of their territory extended as far as the neighbourhood of Taraz (present-day Jambul), where the fortress of Kenjak Sengir was built. To the east, the camps and pastures of different groups of Kïpchak extended as far as the Irtysh and the western slopes of the Altai.\(^39\)

The collapse of the Oghuz and Kimek states in the middle of the eleventh century contributed to the consolidation of the tribes within the Kïpchak federation, whereas previously, small, uncoordinated groups of Kïpchak occupied a vast expanse from the Irtysh to the Volga. They then moved far to the west, taking control of the south Russian and Black Sea steppes, so that in eastern sources this entire region became known as the Dasht-i Kïpchak, and in ancient Russian sources as Polovetskoye Pole.\(^40\) This westward and southward migration of the Kïpchak from the east was accompanied by the formation of a new ethno-political grouping. In addition to groups of Oghuz, other Turkic elements entered the Kïpchak federation, whose integration with the Kïpchak was assisted by the similarity and cognate status of their languages and by the similarity of their economy and social

---

\(^{36}\) Istoriya Kazakhskoy SSR. S drevneyshykh vremen do nasbykh dney, 1979, Vol. 2, pp. 50 et seq.


\(^{38}\) Ibid., pp. 59–70.


structure. Thus the Kipchak absorbed large groups of Yemek (Kimek) who had migrated from the region of the Irtysh and Semirechye as far as the borders of Europe. According to a twelfth-century Persian encyclopaedist, the town of Saksin in the region between the Volga and the Ural rivers was subject to attacks by the Kipchak and the Yemek, and reports mention that some of the latter had penetrated as far as the Kama river at this period. These groups were probably gradually assimilated by the Turkic population of Volga Bulgharia.

The Kipchak federation also included the Bayundur, who were of Oghuz or Kimek origin; and the Bay’a’ut, the Kanglı and the tribe of the Urani, some of whom served in the guard of the Khwarazm Shahs, were also to be found in it. The Bay’a’ut were probably of Kimek origin, but the Kanglı tribe was a component of the Pecheneg-Kangars. Other steppe tribes and peoples also lived in the Dasht-i Kipchak, including some of the ancient Bashkirs and the so-called Uighurs, living to the north and east of the Aral Sea. Islamic historians of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries name a whole series of Kipchak tribes.

From the eleventh to the beginning of the thirteenth century, processes of ethnic assimilation and consolidation of considerable complexity took place throughout the Dasht-i Kipchak. The western Kipchak tribes absorbed people of Oghuz, Pecheneg, ancient Bashkir, Bulghar and other origins; the eastern Kipchak merged with the Oghuz-Kimek, Karluk, Kara Khitay and others, but after a comparatively lengthy period of ethnic development, they all acquired the common ethnonym of ‘Kipchak’.

There was no uniform administrative and political system in the Dasht-i Kipchak. The largest Kipchak groupings were in the region of the Dniepr, the Dniestr, the Ural and the lower Volga; such confederations or hordes were most frequently referred to by the Old Turkic term il, whereas the ethno-territorial groupings were known as ulus. In this same period, there were also a number of groupings of varying sizes in the eastern Dasht-i Kipchak, most of which were led by a Khan, and also in the Aral Sea and the northern Caspian regions along the lower and middle reaches of the Syr Darya and in what is now eastern Kazakhstan. The pasturelands of each of these groupings were strictly delimited; migratory movements were conducted in accordance with established custom and with the permission of the principal leaders and elders of the tribe. The Kipchak tribes were led by their Begs, and the tribal groupings by the hereditary families of Khans, who had their own military forces, servants and slaves.

41 Agajanov, 1969, p. 162.
43 Al-Nasawi, 1895, p. 44; Juwaimi, 1958, p. 465.
The appearance of the Kipchak on the historical stage altered the balance of political forces in the Kazakh steppes, western Central Asia and eastern Europe. Their southward movement further affected the agricultural regions of Khwarazm, Gurgan and Khurasan. At the beginning of the fifth decade of the eleventh century, Khwarazm was taken over by the Seljuq leaders, who defended here the last Oghuz Yabghu, Shāh Malik of Jand. This victory of 1041 helped to shatter the power of the Oghuz, and the neighbouring Kipchak did not fail to take advantage of this; they seized the Aral Sea region, and by way of Mangishlak and the Ustyurt plateau surged into eastern Europe. The Kipchak now occupied a vast expanse of steppelands in what is now western and southern Kazakhstan, apparently by the mid-eleventh century, when we find references in the contemporary sources to important Kipchak rulers living on the lower reaches of the Syr Darya and in the Aral Sea regions with their centre at Jand. According to the historian Ibn al-Athîr, Seljuq forces from Khurasan conducted a campaign against them in 1065, when Sultan Alp Arslan brought a large army to the region of the Kara Kum which had been seized by the Kipchak and the Turkmens who had joined them. Fearful of attack, the supreme Khan of the Kipchak concluded a peace treaty and submitted to the Seljuq ruler.

The French Altaicist and Sinologist Paul Pelliot advanced the hypothesis that a large proportion of the eastern Kipchak were ruled by the Ilbari dynasty in the twelfth century and at the beginning of the thirteenth.\footnote{Pelliot, 1920.} One member of this ruling family was Ulugh Khan who, in his youth, had been a slave in northern India but subsequently became sultan of Delhi in the thirteenth century. The historian Jūzjānī writes that, before being taken prisoner, he considered himself as ‘the Khan of the Ilbari and the Shah of the Yemek’.\footnote{Jūzjānī, 1881–97, p. 1294.} According to the same account, the father of Ulugh Khan was ‘in Turkistan, chief among the tribe of the Ilbari and bore the title of Khan’; his grandfather had been a member of the clan of Abar Khan of the Ilbari, who had ruled ‘over 10,000 families’.\footnote{Ibid., p. 800.}

In the twelfth century and at the beginning of the thirteenth, the Kipchak Khans successfully competed with the Khwarazm Shahs, who had built up a powerful empire in western Asia (see below, Chapter 7). There were struggles between them for control of the towns along the lower and middle Syr Darya through which passed the trade routes from eastern Europe to Central Asia. The first shah of the line of Anûshtegin, Sultan Qutb al-Dîn Muhammad (ruled as a Seljuq vassal 1097–1127), was more concerned with the protection of the northern frontiers of his domains than with decisive operations against the warring nomads of the Dasht-i Kipchak, apparently because of threats from the expanding and

\footnote{Pelliot, 1920.}
\footnote{Jūzjānī, 1881–97, p. 1294.}
\footnote{Ibid., p. 800.}
vigorous Kïchak. Atsïz b. Muhammad, who replaced Qutb al-Dîn Muhammad as shah in 1127, conducted a military campaign against Mangïshlak, when the Khwarazmian forces defeated the Kïchak and their Oghuz allies and occupied the fortress of Jand. In 1133, moreover, Atsïz inflicted a decisive defeat on the Kïchak Khan, who ‘enjoyed the greatest respect among the infidels’. This led to serious disturbances among the nomadic tribes in the area. This Kïchak confederation was apparently headed by a dynasty from the Urani tribe. Sources from the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth mention a whole series of Kïchak nobles from the Urani tribe who played an important role in political events on the borders of Khwarazm. Among these are the names of Alp Kara Urani and Kadïr Buku Khan – the latter’s daughter was married to the Khwarazm Shah Tekish. This led to serious disturbances among the nomadic tribes in the area. This Kïchak confederation was apparently headed by a dynasty from the Urani tribe. Sources from the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth mention a whole series of Kïchak nobles from the Urani tribe who played an important role in political events on the borders of Khwarazm. Among these are the names of Alp Kara Urani and Kadïr Buku Khan – the latter’s daughter was married to the Khwarazm Shah Tekish. This princess (Terken Khathün) had a brother called Gayir Khan Inalchik, one of the pretenders to the title of supreme ruler of the western part of the Dasht-i Kîchak. Inalchik, whose sobriquet was Alp Derek, contended for power with Kadï'r Buku Khan (also known by the name of Kiran or Ikran), who considered himself to be the head of the Kïchak of what is now southern and western Kazakhstan. The Khwarazm Shahs took every opportunity to stir up internecine strife among the Kîchak leaders in order to weaken them: they exploited the fierce struggle of the Kïchak leaders for control of the town of Signak (the main centre of the Kïchak domains in the Syr Darya steppes) and the fierce disputes between Kadi’r Buku Khan and his nephew Alp Derek.

In 1195 Tekish launched a campaign in the direction of Signak against Kadi’r Buku Khan. However, an event occurred during the battle which was unforeseen by the Khwarazm Shah and which decided the fate of his military campaign. The rulers of Khwarazm had long been accustomed to recruiting Kïchak for military service, and many nomad leaders held high posts and titles in their state. As has been mentioned above, Kïchak from the Urani tribe formed a guard for the ruler of Khwarazm. During the campaign of 1195, however, the Kïchak troops in the Khwarazm Shah’s army were reluctant to fight against their kinsmen, and at a decisive moment in the ensuing battle, they betrayed Tekish and went over to the side of Kadï’r Buku Khan. The Khwarazm Shah was defeated, but eventually managed to subdue Signak, using the forces of Gayir Khan Inalchik, who had been appointed governor of the town of Utrait. However, the anarchic nomads continued to chafe against control from Khwarazm. In 1215 they rose in rebellion in the neighbourhood of Jand and Signak, but were severely defeated; the Kïchak who survived the defeat were obliged to withdraw northwards into the steppes of what is now central Kazakhstan.

The campaigns of the Khwarazm Shahs against the Kïchak tribes of the Syr Darya and the Aral Sea region weakened Kïchak power and led to their dispersal across Central

47 Bartol’d, 1898, p.37.
Eurasia, contributing to the political fragmentation of the Dasht-i Kîpchak. The Kîpchak were therefore unable to show effective resistance during the Chinggisid invasions and at the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Dasht-i Kîpchak was conquered and incorporated into the vast Mongol empire.
By the tenth century, the majority of the various Iranian peoples of Khurasan, Transoxania and Khwarazm – Persians, Bactrians, Sogdians, Khwarazmians and others – were using the New Persian (Farsi-Dari) language as their spoken and written form of communication, although such Middle Iranian languages as Khwarazmian and Sogdian were still in use in certain regions – in the case of the former, for some four centuries subsequently. The terms Tāzīk/g (Middle Persian) and Tāzī (New Persian), originally coined in western Persia to denote the conquering Arabs, now came in Khurasan and Transoxania to be applied to all the Muslims there (at this time, the majority were Persians), in distinction to the largely pagan Turks of the adjacent steppelands. Very soon it became used for the Persians as

* See Map 3.
against the incoming Turkish tribal or military ruling class. From the thirteenth century onwards, the later form Tāzīk developed and became standard in Central Asia.

Under the Samanids, i.e. in the later ninth and the tenth centuries, there was a period of expansion and florescence for the cities and towns of Khurasan and Transoxania – Nishapur, Merv, Balkh, Bukhara, Samarkand, Khujand, Bunjikat, Hulbuk, and so on – around which the cultural, social and economic life of the whole region was concentrated.

The creation of the Samanid state

Almost contemporaneously with the Tahirids (see above, Chapter 2), the representatives of another local dynasty, that of the Samanids, began to assert themselves in Transoxania. An ancestor of the Samanids, Sāmān-Khudā, was the founder and ruler of the estate of Saman, which is identified in a number of sources with various settlements of the same name in the provinces of Balkh, Samarkand and Tirmidh (Termez). Sāmān-Khudā enjoyed the patronage of the governor of Khurasan, Asad b. Ābād Allāh al-Qasrī (725–7, 735–8), and converted to Islam, while Sāmān-Khudā’s son Asad was later converted to Islam in Merv by the future caliph al-Maʿmūn (813–33). The sons of Asad – Nūh, Ahmad, Yahyā and Ilyās – took part in putting down the uprisings of Rāfī b. al-Layth (805–10), served the caliph al-Maʿmūn and, as a reward for their services to him, were appointed rulers of a number of rich provinces: Nūh of Samarkand, Ahmad of Ferghana, Yahyā of Chach and Usrushana, and Ilyās of Herat.

The Samanid brothers, while initially subject to the Tahirids, were largely autonomous rulers in their own territories, minted bronze coins in their own names, and mustered militias and mounted campaigns against surrounding provinces. The energetic Nūh b. Asad did much for the advancement of the Samanids and the consolidation of Transoxania, subjugating the province of Isfijab on the frontier with the Turkic nomads in 839–40. However, the basis of the future unitary Samanid state was laid by Ahmad b. Asad, the most capable of the brothers. Ahmad had seven sons: Nasr, Yaʿqūb, Yahyā, Asad, Ismāʿīl, Isḥāq and Hamīd. After the death of Nūh b. Asad in 841/842, the governorship of Samarkand passed into the hands of Ahmad’s son Nasr, and after the death of Yahyā b. Asad, the governance of Chach and Usrushana was transferred to Yaʿqūb, another of Ahmad’s sons. Thus, in the middle of the ninth century, the first partial unification of Transoxania took place, with its main provinces under the authority of the house of Ahmad.

The process of uniting the state was completed with the entry into the political arena of Nasr’s brother, the energetic, intelligent and far-sighted Ismāʿīl b. Ahmad, who became

---

1 For the chronology of the Samanids, see Bosworth, 1996, pp. 170–1.
the virtual founder of the Samanid state. The activity of Ismāʿīl (b. 849) began in Bukhara, where he was invited by his elder brother Nasr (865–92) to be governor after the fall of Tahirid power in 874. The more powerful role played by Ismāʿīl and his appanage of Bukhara, the military clash between the brothers in 888 and the victory of Ismāʿīl over Nasr greatly strengthened Ismāʿīl’s de facto power in Transoxania. In the subsequent years of his rule, Ismāʿīl (892–907) displayed great ability in setting up an orderly system of central and local state administration (diwāns), organizing the army and ensuring the internal and external security of the country, and creating opportunities for economic and commercial development and for the resurgence of local scientific and literary traditions. Ismāʿīl’s military victories over the Saffarids in 898 and 900 made possible the incorporation into the Samanid state of Khurasan, Sistan, Tukharistan and Kabulistan, while in the Syr Darya basin he managed to create a fortified border from Isfījāb to Taraz and eastern Ferghana. A little later, at the high point of Samanid power, the southern frontiers of the state extended as far as the Sulayman mountains, Ghazna, Kandahar and the Persian Gulf. But at the same time, the peripheral provinces retained a substantial degree of autonomy, paid no regular tribute and, indeed, many of the local ruling dynasties in those provinces were not replaced. Some degree of religious freedom also continued. Not all had yet fully converted to Islam in the upper Oxus river valley, where the populations of Badakhshan, Wakhan and Shughnan continued to profess their ancient religions.

Ismāʿīl was succeeded by Ahmad b. Ismāʿīl (907–14), portrayed in the sources as a devout Muslim. He reinstated Arabic as the language of administration in place of Persian and favoured officials who knew Arabic, thereby displeasing the court circles and palace guards. He was soon assassinated by plotters; the youthful Nasr II b. Ahmad (914–43) ascended the throne, and the task of ruling the state was entrusted to the enlightened viziers ʿAbd Allāh Jayhānī (914–18) and Abu ʿl-Fadl Balfamī (918–38), who restored order, put down rebellions and created the essential conditions for social and cultural development.

The reign of Nasr II, like that of Ismāʿīl, was a period of florescence for the Samanid state. The rule of subsequent amirs was distinguished by a gradual consolidation of centripetal forces in the state, more frequent rebellions and court disputes and an increase in the influence of the Turkish palace guards. In the reign of Nūh II (976–97), there were increasingly frequent attempts at invasion by the Karakhanids (see below, Chapter 6), and in the south-east the rise of the Ghaznavids began (see below, Chapter 5). In the reign of the later Samanids, the Karakhanids invaded Transoxania and the Samanid lands were divided up between the Karakhanids and the Ghaznavids. The energetic Ismāʿīl b. Nūh al-Muntasir
made unsuccessful attempts to re-establish the Samanid state in 999–1005 before he was killed.\(^2\)

The documentary sources are unanimous in confirming that the Samanids were able to create a strong, partly centralized state (but see below, Chapter 6), which, for almost a century, at the time of its florescence, shielded Transoxania and Khurasan from large-scale external attack or incursions from the steppes and created important preconditions for the development of agriculture, craftsmanship and trade, learning, literature and art. In this connection it is worth noting the words of a contemporary of the later Samanids, the geographer and traveller al-Maqdisī, who comments that ‘the character of the Samanids, their appearance and their respect for learning and for men of learning make them the best of rulers’. Among the members of the Samanid dynasty, and also their viziers, were some who valued learning, poetry and art, and a number of them wrote poetry and works of geography and history. For example, the fine poetry of the Samanid Ismā‘īl b. Nūh al-Muntasir is well known, as are the geographic writings of the Samanid vizier Abū ʿAbd Allāh Muhammad b. Ahmad, Nasr Jayhānī and the historical works of the vizier Abū ʿAlī Muhammad b. Muhammad Balʿamī (d. 974).

### The system of government

In this system, the head of state was the amir, and the provinces were governed by his appointed governors. Together with the royal court (dargāh), ten centralized military and civilian bureaux (diwāns) were created. The main diwān (the diwān of the vizier) controlled all administrative, political and economic institutions. Financial affairs were conducted by the diwān of the mustawfi, diplomatic relations and important state papers were the responsibility of the ʿamīd al-mulk (or the diwānal-rasāʿīl, i.e. of correspondence), the royal guard and military affairs generally came under the diwān of the sāhib al-shurta, and the state mail and the clandestine surveillance of local rulers and officials were dealt with by the diwān of the sāhib al-bartād which was answerable solely to the central authority. Markets, weights and measures and trade generally, and, later, public morals, were controlled by the diwān of the muhtasib. Control over revenue and expenditure and over other state matters was exercised by the diwān of the mushrif (inspector). There were also diwāns for juridical affairs, state lands and waqf (pious endowment) lands. The local organs of all the diwāns, apart from the postal administration, were responsible both to the central authority and to the local provincial rulers.

\(^2\) Barthold, 1968.
The very names of the diwāns indicate the functions of a clearly structured state apparatus, one of whose major functions was the collecting of taxes from the population of the agricultural oases, artisans and merchants. Available information indicates that the overall budget of the Samanid state amounted to some 45 million dirhams, of which about 20 million dirhams were spent on maintaining the army and state officials.

The nature of political authority under the Samanids

The Samanid state was a provincial successor-state to the ʿAbbasid caliphate centred on Iraq. As was almost universal in the Islamic world at this time, society was hierarchical, with the caliph-imams being, in theory at least, the delegators of all authority, so that the Samanid amirs were their lieutenants. In practice, the amirs enjoyed virtual independence, but were careful to pay lip-service to the caliphal ideal. This ideal was one of a hierarchical, socially static society under a ruler governing with the ultimate authority of God and the divinely ordained šarīʿa and exercising power in the Sunni Islamic tradition. Within this system, the indigenous Iranian landowning classes (dihgāns) retained much of their ancient local authority and social influence, especially in outlying provinces of the Samanid amirate such as Usrushana, Ilaq and the upper Oxus principalities. Thus fixed land assets were in the hands of the Samanid dynasty, major landowners, state officials and the Muslim religious leaders (the waqf lands). Minor landowners and peasants had the use of the so-called kharāj lands. The taxes they paid to the state treasury depended on the quality of the land and the crops grown. The waqf lands, and the lands of many landowners, were exempted from taxes, while some properties (the ʿushr lands) only had to pay a tithe. The principal form of land use was the share-cropping system, under which the land was divided into small plots and let out to tenants in exchange for a specified proportion of the harvest.

Vast masses of peasants were almost or entirely landless, with a largely subsistence economy, and their situation may have been a contributory cause for some of the outbreaks of unrest in the period. In 907 in Ghur and Gharchistan, some 10,000 peasants and artisans rose up under the leadership of one Abū Bilāl. In 961 the citizens of Bukhara revolted. Perceptible elements of some of these movements were various religious heresies; one of these, for example, was the Carmathian or Ismaʿili movement, which gained strength in the first half of the tenth century (see above, Chapter 2).

The struggle of centrifugal forces against the central government, together with discord and endless intrigue in the amir’s court and the diwāns, eventually led to the decline of the Samanid state and enfeebled it politically and militarily. The economic weakening of the state and its financial difficulties exacerbated this decline still further, so that at the end of
the tenth century the Samanid state was unable to withstand the external invasions of the Karakhanids.

Agriculture

The unification of Khurasan and Transoxania around a single centre, the preservation of the country’s de facto independence, the ending of incursions by nomads, and a number of other measures taken by the Samanids, created the essential preconditions for the development of the economic and cultural life of the country. Agriculture, mining, the craft industries and trade developed further. Under the Samanids, Transoxania and Khurasan were shielded from external invasion by the might of the state. This circumstance, together with the other measures taken, promoted the successful development of Transoxania. At the period we are considering, the main provinces of Transoxania, and above all the Zarafshan valley, were, in economic terms, the most advanced provinces of the east.

Transoxania and Khurasan were primarily agrarian lands. Agriculture was based in the main on the use of water from seasonally filled wadis, springs and artificially constructed surface and underground canals. In Transoxania there were numerous working irrigation systems that had been created earlier, particularly in the Zarafshan and Ferghana valleys and in a number of other regions. For example, in the Bukharan oasis, the Samjan and Shahrud canals were operating, as was the irrigation system of Varagsar in the central Zarafshan valley. There were also canals in the regions of the main town of Usrushana, Bunjikat, and in other provinces. During the ninth and tenth centuries a number of new canals and hydrotechnical installations were constructed. For example, in one of the gorges of the Bast Tagh mountain range, in the Nuratau peak, a large stone dam was built (today called Khan Bandi) and a water reservoir created. New canals were also dug from the Hari Rud and Helmand rivers.

Non-irrigated land (i.e. land where dry-farming was possible) was cultivated as well as irrigated land. In the irrigated lands of Sogdiana – in Ferghana, Chach, Usrushana, Khuttal, Chaghaniyan, Khurasan, Gharchistan and Sistan – the peasants cultivated wheat, barley, rice, millet, legumes, oil-seed and other crops, while cotton was an enormously important agricultural crop in a number of regions (the Zarafshan and Ferghana valleys, the Merv oasis, and so on). In the cultivated oases, horticulture was highly developed (apricots, peaches, apples, pears, quinces, cherries, plums, pomegranates, figs, walnuts, almonds), as were viticulture (with dozens of varieties of grape, the Herat grape being especially celebrated) and the cultivation of vegetables and melons. The melons of Bukhara and Merv

were particularly well known and were regarded as the best in the world at that time. Date palms were grown in Sistan and sugar cane in the province of Balkh. This catalogue of agricultural crops indicates how specific was the method of cultivation used, being primarily based on artificial irrigation. Geographers of the ninth and tenth centuries give many enthusiastic accounts of the fertility of the oases and their ‘unbroken carpets of greenery’. The most fertile lands were considered to be the province of Balkh and the region between Herat and Merv al-Rudh. In Transoxania and Khurasan and their mountain and steppe regions, animal husbandry was practised, particularly the rearing of sheep and horses.

Mining

In various regions of Central Asia many different kinds of minerals were mined and processed. Evidence for this comes both from written sources and from archaeological data. In Badakhshan, Darvaz, Rushan and Shughnan, rubies, lapis lazuli and silver were mined; in Tukharistan, lead, sulphur and other metals and minerals; in the upper Zarafshan valley, iron, gold, silver and vitriol; in Uruzgan, large quantities of iron; and in Asbara (Isfara), coal was reportedly to be found. Many minerals were mined in Ferghana: iron, tin, silver, mercury, copper, lead, tar, asbestos, turquoise, sal ammoniac and, apparently, petroleum oil. Ilaq (the Ahangaran valley) was known as a major centre for the processing of silver and lead ore. In Ilaq, and in the Kashka Darya basin, salt was mined. Minerals were processed in Khurasan: turquoise (in the district of Rivand, near Nishapur), marble (in the district of Bayhaq), fine stone for craft working (in the Tus region), gold and iron (in Gharchistan), iron (in the Nishapur district), copper (in the Merv district), vitriol, sulphur, lead, arsenic (in the Balkh district), jet, clay for pottery, and so on. The mountains of Jurjan produced gold, silver, iron, copper and various kinds of vitriol; silver came from Parwan and Panjshir, and marble from Bayhaq.

Archaeological and geological research gives some idea of the development, scale and technology of mining and of how deposits were prospected and explored. By the standards of the time, ore-workings were extremely successful. Numerous mine-workings of the Middle Ages have been excavated and studied. They include such enormous mines as the group of Koni Mansura, Kukhi Sim, Konjol, Kansai, Tarazkan and others in the Karamaz mountains, Koni Gut in Ferghana, and so on. The mining industry employed both free men and serfs and slaves. Thus in Koni Gut, the iron fetters of slave miners have been found. Mining occupied an important place in the economy of Transoxania and Khurasan in the ninth and tenth centuries. It is possible, by analogy with the state of development of the mining industry, to judge the general level of development of the economy of the age.
Crafts

The growth in agricultural output and mining was the basis for an advance in the craft industries, which were economically very important for the population of Transoxania and Khurasan. One of the main developments took place in textiles. Several centres of this craft are known: the settlements of Zandana (near Bukhara), Wadhar (near Samarkand) and Darzangi (in the Surkhan Darya valley). These centres produced fine cotton fabrics and their wares were widely known far beyond the boundaries of Transoxania. Both fine and coarse cotton fabrics were produced in large quantities in Samarkand, Dabusiyya, Bukhara, Iskijkat, Nasaf (Karshi), Kish (Shahr-i Sabz), Benakat and other locations. Woollen cloth and garments were manufactured in many places, including towns near the nomadic steppes: in Dizak, Urgench, Arbinjan and Chach. These places, particularly Chach, were centres of leather-working, manufacturing leather goods and other items for which there was a market among the nomads.

The paper produced in Samarkand, which was famous in Transoxania and throughout all the countries of the Middle and Near East, gradually displaced papyrus and parchment in the central Arab lands. Glass was also produced in Samarkand and was highly prized in China. In the towns and population centres of Ferghana and Uruzshana, and also in Khujand, armour, weapons, agricultural implements and metal dishes were produced.

The processing of agricultural products was widely developed. For example, in the Hari Rud valley, Balkh, Sistan and other provinces there were many watermills in operation. One river alone, the Balkh river, provided the motive power for seventy water mills. Wind energy was effectively used: it powered windmills and also, as reported in the *Tārīkh-i Sīstān* [History of Sistan], raised water from the wells for irrigation.

The production of ceramics flourished; potters made exquisite and high-quality glazed wares decorated with a variety of ornamentation, and it became fashionable to inscribe the rims of ceremonial ware with passages from the Qur’an, quotations from the works of celebrated poets or simply messages of goodwill. Potters also made cheap ceramics on a large scale intended for the poor, while metal and glassware were also produced.

Domestic and external trade

The development of agriculture, mining and the craft industries, together with urban expansion, led, in turn, to an increase in the exchange of goods between town and country on the one hand, and, on the other, between rural and agrarian regions and the nomadic steppe. Bread, dried fruits, cloth, weapons and utensils were exported from agrarian regions and
towns into the surrounding nomadic steppe. In exchange, the nomads brought livestock, wool, dried skins and slaves to the markets of Transoxania and Khurasan.

A very clear picture of the specialization of certain towns and localities in the production of goods, for both domestic and foreign markets, is given by al-Maqqdisi. Bukhara exported fine fabrics, cloth for use as floor coverings, various fabrics, carpets, prayer mats, brass lamps, saddle-girths, grease, sheepleather, oil for anointing the head, meat and melons. From Karminiya came napkins; from Dabusiyya and Wadhar, Wadhari cloth; from Arbinjan, red woollen winter cloaks, prayer mats, skins, strong hemp, sulphur and pewter vessels; from Samarkand, brocade, which was exported to the Turkish peoples, silver cloth (sîmgîn), red cloth (mamarajil), linen cloth (sinizi), much silk and silk cloth, tents, paper, glass, large brass cauldrons, elegant goblets, stirrups, bits, straps, hazelnuts and walnuts; from Dizak, high-grade wool and woollen clothing; from Ferghana, Turkish slaves (for resale), white cloth, armaments, swords, copper, iron; from Chach, cotton, which went to the Turkish peoples, cloaks, tents, shoulder ornaments, high saddles made of horse leather, processed skins, fine bows, quivers, needles, scissors and grain; from Termez, soap and fragrant resin; from Balkh, skins, soap, sesame, rice, walnuts, almonds, raisins, honey, vitriol, sulphur, lead, women’s shawls and striped garments; from Merv, brocade, embroidered fabrics, cloaks, silk and cotton shawls, sesame oil, cheese, copper, etc.; from Nishapur, yarn, cloth, cotton and woollen garments, turbans, shawls, cloaks, needles, knives, iron, etc.; from Nasa and Abiward, cotton and silk garments, silk, sesame oil, fox and sable furs; and from Herat, large quantities of raisins, pistachios, honey and other delicacies.

In the ninth and tenth centuries, the caravan trade with China, India, Iran, the Caucasus and the countries of Western Asia and eastern Europe acquired importance. The major caravan routes of Asia passed through Khurasan and Transoxania. Local merchants embarked on enterprising commercial expeditions and probably reached China, India and Inner Asia. Al-Maqqdisi reports that he saw people travelling with caravans from Sogdiana and Khurasan to Tibet and China. The busiest route was from the countries of the Levant to China, the so-called ‘Great Silk Route’. It passed through Baghdad, Hamadan, Nishapur, Merv, Amul (Charju), Bukhara, Samarkand, Ucrushana, Chach, Taraz (Jambul), Balasagun, the southern shore of Lake Issyk-kul and thence into Mongolia and northern China.

The route to eastern Europe, described by Ibn Fadlan, was likewise of importance. It passed through Merv, Bukhara, Khwarazm, Zanjan, the River Emba, Yik (the Urals) and Cheremshan to the city of Bulghar on the middle Volga. The caravans took the same route into the Khazar kingdom as far as the city of Itil on the lower Volga. There was also trade with the ancient Russian princedoms through the trans-shipment points of the cities of

91
Itil and Bulghar, to which rice, dried fruits, cotton, woollen and silken fabrics and silver dirhams were exported. From Rus, Bulghar and Khazaria came furs, wax, honey, skins, cattle and Slav and Turkish slaves. The large number of Samanid coins found in various regions as far away as northern Russia and the Baltic is evidence of the busy trading links with the ancient Rus and their western neighbours.

Caravanserais were set up along the roads, with storerooms and accommodation quarters, wells and other facilities. Caravans were both small and large; the largest caravan of the caliph al-Muqtadir (908–32) comprised 3,000 pack animals and 5,000 men. Caravans had personnel to service them (drivers and armed guards). Artisans, scholars and diplomatic envoys often travelled with them.

In the period that we are considering, the range of goods changed. Whereas luxury items such as jewellery made of gold, silver and precious stones, costly weapons, bronze and silverware, glass, high-quality fabrics, and so on, had earlier been the main goods carried in the caravan trade, now there were increasing quantities of utilitarian items, foodstuffs, raw materials for the craft industry and craftwares.

Material culture

Under the Samanids, there was a widespread development of urbanization and of architecture and the decorative arts. The standard attained in these areas by architects and master artisan-decorators is shown above all by the Samanid mausoleum in Bukhara, which was probably built in the early tenth century. The mausoleum is constructed of baked brick and is in the form of a cube topped by a dome. The external corners have three-quarter columns and in the middle of each of their four façades is an entrance bay with a pointed arch. Inside the mausoleum, the simplicity and massiveness of the forms are combined with the decorative treatment of brick-tiled wall surfaces. The decoration is austere and simple. The architectural style of the mausoleum, while expressing the traditions of the past, at the same time shows clear signs of something new that is characteristic of provincial, dynastic architecture.

Another outstanding building of the subsequent phase of monumental architecture is the ʿArab Atā mausoleum in the village of Tim near Kattakurgan. This single-chamber structure, square in plan, has a splendid decorative portal. Similar to it is the small mausoleum of the last Samanid, Ismāʿīl b. Nūh al-Muntasir, near the town of Kerki. It is square in plan and was built c. 1005 of baked brick, topped by a dome based on a hexagon of niches and squinches. The centralized-plan structure of the mausoleum, emphasized by the small octagonal corner columns, relates it to the mausoleum of the Samanids, but its
pı̂shtaq (fore-porch) and incised bricks give it an affinity with the later monuments of the
eleventh century. The ārāb Atâ and al-Muntasir mausoleums show the evolution of this
form from the centralized-plan structure to a portal structure. These Samanid mausoleums
also exemplify an important process in the history of architecture: the development of the
use of baked brick in monumental architecture.

Documentary sources refer to the construction in towns of central mosques, mausoleums,
minarets and covered bazaars. The main building material was raw brick (adobe). It is to
this period that such adobe buildings as the Kïrk kïz caravanserai in Termez, two Kïz-
kala buildings in ancient Merv, and others belong. The structures in Bukhara were, for the
most part, timber-framed adobe buildings. Remarkable examples of architectural detail and
decoration have survived in the regions of the upper Zarafshan, such as the celebrated mon-
uments of carved wood, including the mihrab from the settlement of Iskodar, and columns
from the settlements of Obburdon, Kurut, Rarz, Fatmev and others, all richly ornamented
with vegetation and including stylized animal motifs. Among the monuments of applied
art of the time is the exquisite carved stucco of the palace of the princes of Khuttal in
Hulbuk (the small town of Khishtep in the settlement of Kurbansaid in the southern region
of modern Tajikistan), with painted relief ornamentation ranging from simple geometric
rosettes to highly complex designs and wickerwork patterns forming large stucco panels.
One fine monument using this decorative technique is the tenth-century alabaster panel
from Afrasiyab (Samarkand), which shows traces of a rich and ancient tradition. It is com-
posed of trefoils, sinuous leafed stems, circles filled with small squares, six-pointed stars,
and so on.

The degree of sophistication attained in the applied arts is demonstrated by the Afrasiyab
glazed ceramics of the ninth and tenth centuries which were the peak of Central Asian artis-
tic achievement in ceramic technique and decoration. A white or red engobe covering was
initially applied to this type of ware as a ground; it was then painted white, red, black or
other colours and a transparent glaze was applied on top, giving the ware a luminous sheen.
The surfaces of dishes, bowls and other vessels were ornamented with various geometric
designs and plant motifs, as well as inscriptions conveying greetings. Animals and birds
were sometimes also depicted.

**Intellectual life**

In the ninth and tenth centuries, intellectual life in Transoxania and Khurasan attained a
high level. It was inevitable that the local Samanid dynasty, seeking support among its liter-
ate classes, should cultivate and promote local cultural traditions, literacy and literature.
Poetry in Persian made rapid strides and is best exemplified in the work of Abū ʿAbd Allāh Rūdakī, the father of Tajik-Persian poetry, of Abu ʾl-Qāsim Firdawsī, the greatest poet of the age and author of the famous Shāh-nāma [Book of Kings], and of a pleiad of other magnificent poets. Poetry was only one manifestation of this culture; equally interesting was the development of scholarship and its various branches (mathematics, astronomy, geography, chemistry, medicine, history and philology), with such outstanding exponents as Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), Abū Rayhān al-Bīrūnī and others (see below; for a detailed discussion of these arts and sciences, see Volume IV, Part Two).

The main towns – Bukhara, Samarkand, Balkh, Merv, Nishapur, Khujand, Bunjikat, Hulbuk, Termez and others – became the major cultural centres of the time. Scholars, poets, artists and other men of culture from many Muslim countries gathered in the Samanid capital of Bukhara, where a fertile soil was created for the burgeoning of creative thought, so that it became one of the outstanding cultural centres of the East. In Bukhara, a rich library was assembled known by the name of Siwān al-hikma (Storehouse of Wisdom), containing books on various branches of learning, including the most esoteric; and the rarest and best works of scholarship were to be found in the Bukhara book bazaar.

Although a generally hostile and contemptuous attitude towards the Arabs was one of the main features of the so-called Shūʿubiyya literary movement in the early ʾAbbasid days (eighth and ninth centuries), by the tenth century the movement no longer involved opposition by the Iranian peoples to the Arabs and to Arab culture per se. Anti-caliphal and even anti-Islamic motives were still discernible in the Shūʿubiyya of the tenth century, but the Tajik-Persian poets and people of culture extolled the history and culture of their own people without rejecting the cultural achievements of the Arabs.

**SCHOLARSHIP**

In the ninth and tenth centuries, scholarship made great strides and there was a host of scholars in the various branches of knowledge who gradually began to write in Persian. In the fields of history, literary studies and geography, there were Abū Bakr Narshakhī (d. 959), the author of the Tārīkh-i Bukhārā [History of Bukhara]; the Samanid vizier Abū ʿAlī Muhammad Balsami, the author of a Persian epitomized translation, with numerous interpolations, of the work of al-Ṭabarī; the great connoisseur and scholar of poetry and history Abu ʾl-Muʿayyad Balkhī, the author of books in Persian such as ʿAjāʾīb al-buldān [Marvels of the Lands], a Shāh-nāma and a Garshāsp-nāma [Epic of Garshāsp]; and the anonymous geographer who wrote the Hudūd al-ʾalām [The Limits of the World].

Islamic religious and legal scholarship was particularly flourishing at this time in the north-eastern provinces of the Iranian world and enjoyed the enthusiastic patronage of the
Samānī amirs; Ahmad b. Isma‘īl is said to have been assassinated in 914 by his Turkish slave soldiers because of his undue frequentation of the ‘ulamā’ (religious scholars) and religious lawyers. It was not without significance for the strength of Sunni Muslim learning in these provinces that five out of the six authors of the canonical collections of hadīth (Muslim tradition), the Sunan, should be from the north-eastern Iranian world or have connections with it.

In Transoxania and Khurasan, mathematics and astronomy of global significance developed out of a synthesis between the traditional local expertise in irrigation and other technology, and the mathematics of ancient Greece and India – this was the foundation of all subsequent mathematical advances in Asia and Europe. Particularly prominent among these scholars was the eminent mathematician, astronomer and geographer Muhammad b. Mūsā al-Khwārazmī (780–c. 850), whose name lives to this day in modern mathematical terminology in the word ‘logarithm’ (the medieval distortion al-garīzม from ‘al-Khwārazmī’). The name of the science of algebra (in Arabic, al-jabr) also comes from the first word of the title of al-Khwārazmī’s work on algebra. He discovered how to solve linear and quadratic equations. The mathematician Ahmad b. ʿAbd Allāh al-Marwāzī, known as al-Habash al-Khāsib (d. c. 870), already used tangents and cotangents and their tables in his calculations. The astronomer Abū Ma’shar Balkhī (d. 886) wrote some forty works. The astronomer and mathematician Abū ʿAbbas Ahmad al-Farghānī (ninth century), in his work Usūl ʿilm al-nujūm [Principles of Astronomy], expounded the knowledge of his time and described instruments and the sundial. The astronomer and mathematician Abū Mahmūd Khujandī (tenth century) invented the sextant, which is used as an astronomical instrument for accurately determining the positions of the planets and the fixed stars appearing in the vicinity of the planets. The mathematician Abū ʿl-Wafā al-Būzjānī (940–98) solved a number of geodesic and geometric problems, gave a systematic account of trigonometry and, together with al-Battānī, was the founder of trigonometry. In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the mathematician Abu ʿl-Hasan al-Nasawī and many others worked in the region.

Medicine also developed. A number of scholars were active in that field in the ninth and tenth centuries, the most outstanding of whom was Zakariyyā Rāzī. Another able physician was Akhawaynī Bukhārī. He was engaged in medical practice, particularly in the field of mental disorders, and was one of the first to use Persian to write his medical treatises in which he expounded on human anatomy and physiology, described illnesses and their cures, and gave the dosage of medicines and as many as ten original prescriptions. Another learned physician was Hakīm Maysarī, the author of many books including a medical work.
in Persian verse, the Dānīsh-nāma [Book of Knowledge]. The well-known pharmacopeia of Muwaffaq is also written in Persian.

ABŪ ʻALĪ IBN SĪNĀ AND ABŪ RAYHĀN AL-BĪRŪNĪ

In this period, the two greatest medieval polymaths of the East, Abū ʻAlī Ibn Sīnā and Abū Rayhān al-Bīrūnī from Khwarazm, began their work which has left an indelible mark on world scholarship. Abū ʻAlī Ibn Sīnā (known to the West as Avicenna) was born c. 980 in the village of Afshana near Bukhara. His childhood and early student years were spent in his native village, after which the family moved to Bukhara, where he studied all the sciences of that time and, while still a young man, began his scholarly and medical activity. After the fall of the Samanid dynasty, he was sought in vain by the Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmūd. Ibn Sīnā lived in Urgench and Isfahan before becoming a court physician and vizier to the Kakuyid ruler of Hamadan. He died and was buried in Hamadan on 18 June 1037.

Ibn Sīnā was the greatest scholar of the Islamic Middle Ages – a philosopher, natural scientist, physician, mathematician, poet and original thinker. He gave voice to the developing tendencies of his time and, in an age when religious orthodoxy was dominant, endeavoured to revive interest in the study of nature, to give an impetus to creative and analytical thought and to review critically what had been achieved by scholarship in earlier days, systematizing and developing it further. In his research, Ibn Sīnā placed great emphasis on experimentation, practical experience and the objective observation of facts. He wrote many works, the most important of which were al-Qānūn fi ʻl-tibb [The Medical Canon], a medical encyclopedia in five parts, and Kitāb al-Shifāʾ [The Book of Healing], a philosophical work in eighteen parts, which were written in Arabic. He became widely celebrated in the East and in Europe, and many of his works were translated into several European languages. His al-Qānūn fi ʻl-tibb was used for many centuries for teaching and treatment in both East and West. It was translated into Latin (as early as the twelfth century), classical Hebrew, Persian, Urdu and other languages; the Latin translation went through thirty editions. In the al-Qānūn fi ʻl-tibb, Ibn Sīnā expounds a general theory of medicine, anatomy, physiology, surgery, diagnosis, therapeutics, drugs and prophylactic medicines, and discourses on acute and chronic illness. In Persian, he wrote a short philosophical encyclopedia entitled the Dānīsh-nāma [The Book of Knowledge] in which he touches on questions of philosophy, logic, mathematics and astronomy. In the Kitāb al-Shifāʾ he gives an exposition of questions of logic, natural science, metaphysics, mathematics and other sciences of his time. These books by Ibn Sīnā may be regarded as among the best works of enlightened medieval thought of the tenth and eleventh centuries. He was
also a poet, writing in Persian and mainly using the *rubā‘i* (quatrain). In these verses, he openly expresses something like free-thinking.

Another outstanding encyclopedist, Abū Rayhān al-Bīrūnī (973–1048), was the author of many works of major importance in which he examines problems of mathematics, astronomy, physics, botany, geography, geodesy, general geology, mineralogy, history, chronology and ethnography. One particularly well-known work of his is *al-Āthār al-bāqiya* [Memorials of Past Generations], which among many other topics describes in detail the calendar systems of the peoples of the Middle and Near East, including the peoples of Sogdiana and Khwarazm. His great work on India is an important description and criticism of the higher Indian learning and sciences of the early Middle Ages. Part of his treatise *Kitāb al-Tafhīm il-awā’il sinā‘at al-tanjīm* [The Key to Astronomy], with its popular exposition of the fundamentals of mathematics, astronomy and astrology, has survived.

He also wrote *al-Qānūn al-Mas‘ūdī* [The Canon of (Sultan) Mas‘ūd], a lengthy treatise on mathematical and descriptive geography; and *Kitāb al-Jamāhir* [Book of Data for the Recognition of Gems] (on mineralogy), in which he gives detailed information on over fifty minerals, ores, metals and alloys, and on glass, enamel, porcelain and so on, and in which he also catalogues mineral deposits and gives other data. Mention must also be made of his book *Istikhrāj al-awtār* [Chords] on the topography of Central Asia; and his *Rules for Determining the Specific Gravities of Minerals*, among others.

**LITERATURE**

In the ninth and tenth centuries, there was an enormous growth in literature, principally poetry. It was during the Samanid period that Persian literature began to appear in Transoxania and was officially recognized. The development of an Islamic New Persian literature thus began in Transoxania and Khurasan rather than further west in Fars. The work of a large number of poets dates from this period, of whom the best known are Rūdakī (d. 941), Daqīqī (d. 977) and Firdawsī (d. c. 1020).

Together with the nascent literature in Persian, literature in Arabic also continued to enjoy high prestige and royal favour under the Samanids. The most active part in the creation of this literature, both original and in translation, was taken by the Central Asians and Khurasanians. For example, Tha‘alibī wrote his anthology, the *Yatīmat al-dahr* [The Unique Pearl], in Arabic; in its fourth section, it gives a detailed account of the poets of the Samanid period living in Bukhara and Khurasan, and also those of Khwarazm, who wrote in Arabic.

The recognized founder of Persian-Tajik classical poetry, and a man of great culture, was Rūdakī, who was born in the village of Panjrudak in what is today the Panjikent region
of modern Tajikistan. From his early years, Rūdakī’s poetic gift, his fine voice and his skilled playing on the chang (a harp-like musical instrument) made him popular. He was invited to the Samanid court, where he spent almost the whole of the rest of his life. Some-what fewer than 2,000 lines of his output have survived, but they demonstrate his mastery in all the poetic genres of the age. He perfected the basic verse forms of medieval Persian poetry: mathnawī, qasīda, ghazal and rubā‘ī. Another noted poet was Shahīd Balkhī, born near Balkh in the village of Jakhudanak. Little is known about his life, but at one time he was one of the best court poets of the Samanid Nasr II, and one of the leading scholars of the age. A close student of Rūdakī, he died in 936, before Rūdakī, and the latter wrote a touching elegy on the death of his favourite student.

Daqīqī began his literary activity at the court of the ruler of the principality of Chaghaniyan and was later invited to Bukhara. Under the Samanids, particular attention was paid in literary circles to making compilations of ancient legends embodying the heroic traditions of their past. It was thus that the prose Shāh-nāma of Abū Mansūr was created. Nūh II entrusted Daqīqī with the task of putting the Shāh-nāma into verse, but the poet was killed in 997 before completing his work. The part of Daqīqī’s poem describing the struggle between Gushtasp and Arjasp was included by Firdawsī in his own Shāh-nāma. In addition to a fragment of his Shāh-nāma, the surviving work of Daqīqī includes qasīdas, ghazals, qitēs and bayts.

The greatest poet of that age, however, was Firdawsī. He was born in Khurasan, in a suburb of Tus, between 934 and 941 into a middle-ranking aristocratic family. His youth coincided with the period of growth of the Samanid state. The idea of stimulating a resurgence of the Iranian national and heroic spirit in culture induced him to write his epic Shāh-nāma, which he completed in 994, by which time the Samanid state was in full decline. The second version of the poem (completed in 1010) was presented to the Ghaznavid Sulṭān Mahmūd; but the poet’s masterpiece was not appreciated in his lifetime.

In his poem, Firdawsī revealed to the people their heroic past and apparently sought to arouse their sense of patriotism. He made the basis of his work the epic of the Iranian peoples (the ancient Saka tribes, Sogdians, Khwarazmians and others), including the tales about such epic heroes as Rustam, Siyāwush and Isfandiyār, and about national uprisings led by the blacksmith Kāwa and Mazdak. Firdawsī drew much inspiration from the monuments of material culture in Khurasan and Transoxania. In particular, a whole epic cycle of exploits connected with the name of Rustam – the struggle of the heroes against monsters – is depicted in the murals of ancient Panjikent. Another scene in temple painting, also

---

In Panjikent, is devoted to mourning for the mythological hero Siyāwush. In the ruined palace of the Afshins of Usrushana (near Shahristan), a large carved wooden panel has been discovered depicting scenes of the struggle of the forces of good (the prince and the blacksmith Kawā) with the wicked and murderous King Zahāk. The Rustam epic of the Sogdian texts, the Sogdian tales of Siyāwush, Farīdūn and the blacksmith Kāwa, and these paintings at Panjikent and Bunjikat, undeniably indicate the Central Asian provenance of many of the themes of the Shāh-nāma.

Firdawsī also masterfully reworked the written sources (the Sasanian historical chronicle, the Khwādāy-nāmak [Book of Kings], Mansūr Balkhī’s Shāh-nāma, and others), drawing on the treasures of material culture and on popular oral legends. He recounts events in his own way and celebrates the ideas of Iranian national feeling and love of his homeland. From beginning to end, the poem is written in a heroic metre (mutaqārib), in an austere and monumental poetic style, and is distinguished by its epic grandeur and unique emotional tone. It contains between 50,000 and 60,000 couplets (bayts). Firdawsī’s Shāh-nāma has immortalized the author’s name and is a major contribution to the treasure-house of world culture; it had an enormous influence on the subsequent development of Persian literature and there have been frequent translations of his poetry into many languages of both East and West.

MUSIC

In the ninth and tenth centuries, the musical culture of the eastern Iranian peoples, the origins of which went back to antiquity, continued to develop. They had a long tradition of virtuoso musicianship and a developed musical theory. In the period that we are considering, a series of patterns of musical art in various genres was created. Classical professional music in the oral tradition and settings of poems to music continued to be produced and these were subsequently combined in the dūvāzda maqām (twelve maqāms, or modes), and then reworked in the shash maqām (six maqāms). Poetry and song were not only intimately interwoven but were regarded as branches of a single art. Many poets were at the same time well-known musicians, singers and musical theorists. Popular creative art had a marked influence on the development of professional poetry and music.

As noted above, the poet Rūdakī was also a gifted musician and a well-known singer. He had a fine voice and was a performer on several instruments (‘ūd, chang, barbat and rūd). It was he who was responsible for reworking two classical modes and melodies, the

---

5 D’yakonov, 1951.
Among the musicians of the age were the poet and musicologist Abū Hafs Sughdī, who invented the musical instruments called shāh-rūd and mūstikār, the poet and composer Abū Sālih (ninth century); the poet Abū Tayyib Tāhir al-Khurāṣānī, an outstanding performer of one of the maqāms called khusrawān; the well-known chang-player Lukari Changzan; the musicologist Abū ’l-Abbās Bakhtiyār; ʿĪsā Barbatī; one of the best-known female singers, Sitt Zarīn; the flautist Zilzil Rāzī; and the flautist and tunbūr-player ʿAlībegī. The foundations of musical theory were also laid, and Ibn Sīnā is even credited with having invented the instrument known as the shāhnāy (surnāy).

This eastern Iranian music became a firmly established part of all aspects of social life and was an inseparable element in weddings and feasts, festivals and battles, anniversaries and formal ceremonies, religious and funerary rites. In particular, the historian Narshakhi refers to songs of mourning, and we find information on celebratory, military and funerary music in Firdawsī’s Shāh-nāma and in the poetry of Rūdakī and Daqīqī. There were a number of musical modes: the dāstan-i khusrawān, surūd (rūh, khaftī), tarona and others, and a large number of melodies: khusrawānī, ʿushshāq, rāst, bāda, irāk, zarafkanda, busalik, sipāhāʾī, nāwa, basta, chawasht, etc. There were also a large number of musical instruments: the stringed ones mentioned above, and others; wind instruments like the nāy, shāhnāy (surnāy), shāhrūd, shaypūr, karnāy (bāq), etc.; and percussion instruments like the daff (dāʿira), tanbūrak and tabl (shandaf). In addition to those that have been enumerated, one must also mention the duruya, zīr, chagana, santūr, kāpun, urghunūn, ankā, etc.

Central Asia and the Ismaʿili movement

In the ninth and tenth centuries, the Sunni form of orthodox Islam became firmly established in the eastern lands. Yet even though Islam was already generally accepted as the state religion and had spread to almost all parts of Central Asia, there continued to exist, at the same time, vestigial communities of Zoroastrians, Manichaeans and Christians.

In the first half of the tenth century, the propaganda of Ismaʿilism achieved a foothold in Central Asia, as has been described in Chapter 2 above. The movement was initially led by the Samanid commander Husayn b. ʿAlī Marwazı. In an attempt to turn it to his advantage, he quickly provoked an uprising but was defeated and captured. Leadership next passed to the Ismaʿili propagandist Muhammad b. Ahmad Nakhshabī, whose activities were at first highly successful. Many eminent dignitaries converted to Ismaʿilism and the movement...
gathered strength, particularly during the reign of Nasr II, who may also have accepted its teachings. This incensed the orthodox Sunni Muslim religious classes, who conspired against Nasr II with representatives of the Turkish palace guard. Even though the plot was discovered, Nasr II was obliged to renounce the throne in favour of his son Nūh I (943–54). Nūh organized the extermination of Ismaʿili sympathizers and the execution of the leaders of the movement of Muhammad Nakhshabī. The doctrine survived in Transoxania only as a clandestine tendency, although in Bukhara a secret organization of supporters of the heresy may have been active.

The ethnic composition of the Samanid state and the creation of an Eastern Persian-Tajik ethnic identity

In early Islamic times, there were a number of Iranian peoples in Khurasan and Transoxania. The Zarafshan valley, the Kashka Darya oasis and Usrushana were occupied by Sogdians; the upper Oxus basin and its tributaries by the Bactrian-Tukharian population; the basin of the lower Oxus by the Khwarazmians; the Ferghana valley by the Iranian Ferghanans; the southwestern oases of Central Asia by the Iranian Khurasanians; and the Pamir mountains and their foothills, and the mountains surrounding the Ferghana valley, by the remnants of Saka and other early Iranian peoples. All these peoples were ethnically related and spoke languages and dialects of the Middle Iranian and New Persian language groups; they were the basis for the emergence and gradual consolidation of what became an Eastern Persian-Tajik ethnic identity.
The establishment of the Ghaznavid amirate in what is now Afghanistan in the last quarter of the tenth century A.D. represents the culmination of a process which had begun in the Samanid amirate whereby the military bases of the state had been transformed from a reliance on the indigenous, Iranian landed classes, the dihqāns, to a substantial dependence on Turkish slave troops. Until the decay of their power in the second half of the tenth century, the Samanid amirs had kept a firm hold on the direction of affairs, and the flourishing state of their lands in Transoxania and Khurasan had won them admiring comments from such Arab geographers who had travelled through their territories as Ibn Hawqal and al-Maqdisī (see above, Chapter 4). However, the decline of the amirs’ personal authority and the growth of centrifugal forces in the state, aggravated by the personal ambitions of the great military commanders, had plunged the Samanid amirate into increasing crisis and chaos; it was these difficulties, and the mutual rivalries of leading figures, which allowed the formation of the Ghaznavid amirate. For roughly half a century, it was to be the most

* See Map 4.
powerful state known in the eastern Islamic lands since the weakening of the Abbasid caliphate.

The prehistory of the Ghaznavids

Prominent among the disputing Turkish generals at the Samanid court in the middle years of the tenth century was the commander-in-chief (Persian, ispahsālār; Arabic, ḥājib al-huẓjāb) of the Samanid army in Khurasan, Alptegin (appointed to this office by Amir ʿAbd al-Malik in 961), who worked with the Persian vizier Abū ʿAli Muhammad Balʿamī to secure an ascendancy in the state for their own personal interests. But their attempt, on ʿAbd al-Malik’s death in 961, to impose their own candidate on the throne in Bukhara, the dead man’s young and pliant son, failed, and under the new amir, ʿAbd al-Malik’s brother Mansūr I, a rival group of Turkish generals headed by Fāʾiq Khāṣṣa was now supreme at court. Threatened by the new regime and squeezed out of power, Alptegin prudently withdrew to the far eastern fringes of the Samanid empire with his personal force of Turkish professional, military ghulāms (slave soldiers) and a group of Iranian ghāzīs (fighters for the faith). The sources state that his aim was to carry on holy war against the infidels there and thus earn divine merit. In reality, Alptegin was seeking safety for his own person, and was very probably influenced by the example of a predecessor of his, another Turkish general of the Samanids, Karategin Isfījābī, who before his death in 929 had built up round himself a petty principality in what is now south-eastern Afghanistan centred on Bust and the region of al-Rukhkhaj or Arachosia, nominally still subject to the Samanids but in practice autonomous. This principality had continued there under succeeding Turkish ghulām leaders.¹

Alptegin’s destination was the region in eastern Afghanistan of Zabulistan, centred on the small and obscure town of Ghazna or Ghazni, where he now found himself; the Samanid authorities in Bukhara had to make the best of the situation and to send Alptegin an investiture patent as local governor in a region where their control had in any case been very shadowy or even nonexistent. In fact, Ghazna seems to have been held by a local family, whose generic name may have been that of Lawīk (although the reading as a personal name, Anūk, has been less plausibly suggested), doubtfully Muslim and closely linked with the indigenous rulers in Kabul of the Hindūshāhī family. Alptegin’s son Abū Isḥāq ʿIbrāhīm, who succeeded his father briefly in 963, had in 964–5 to flee to Bukhara when the Lawīk dispossessed by Alptegin returned. A decade or so later, the people of Ghazna, chafing under the tyranny of one of the Turkish commanders who had by then come to

power there, Böri or Böri Tegin, again invited Lawık back. After this temporary hiatus, however, the town remained firmly in Turkish hands, although the neighbouring town of Gardiz – which seems to have had its own local ruling family, that of the Abū Mansūr Aflah mentioned at the time of the first Saffarid Ya‘qūb b. Layth a century before – did not fall to the Turks until c. 974–5, since Bilgetegin, Abū Is’hāq Ibrāhīm’s successor in Ghazna, was killed at its siege.²

The establishment of Sebüktegin in Ghazna

Thus the rule of the line of Turkish generals, all originally in the Samanid service, gradually became firmly established in the eastern part of modern Afghanistan. On the evidence of the few surviving coins of the period, however, they still recognized the Samanid amirs in Bukhara as their suzerains. This was the position when Sebüktegin (this seems to be the most probable form for this name; Turkish sevük/sebük tegin or ‘beloved prince’) in 977 took over from the deposed Böri, beginning a twenty-year rule in Ghazna. Sebüktegin had been one of the most trusted personal slaves of Alptegin, accompanying him on his withdrawal to Ghazna in 962. All that we know of his antecedents stems from a collection of aphorisms on statecraft and kingly power allegedly left by him to his son Mahmūd, the Pand-nāma [Epistle Containing Pieces of Advice], in which it is stated that he came from the Turks of Barskhan, on the shores of the Issyk-kūl in the region later known as Semirechye (now in Kyrgyzstan). Obsequious genealogists later fabricated for Sebüktegin a genealogy stretching back to the Sasanian emperors of Persia, but in fact he probably came from one of the component tribes of the Karluk Turkic group. Regarding his subsequent career, the elaborate account in the Seljuq vizier Nizām al-Mulk’s Siyāsat-nāma [Book of Statecraft] of Sebüktegin’s rise to fame under Alptegin’s patronage because of his outstanding personal qualities can hardly be taken at face value.³ Be this as it may, Sebüktegin now began an uninterrupted period of power in Ghazna (977–97), still acknowledging the Samanids as his nominal overlords: placing their names before his own on the coins which he minted and being content, it would appear from the inscription on his extant tomb in Ghazna, with the title expressing his subordinate status, al-hājib al-ajall (Most Noble Commander). Yet in practice, he was securely laying the foundation of an independent Ghaznavid state which his son Mahmūd was to erect into a mighty, supranational empire.

On arriving in Ghazna, Alptegin’s ghulāms had established on the surrounding agricultural lands a series of territorial revenue assignments (iqṭāʾs) for their support. Sebüktegin now

reformed this system, insisting on control from the central diwān in Ghazna and ensuring that all soldiers had adequate stipends.\footnote{Bosworth, 1963, pp. 41–2, 124–5.} The Turks there were nevertheless still an isolated pocket in a hostile environment, with powers to their east like the Hindūshāhīs of Wayhind and other north Indian rulers, whose attitude was bound to be hostile, for eastern Afghanistan had always tended both historically and culturally to be part of the Indian world.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 41–3.}

Accordingly, Sebüktegin may have made a conscious decision that a policy of expansion would preserve the dynamic of his Turkish followers and ensure the survival and future florescence of his petty lordship. He early moved against the existing line of Turkish rulers in Bust, overthrowing their leader Baytuz, and also adding Qusdar (in north-eastern Baluchistan) to his dominions (c. 977–8). More significant for the future direction of Ghaznavid expansion were clashes with the Hindūshāhīs, who held the Kabul river basin and the Panjab plains. Retaliatory attacks on Ghazna by the Rajah Jaypāl (c. 986–7) led to Sebüktegin’s victory over his forces and the extension of Ghaznavid power into the region of Lamghan and the Kabul river valley as far as Peshawar. There is nothing to show that Islamic religious motives were uppermost here, but Islam must have been implanted in these regions, and the tradition of winter plunder raids from the mountain rim of eastern Afghanistan down to the Indian plains now took shape.\footnote{Nāzim, 1927, pp. 485–95; 1931, pp. 29–30; Habīb, 1951, pp. 14–16; Ray, 1931–6, pp. 55–83; Bosworth, 1975, pp. 165–8.}

The firmness of Sebüktegin’s power in Ghazna and his expansionist policies enabled him in the later years of his reign to intervene in the politics of the Samanid state which had originally nurtured him. The power of the amirs was now in steep and irreversible decline, so that in 992 the capital Bukhara had been temporarily occupied by the invading Turkish Karakhanids, and the perpetuation of the amir’s authority was threatened by the alliance of two of the most powerful Turkish generals in the state, Abū ʿAlī Sīmjūrī and Fāʾiq Khāssa. Against this last threat, Amir Nūh II b. Mansūr summoned to his aid Sebüktegin and his son Mahmūd. The two swore allegiance to Nūh at Kish and appeared in Khurasan with their army. In a battle near Herat the royal forces secured a complete victory over the two rebel generals, who fled westwards to the northern Persian territories of the Samanids’ Buyid rivals in 994. For these services, Sebüktegin received the honorific title (laqab) of nāsir al-dīn waʾl-dawla (Helper of Religion and the State) and Mahmūd that of sayf al-dawla (Sword of the State) plus command of the Samanid army in Khurasan; and an attempted revanche by Abū ʿAlī and Fāʾiq was defeated in the following year. Fresh incursions into Transoxania by the Karakhanids in 996 rendered the Samanid amir even more dependent.
on Sebüktegin and Mahmūd. They were able to compel Nūh to nominate a vizier favourable to their interests, and then to negotiate a peace treaty with the Karakhanids which left the latter in control of the Syr Darya valley and the Ghaznavids with the whole of Khurasan, which was never again to be controlled by the Samanids.7

The succession of Mahmūd

Sebüktegin died in 997 and Ghaznavid control of Khurasan was thrown in jeopardy. Mahmūd had to hurry eastwards to Ghazna in order to wrest power from his younger half-brother Ismā‘īl (997–8) whom Sebüktegin – perhaps influenced by the fact that Ismā‘īl’s mother was a daughter of Alptegin – had appointed his successor there. Mahmūd’s superior military skill soon made him master in Ghazna (998); the new Samanid amir, Mansūr II b. Nūh, invested him with what is now Afghanistan and eastern Khurasan and he was able to recover western Khurasan from the Turkish general Begtuzun. Thus by 999 Mahmūd was in complete control of the whole of Afghanistan and the former Samanid territories south of the Oxus (Amu Darya) and now regarded himself as an independent sovereign. He secured legitimation of his new power from the ʿAbbasid caliph in Baghdad, al-Qādir (991–1031), who bestowed on him the titles of wali amīr al-muʾminīn (Friend of the Commander of the Faithful) and yamin al-dawla (Right Hand of the State) the latter being the one by which Mahmūd became best known and which was at times applied to the Ghaznavid dynasty as a whole (thus the historian Jūzjānī refers to them in his Tabaqāt-i Nāsirī as al-Sebüktigīnyā al-Yamīnīyya al-Mahmūdīyya ). Thus was inaugurated, also, the tradition whereby the Ghaznavid sultans always buttressed their power by caliphal approval, were assiduous in sending gifts from Indian plunder to Baghdad, and carefully cultivated an image of defenders of Sunni orthodoxy against the caliph’s opponents and rivals such as the Shi‘ite Buyids of Iraq and western Iran and the Isma‘īli Fatimids of Egypt and Syria.8

An agreement was reached at this point with the Karakhanid Ilīg Nasr b. ʿAlī making the Oxus the boundary between the two empires, for the shrunken Samanid amirate came to an inglorious end when the Ilīg occupied Bukhara definitively in 999. This was a historical event whose significance cannot have been apparent at the time. After 1017 the north-eastern lands of Islam were wholly in the hands of two Turkish sovereign powers, ending the rule there of indigenous Iranian dynasties. The region became open to a steady flow of Turkish immigration from the Inner Asian steppes. Thus the process began of converting what had been in pre-Islamic times ‘l’Iran extérieur’ into a majority Turkish ethnic

and linguistic region by the sixteenth century; while the gradual influx over subsequent centuries of Turkish pastoral nomads and their herds from beyond the Jaxartes (Syr Darya) was to have a decisive effect on the pattern of land utilization and agricultural economy in Transoxania and the northern tier of the Middle Eastern lands.

The zenith of the empire under Mahmūd

Mahmūd’s thirty-two year reign (998–1030) – lengthy by contemporary standards – enabled him to build up, by ceaseless campaigning, a vast military empire. From a nucleus in Afghanistan and Khurasan, this empire stretched by his death from the fringes of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan in the west to the Ganges valley of northern India in the east, and from Khwarazm and the upper Oxus principalities in the north to the Indian Ocean shores of Sind and Makran in the south. Not since the heyday of the Abbasid caliphs had one man ruled so much territory, and that from the insignificant town of Ghazna. For some two centuries, until the decline of Ghurid power in India at the beginning of the thirteenth century, Ghazna was to be a place of international significance. Only then did it relapse into its former obscurity, so that, visiting it three centuries later, Bābur, the founder of Mughal rule in India, was to muse, ‘Ghazna is a very humble place; strange indeed it is that rulers in whose hands were Hindustan and Khurasan should have chosen it for their capital.’

As noted above, the pattern of expansionism had been set by Sebüktegin, but his son Mahmūd was now far better endowed with both military and financial resources than his father had been. Mahmūd took over the Samanid forces in Khurasan and his successes as a war leader ensured a steady stream of free soldiers and volunteers to supplement his core of Turkish ghulāms. Above all, the fiscal resources of the province of Khurasan, with its rich agricultural oases and its urban centres for commerce and industry, provided a steady income from taxation for the maintenance of the highly expensive Ghaznavid standing army, a financial injection which the much sparser economies of the plateaux and mountains of the Hindu Kush–Pamirs region could never have supplied.

The protection of Khurasan and the Oxus frontier was thus a prime concern of Mahmūd’s, for, despite the agreement with the Karakhanids and the sultan’s marriage in 1000 to a daughter of the Iilig (possibly the Mahd-i Chigil of certain sources), the Khans coveted Khurasan for themselves. While Mahmūd was absent at Multan in India in 1006, Karakhanid armies swept down on Balkh and on Nishapur, where the local inhabitants, exasperated at the rapacity of Ghaznavid tax-collectors, actually welcomed the invaders. Returning swiftly, Mahmūd restored the situation, but a second invasion under the Iilig and

his kinsman Kadîr Khan Yûsuf of Khotan came in the following year. This was stemmed by a brilliant victory of Mahmûd’s near Balkh in 1008, in which the Ghaznavids’ war elephants struck terror into the Karakhanid ranks, unfamiliar with these awe-inspiring beasts. This defeat quelled Karakhanid designs on Khurasan; being a tribal confederation rather than a unitary state as was the Ghaznavid empire, the Khans were never again able to present a united front against Mahmûd. The sultan, for his part, negotiated marriage links (thus his son Masûd, the future sultan, married a daughter of the Great Khan Arslan Khan Mansûr, brother of the Ilig Nasr) and skilfully exploited those dissensions within the Karakhanid family, which were later to lead to a division of territories into a Western and an Eastern Khanate.

The main Karakhanid threat to Mahmûd’s position was now to come from his immediate neighbour to the north, ʿAlî b. Bughra Khan Hasan or Hârûn, called ʿAlî Tegin, of Bukhara and Samarkand – until his death in 1034, he was the most strenuous opponent of Ghaznavid ambitions in Central Asia. In 1025 Mahmûd invaded Transoxania with the aim of destroying ʿAlî Tegin and he made an alliance with the latter’s rival, Kadîr Khan Yûsuf (now ruling in Khotan and Kashghar), sealed, as usual, by marriage links. Although ʿAlî Tegin was temporarily driven out of Samarkand, he returned in 1026 when Mahmûd left Transoxania in order to prepare for the Somnath expeditions (see below), and the sultan made no further efforts in this quarter. Barthold is probably correct in stating that Mahmûd preferred to leave ʿAlî Tegin in Transoxania as a counterbalance to Kadîr Khan Yûsuf. Significant, however, of the access of prestige which Mahmûd’s campaigns in Transoxania and Khwarazm brought him within Inner Asia is the historian Gardîzi’s mention under the year 1026 of embassies from the distant Kitā (sc. the Kitan or Liao of northern China) and the Uighurs of Kocho in East Turkistan (what is now Xinjiang), coming to the sultan to seek marriage alliances for their rulers; such ties with pagans were courteously but firmly rejected by Mahmûd.

Mahmûd’s activist policy in Transoxania during these years had been facilitated by his acquisition of an important bridgehead across the Oxus, possession of which enabled him to turn the flank of the Karakhanids and exert pressure on ʿAlî Tegin. The ancient Iranian kingdom of Khwarazm had been ruled until 995 by the old-established line of Afrighids of Kath, but control subsequently passed to a new line of Khwarazm Shahs, the Ma’munids of Gurganj. Although the shahs had been nominally subject to the Samanids, in practice they had been independent, especially as Khwarazm formed an isolated salient of settled,
irrigated land within the surrounding deserts and steppes. The province’s agricultural richness and its historic commerce with Inner Asia and southern Russia attracted Mahmūd’s greed. He married his sister (known as Hurra-yi Khuttalī or Kālījī) to Ma’mūn b. Ma’mūn Khwarazm Shah and, by deliberately provoking local Khwarazmian feeling and pursuing an unscrupulous diplomacy which led to his brother-in-law’s murder, secured in 1017 a pretext for intervention in Khwarazm. A Ghaznavid invasion took place; the Ma’mūnids were overthrown, thereby putting an end to the last independent Iranian line in Central Asia; and Khwarazm was incorporated into the Ghaznavid empire under the governorship of Altuntash, a former ghulām of Sebūktegin, who now ruled there with the traditional title of Khwarazm Shah, the first of a series of Turks to bear that designation.13

Within what is now Afghanistan and Baluchistan, the heartlands of the Ghaznavid empire, various local rulers – some of whom had been loosely dependent on the Samanids – were brought into the Ghaznavid orbit. A local prince was allowed to remain in Qusdar as a vassal after a Ghaznavid show of strength there in 1010–11, as also in Makran, the coastal strip of Baluchistan, where a Ghaznavid force intervened in 1026 in a succession dispute.14 Existing local lines seem also to have been left in the trans-Oxus principalities of Chaghaniyan and Khuttal. These had strategic value as bridgeheads for Ghaznavid campaigns against the Karakhanids and were also the first line of defence for northern Afghanistan against predatory peoples like the Kumījīs of the Buttaman mountains (in what is now Tajikistan) (perhaps remnants of an element of the Hephthalite confederation), whose raids were to be encouraged in the 1030s by the Karakhanid prince Bōri Tegin (the later Tamghach Khan Ibrāhīm).15 We know that in Mahmūd’s time, an amir survived in Chaghaniyan from the old-established Muhtājid family, and in Maṣūd b. Mahmūd’s reign the local amir (of unspecified family) was the sultan’s son-in-law.16

Within Afghanistan proper, there was no strategic need to maintain buffer-states like these. The ruler of Gharchistan in northern Afghanistan, the Shir, was deposed in 1012 and his principality was incorporated into the Ghaznavid empire, and the neighbouring one of Guzgan likewise in 1010–11 when its rulers, the Farīghanids, apparently failed in the male line.17 The remote region of Ghur in central Afghanistan remained, however, substantially a pagan enclave outside Ghaznavid control. Mahmūd sent expeditions in 1011 and 1020 and with difficulty secured the submission of some local chiefs, including the

lord of Ahangaran, Muhammad b. Sūrī of the Shansabānī family (who were to be the driving force behind the remarkable rise to power in the next century of the Ghaznavids’ supplanters, the Ghurids). Ghur was never properly subdued, however, and the implantation there of Islam was to be a slow process (see below, Chapter 8). \(^{18}\)

Sistan, in south-western Afghanistan, was a region with strong traditions of its own independence going back to the Saffarids, when it had been the centre of a vast if transient military empire. Despite the collapse of this empire, scions of the Saffarids had survived in Sistan as petty rulers under generally nominal Samanid suzerainty. Amir Khalaf b. Ahmad had become Sebüktegin’s neighbour after the latter’s annexation of Bust, and he feared for the integrity of his own territories. He temporarily seized Bust while Sebüktegin was involved with Jaypāl, seized Pushang while Mahmūd was disputing with Ismāʿīl over the succession and intrigued with the Karakhanids. Hence Mahmūd sent forces into Sistan in 999 and 1003, on the latter occasion deposing Khalaf and annexing his territories. Nevertheless, local feeling in Sistan was always strongly anti-Ghaznavid, and when the Seljuq Turks appeared on the fringes of Sistan in the 1040s, in Mawdūd b. Masʿūd’s sultanate, the people there threw off the Ghaznavid yoke and raised to power a line of local chiefs as the Malikś of Nimruz. \(^{19}\)

The story of Mahmūd’s Indian campaigns does not directly concern the history of Central Asia, but so important an aspect of Ghaznavid policy requires some discussion. Sebüktegin’s clashes with Jaypāl have been mentioned above. Mahmūd likewise felt that the Hindūshāhīs were a major obstacle to any expansion into northern India. He defeated Jaypāl in 1001, and his son Anandpāl in 1009, and then a coalition of the princes of Kashmir and other regions of northern India, alarmed at the threat from the Turushkas (as the [Ghaznavids’] Turks appear in Indian sources), under the leadership of Anandpāl’s son Trilochanpāl (1004). Further coalitions, including the Rajahs of Kalinjar and Kanawj, failed to stem the Ghaznavid onslaught. Trilochanpāl died in 1021, and with the death of his son Bhimpāl in 1026, the line of Hindūshāhī Rajahs came to an end; surviving members of the family took refuge in Kashmir (which Mahmūd made a disastrous attempt at raiding in 1021, but which was not to be seriously penetrated by Islam until the fourteenth century). \(^{20}\)

Other expeditions were mounted by Mahmūd into what is now eastern Panjab and into the Ganges plains (modern Uttar Pradesh) and central India (modern Madhya Pradesh). Thus in 1004 the Rajah of Bhatinda, to the south of Lahore, was attacked and an immense

\(^{18}\) Nāzīm, 1931, pp. 70–3.

\(^{19}\) Ibid., 1931, pp. 69–70, 187–9; Bosworth, 1975, pp. 172–3; 1994, pp. 321–8, 368 et seq.

booty, including 120 elephants, taken. In 1009 the ruler of Narayanpur, in north-eastern Rajasthan, was humbled, agreeing in his peace treaty with the sultan to supply a contingent of 2,000 Indian soldiers for the Ghaznavid army. The rich and fertile Doab between the Ganges and the Yamuna was the seat of many wealthy shrines and temples. Thanesar, where the Hindus venerated an idol named Chakraswami (Lord of the Wheel), was plundered in 1014 and the idol carried off to Ghazna. The expedition in the winter of 1018–19 captured rich booty from Mathura or Muttra, the reputed birthplace of the deified Indian hero Krishna, and then pushed on to confront one of the leading Hindu princes of northern India, the Pratihāra Rajah of Kanawj, gaining from the whole expedition what was reckoned by the historian ʿUtbi at 3 million dirhams, 55,000 slaves and 350 elephants.21

Over the ensuing years, expeditions were sent against a coalition of princes under Ganda of Kalinjar, including also the rulers of Kanawj and Gwalior (1019–20, 1022–3), penetrating into central India. But the culmination of Mahmūd’s Indian campaigns was his attack on Somnath on the southwestern coast of the Kathiawar peninsula (1025–6), where lay a temple with the lingam of the moon-god Mahādeva, endowed with fabulous riches. The raid involved an arduous march from Multan across the Thar desert and an equally difficult return one through Cutch, harassed by the Jhats, to Sind, with 30,000 of the regular army plus volunteers. The immense plunder gained from the despoiled temples, said to total over 10 million dinars and brought back to Ghazna, gave ample recompense for the hardship endured. Above all other raids of the sultan, the attack on Somnath caught the imagination of the Islamic world. Rich gifts were sent to Baghdad and the caliph awarded the sultan – his reputation as ‘hammer of the infidels’ now much inflated – further honorific titles. Over the centuries, a rich accretion of stories and legends was to attach itself to the historical core of the episode.22

Although later generations of Indian Muslims were to venerate Mahmūd as the founding father of Islam in India, the Ghaznavid expeditions should in reality be seen as essentially plunder raids, as has been emphasized by, for example, Mohammad Habib.23 Their aim was to exact tribute from the Indian princes in the shape of gold, elephants, slaves and – quite often – troop contingents for the Ghaznavid army, while the treasures from despoiled temples were taken to Ghazna and either converted into negotiable form or else used to adorn and beautify public buildings such as palaces, gardens and mosques. Such gains were especially welcomed by pious Muslims as māl-i ḥalāl (lawful wealth) as opposed to the taxation collected from Muslim subjects, frequently by oppression and violence. No

23 See Habib, 1951, pp. 76–7, 81–4
conditions of adherence to Islam were imposed on the Indians, nor could any such conditions be enforced, for as soon as the Ghaznavid forces withdrew homewards, any forced converts would have apostatized. Only in western Panjab, where Lahore became the concentration-point for ghāżīs, can Islam have become gradually implanted at this time, adjacent as this region was to existing Muslim communities of the middle and lower Indus valley established there since the Arab conquest of Sind at the beginning of the eighth century. Only at Lahore, too, was there an attempt in the latter years of Mahmūd’s reign and in the early ones of Masʿūd’s to set up a civil administration, with the aim of making western Panjab something like a regular province of the empire for fiscal purposes. This attempt foundered because of the unpacified state of northern India and the sultan’s inability to control bellicose and volatile military elements and ghāżīs in the Muslim garrisons.24

Over the three centuries since Muhammad b. al-Qasim al-Thaqafī’s conquest, the existing Islam of the Indus valley Arab communities had acquired what was, in the eyes of the sternly orthodox Mahmūd, a heretical tinge. During the tenth century, the Muslims of Sind and Multan had come to recognize the spiritual and moral supremacy not of the ʿAbbasids but of their Shiʿite Fatimid rivals (see above, Chapter 2). Hence although the local ruler in Multan, Abu ʾl-Fat’h Dāwūd, had been on friendly terms with the Ghaznavids, in two campaigns of 1006 and 1010 the sultan attacked Multan, massacred the Ismaʿilis there (called in contemporary phraseology Qarāmita or Carmathians) and deposed Abu ʾl-Fat’h. In ʿUtbrī’s words, ‘He was unable, in the interests of religion, to endure that he [Abu ʾl-Fat’h] should remain in power, seeing the vileness of his evildoing and the abomination of his affair.’25 The fact that the remaining people of the prosperous trading city of Multan had to pay a heavy fine to save it from being plundered by the Ghaznavid army, however, indicates that the enforcement of orthodoxy could have its profitable side. Even so, Ismaʿilism survived there and, probably after Masʿūd’s deposition and death in 1041, the Ismaʿilis of Multan once more rose against Ghaznavid control, under Abu ʾl-Fat’h Dāwūd’s son, and the new sultan, Mawdūd, had to send a further punitive expedition.26

Such campaigns as these formed part of the image that Mahmūd carefully built up round himself as the hero of Sunni orthodoxy and the scourge of heretic Muslims and of infidels like the Hindus or the pagans of Ghur and Kafiristan (modern Nuristan). Although earlier in his career as a commander in Khurasan, Mahmūd had, like his father, given support to the leaders of the pietistic Karrāmiyya sect, which was strong in Nishapur,27 the

24 Habib, 1951, pp. 73, 76–87; Bosworth, 1963, pp. 75–6, 77–8, 114–16; 1962a, pp. 54–6.
Ghaznavids assimilated themselves to the norm for most eastern Iranian and Turkish peoples: adherence to orthodox Sunnism and the Hanafi law school. This involved allegiance to the moral and spiritual heads of Sunni Islam, the Abbasid caliphs, by now living a reduced existence in Baghdad as pensioners of the Buyids and with their court overshadowed culturally and intellectually by the splendour of the Fatimids in Cairo. Mahmūd needed the moral backing of the Abbasids when first he took over Khurasan and supplanted his lawful suzerains, the Samanids, just as his son Masʿūd was to require it for the succession struggle with his brother Muhammad on their father’s death in 1030. Hence gifts from plunder and announcements of victories were sent regularly to Baghdad, a harmless envoy from the Fatimids to the Ghaznavid court was summarily executed and accusations of ‘Carmathian’ sympathies were used to justify the removal of the sultan’s internal enemies; in return, the sultans received from Baghdad grandiloquent titles and other insignia of royal power.28

The excuse of an anti-Shīite crusade became the justification for Mahmūd’s last great campaign, directed against the Buyid amirate of northern Iran. The weak ruler there, Majd al-Dawla, unable to control his Daylamite soldiery, injudiciously appealed to the sultan for help. Until then, Mahmūd had been circumspect in his dealings with the Buyids, still the dominant power in Iraq and in Iran west of Khurasan. On this pretext, in 1029 Mahmūd marched against Rayy, deposed the amir and sacked the city, carrying off rich booty from what was the main commercial and industrial centre of northern Iran. Massacres of heterodox elements, described as Bātiniyya (sc. Ismaʿilis), Muʿtazilites, Mazdakites, and so on, gave the sultan religious backing for his aggression. Possession of Rayy, the strategic key to northern Iran, opened up the possibility of a drive towards the west and crusades against the Byzantines and Fatimids. Amir Masʿūd was dispatched with an army against local Daylamite and Kurdish rulers in western Iran, although these operations were brought to an end by the sultan’s death in 1030. The Ghaznavids thus came to control most of northern Iran, either through direct conquest or through vassals like the Ziyarids of Gurgan and Tabaristan in the Caspian coastlands. Their rule was to last a mere seven years, however, for the growing power of the Seljuqs and their Turkmen followers made it impossible for the sultans to retain their Iranian and Central Asian provinces (see below).29

Masʿūd and the Seljuqs

On Mahmūd’s death, rule in Ghazna passed briefly to his son Muhammad in accordance with the dead man’s wishes, but after a few months, Masʿūd arrived back from Rayy with

the army of the west and Muhammad’s support melted away. In an empire built up solely through Mahmūd’s personal skill as a war leader, the military and civilian notables in Ghazna speedily recognized that the more experienced Masʿūd was better fitted to maintain the momentum of his father’s conquests. Unfortunately, Masʿūd had not inherited all Mahmūd’s capabilities; though personally brave in the field, his judgement was less sound and his advisers were to complain of his arbitrary decisions and unwillingness to listen to good counsel. In the early years of his reign, he conducted a vendetta against the great men of state who had been dominant in Mahmūd’s reign and who had in many cases initially supported the ephemeral sultanate of Muhammad, the Mahmūdiyān or Pidariyān (‘adherents of the father’), as Bayhaqī calls them; instead, there began the ascendancy of the Masʿūdiyān or Naw-khwāstagān (‘upstarts’), who tended to act as the sultan’s yes-men. But it may be that we are unduly influenced by hindsight and by the fact that Masʿūd’s reign (1030–41) ended in failure and his death. Differences in character between him and his father were important but not decisive. The crucial point was that Masʿūd inherited a vastly over-stretched empire, one which was rapidly threatened by a new factor that eventually overwhelmed the Ghaznavids in the west: the irruption of the Turkmen hordes into Khwarazm and northern Iran.30

At first, Masʿūd continued his father’s policies in both India and the Iranian lands. He tried to round off the recent Iranian conquests by the acquisition of Kerman from the Buyids in 1003, having dreams of outflanking the Buyids via Makran and Oman and liberating the caliph in Baghdad from their tutelage, but Ghaznavid financial exactions in Kerman favoured the return of the Buyids the following year.31 In 1035 the sultan led a punitive expedition against the Ziyarid ruler Abū Kālijār because of his arrears of tribute; but the violent methods of the Ghaznavid army in collecting taxation at the capital of Tabaristan, Amul, caused a revulsion against Ghaznavid rule which echoed throughout the eastern Islamic world.32 In India, Mahmūd’s gains were retained and Masʿūd personally led fresh campaigns, such as that of 1037 against the ‘Virgin Fortress’ of Hansi to the north-west of Delhi; he also managed to restore order in Panjab after the commander of the army of India based in Lahore, Ahmad Inaltegin, rebelled in 1033. But the difficulties of controlling unruly ghāzī elements led to frequent disturbances in the Ghaznavid territories in India. Moreover, because of Mahmūd’s spectacular successes there, and the importance of an inflow of tribute and plunder in maintaining the fabric of the state, India and its problems tended to dominate the central councils of the empire, and from the

32 Bosworth, 1963, pp. 84, 90–1.
middle years of Masʿūd’s sultanate onwards, this became a source of weakness. Threats to the territorial integrity of the empire on its northern frontiers, from the Karakhanids and the Seljuqs, were not properly faced and the defences there neglected. Thus despite promptings from his more perspicacious ministers, Masʿūd’s attentions remained divided, with the result that the situation in the west became out of hand: the Turkmens enlarged the foothold gained there in Mahmūd’s closing years and could not now be dislodged.33

Masʿūd initially cultivated good relations with the Karakhanid Kadïr Khan Yūsuf and his son and successor, Bughra Khan Sulaymān, and himself married one of Yūsuf’s daughters in 1034. Ğūr Tegin remained the common enemy and in 1032 Masʿūd sent an army against him into Transoxania under the Khwarazm Shah Altuntash. Bukhara was captured, but a battle at Dabusiyya against Ğūr Tegin and his Seljuq allies was indecisive and led to the death of the wise and experienced Khwarazm Shah. The latter was succeeded as governor by his son Hārūn who, mindful of Masʿūd’s earlier attempt to have his father Altuntash, as one of the Mahmūdiyān, murdered, adopted a hostile attitude to Masʿūd. Hārūn allied himself with Ğūr Tegin for a joint attack on Ghaznavid territories in northern Afghanistan in 1034 and also gave help to the Seljuqs who had settled on the fringes of Khwarazm. Masʿūd’s position was saved by the deaths of Ğūr Tegin in 1034 and of Hārūn (the latter was assassinated at the sultan’s instigation in 1035). But Ğūr Tegin’s sons were still active along the Oxus frontier; and after 1038, Böri Tegin (see above) began harrying Khuttal and Wakhsh in alliance with the Kumūjis and the Turkmens, soon taking over almost all Transoxania.34 Khwarazm had meanwhile slipped irrevocably from Ghaznavid control. The sultan could only join with a group of the Oghuz hostile to the Seljuqs, those under the leadership of Shāh Malik, who held the ancient Turkic title of Yabghu and who controlled the towns of Jand and Yengi-kent at the debouchment of the Syr Darya into the Aral Sea (see Chapter 7, Part One, below). Shāh Malik did in fact secure control of Khwarazm and proclaim Ghaznavid suzerainty there once more in 1041, but by that time Masʿūd was dead. Three years later, the Seljuqs expelled Shāh Malik himself and became universally victorious in Khurasan and Khwarazm.35

As mentioned above, the role of the Seljuqs was decisive in the downfall of Ghaznavid power in the west. Bands of Oghuz Türkten from the steppes of south-western Siberia (the modern Kazakhstan) had been infiltrating southwards into the settled lands since the last decades of the tenth century, at times aiding the last Samanids and at others their Karakhanid supplanters. Support from these Oghuz – since the start of the eleventh century

at least superficially Islamized – was decisive in enabling Ālī Tegin to retain power in the Bukhara region from c. 1025 onwards. Dislodged by the combined operations of Mahmūd of Ghazna and his ally Kādīr Khan Yūsuf, some 4,000 Oghuz families, former followers of Arslan Isrā’īl b. Seljuq, sought permission from the sultan to settle on pastures in northern Khurasan, promising to guard the frontiers there against further nomadic incursions. This proved a delusion and Ghaznavid forces had to disperse bands of plundering Oghuz throughout northern Persia. Others of the Oghuz, led by the Seljuqs Toghrïl, Chaghrï, Mūsâ and Ibrâhîm Inal, remained north of the Oxus, involved in the politics of Khwarazm until they too were compelled to move southwards into Ghaznavid Khurasan in 1035. There, their herds devastated the agriculture of the oases, and by their depredations they disrupted long-distance commerce also. Ghaznavid forces sent against them failed to achieve permanent success and by 1037–8 such leading towns as Rayy, Merv and Nishapur opened their gates to the Seljuqs, despairing of ever receiving adequate protection from the sultan. Mahmūd was at last deflected from his Indian preoccupations and marched westwards; but his heavily armed and ponderous, conventional-type Islamic army was defeated by some 16,000 Turkmens at Dandanqan in the desert between Merv and Sarakhs in 1040. The result of this battle, one of the most decisive in the history of the eastern Islamic world, was that the Seljuqs, now proclaiming their allegiance to the Baghdad caliph as their sole suzerain, were able within the next 20 years to take over the whole of Iran and make it the nucleus of the Great Seljuq empire. The Ghaznavids lost all their western provinces; the frontier was stabilized in c. 1059 on a line roughly bisecting modern Afghanistan from north to south. In future, the orientation of the Ghaznavid empire was to be towards India (for which the despairing Sultan Masmūd had set out after the Dandanqan débâcle) and the exploitation of its riches. Thus the history of the remaining 140 or so years of the sultanate concern primarily eastern Afghanistan and India rather than Central Asia; in the last years of its existence, the sultans ruled from Lahore and not Ghazna.

Mawdūd b. Masmūd (1041–8) was the last ruler to endeavour to concert operations with the Karakhanids against the Seljuqs. The upper Oxus territories remained the subject of Ghaznavid–Seljuq disputes during the reign of Ibrâhîm b. Masmūd (1059–99), but Bahram Shah (1118–52) ruled in a loose vassal status to the Great Seljuqs, who were however unable to save the last Ghaznavids from the rising power of the Ghurids from the modern Ghorat province of central Afghanistan (see below, Chapter 8). In retrospect, it appears that the vast empire assembled by Mahmūd could no longer be held together by one man

37 Bosworth, 1977, pp. 50–2.
once the incursions of the Seljuqs had reached a certain level of intensity. The central administration in Ghazna (on which, see below) was unable to preserve its communications with distant provinces like northern Persia and Khwarazm once these regions came under pressure or threw off allegiance to the sultan. In fact, one might conclude that the loss of the western provinces to the Seljuqs reduced the Ghaznavid empire to more manageable proportions, thus enabling it to survive right down to its extinction in 1186 by the Ghurids: a respectable span of life for an Islamic state.

The nature and structure of the Ghaznavid state

The Ghaznavids display the phenomenon of the rapid transformation of a line of barbarian, originally Turkish slaves into monarchs within the Irano-Islamic tradition who presided as authoritarian rulers over a multi-ethnic realm comprising Iranians or Tajiks, Turks, Afghans, Indians and others. In this age before the evolution of the nation-state, the possession of subjects who, with their various ethnic backgrounds, could contribute differing expertise and skills to the functioning of the state was regarded as a source of strength rather than of weakness. The sultans could never forget their Turkish ethnicity, since the essential core of their military support was likewise Turkish. Thus they had to stay attuned to the needs and aspirations of those troops and, above all, to act as successful war leaders and suppliers of plunder; when Mas'ūd's nerve seemed to fail after Dandanqan, the army abandoned him. But for the administration and financing of their empire, the Ghaznavids early recognized the need for the services of their Iranian subjects, above all, for the secretarial class, whose secular traditions and practices went back beyond the Islamic caliphate and ultimately to the Sasanians. To this heritage had been added the Islamic element, with a stress on the ruler’s divine backing but also on his duty to act in consonance with the laws of God as exemplified in the shari‘a; yet in practice, rulers behaved largely as despots.

All these elements came together within what might be called the Ghaznavid ‘power-state’, in which the sultan and his servants, both military and civilian, stood over and against the mass of subjects (the division which was later to be termed, among the Ottomans, that of askerîs and re‘âyâ). There were no national or patriotic feelings which could act as a cement for society, since the vision of the subject, were he peasant, trader or artisan, was confined to his own locality and to the protection of his own immediate interests. It was the duty of the subjects to pay taxes to the state; in Bayhaqī’s words, ‘It is vital that they should be in complete fear and trembling of the king and the army, and give [them] complete obedience.’

to protect the subjects militarily and thereby enable them to carry on their avocations; but
the two spheres of responsibility were never to mix. According to Bayhaqī again, Mahmūd
severely censured the people of Balkh for resisting the Karakhanid invaders in 1006, thus
causing the destruction in the town of a market belonging to the sultan which had brought
in much revenue; they should simply have submitted to the more powerful incomers.41
Hence Mahmūd’s son Masʿūd was only following the same line of argument when at the
end of his life he resolved to abandon Ghazna for India, instructing his officials to make the
best terms they could with the Seljuqs whom he expected to occupy the capital and replace
his dynasty there.42

Both the central and the provincial administration were run by Tajiks, with the vizier
at the head of the hierarchy. The sultans disposed of the services of some of the leading
littérates and officials of the age, such as Sebüktegin’s chief secretary Abu ’l-Fat’h Bustī,
and the vizier under both Mahmūd and Masʿūd, Ahmad b. Hasan Maymandī. There was a
fivefold division in the central bureaucracy, with separate dīwāns for the vizier, the chief
secretary, the secretary for the army, the head of intelligence and the postal service and
the chief steward of the household.43 Financial demands were the overriding considera-
tion. The maintenance of a powerful standing army and the mounting of frequent military
campaigns were very expensive, as was the sultans’ extravagant lifestyle in their palaces
and gardens and their lavish spending on public buildings. The bureaucracy, and with it the
wages bill, grew with imperial expansion.44 The vizier was thus under constant pressure
to increase the flow of revenue and to find new sources of taxation. Failure here meant
dismissal, torture to disgorge personal gains and often execution; of the six viziers serving
Mahmūd, Muhammad and Masʿūd, three died violent deaths and one suffered prolonged
imprisonment. The vizier had also to keep control over provincial governors and officials,
who might be tempted, through distance from the capital, to withhold taxation and rebel;
this control was exercised through a network of couriers and spies, the barīd and ishrāf
system, thus contributing to the atmosphere of fear and suspicion in the empire.45

There is ample evidence in the sources of the harshness of provincial tax-collectors, but
the sufferings of the subject population were even worse when the soldiers of the army
were allotted assignments of revenue (barāts) which they then collected personally. We
know that the people of Rayy, who had originally welcomed the Ghaznavids as liberators
from the excesses of the Buyid troops there, speedily turned against an oppressive military

governor and were later reluctant to put up any serious resistance to the Seljuqs; and the notorious exactions of the vizier Isfarāʾīnī and the governor Abu ʿl-Fadl Sūrī in Khurasan contributed powerfully to the population’s disenchantment with the Ghaznavids and the capitulation of their towns to the Seljuqs without a blow.\footnote{Bosworth, 1963, pp. 79–91; cf. Bulliet, 1972, pp. 69–70.}

The diwān of the chief secretary dealt with correspondence with provincial officials and with external rulers. We possess in sources such as Bayhaqī’s history and ʿAqīlī’s Āthār al-wuṭarāʾ [Famous Past Deeds of the Viziers or Past Traces of the Viziers] the texts, in florid Arabic and Persian, of several letters to the Karakhanids and the ābāsid caliphs, including announcements of victories (fatḥ-nāmas).\footnote{Nāzīm, 1931, pp. 142–4; Bosworth, 1963, pp. 91–3.} Of especial importance in a military state like that of the Ghaznavids was the diwān of the ʿārid (secretary for the army), who organized mustering, the provision of matériel and the commissariat, and pay. There were regular army parades on ceremonial occasions such as the reception of diplomatic envoys or the celebration of the Islamic festivals and the Iranian ones of Nawrūz, Sada and Mihrgan, these parades being often held on a plain outside the capital.\footnote{Nāzīm, 1931, pp. 137–8; Bosworth, 1963, pp. 122–6.}

The core of the army was an élite force of Turkish ghulāms who guarded the sultan’s palaces and person and hence were known as ghulāmān-i sarāy (palace guards). What we know from the literary sources of their rich uniforms and bejewelled weapons has received striking confirmation from the remains of mural paintings in the audience hall of the complex of Ghaznavid palaces at Lashkar-i Bazar near Bust.\footnote{Bosworth, 1963, p. 104; Schlumberger et al., 1978, Part 1A, pp. 101–8, Part IB, pp. 121–4.} From these palace ghulāms – recorded as amounting to 4,000 at a review in 1037 – were drawn the holders of household and ceremonial offices such as the sultan’s armour-bearer. Outside this inner group, however, a wider force of Turkish slave troops formed the backbone of the army; the Ghaznavids were thus continuing a feature of military organization begun by the ābāsid in the early ninth century and adopted by most of their successor-states, including the Samanids. Turkish troops like these were valued above all for their hardiness, stemming from their harsh early life in the steppes, their skill as mounted archers and the single-minded loyalty which in theory (though not always in practice) they gave to their master.

The sources tell us little about the tribal origins of the Ghaznavids’ Turks, who came mostly via the slave markets of Transoxania or as gifts from the Karakhanid rulers, but specifically mentioned are soldiers from the Kar lucr, Yaghma, Kay, Tukhsi and Chigil and the men of Khotan (?Uighurs), while the frontier auxiliaries recruited by the Ghaznavid governors in Khwarazm apparently included men from the Kipchak and Kanglī.\footnote{Bosworth, 1963, pp. 98–105, 109–10.}
Other nationalities within the Ghaznavid forces included free troops from the local Arabs and Kurds, valued as dashing cavalrymen and skirmishers; Daylamite infantrymen, who fought with their characteristic weapons of the spear and javelin; and Indians. These last were probably in large part slaves, valued for their loyalty and at times used as a counterbalance to the Turks; conversion to Islam does not seem to have been necessarily required of them. The elephants which were deployed as beasts of war in the Ghaznavid armies have been mentioned above; it was the sultans who reintroduced these animals, taken as tribute from the Indian princes, into military usage in the Persian lands, where they had last been thus employed by the Sasanians.

The ideology of the sultans was strongly orthodox and Sunni, and, as already described, they strove to build a contemporary image as defenders of Islam against heterodoxy and infidelity. We have little evidence of any deep personal faith on the part of Mahmūd or Masʿūd, and they certainly enjoyed wine-drinking parties to the full. They nevertheless recognized the importance of the official religious institution of the ʿulamāʾ (learned men) as part of the fabric of state and often used scholars as diplomatic envoys, with an especial penchant for the Hanafīs, characterized by Mahmūd at one point as the madhhhab-i rāst (righteous law-school). Hence the services of the leading Nishapur Hanafī family of scholars and lawyers, the Tabānīs, were often called upon. In 995 Mahmūd, as commander in Khurasan, had invited Abū Sāliḥ Tabānī to become head of the Hanafī lawyers there and to teach in a madrasa (Islamic college); Abū Sāliḥ’s nephew Abū Sādiq was later appointed by Mahmūd as chief judge in Khuttal, and 1037 sent by Masʿūd to head a successful embassy to the Karakhanids, with the promise of the judgeship of Nishapur as a reward. Another prominent Hanafī family in Khurasan was that of the Sācīdīs; Mahmūd appointed the judge Abu ’l-ʿAlā Sāʿīd as tutor to his sons Muhammad and Masʿūd, and this scholar was to play a leading role in reducing the power of the Karrāmiyya in 1012.

There was clearly considerable royal patronage of the Sunni revival in the eastern Islamic lands as part of the general movement which had grown up in reaction to the bid for political power in the tenth century of Shiʿism. Already in the opening years of the eleventh century, it is recorded that in Khuttal there were over twenty madrasas, these colleges being one of the chief instruments for the education and training of an orthodox Sunni religious and official class. Virtually all members of the ruling strata of Islamic society were susceptible to the appeal of a holy man or mystic, while people were often aware that there were many charlatans in the ranks of the Sufis, and this seems to have

---

51 Ibid., pp. 107–12.
52 Ibid., pp. 115–18.
53 Ibid., pp. 175–8; Bulliet, 1972, pp. 63–4, 201–4.
54 Bosworth, 1963, pp. 175, 176–7.
been substantially the attitude of the sultans. It is difficult to distinguish fact from pious fiction in the biography of the Khurasanian Shaykh Abū Saʿīd of Mayhana by his descendant; hence we cannot know for sure whether the sultan really paid off the remaining debt on Abū Saʿīd’s khānaqāh (convent) when the latter died in 1049. One would expect the Ghaznavids to have lent more support to the moderate Sufi groups of the time, such as that around the Nishapur scholar Abu 'l-Qāsim al-Qushayrī, than to an extravagant thaumaturge like Abū Saʿīd.55 (See further below, Chapter 18.)

Cultural and intellectual life

As well as being aware of the importance of the Islamic religion in buttressing their authority, the Ghaznavids were concerned to conform to the norm of traditional Islamic rulers who made their courts centres of culture and learning, with the monarch as the recipient of laudatory poetry and as the dispenser in turn of patronage and largesse. Displaying something of the admiration that barbarians often showed for higher things, Mahmūd seems to have chosen the ideal of the Samanid court, which had nurtured such luminaries as Rūdkī and Daqīqī (see above, Chapter 4), for his own circle at Ghazna, even if we discount the later literary biographer Dawlat Shah’s claim that there were 400 poets in attendance on Mahmūd, led by the laureate ʿUnsurī and hymning the sultan’s praises as a Maecenas and as the scourge of the kāfirs (pagans). The courts of Mahmūd and Masʿūd certainly nurtured a fine school of lyric poetry in New Persian, with such notable figures as ʿUnsurī, Farrukhī and Manūchihrī (there were poets of similar calibre at the courts of later sultans like Masʿūd III (1099–1115) and Bahrām Shah).56 There are indications that Turkish poetry was also known there.57 But modern scholars have emphasized that such encouragement did not necessarily arise from a disinterested love of learning. A well-known anecdote by the twelfth-century writer Nizâmi ʿArūdī Samarqandī describes how Mahmūd peremptorily demanded of the Maʾmunid Khwarazm Shah that he dispatch to his own court in Ghazna the leading literary and scientific figures in Gurganj (the physician and philosopher Ibn Sinā was so little enchanted at the prospect that he fled westwards, eventually reaching the court of the Daylamite prince Ibn Kākūya at Isfahan). Indeed, the greatest intellect of the age, the polymath Abū Rayhān al-Bīrūnī (973–1048), while taking advantage of the facilities offered to this Khwarazmian scholar by service under the Ghaznavids, including the opportunity to visit India and gather material for his magnum opus, the Tahqīq mālī...
'l-Hind [Inquiry Into What is to be Found in India], never seems to have been especially close to Mahmūd or to have enjoyed any direct official encouragement from him.  

As observed above, a substantial proportion of the state revenue went on the sultans’ palaces and on entertainment there. To some degree, this was necessary to the functioning of the state, which ensured the loyalty of the army and the bureaucracy by the distribution of favours, offices and largesse and by the visible and conspicuous image of the sultan as the munificent and successful head of state. Such sources as Bayhaqī describe at length the splendours of court life, with rich clothing and robes of honour provided by the royal workshops (kārkhanahs) for the embroidery of tirāz decoration, and with the traditional medieval Islamic separation of the open, public, court life of the ruler from his private life in the harem with its eunuch attendants. The numerous palaces and gardens at Ghazna and at provincial centres like Herat and Balkh have failed to survive in the harsh Afghan environment, although the remaining ruins at Lashkar-i Bazar (see above) show the magnificent scale on which such palaces were conceived.

Agriculture and trade

Given the fact that the sources for Ghaznavid history are all products of an elite, court culture, we can only piece together odd fragments of information on the life and social habits of the mass of the population, the peasants, traders and artisans. We can, however, assume that demands for taxation (the kharāj, or land tax) and a multitude of local tolls and dues (mukāts), pressed hard on them; and we know from Bayhaqī that forced labour, corvées (mard-bīgārī), was exacted for the construction of palaces and the driving of game on royal hunts – a practice strongly entrenched in Iranian and Afghan life and lasting almost to the present day.

Agriculture was concentrated on the oases and was essentially small-scale and designed for subsistence within the rural area concerned or for supplying towns like Herat, Merv and Nishapur which could not grow enough food for themselves. Only certain highly specialized foodstuffs like truffles and the edible earth of Khurasan are mentioned as being exported as far as Egypt and the Turkish lands. Within the Ghaznavid realm, comprising the plateaux and mountain regions of Afghanistan and Khurasan, the only significant permanent sources of running water were rivers like the Oxus, Murghab and Helmand, on which the geographers mention the existence of water mills. Most irrigation came from subterranean qanāts or kārīzs, requiring large injections of capital for

59 Ibid., pp. 135–41.
60 Bosworth, 1963, pp. 79–91, 141.
61 Bosworth, 1968b, pp. 131–2.
construction and maintenance which only the more wealthy landholders could provide. The sultans themselves are recorded as responsible for hydraulic constructions in the region of Ghazna itself. Only a few favoured upland areas allowed dry-farming; the lush pastures of the upper Oxus valley and its tributaries were, however, famed for horse breeding.62

Industrial production was the small-scale activity of artisans and craftsmen, and was mainly for local consumption. Only within Khurasan, where virtually all the towns produced textiles or carpets, were certain celebrated local fabrics, such as the ʿattābī and saqlatānī silk brocades of Nishapur, the white cottons of Herat and the gold-threaded mulham cloth of Merv, exported outside the province.63 It is only for such towns as these that we know anything about municipal organization, involving the presence of a class of notables and leading families, who produced scholars, preachers and judges for the official religious hierarchy (such as the above-mentioned Tabānis and Saʿīdis), and the existence of such municipal officers as the raʿīs al-balad (the head of the local community vis-à-vis the central government), with functions analogous to those of the later Iranian office of kalāntar. In Nishapur, the important family of Mīkālīs held this office of raʿīs or zaʿīm for much of the later Samanid period and the early Ghaznavid one.64

Families like this were also involved in the caravan trade which linked Khurasan and Afghanistan with Transoxania and the steppes on the one hand, and with Baghdad and Iraq on the other, and whose disruption by the Oghuz invaders predisposed the towns of Khurasan to come to terms with the Seljuqs. One aspect of this long-distance trade was of course the traffic in slaves, for Turkish slaves had since the ninth century regularly been transported across Khurasan from the Transoxanian slave markets en route for Iraq and the Islamic heartlands; likewise, we know that slaves came directly across the upper Oxus lands through the intermediacy of the Karakhanids.65 Finally, the inflow of plunder from India to Ghazna involved a traffic in Indian slaves and the conveyance of bullion, trophies of war, and so on. Some of this last, including captured idols and similar spoils, was apparently incorporated into the fabric of the sultan’s new buildings in the capital. Other items required the services of a staff of assayers and valuers in Ghazna in order to turn these into a negotiable form or into the precious metals required for the mining of the high-quality gold and silver coinage which was a feature of Ghaznavid monetary practice and which must have stimulated economic activity within the whole eastern Islamic world.66

63 Ibid., pp. 150–2; 1968b, pp. 133, 135.
66 Ibid., pp. 78–9, 140.
In conclusion, one might observe that the establishment of the Ghaznavid sultanate represents the first major breakthrough of Turkish power in eastern Islam against the indigenous Iranian and other peoples. Although the impressive empire built up by the early rulers could not be sustained, the Ghaznavids’ destruction or weakening of local dynasties and of the landed classes by the imposition of rule by a central bureaucracy in Ghazna did much to prepare the way for the coming of the Great Seljuqs, the Khwarazm Shahs of Atsiz’s line or Anushteginids, and so on. The pattern of the despotic power-state introduced by the Ghaznavids became the norm for many of the subsequent pre-modern Islamic dynasties.⁶７

Sources for Karakhanid history

The history of the Karakhanids is one of the least studied periods in the history of Central Asia and East Turkistan. The most important information is derived from written sources of a later date. These sources provide a very detailed account of relations between the Karakhanids and the neighbouring states of the Ghaznavids, the Seljuqs, the Khwarazm Shahs and the Kara Khitay. Information about events within the Karakhanid state is sparse and frequently contradictory, and has quite often proved to be completely incorrect. Barthold conducted a critical analysis of the principal written sources in the 1920s, and his works on the history of the Karakhanids still provide the fullest and most reliable account. Other historians have since managed to extract no more than isolated details from the written sources.

* See Maps 3 and 4.
The second historical source is Karakhanid coinage. Barthold and other historians realized that Karakhanid coinage represented a major source for the political history, supplementing the written sources and correcting their at times contradictory testimonies. They also understood, however, that Karakhanid coinage represented the most difficult branch of Islamic numismatics and that its attribution demanded a great deal of preparatory work. Barthold wrote despondently that it was often impossible to determine even such a simple point as the number of persons referred to in the inscriptions on coins.1 None the less, he made careful use of the Karakhanid coins published in his day, and this enabled him to discover a great deal of information, although it did not prevent him from making the occasional mistake.

The content of the written sources and the progress made in the study of the coins did not permit a reliable list of Karakhanid rulers to be constructed at that time; this is reflected in the reference books used by all orientalists, such as handbooks for the chronology and the genealogy of Muslim dynasties. The section on the Karakhanids in Lane-Poole’s book, even with Barthold’s additions,2 is very brief and fragmentary and contains errors. A similar section in the work by Zambaur should simply not be consulted.3 Bosworth based his section on the Karakhanids in his book on the work of Pritsak.4 Later numismatists and historians (Vasmer, Pritsak, Davidovich, Kochnev and others) have published and studied an enormous number of Karakhanid coins, developing methods for their attribution, supplementing and correcting the information in the written sources for political history and providing fresh data for the chronology and genealogy not only of dynastic heads but also of a number of appanage-holders. Karakhanid coinage has also provided information for the study of a number of questions in the areas of social and economic history.

The conquest of Transoxania by the Karakhanids: the division into appanages

The confederation of Turkish tribes present in Kashghar and Semirechye in the ninth and tenth centuries was ruled by a dynasty referred to in the literature as the Ilek Khans or Karakhanids.5 The accounts provided in the sources regarding the composition of this confederation and the origin of the dynasty itself are contradictory and have given rise to

---

1 Barthold, 1928, p. 274.
2 Lane-Poole, 1899, pp. 110–12 (there is no genealogical table).
3 Zambaur, 1927, pp. 206–7 (on the errors in the section on the Karakhanids, see Davidovich, 1957, pp. 115–17).
5 Both designations represent titles. The title Kara Kaghan was the most important Turkish title up till the end of the dynasty.
several hypotheses. It is, however, probable that the dynasty came from the Yaghma or Chigil tribes.

Clashes between the Samanids and the Karakhanids began to occur in the ninth century. The Samanids even advanced some small distance to the east into the lands of the Turkish peoples. In 840 they took Isfijab and built walls around it to protect its inhabitants’ crops from the raids of the nomads. Isfijab was not merely a military outpost, however; brisk trade with the nomads was also conducted there and the town contained many bazaars and caravanserais. The traders from Bukhara, Samarkand and other large towns of Transoxania constructed separate caravanserais for themselves. Significantly, however, Isfijab remained a largely independent possession of the local Turkish dynasty, which owed only three obligations to the Samanids: military service, the presentation of symbolic gifts and the inscription of the name of the Samanid amir as suzerain on their coinage. The names of several members of this Turkish family who ruled Isfijab in the tenth century are known from the legends on coins and from the manuscript sources. At a later date, in 893, the Samanid Ism¯a¯il b. Ahmad took Taraz, long a possession of the Karakhanids, and converted the Christian church there into a mosque; Taraz was another major trading post for exchanges with the Turkish nomads.

In the mid–tenth century, the Karakhanids themselves adopted Islam and declared it to be the religion of their tribal society. They began to take Muslim names and, later, Muslim honorifics (alqāb; pl. of laqab). But the regnal titles conveying the real or formal position of their holders in the dynastic hierarchy were Turkish: Khan and Kaghan (Kara Khan and Kara Kaghan), Ilek (Ilig), Tegin, etc. The names of animals were a regular element in the Turkish titles of the Karakhanids: thus Arslan (lion), Bughra (camel), Toghan (falcon), Böri (wolf), Toghrul or Toghrïl (a bird of prey), etc. The Karakhanids later also began to use the Arab titles sultan and sult¯an al-sal¯at¯ın (sultan of sultans). The titles of the members of the dynasty changed with their changing position, normally upwards, in the dynastic hierarchy.

In the final decade of the tenth century, the Karakhanids began a systematic struggle against the Samanids for control of Transoxania. As Muslims who had already had contacts with the Islamic culture of Transoxania, they knew that one of the principal emblems of power, providing material proof of the control of a town, a region or a state, was the minting of coins in one’s own name. That is why the coins that made their appearance with the first military successes of the Karakhanids represent a most important indicator for their political history.

The conquest of Transoxania was initiated by two cousins, Al¯ı b. M¯us¯a (the head of the dynasty; title: Kara Khan or Arslan Khan) and Hasan b. Sulaym¯an (title: Bughra Khan).

Pritsak, 1953, pp. 21–2.
Pritsak proposed that the families of these two cousins be referred to as the ‘Alids and the Hasanids, and this nomenclature is most convenient for a consideration of the subsequent history of the Karakhanids, as the relations between the two families determined the events of the time (see Table 1).

The following account of the conquest is provided by the written and numismatic sources. The first campaign was led by Hasan b. Sulaymān Bughra Khan. The Karakhanids took Isfījab in 380/990, Ferghana in 381/991–2 and Ilaq, Samarkand and the Samanid

---

capital, Bukhara, in 382/992. These military successes were celebrated by a political gesture: the minting of coins in the name of Bughra Khan.\(^8\) Having fallen ill in Bukhara, he travelled to Samarkand and from there set out for Kashghar but died on the way in 382/992. The Samanid ruler returned to Bukhara and took control of the central regions of Transoxania, whereas the Karakhanids retained a part of the north-eastern and eastern regions. The initiative then passed to the family of \(\mathcal{\text{c}}\)Ali b. Mūsā. One of his sons, Nasr b. \(\mathcal{\text{c}}\)Ali, played a particularly active role; in 386/996 he conquered the region of Chach, in 387/997 Samarkand and in 389/999, having encountered no resistance, he also took the capital, Bukhara.\(^9\)

There were two reasons for the speedy and effortless victory of the Karakhanids. The first was that the members of the military and bureaucratic structures of the Samanid state, who wielded a great deal of power, fought among themselves and also, at times, against the head of the dynasty. The vassal rulers of Khwarazm, Khurasan and Tukharistan had become virtually independent and took part in the internecine strife, sometimes on the side of the Samanids and sometimes against them. A new state had thus emerged, the state of the Ghaznavids. In this complex situation, the Samanid ruler was unable to concentrate all his forces on the struggle against the Karakhanids. Second, the Karakhanids were Muslims, and their arrival merely represented a change of rulers at the apex of government at a time when many people were unhappy with the Samanids and entertained hopes of fresh privileges and advantages under the Karakhanids. Certain leading representatives of the military and bureaucratic class assisted the Karakhanids, and the \(\text{dihqā̄ns}\) (major landowners) also took their side. The populace, on the other hand, looked on the change of dynasties with indifference.

There seems no doubt that the Karakhanids rewarded generously those who had assisted them. A typical case is that of Begtuzun, who had risen to the highest office under the Samanids and had settled the fate of the throne on more than one occasion. When the Karakhanids reached Bukhara in 999, Begtuzun rallied to their cause and, as their vassal, went on to govern several towns including Kish (coinage 399–402/1008–12) and Khujand (coinage 415/1024–5).\(^{10}\) The position of the Ilaq \(\text{dihqā̄ns}\) was strengthened under the Karakhanids. From the year 992 onwards, the Karakhanid coinage for the region refers to

\(^8\) On the early coinage of the Karakhanids, see Ishankhanov and Kochnev, 1979. (Since many of the dates given in this chapter stem from coin legends, the original \textit{hijri} forms of these dates are given in this chapter – Editors.)

\(^9\) On the unsuccessful struggle of the last Samanid against the Karakhanids, see above, Chapter 4.

\(^{10}\) Kochnev, 1982, pp. 152–7.
the *dihqāns*, the direct rulers of Ilaq,\(^\text{11}\) as vassals. That was a privilege they had not enjoyed under the Samanids.

The Karakhanid state exhibited several prominent features during its first period (until c. 1040). First, there was the idea of the integrity of the state, which found expression in the recognition of the head of the dynasty and was reflected in the references to him in coin legends as suzerain. Second, there was the division of the state into appanages, which lacked stable borders because of the internecine strife. A third feature was the hierarchical structure of political power, which was reflected in the differing ‘value’ of titles. Lastly, there were the common economic rights – to one and the same appanage sometimes nominal, and sometimes real – of several members of the dynasty.

Four sons of \(^\circ\)Alī b. Mūsā (Ahmad, Nasr, Mansūr and Muhammad) held their own independent appanages within the Karakhanid state; two of them (Ahmad and Mansūr) became, in turn, head of the dynasty after the death of their father in 388/998. The first to do so was Ahmad b. \(^\circ\)Alī (not Nasr b. \(^\circ\)Alī, as believed by many historians). Ahmad, to whom the Muslim written sources make practically no reference, adopted his father’s title (Kara Kaghan) as well as the title Toghan Khan; Nāṣir al-Haqq Khan is found more often on the coinage. His own appanage was located in Semirechye, but he also held Chach. The chief town of the appanage and the capital of the Karakhanid state at the time was Balasaghun (thus in Muslim sources), otherwise referred to as Quz Urdu and Ulush Urdu (Mahmūd Kāshgharī). The dynastic head lived not in the town but in his nearby army encampment (*ordo, urdu*); the nomadic traditions and way of life of the Karakhanids were still very strong at the time. Palaeographic studies provide us with two possible interpretations of the legends on the coins struck in the capital: *Qara Urdu* and *Quz Urdu*. Pritsak made a special study of the question of Turkish colour symbolism and concluded that the headquarters of the dynastic head near Balasaghun was indeed called *Qara Urdu*.\(^\text{12}\) Kashghar at that time, and subsequently, was in the hands of the Hasanids. From 395/1004–5 Yūsuf Kadîr Khan (the son of Hasan Bughra Khan) regularly struck coins there in his own name with the title *malik al-mashriq* (King of the East).

The most influential and the best-known figure was the \(^\circ\)Alid Nasr b. \(^\circ\)Alī (the conquor of Transoxania). Although his titles were modest (initially Tegin and later Ilek), he held a vast, wealthy and prestigious appanage that comprised the central areas of Transoxania (Samarkand, Bukhara, etc.), Ferghana and also, at certain periods, other areas and towns. The principal town in his appanage was Uzgend in Ferghana. Nasr b. \(^\circ\)Alī was in practice an independent ruler but formally recognized his brother, Ahmad b. \(^\circ\)Alī, as head

---

\(^{11}\) Davidovich, 1978, pp. 80–100.

\(^{12}\) Pritsak, 1955, p. 15.
of the dynasty. They both appear on most of the coins from Nasr’s appanage as suzerain and vassal (with the emphasis on Nasr’s independence, however). There are instances of joint economic ownership, including that of the wealthy town and region of Khujand: the brothers shared the income from this domain. Ahmad and Nasr also transferred control of individual towns and regions in their enormous appanages to other individuals (some of whom were not members of the dynasty) as their vassals.

After the death of Nasr b. ךAlũ in 403/1012–13, his appanage was broken up. A large part fell to the head of the dynasty, but his other brothers were also stirred to action. Mansûr b. ךAlũ, who, according to the coinage, had assumed the august title of Arslan Khan during Ahmad’s lifetime, seized the capital Balasaghun and many other towns. This act evidently led to a state of war between them, and they were reconciled only as a result of the mediation of the Khwarazm Shah Ma’mûn. Nevertheless, in defiance of every tradition governing the hierarchy of titles, the title of Khan was for a certain time borne by three Karakhanids: the ךAlûds, Ahmad and Mansûr, and the Hasanid, Yûsuf b. Hasan.

Among the external political events of the period during which Ahmad b. ךAlũ was the head of the dynasty, mention should be made of the war against the ‘infidel’ Turkish peoples to the north-east and east of the frontiers of the Karakhanid state, and also of relations with the Ghaznavids to the south-west and the south. Ahmad’s father had fallen in combat against the infidel Turks in 388/998, and Ahmad himself fought against them on at least two occasions. Following the first clash, he obtained the title of ghâzî (fighter for the faith). At a later date (not before 403/1012–13), the pagan Turks invaded the domains of the Karakhanids and almost reached the capital Balasaghun, but many ghâzî volunteers, including some from neighbouring Muslim states, responded to the appeal of Ahmad b. ךAlũ, who repelled the invaders and gained a brilliant victory, seizing both prisoners and vast spoils. News of this major campaign spread throughout the Muslim world, hence the detailed and exaggerated accounts found in the sources (the dates for this campaign vary).

Relations with the Ghaznavids were not stable, and the brothers Ahmad and Nasr conducted independent foreign policies. Nasr and Mahmûd of Ghazna at first agreed that the Oxus (Amu Darya) should be considered the frontier between their two states. However, Nasr attempted on two occasions to expand his appanage southwards at the expense of Ghaznavid territory. Ahmad, on the other hand, relied on an alliance with Mahmûd of Ghazna whenever relations with his brother worsened.

After the death of Ahmad b. ךAlũ in 408/1017–18, his brother Mansûr b. ךAlũ became the nominal head of the dynasty, with the title of Arslan Khan; later (after 415/1024–5), supremacy passed to the Hasanids. It is important to emphasize that there was no

---

13 On a silver coin from Isfijab 398/1007–8, see Kochnev, 1988, pp. 197–9.
precise delimitation of territory between the ālids and the Hasanids during the first period (regardless of which family representative was head of the dynasty). Some Hasanids held appanages in Transoxania and declared themselves to be vassals of the ālids. Another significant feature of the time was the further development of the hierarchical structure of power and joint economic ownership, i.e. the sharing of the income from the same appanage between several members of the dynasty. This process can be closely traced in the coinage of the Karakhanids. We may consider by way of example the coins of Akhsikath from 409/1018–19 to 415/1024–5. The head of the dynasty at that time was Mansūr b. ālī Arslan Khan, who is referred to as suzerain on these coins. The ruler of the town during these years was his brother Muhammad b. ālī Ilek, who at one time ceded some of his rights and income to one of his nephews, Ahmad b. Mansūr (coining of the years 409–10/1018–20), at another time to a second nephew, Muhammad b. Nasr (coining of the years 413–15/1022–5), and at a third time to both together (coining of the year 412/1021–2). The year 415/1024–5 appears to have been most eventful: the two previous joint owners, Muhammad b. ālī and his nephew Muhammad b. Nasr, were joined by the latter’s son, ābbās. The head of the dynasty, the ālīd Mansūr b. ālī Arslan Khan, died in the same year: the Hasanid Toghan Khan II (= Muhammad b. Hasan)14 then appears on the coinage as suzerain, while the ālīd Muhammad b. Nasr and his son ābbās figure as joint owners of Akhsikath.

Even before Muhammad b. Hasan Toghan Khan II became the head of the Karakhanid dynasty, another member of the same family, ālī Tegin (= ālī b. Hasan), played an extremely active role in the central region of Transoxania. The written sources and the coinage both provide a great deal of information about him. Having been imprisoned by the head of the dynasty, the ālīd Mansūr b. ālī Arslan Khan, ālī Tegin escaped from captivity (not later than 411/1020–1) to seize control of Bukhara and several other towns and regions. After the death of Mansūr b. ālī, he extended his domains still further. Peace did not reign among the Hasanids at that time. ālī Tegin was allied to his brother Muhammad Toghan Khan II (the head of the dynasty), in opposition to their brother, Yusuf Kadir Khan (the long-established ruler of Kashghar), who sought to become the head of the Karakhanids. Yusuf Kadir Khan formally achieved his ambition, but central Transoxania remained in the hands of ālī Tegin until his death in 426/1034–5 and was then passed on to his sons.

Mahmūd of Ghazna also intervened in the internal strife between the Karakhanids. According to the sources, complaints about ālī Tegin from the region’s inhabitants

14 The written sources identify Toghan Khan with various Karakhanids. Kochnev, 1979, pp. 125–31, convincingly shows on the basis of coin inscriptions that he was, in fact, Muhammad b. Hasan.
provided the pretext for Mahmūd’s campaign against Transoxania. Mahmūd was himself displeased, as ʿAlī Tegin allegedly did not allow his envoys passage to Yūsuf Kadīr Khan in East Turkistan. The real reason uniting Mahmūd and the Karakhanid Kadīr Khan, however, was the threat posed by the strengthening position of ʿAlī Tegin. The allies met in the year 416/1025 to the south of Samarkand, exchanged gifts of great value and decided to join forces in order to wrest Transoxania from ʿAlī’s grasp. Mahmūd routed his Turkmen allies, and ʿAlī then abandoned Bukhara and Samarkand: his baggage train was pillaged en route. Although Mahmūd of Ghazna did not consolidate these military successes and returned to his capital, he had achieved a great deal. Henceforth, none of the Karakhanids represented a threat; their forces counterbalanced each other, although the balance of forces in the Karakhanid state continued to be a matter of concern to the Ghaznavids even after Mahmūd’s death (see above, Chapter 5).

The two Karakhanid Khanates; the policy of Ibrāhīm b. Nasr Tamghach Khan

The formation of two states (Khanates) was a watershed in the history of the Karakhanids. Barthold notes in passing that Ibrāhīm b. Nasr established an independent state in Transoxania but is extremely circumspect about the date of this event, supposing that Ibrāhīm could still have ruled as a vassal in Bukhara in 433/1041–2.15 Pritsak was the first to give special, detailed consideration to this question. In essence, his view is that following the death of the nominal head of the dynasty, Yūsuf Kadīr Khan in 424/1032, two of his sons assumed the highest titles: Sulaymān b. Yūsuf in Balasaghun and Kashghar became Arslan Khan, and Muhammad b. Yūsuf in Taraz and Isfījāb took the title of Bughra Khan. Two sons of the ʿAlid Nasr b. ʿAlī broke away completely from the Hasanids: Muhammad b. Nasr became the ruler of the whole of Ferghana, with his residence at Uzgend and the title of Arslan Khan, whereas Ibrāim b. Nasr established himself in the centre of Transoxania. The process of partition culminated in the year 433/1042–3: an Eastern Khanate was formed with its capital at Balasaghun (later, Kashghar) and a Western Khanate with its capital at Uzgend (later Samarkand). The head of each Khanate bore the title Arslan Khan, and the second-ranking associate Khans the title Bughra Khan.16

This concept, while orderly in appearance, does not tally with some of the written sources or with any of the numismatic evidence. Indeed, the independent state of the Western Karakhanids was formed in an entirely different manner. Muhammad b. Nasr was never

---

15 Barthold, 1928, p. 304.
head of that state, nor did he bear the title Arslan Khan. Moreover, Ferghana did not constitute the core nor Uzgend the capital of the Western Khanate. Muhammad b. Nasr (better known as Ayn al-Dawla) was always the holder of an appanage and a vassal of either his close relatives, the Alids, or the more distant Hasanids. Between the years 411/1020–1 and 447/1055–6 coins bearing his name appeared at different periods in the various towns of Ferghana, in Khujand and in Ilaq. For example, when the head of the dynasty of all the Karakhanids was his uncle Mansur b. Ali Arslan Khan (up to 415/1024–5), Muhammad b. Nasr controlled Uzgend (the main town of Ferghana) and Akhsikath, recognizing his two uncles Mansur b. Ali and Muhammad b. Ali as suzerains. Even in economic terms he was not in full possession of these towns, as he was obliged to share the revenue with other members of the dynasty. In the year 415/1024–5, when the Hasanids became dynastic heads, Muhammad b. Nasr recognized their suzerainty and retained control of both towns for a certain time. In 431/1040 a celebrated battle took place between the Ghaznavids and the Seljuqs near Dandanqan; the Seljuqs were victorious, and Khurasan passed into their hands (see above, Chapter 5). They then informed the following Karakhanids of their victory: the two Khans of Turkistan (i.e. the brothers Sulayman b. Yusuf and Muhammad b. Yusuf), the sons of Ali Tegin in Transoxania and also the brothers of the Alid family, Boiri Tegin (i.e. Ibrahím b. Nasr) and Ayn al-Dawla (i.e. Muhammad b. Nasr). The Karakhanid state was still formally united; the Hasanid family enjoyed clear political preponderance, although two sons of Nasr b. Ali, Muhammad (their vassal) and Ibrahím (who had already engaged in a struggle against them), were well known to the world beyond and were held in high esteem.

When the Karakhanid state split into two independent Khanates, Ferghana fell within the bounds of the Eastern Khanate, i.e. within the sphere of influence of the Hasanids. Both Hasanids – Sulayman b. Yusuf Arslan Khan and Muhammad b. Yusuf Bughra Khan – appear as suzerains on the coinage of a number of towns there (Uzgend, Kuba, Marghinan and Akhsikath) in the year 440/1048–9. The northern part of Ferghana (Akhsikath) belonged to the latter and the south-east (Uzgend, Kuba, etc.) to the former, although these boundaries were not rigid. The Hasanids also had their vassals in Ferghana. Muhammad b. Nasr Ayn al-Dawla was one of the vassals of Sulayman b. Yusuf Arslan Khan and held some of the towns there in appanage (it is not known whether at certain times he controlled such towns as Kuba and Marghinan). Muhammad b. Nasr remained an appanage-holder, a vassal and nothing more, until the end of his life.

The political career of the other son of Nasr b. Ali, Ibrahím b. Nasr (the Boiri Tegin of the written sources), was very different. Boiri Tegin was for some time a prisoner of the

Hasanids (the sons of Ėlī Tegin in Transoxania). Escaping to join his brother in Uzgend, he then moved south to the mountains, where he assembled an army, intending to win back some regions from the Ghaznavids. He first laid waste the areas of Khuttal and Wakhsh (in modern southern Tajikistan) and then took control of the area of Chaghaniyan (in modern southern Uzbekistan). Coins were minted in his name in Chaghaniyan from 430/1038–9. It was from there that Bōrī Tegin began the battle for Transoxania against the sons of Ėlī Tegin. He gained several victories over them at the beginning of 431/1039, and by the following year had seized a considerable part of central Transoxania. He marked his military successes by a political act: in 431/1039–40 (coinage of Chaghaniyan) he replaced his modest title Bōrī Tegin with the title Tamghach Bughra Khan (Kaghan).\textsuperscript{18} Ibrāhīm Tamghach Khan immediately made Samarkand his capital. Such were the origins of the independent state, the Western Khanate: all the initiative was taken not by Muhammad b. Nasr but by his brother, Ibrāhīm b. Nasr. The division of the Karakhanid state also established the demarcation line between the two families, the Ėlids and the Hasanids, ruling respectively the Western and Eastern Khanates. The border between the two Khanates changed repeatedly. The bone of contention was Ferghana, with its wealthy towns, mineral resources and fertile land. Several areas along the course of the Jaxartes (Syr Darya) also changed hands.

Ibrāhīm Tamghach Khan no longer conducted an active foreign policy after forming an independent state. However, he successfully exploited the civil strife among the Eastern Karakhanids, the struggle between the Hasanid brothers, Sulaymān and Muhammad. No later than the year 451/1059–60 Ibrāhīm attached Ferghana to his domain. The conquest of the region was duly marked by the striking of coins in his name at a number of towns (such as Uzgend, Akhsikath and Marghinan).

Muslim historians considered Ibrāhīm Tamghach Khan to be a great and devout sovereign. His domestic policy does indeed reveal him to have been a quite exceptional ruler. Barthold discovered in the written sources some amusing stories about his life and deeds,\textsuperscript{19} each of which has a rational core. These stories, together with the indirect evidence provided by the coinage of the time, show that Ibrāhīm did indeed concern himself with internal order in the country, the security of the population, respect for property, trade and currency circulation. According to one tale, some robbers once wrote on the gate of the citadel of Samarkand, ‘We are like an onion, the more we are cut the bigger we grow.’ The Khan ordered to be written underneath their words, ‘I stand here like a gardener; however

\textsuperscript{18} Davidovich, 1970, pp. 88–94.
\textsuperscript{19} Barthold, 1928, pp. 311–13.
much you grow I will uproot you.’

It is clear from another story that he did indeed instil terror among thieves and robbers and that the ordinary people in his dominions felt safe. It may be concluded from indirect evidence that state control of market prices existed during Ibrāḥīm’s reign. On one occasion, the butchers complained to him that the statutory price of meat was too low and asked him to raise it, promising to contribute 1,000 dinars to the treasury. The Khan agreed but forbade the people to buy any meat. The butchers were then obliged to pay more money into the treasury in order to have the old, low price of meat restored.

Normal trading always depended on the organization of currency circulation. Ibrāḥīm took responsibility for this aspect of economic life. During his rule, a single system of coinage with different denominations circulated throughout the Western Karakhanid Khanate, creating good, stable market conditions. The dirhams struck with the name and title of Ibrāḥīm Tamghach Khan were known as mu’ayyadī. They were made of low-grade silver, but the addition of copper was not a fraud carried out in secret. The population knew the official standard of purity of the mu’ayyadī dirhams; their value, which tallied with that standard, fluctuated slightly and was fixed in terms of pure gold. Greater purchasing power was attached to the Bukhār Khudāt dirhams, which were struck on the model of the Sasanian coinage (see below, Chapter 20). By the beginning of the ninth century these dirhams were divided into three groups, each with its own name, on the basis of the quantity of silver they contained: the highest-grade coins (with over 70 per cent silver) were known as _musayyabī_, the lower-grade (over 40 per cent silver) as _muhammadī_ and the copper coins with no silver content as _ghitrīfī_. _Muhammadī_ and _ghitrīfī_ dirhams were still in circulation under the Karakhanids. The rate for the copper _ghitrīfī_ was equal to or higher than that for pure silver, but the rate for the _muhammadī_ was higher than that for the _ghitrīfī_. This phenomenon developed in the ninth and tenth centuries and continued under the Karakhanids, which clearly shows that they pursued the same financial and fiscal policies as had been applied by the Arab governors and Samanids in the previous period. In this context, it is important to note that the three types of dirham provided a satisfactory basis for the different levels of internal trade under Ibrāḥīm Tamghach Khan (see below, Chapter 20).

An important component of Ibrāḥīm’s financial and fiscal policy was the currency reform that he introduced after conquering Ferghana, previously a part of the Eastern Karakhanid Khanate. Copper–lead dirhams were issued in the towns of Ferghana and in several other towns of the Eastern Khanate. These were coins of irregular shape and differing weight, with serrated edges. Ibrāḥīm banned their circulation in Ferghana and

---

20 Ibid., p. 312.
Mu‘ayyadī dirhams began to be issued in various towns of the region. This led to very different consequences in the two Khanates. Ferghana was incorporated into the currency area of the Western Khanate, whereas the bulk of the banned copper–lead dirhams flowed into the Eastern Khanate (mostly to the territory of modern Kyrgyzstan and southern Kazakhstan). However, the level of trade there did not require such large quantities of copper–lead dirhams and the resulting inflation led to a severe currency crisis. People no longer wanted the devalued coins and they ended up in deposits.

Ibrāhīm waged a successful struggle against the appanage system, which had been the cause of endless fratricidal strife, and the reassignment of towns and regions. He did not set up a centralized state, but managed to reduce considerably the number of appanages and the rights of appanage-holders. This was a great political triumph and one of the most important factors contributing to the stability of the Western Karakhanid Khanate under Ibrāhīm Tamghach Khan.

The economic successes were of even greater importance, however. We may assume that substantial sums flowed into the coffers of the central government. This was one of the factors underpinning the considerable building activity that took place. Both Ibrāhīm and his son Nasr Shams al-Mulk engaged in major building projects. Ibrāhīm built a hospital in Samarkand where he not only cared for the sick but also gave shelter to the poor. He provided the hospital with funds for the maintenance of the doctors and auxiliary staff, for the patients’ meals, for light, for firewood for the kitchen and for the repair of the premises. In Samarkand he also built a madrasa (Islamic school), providing the wages of the teachers, grants for the students, books for the library, the lighting of the premises, etc.21 For the benefit of the caravan trade, his son built ribāts (caravanserais) in the steppes between Bukhara and Samarkand (Ribāt-i Malik, ‘the ribāt of the king’) and on the road from Samarkand to Khujand. Nasr Shams al-Mulk also restored the mosque and minaret in Bukhara and, close to the town, built a beautiful palace at a place that was thereafter known as Shamsabad. Muhammad b. Nasr (Ibrāhīm’s brother) and his son, ʿAbbās, built a mausoleum in Ferghana (now known as the Shāh Fādīla mausoleum), the interior of which is decorated with elaborate alabaster carving and inscriptions recording the names of both men.22 At this period the Karakhanids still maintained their nomadic traditions, but the extent and diversity of the civil and religious buildings constructed testify to the fact that the culture and traditions of the settled population of Transoxania had been more extensively and profoundly assimilated.

21 Khadr, 1967. One of the waqfs is dated Rajab 458/May–June 1066.
Karakhanids, Seljuqs and Kara Khitay

It was clear even in the days of Ibrāhīm Tamghach Khan and his son, Nasr Shams al-Mulk, that the Seljuqs had designs on Transoxania, but they achieved no decisive successes. On the contrary, Nasr took possession of the Seljuq towns in northern Khurasan, albeit for just a short time. But during the reign of Ibrāhīm’s grandson Ahmad b. Khidr (d. 1095), the Seljuqs took Samarkand with the support of the town’s religious classes (friction had long existed between them and the Karakhanids), together with other domains belonging to the Western Khanate. Even the Karakhanids of Kashghar declared their submission. For half a century the Karakhanids became vassals of the Seljuqs. The vassal status of the Eastern Karakhanids was of short duration. Moreover, at the beginning of the twelfth century they invaded Transoxania, advancing into the domains of the Seljuqs themselves; for a short time they even held the Seljuq town of Termez on the Oxus. The Western Karakhanids were more dependent on the Seljuqs, although nothing is known of the financial aspect of their dependence. (Did they pay tribute?) Their political dependence was considerable, however: the Seljuqs placed on the Karakhanid throne in Samarkand whichever members of the dynasty they required. The vassal status of the Western Karakhanids is also reflected in the coinage, some of which bears the names of Seljuq sultans.

The following internal events are also worthy of note. The Seljuqs soon restored to the Karakhanid Ahmad b. Khidr the throne that they had wrested from him. The long-standing strife between the Karakhanid rulers and the ‘ulamā’ (scholars learned in the Islamic legal and theological sciences) grew more intense during Ahmad’s reign, however, and the clergy gained the upper hand in the struggle. They accused Ahmad of heresy and in 1095 secured his execution. Barthold correctly emphasized that ‘this event must be regarded as the greatest of the successes gained by the priesthood in alliance with the military classes over the government and the mass of citizens’. 23

In 1102 the Seljuqs placed Muhammad Arslan Khan, the great-grandson of Ibrāhīm Tamghach Khan, on the throne of Samarkand and helped him to overcome another claimant. The situation in Transoxania remained peaceful and stable (until 1130) during Muhammad’s reign, and he himself became renowned for his building activities. The scale of civic construction was considerable. Muhammad built a ribāt, restored the walls of the Bukhara citadel and constructed a new outer wall surrounding the entire town; he also raised three new palaces, one in the citadel and two in the town. Having managed to maintain smooth relations with the ‘ulamā’in, he erected many religious buildings. Thus on the outskirts of Bukhara (on the site of the palace at Shamsabad, which had by that time been destroyed),

23 Barthold, 1928, p. 318.
he laid out an area for ceremonial acts of worship (*namāzgāh*); within the town he built a magnificent new mosque, the minaret of which still stands, and also repaired an old one.

At the end of his life, Muhammad was struck down by paralysis. Conflicts with the religious classes broke out once more and the Seljuqs again interfered in the affairs of the Karakhanids. The renowned Seljuq Sultan Sanjar took Samarkand in 1130 and began to dispose of the throne in a despotic fashion, replacing one Karakhanid with another.

It was at that time that the Kara Khitay (referred to as such by the Muslim sources) made their appearance on the political scene. The Khitay had established an enormous empire as early as the end of the tenth century, the residence of the dynasty being in northern China. They were driven out by the nomadic Jürchen, and surviving elements made their way westwards. The Khitay first took over the domains of the Eastern Karakhanids and in 1137 defeated the Western Karakhanids near Khujand. They did not move into Transoxania in the same year, however. The chief of the Kara Khitay bore the title of Gür Khan and his capital was located not far from Balasaghun.

In 1141 the Qatwan steppe to the north of Samarkand was the scene of a decisive battle between the Kara Khitay and the Seljuqs in which the latter were utterly defeated. Sultan Sanjar and the ruler of the Karakhanids both fled to Khurasan and the Kara Khitay took control of Transoxania. They did not, however, destroy the dynasty of the Karakhanids. We do not find the names of Kara Khitay Gür Khans on Karakhanid coins, which indicates that they were not interested in what was for the Muslims an important mark of political supremacy. The financial aspect of the conquest found expression in the tribute that the Kara Khitay exacted from the Karakhanids. The Kara Khitay did not remain in Transoxania, however, and did not themselves collect the tribute; that task was performed on their behalf by Karakhanid officials.

The dominion of the Kara Khitay did not bring peace and tranquillity to Transoxania. Various nomadic Turkic tribes and federations living within its bounds (Karluk, Turkmens, etc.) were highly active at the time. The Karluk killed Ibrāhīm III Tamghach Khan (536–51/1141–56), head of the Western Karakhanids, and left his body on the steppe. The next head of the Western Karakhanids took vengeance on the Karluk, killing their leader. The Kara Khitay Gür Khan demanded that all the Karluk move to Kashghar and take up agriculture; he clearly hoped to assist the vassal Karakhanids in this way and establish order in Transoxania. The result was quite the opposite, however. A new war against the Karluk ended with the victory of ʿAlī b. Hasan, but the victory did not prove decisive. Masʿūd b. Hasan (the brother of ʿAlī b. Hasan) mounted the throne after a long and exhausting struggle of perhaps two years’ duration against the nomadic pagan Türks, a struggle that was to have ruinous consequences for Transoxania. Masʿūd won a decisive victory in 556/1160–1
on the steppe near the famous Ribāt-i Malik, which has survived to this day, where travellers and caravans carrying merchandise stopped on the ‘shah’s road’ between Bukhara and Samarkand. It was shortly after Mas'ūd’s accession to the throne that Muhammad al-Kātib al-Samarqandī presented him with his Sindbād-nāma [Book of Sindbad]: in the introduction and the final part of this work, Samarqandī extravagantly praises the ruler for his victory in the fierce struggle against the nomads.

Rukn al-Dunya wa 'l-Dīn Kilīch Mas'ūd Tamghach Khan was a well-known figure mentioned in many of the written sources. Al-Samarqandī dedicated two celebrated works to him, the above-mentioned Sindbād-nāma and the later A'īrād al-siyyāsā, and the poet Sūzanī Samarqandi a number of qasīdas (odes). In 560/1164–5 Mas'ūd restored the walls of Bukhara, which had been destroyed. He also conducted a successful campaign against the Karluk to the south (in Nakhshab, Kish, Chaghaniyan and Termez) and established order there. He suppressed a rising by one of his commanders and was successful in his operations against the Oghuz, who had plundered Khurasan. The date at which his rule came to an end (566/1170–1)²⁴ and the names of his successors in Samarkand have been determined from coins.

Two developments affected the state of the Western Khanate in the second half of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth. First, lasting control of the throne of Samarkand passed to the Ferghana branch of the Karakhanids. The above-mentioned brothers, ʿAlī and Mas'ūd, were members of this family, as were all subsequent rulers until the end of the dynasty. The second change was that the region of Ferghana itself became formally as well as de facto independent. The rulers of Ferghana, who were members of the same family, struck coins in their own name in Uzgend, the chief town of the region, bearing no reference to the Karakhanids of Samarkand as their suzerains.

The idea of the unity of the Western Khanate was expressed through the prestige of the titles, those of the rulers of Samarkand being slightly more august than those of the rulers of Ferghana. Thus, at the time when Samarkand was ruled by Mas'ūd b. Hasan and his son Muhammad (under their title of Tamghach Khan), Ferghana was held by their close relatives, the brothers Mahmūd b. Husayn and Ibrāhīm b. Husayn. Ibrāhīm issued coins annually from 559/1163–4 to 574/1178–9 in his own name under the title Arslan Khan. At that time, the title Arslan Khan (Kaghan) had a somewhat lower status than the title Tamghach Khan in the Western Khanate. By 574/1178–9 Ibrāhīm b. Husayn was ruling in Samarkand and the title ulugh sultān al-salātīn (great sultan of sultans) appeared on

²⁴ Two manuscripts of Jamāl Qarshī erroneously give the year a.h. 560. The description of the Karakhanids contained in these manuscripts also contains many other errors, which have been corrected with information drawn from the legends on coins (see Davidovich, 1977, pp. 179–83).
his coinage. This title, together with the throne, was passed on to his son ʿUthmān at the beginning of the thirteenth century. His other son, Kadīr b. Ibrāhīm, had his residence in Uzgend and his title was lower in status than that of his father and brother. The last Karakhanid in Ferghana was another member of the Ferghana family, Mahmūd b. Ahmad.

The Karakhanids and the Khwarazm Shah
Muhammad b. Tekish

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad b. Tekish (1200–20), the penultimate member of the Anushteginids (the third dynasty of Khwarazm Shahs), consolidated and extended his father’s military successes in the south. His main task was then to defeat the Kara Khitay. The Anushteginids were vassals of the Kara Khitay (like the Karakhanids) and paid tribute to them. Muhammad initially wished to have the Karakhanids as his allies in the fight against the common enemy, the ‘infidel’ Kara Khitay. A threat from a different quarter also awaited the Kara Khitay. To the east there appeared the nomadic Mongol tribe of the Naiman, led by the warlike Küchlüg. The generalized conflict that brought about the downfall of both the Karakhanids and the Kara Khitay was preceded by the following events and upheavals.

Bukhara was in practice controlled by the sadrs (leaders of the Muslim religious classes) of the Burhān family. They were extremely rich and used their power to oppress the people. In 1207 a certain Sanjar, the son of a seller of shields, led a revolt of the citizenry against the sadrs and seized control of the town. This provided the pretext for a campaign against Bukhara; ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad b. Tekish took the town and quelled the revolt, but also destroyed the power of the sadrs. He did not have Sanjar executed but instead sent him to Khwarazm. Muhammad ordered the citadel and the walls of Bukhara to be rebuilt and he himself returned to his domains. Subsequent relations with the Karakhanids were to a considerable extent influenced by the cunning policy of ʿUthmān, who manoeuvred between the Kara Khitay and Muhammad b. Tekish. Initially, he took the side of the latter, and relations between them were those of allies: ʿUthmān even held a higher title (ulugh sultān al-salāṭīn) than did Muhammad (sultān). However, ʿUthmān soon sided with the Kara Khitay and sought the hand in marriage of the Gür Khan’s daughter. On being refused, he reverted to his alliance with Muhammad, but this time as the latter’s vassal. In 606/1209–10 coins were struck to mark the new relationship between the two

25 Küchlüg the Naiman fled into the lands of the Kara Khitay after the defeat inflicted on him in 1208 by Chinggis Khan.

26 The accounts provided by the written sources about events at this time are contradictory: the dates vary and are unreliable. The legends on coins have provided the basis for major amendments and a reconstruction of the major changes (see Davidovich, 1957, pp. 113–14; 1994).
rulers; the names of both appear on the coins, that of Muhammad as suzerain and that of ĒUthmān as his vassal. ĒUthmān was obliged to curb his ambitions: both rulers are given the same title, sultan, on these coins. The Kara Khitay Gür Khan, responding to ĒUthmān’s ‘treason’, seized control of Samarkand but spared the town and prevented it from being pillaged. However, he was soon compelled to abandon Samarkand and return to his main possessions, where the Naiman Küchlūg had achieved great successes, even seizing the Gür Khan’s treasury, which was stored in Uzgend.

The Gür Khan’s reversals inspired ĒUthmān to acknowledge ĒAlāʾ al-Dīn Muham-mad b. Tekish yet again as his suzerain, and this acknowledgement was duly marked in 607/1210–11 by new coins in both their names that were struck in Samarkand. Many major events occurred in the course of that year. The Gür Khan won a victory against Küchlūg, but the other half of his army, under his commander Tayanku, was defeated by Muhammad b. Tekish, and Tayanku was taken prisoner. ĒAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad’s victory was the cause of great rejoicing among the Muslims: henceforth, the ruler was referred to in documents and on the coinage as ‘The Second Iskandar’ (i.e. the second Alexander) and the equal of Sultan Sanjar.

ĒAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad dispatched envoys to all the leading Karakhanids demanding their submission. ĒUthmān had already acknowledged Muhammad as his suzerain and the others now followed suit. Thus Kadîr b. Ibrâhîm, ruler of Ferghana and second ruler in status among the Karakhanids, acknowledged his vassal status in the same way as his brother ĒUthmān, that is to say, coins bearing Muhammad’s name as well as his own were struck in Uzgend. Kadîr curbed his ambitions to an even greater extent than ĒUthmān; his title on the coins is lower than that of Muhammad. The minor ruler who held Utrar was dilatory in declaring his submission and was therefore stripped of his domains and sent to Nasa. Muhammad then incorporated Utrar into his dominions and struck coins in his own name in the town in 607/1210–11. This was the first indication of a change in Muhammad’s policy towards the Karakhanids.

Shortly afterwards, ĒUthmān married the daughter of ĒAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad b. Tekish and went to live in Khwarazm for a considerable period. He then returned to Samarkand in the company of a Khwarazmian plenipotentiary. Clearly, Muhammad did not trust ĒUthmān – and rightly so, for the latter was not content with his vassal status or the fact that he had to submit to the plenipotentiary. The population of Samarkand was also unhappy with the behaviour of the Khwarazmians. ĒUthmān therefore once more took sides with the Kara Khitay, and the inhabitants of Samarkand massacred all the Khwarazmians there in the most barbaric fashion. In 1212 Muhammad b. Tekish captured Samarkand and on this occasion showed no mercy. In 609/1212 he ordered the execution of the Karakhanid ĒUthmān
and again sent envoys to the Karakhanids of Ferghana demanding their submission. The last ruler of Ferghana, Mahmūd b. Ahmad, postponed the end of the dynasty by accepting vassal status and confirming it by the issue of coins in two names in 609/1212–13. This was no more than a short-term compromise, however. On the coins of Uzgend struck in 610/1213–14 we find only the name of Muhammad b. Tekish. Starting in the same year, coins were also regularly struck in his name in Samarkand, the capital of the new Anushteginid empire, and then in other towns formerly held by the Karakhanids.

In conclusion, we may say that Ālā al-Dīn Muhammad b. Tekish did not initially intend to destroy the Karakhanid dynasty but merely sought allies in his struggle with the Kara Khitay. He considered it normal that the title of the Karakhanid ‘Uthmān should be higher than his own and laid no claim to any of the insignia of power in the Karakhanid state. Subsequently, however, the Karakhanids were obliged to acknowledge themselves as vassals of Muhammad b. Tekish: both ‘Uthmān in Samarkand and Kadīr in Uzgend confirmed their vassal status by striking coins in two names and adopting titles with an inferior status.

In the third and final act, the Karakhanids gradually surrendered their domains – and, in many cases, their lives – to Muhammad b. Tekish. The eastern branch thus disappeared as a result of the struggle between the Kara Khitay, the Naiman Küchlüg and their internal enemies in Kashghar.

**Iqtā’s and the structure of the state**

Historians have for long drawn a contrast between the structures of the Karakhanid and Samanid states and the significance of the institution of the *iqtā* (assignment of revenue from an estate) in those states. They considered that the Samanid state was centralized and that *iqtā*’s had not developed there, whereas *iqtā*’s and the system of appanages were dominant under the Karakhanids.

It is known that the Samanids allocated half their budget for the wages of their troops and officials, a fact that attracted the scholars’ attention when they came to evaluate the significance of the *iqtā*; there is also direct evidence indicating that the Samanids did not grant *iqtā*’s. The existence on the borders of the state of hereditary vassal domains that were virtually independent did not contradict this assessment, since such domains could not be classed as *iqtā*. However, the situation in the main part of the Samanid state remained outside the consideration of the historians. Narshakhī, writing in his *Tārīkh-i Bukhārā* [History of Bukhara] (mid-tenth century), does not employ the term *iqtā*, although an analysis of the information provided about the relationship between the Samanid Nasr I (the head of the dynasty) and his brother Ismā’īl establishes beyond any doubt that
Bukhara was held by the latter as an *iqtāʾ*, that is to say, as a conditional reward for services rendered in the capacity of governor with the right to levy for his own benefit a part of the income of Bukhara and, later, the entire income from the town.\(^\text{27}\) It is also clear from the legends on Samanid coins that Bukhara, Akhsikath, Kuba, Nasrabad and other towns and regions were held as *iqtāʾs* for various periods of time by members of the dynasty and by senior military and civilian officials as rewards for their services. These grants were neither lifelong nor hereditary, although attempts were made to move in that direction and were resisted by the central government.\(^\text{28}\) Given the presence of such domains and appanages within the main body of the Samanid state, we cannot consider it centralized; the appanage system was already developed in the tenth century, which means that it was not simply introduced by the Karakhanids. The institution of *iqtāʾ* was also quite well developed under the Samanids, but the grants were always large ones, given in return for service as the governor of a town or region, and so on. Middle- and lower-ranking members of the military and official class and simple soldiers received fixed payments in cash from the treasury. Such were the characteristics of the state structure and the institution of the *iqtāʾ* under the Samanids.

The conclusion that the *iqtāʾ* was dominant under the Karakhanids did not rest on facts but solely on an analogy with the Seljuq state. But an analogy does not in itself constitute proof, and it automatically overlooks the varying ways in which the same institutions develop in different states. Variations certainly did occur; convincing proof is furnished by a comparison between the *iqtāʾ* in the Seljuq and Ghaznavid states. Under the Seljuqs there were large and small *iqtāʾs* that were granted to members of the dynasty, to various members of the military and official class and to ordinary soldiers. The Ghaznavid Sebüktegin (977–97) (see above, Chapter 5) seized land allotments from his forces and reformed the system of rewards for service: ‘the central power in Ghazna was now strong enough to resume the fiefs and substitute a system of cash payments. In general, his successors for at least the next two or three generations maintained the system of paying the troops in cash.’\(^\text{29}\) The Ghaznavids also avoided distributing large *iqtāʾs*. Nizām al-Mulk provides an interesting account concerning the governor of Khwarazm, Altuntash, whose salary (paid from the treasury of Mahmūd of Ghazna) represented twice as much as the entire revenue from Khwarazm. Altuntash wished to keep the taxes collected there in settlement of half his salary, but the *wazīr* (*vizier*) called him to order: the taxes belonged to the ruler and not to his officials; they should therefore be handed over to the treasury in return for

---


\(^{28}\) Davidovich, 1954, pp. 77–117. Later publications describe further examples of conditional rewards for services consistent with the existence of *iqtāʾ*.

a receipt, and payment should then be requested for services rendered.\textsuperscript{30} Contemporaries were clearly aware of the danger that the system of the \textit{iqtā‘} posed for the integrity of the state and its economy. This awareness and the indisputable existence of the two variants mentioned above (Seljuq and Ghaznavid) prove that the significance of the \textit{iqtā‘} in the life of society and the state was determined not only by the objective features of development but also by a whole set of specific causes particular to each state (the state of the economy and the treasury, the political situation and financial policy, and so on).

Consequently, the question of the \textit{iqtā‘} under the Karakhanids requires specific historical research based on local sources; the inscriptions on coins are the one source of this type available at present. During the first period, up to the division of the Karakhanid state into two Khanates, the appanage system exhibited the following features.\textsuperscript{31} The head of the dynasty had his own appanage, and major appanage-holders recognized the head of the dynasty as their suzerain (the political dimension); in most cases, the latter also appeared on their coins. The head of the dynasty enjoyed no other rights within their appanages. But even these principal and major appanages had no fixed and stable borders; nor were they hereditary. The head of the dynasty and the major appanage-holders transmitted some of their rights to their vassals and sub-vassals; this gave rise to a complex, multi-tiered system of joint economic ownership based on vassalage (the economic dimension), in which the joint owners (usually two or three but sometimes four) divided up in specific proportions the entire revenue from the town (or region) or items of such revenue. The lower level of the hierarchy was occupied, and joint economic ownership held, not only by members of the dynasty but also by longstanding local owners from the period before the Karakhanids and by members of the military and official class who had entered their service. A trend towards the consolidation of inheritances was none the less observable in certain regions and towns, although a similar trend also developed under the Samanids. In other words, the appanage system during the first period of Karakhanid rule differed from that under the Samanids not so much in quality as in quantity, i.e. by its all-inclusiveness. This was the result of a development process that was accelerated by the nomadic Karakhanids. The financial nature of appanages and joint ownership under the Karakhanids during this first period corresponds essentially to the institution that received the designation \textit{iqtā‘}.

Several changes occurred in the structure of the state during the second period, after the division into two separate Khanates. Chief among these were a reduction in the number


\textsuperscript{31} Barthold somewhat simplifies the characteristics of the appanage system under the Karakhanids, supposing that the state ‘was divided into a number of appanages, the large ones being in turn subdivided into many small ones’ (Barthold, 1928, p. 268).
of appanages and the political rights of the appanage-holders, and attempts to consolidate the central authority, to expand its powers and to establish a monopoly over the coinage. Unfortunately, the economic dimension of the changes during this second period cannot be deduced from the numismatic evidence.

The third stage, however – that starting particularly from the second half of the twelfth century – witnessed the consolidation of the appanage system and a considerable increase in the rights of holders. Appanages on the borders of the Western Khanate became hereditary and independent even in political terms. The Karakhanids who held Ferghana and other lesser appanages such as Marghinan, Kasan, Binakat and Utrar issued on a regular or, in the case of the minor appanages, an occasional basis, coins that make no reference to their suzerains. The multi-tiered system of a hierarchy of dependants and joint economic ownership, so typical of the first period, had ceased to exist.

At this third period, there were also domains that did not belong to members of the dynasty. Thus Bukhara was held on a hereditary basis by members of a clerical line, the Āl-i Burhān, upon whom was conferred the title of sadr-i jahān (Pillar of the World) and the office of ra’īs (headman) of Bukhara. They themselves collected the taxes, and the Kara Khitay sent a special envoy to receive the town’s tribute. The local rulers did not issue coins in their own names (we know only of Karakhanid coins in Bukhara during this time), but were otherwise independent. It is also impossible to refer to hereditary domains of this type as iqtā’s.

Even this scant evidence is sufficient to show that we would be committing errors of methodology and of fact if we evaluated the institution of the iqtā under the Karakhanids on the basis of Seljuq evidence. The inscriptions on the coins cannot tell us whether, under the Karakhanids, small grants were made to ordinary soldiers and to minor and middle-ranking members of the army and the civilian bureaucracy; consequently, there are simply no data available for the purposes of comparison with the Seljuq system. On the other hand, we may confidently conclude that there are no similarities between the Ghaznavid and Karakhanid systems during the first period. We can also deduce from inscriptions on the coins that the system of rewards and ownership had developed and acquired features ‘in the upper echelons of power’ that clearly demonstrate the inappropriateness of applying the term iqtā to it. The system of appanages in the Karakhanid state also underwent considerable change; the process was not identical in the Western and Eastern Khanates, however, being less developed in the latter.

In terms of the form of ownership, any holding or joint holding given in reward for services was state property (ground-rent-tax, urban taxes, etc.). It is essential to note that members of the dynasty who received an income from state property on this basis
wished: by sale, donation, bequest to his heirs or assignment to a waqf (endowment for pious purposes). The Karakhanids were great builders, and all buildings were maintained by means of such endowments, so that the volume of waqf property expanded considerably during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. The Karakhanids also endowed waqfs for the benefit of their descendants, the most effective means of preserving property amid all the political upheavals of the time.

**Towns and trade**

The eleventh and twelfth centuries were a period during which towns continued to grow and crafts and trade continued to expand. Three aspects of the development of urban life at the time are worthy of attention. The physical expansion of many towns, limited by the walls of their rabads (suburbs), had come to a halt in the tenth century. In these towns the density of the urban fabric increased under the Karakhanids, and a growing number of premises were concerned with trade and craftwork, especially on the outskirts. The areas of other towns did expand in the eleventh and twelfth centuries, especially those towns on the borders of the state, on the frontier with the nomadic world.

Lastly, the relative importance of the older towns was altered in certain sub-regions. Thus of the many towns, large and small, in Ferghana in the tenth century under the Samanids, Akhsikath (then the region’s capital) was considered the most important, followed by Kuba and Ush; Uzgend was two-thirds the size of Ush. Under the Karakhanids, Uzgend became the principal town and capital of both the region and the appanage; Marghianan and Kasan also gained in importance. In the regions of Chach and Ilaq, the valleys of the rivers Chirchik and Angren, an urban explosion took place under the Samanids; there was no other region of Transoxania where so many towns were to be found in such a small area. The main towns in Chach and Ilaq were respectively Binkath and Tunkath. Under the Karakhanids, they were gradually overshadowed by Binakat and Naukat, but did not lose their importance: tenth-to twelfth-century ceramics have been found at all the excavated archaeological sites. On the middle course of the Syr Darya, new towns sprang up during
the Karakhanid period, and old ones expanded. In the latter category we find Isfijab, the possession of a local Turkish dynasty that had managed to hold on to its position under the Karakhanids, and also Barab-Utrar, which, in the twelfth century, was an independent appanage held by the Karakhanids of Ferghana.

Every town had its bazaars and caravanserais. The craftsmen’s booths were not to be found only in the bazaars, however, but also built against the walls of the caravanserais or simply set up in the street. The ribāts along the roads between towns and the caravanserais inside the towns built under the Karakhanids testify to the lively caravan trade in the eleventh and twelfth centuries.

Baths for men and women were an essential amenity of urban life. Bath houses and caravanserais represented good sources of income, and people were therefore ready and willing to build them. They were often originally milk but were frequently transferred to waqf ownership. Qubawi tells of two magnificent ‘royal’ bath-houses that were built in Bukhara by Ahmad, head of the Karakhanid dynasty and grandson of the renowned Ibrāhīm Tamghach Khan. References to many private and waqf bath-houses may be found in the list of properties transferred to waqf ownership in two waqf-nāmas belonging to Ibrāhīm in which he describes the boundaries of the hospital and madrasa that he built in Samarkand. Booths belonging to craftsmen and traders also attached themselves to the walls of these buildings.

To the best of our knowledge, strenuous efforts were made to keep the towns clean. It was forbidden to throw rubbish into the streets and alleyways, which were considered to be public property. Deep wells for rubbish and sewage, covered by earthenware or wooden lids, were provided in private courtyards as well as in public places, houses and palaces, according to the archaeological evidence. Archaeologists have discovered ceramic water pipes and segments of paved streets and courtyards dating from the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Blown window glass was also in use at the time.

Materials produced in large quantities such as ceramics and glass also provide a fair idea of the development of urban crafts. The ceramic industry under the Karakhanids developed its own style, and there were changes in techniques and in the range of colours used to decorate ceramics. Crockery completely covered with a blue glaze enjoyed great popularity. Equally in demand were bowls and cups with an underglaze decoration in the form of intricate geometric and wickerwork patterns in an elegant combination of light-brown and dark-brown tones. Kufic inscriptions were still employed, but they were transformed into an illegible form of decoration imitating Kufic script. Unglazed ceramics resembling metalware in their form and decoration were in great vogue. Such jugs and flasks in grey clay are entirely covered by geometric, stylized vegetal patterns in relief, arranged in several horizontal bands around the vessels. Wild animals are also depicted on this type of ware.
Attractive pottery became cheaper and more easily affordable for the bulk of the urban population as a result of certain technical innovations and the standardization of forms. It is an important sign of the times that this urban ware reached the most remote mountain areas. Yet the influence of the ceramic traditions of these mountain areas on urban ware is of no lesser interest. Unglazed ware thrown on the potter’s wheel and embellished with simple terracotta designs made its appearance in the towns, copying the forms and decoration of the unthrown mountain ware. This indicates that the population of the towns was swelled in the eleventh and twelfth centuries not only by lowland peasants and by settled Turkish peoples but also by mountain people whose tastes were at once reflected by urban craftsmen.

The glassware, produced in a variety of forms and sizes for a variety of purposes, also merits attention. Flasks for toiletries and pharmaceuticals, bowls, stemless drinking cups and long-stemmed goblets are among the common finds of archaeologists; blown from transparent, coloured glass, they also ceased to be luxury items. Although engraved and silver-encrusted bronze jugs were very expensive, simpler, almost unadorned versions have also been found.

In the course of the eleventh and twelfth centuries, baked brick came to be used more widely, especially in major construction projects such as palaces, mosques, madrasas, mausoleums and bridges. Patterned brick facework and engraved terracotta were extensively employed for the decoration of important buildings. Epigraphic masterpieces in engraved terracotta – Kufic and Naskhi inscriptions in high relief framed by elegant plant and geometric ornamentation – have survived to the present day. Extant Karakhanid monuments include four mausoleums in Ferghana, the mosque of Magok-i Attari and the Kalan minaret (of the Friday mosque) in Bukhara as well as the above-mentioned Ribât-i Malik in the steppes between Bukhara and Samarkand.
THE SELJUQS AND THE KHWARAZM SHAHS*

A. Sevim and C. E. Bosworth

Contents

THE ORIGINS OF THE SELJUQS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SELJUQ POWER IN THE ISLAMIC LANDS UP TO 1055 .......................... 151
THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SELJUQ SULTANATE IN IRAN ................. 161
Historical survey ................................................................................. 161
The structure of the Seljuq state in the east .............................................. 165
Historical survey ................................................................................. 167
The structure of the eastern Seljuq state .................................................. 178
The structure of the Khwarazmian state .................................................. 179

* See Maps 4 and 5.
Part One

THE ORIGINS OF THE SELJUQS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SELJUQ POWER IN THE ISLAMIC LANDS UP TO 1055

(A. Sevim)

What might be called the prehistory of the Seljuqs is in many ways obscure. The Seljuqs were a family of the Kïnïk tribe of the Oghuz Turkish people, a tribe which the lexicographer Mahmûd al-Kâshgharî (who completed his Diwân lughât al-turk in 1074) describes as the leading, princely tribe of the Oghuz (for the early history of the Oghuz, see above, Chapter 3). In the early and middle decades of the tenth century the Oghuz nomadized in the steppes to the north of the Aral Sea and the east of the Caspian Sea, reaching as far west as the Ural and Emba rivers. They were, however, at a much lower stage of cultural development than such peoples as the Bulghars on the middle Volga and the Khazars on the lower Volga or the Karluk to their east. The envoy of the Abbasid caliph to the king of the Bulghars, Ahmad b. Fadlân, travelled from Baghdad via Khwarazm and then across the Oghuz steppes to the middle Volga. His Risâla [Epistle] containing his travel account provides us with our earliest authentic, as opposed to semi-legendary, information on the Oghuz. He describes them as animistic in belief, following the counsel of their shamans in some religio-cultural matters but in effect largely irreligious, and as wandering ‘like straying wild asses’ in the region of the Ustyurt plateau to the east of the Caspian.

3 The conventional spelling of European scholarly usage is adopted here. Strict adherence to the phonological laws of Turkish would require something like Seljûk, as in certain early sources, but by far the most common spelling of the medieval Arabic and Persian sources is S.ljûq. See Rasonyi, 1939; Bosworth, 1973, pp. 298–9.
It is further possible that the general southwards movement of the Oghuz at this time was in response to pressure from other Turkish peoples, the Kipchak and Kimek, in the steppes further to their north.

The tribal leader of the Oghuz was the Yabghu, a title dating back to Orkhon Turkish times, and there were various other titles in the tribe denoting military office. Among the shadowy ancestors of Seljuq himself are mentioned one Temür-yalîgh (‘[the man with the] iron bow’) and Seljuq’s own father Dukak (unless Temür-yalîgh and Dukak were the same person). The Yabghu appointed Seljuq as sü-bashî, or war leader (Ibn Fadlân’s sâhib al-jaysh), but seems speedily to have considered him as a potential rival. Hence at some point soon after the middle of the tenth century, Seljuq and his followers moved further up the Jaxartes (Syr Darya) from the Yabghu’s winter capital of Yengi-kent (‘New Town’) to Jand. They were now near the borders of the Dâr al-Islâm, and soon afterwards, Islam began to spread among the Seljuq family and their retainers, as it was at this time spreading among the so-called ‘trucial Turks’, i.e. those on the northern borders of the Samanid state, semi-Islamized and in some sort of loose treaty relationship with the Muslims. Later Seljuq historiography then states that they immediately became ghâzîs (fighters for the Islamic faith), and that Seljuq’s son Mîkâ’îl was killed in such fighting, so that his two sons Toghrîl Beg Muhammad and Chaghri Beg Dâwûd had to be brought up by their grandfather.4

The Seljuqs’ position at Jand allowed them to be recruited as auxiliary troops for the defence of the Samanid amirate against pressure on its northern boundaries from the Karakhanids and their Karluk followers (see above, Chapters 4 and 6). The Samanid Nûh II b. Mansur recruited Seljuq troops under the leadership of Seljuq’s son Arslan Isrâ’il, and subsequently allowed them to settle near the small town of Nakhshab or Nur (modern Nur Ata) between Bukhara and Samarkand (c. 990). Seljuq himself did not migrate southwards and died at Jand in c. 1007. After his death, his eldest son Arslan became the Yabghu of the Seljuqs, adopting this title as a conscious act of rivalry with the elder branch of the Oghuz – for use of the title implied headship of the whole Oghuz people – from whom Seljuq had split by his move from Yengi-kent. The rivalry between these two branches of the Oghuz was to continue almost until the middle of the eleventh century, until the branch of the Seljuqs was finally triumphant over the branch of the original Yabghu (see below). It seems that various bands of Oghuz gave their allegiance to several leading figures in the Seljuq family, such as Toghrîl, Chaghri and Mûsâ, so that, in subsequent decades, when the Turkmans (as the Oghuz, Kûpchak and related tribes of the south-western Turkish people

begin to be called in the Islamic sources)\(^5\) were overrunning Khurasan and northern Iran, such separate bodies as the Yinaliyân, followers of Ibrâhim Yinal, are mentioned.

Meanwhile, the Karakhanid Bughra Khan Hârûn (Hasan) had entered the Samanid capital in 992 and temporarily occupied it (see above, Chapter 6). A few years later, the Samanid amirate came to an end and its dominions were divided between the Ilig Khan Nasr and Mahmûd of Ghazna. In this fighting – and in the attempts, up to his death in 1005, of the last Samanid Ismâ‘îl al-Muntasir to retrieve his ancestral lands – the Seljuqs and their partisans were to be found in the service of both sides on various occasions, following whoever could promise them the most plunder and pasture grounds and changing sides without compunction. With the final triumph of the Karakhanids in Transoxania, the Seljuqs forged links with the new regime. Arslan Isrâ‘îl gave military aid to ĖAlîl Tegin b. Bughra Khan Hârûn, enabling him to seize control of Bukhara, married the Khan’s daughter and became influential at his side. Toghîl and Chagî, however, seem to have been excluded from these arrangements and may have been on cool terms with Arslan Isrâ‘îl. They and their followers were at this time in the steppes to the west of Sogdiana, the Kara Kum desert.\(^6\)

Towards the end of the second decade of the eleventh century, in 1018 or 1019, these Turkmens are recorded in certain Christian Syriac and Armenian sources and the late Islamic source of Mîrkhwând as having mounted, under the leadership of Chagî, a long-distance raid westwards, across northern Iran to Azerbaijan and eastern Anatolia, reaching as far as Dvin and Lake Van. The late Ibrahim Kafesoglu devoted a special study to this episode and affirmed its historicity.\(^7\) But Claude Cahen raised cogent objections to an expedition as early as this, and placed it ten years later, the whole episode either resulting from some chronological confusion in the sources or else from a subsequent attempt by publicists or historians of the Seljuqs to glorify the exploits of Chagî, forebear of all the later Great Seljuq sultans after Toghîl.\(^8\)

Certainly by the mid-1020s groups of Turkmens had crossed the Kara Kum steppes and were harrying the northern fringes of the Ghaznavid province of Khurasan. A catalyst for these southward movements was the alliance of Mahmûd of Ghazna with the Karakhanid ruler of the east, Kadir Khan Yûsuf b. Bughra Khan Hârûn, against ĖAlîl Tegin in Bukhara. This led to the temporary ejection of ĖAlîl Tegin from his city in 1025 and the consequent

\(^5\) The Arab geographer al-Maqdisi, who wrote c. 980, mentions Turkmâniyyûn as harrying frontier posts in the province of Isfijab on the middle Syr Darya, but it is not clear whether this was originally a political or an ethnic term. See Pritsak, 1953, pp. 397–8.


\(^7\) Kafesoglu, 1953b.

\(^8\) Cahen, 1949, pp. 50–1.
flight from Sogdia of his Turkmen auxiliaries, under Arslan Isrā‘īl, into the deserts to the west. Mahmūd must have felt that the Turkmens were a danger to his position in Khurasan, for he seized Arslan Isrā‘īl and dispatched him to imprisonment at the fortress of Kalanjar in northern India, where he died after seven years’ incarceration.9

Deprived of Arslan’s leadership, his Turkmen followers could only straggle across the desert towards Khurasan. Various minor chieftains led individual bands, but Toghrïl and Chaghri do not yet seem to have had sufficient prestige to impose their leadership on all the Turkmens, and only emerged in dominant roles after the death in 1032 of Arslan Isrā‘īl (although the actual title of Yabghu was at that point assumed by the senior member of the Seljuq family, Mūsā). Some of Arslan Isrā‘īl’s former followers, complaining of the tyranny of their amirs and promising to act as frontier guards against further Turkmen incursions from the deep steppes, asked Mahmūd for permission to settle in northern Khurasan. The sultan allowed 4,000 families, with their baggage and flocks, to settle near the towns of Farawa, Sarakhs and Abiward. However, the Turkmens attacked the towns of northern Khurasan and their herds disrupted the agricultural systems of the oases there. When in 1027 the people of Nasa and Abiward complained to the sultan about these activities, Mahmūd first sent a punitive expedition under his commander Arslan Hājib and then in 1028 came personally to Khurasan with an army, inflicting a crushing defeat on the Turkmens. Elements of them scattered wide, some to the Balkhan Kuh hills to the south-east of the Caspian, some to the Dihistan steppes adjacent to Gurgan and others into northern Persia. These last sought employment as auxiliaries with the local rulers there, threatened by Ghaznavid expansion, such as ʿAlā’ al-Dawla Ibn Kākūya of Isfahan.

They now appear in such sources as the Ghaznavid historian Abu ʿl-Fadl Bayhaqi and the later source Ibn al-Athir10 as the so-called ‘Iraqi’ Turkmens, because they had penetrated as far as western Iran, or ʿIraq Ėjamī. Under various leaders, among whom are named Bugha, Kizıl, Göktash, Yaghmur and Anası-oghlu, they speedily became a source of chronic violence and unrest in the provinces of Rayy and Jibal. In his bid for the throne of Ghazna in 1029, Mahmūd’s son Masīūd enlisted Turkmens under Yaghmur at Rayy. He later used them, as auxiliaries of the Ghaznavid regular army, for an expedition to Makran in southern Baluchistan, but they never proved a reliable military force. Other Turkmens remained in the Kara Kum and continued to raid northern Khurasan from there and from Balkhan Kuh; in 1033 the Ghaznavid governor of Rayy, Tash Farrāš, executed 50 of the Turkmen chiefs, including Yaghmur. It is clear that such bands as these ‘Iraqi’ Turkmens

10  Here Ibn al-Athīr was very probably quoting the lost Malik-nāma, an account written in Persian for Chaghri Beg’s son, the subsequent Great Seljuq sultan Alp Arslan, as something like an official history of the dynasty’s origins and early history.
operated entirely independently of each other, in general remaining separate from those
bands acknowledging the leadership of the Seljuq family, with hostility between the two
groups rather than co-operation. The amirs of whose tyranny the Turkmens had complained
to Sultan Mahmūd may have been members of the Seljuq family trying to extend their
authority over other bands. In 1035 the Seljuq leaders Mūsā Yabghu, Toghril, Chaghri and
Ibrāhīm Inal or Yinal (leader of the group of Turkmens appearing in the sources as the
Yināliyān) approached the Ghaznavid āmīd (governor) of Khurasan, Abu ‘l-Fadl Sūrī, for
permission for their 7,000 or 10,000 followers to settle at Nasa and Farawa. In return, they
promised to act as guards against fresh incursions of Turkmens from the Kara Kum and
Balkhan Kuh and to inflict punishment on the ‘Iraqi’ Turkmens.¹¹

Meanwhile, other Turkmen bands under the leadership of the Seljuq family had remained
in Sogdia, in an uneasy relationship with Ālī Tegin, now as his allies, now as his foes. But
they felt their position to be increasingly untenable, and after 1029 moved away from
Sogdia to Khwarazm, settling on lands allotted to them by the Ghaznavid governor of
the province, Altuntash Hājib. Altuntash died of wounds received in 1032 at the battle of
Dabusiyya against Ālī Tegin, the enemy of the new Ghaznavid sultan Masā‘id b. Mahmūd.
Altuntash’s son and successor in Khwarazm, Hārūn, received less favour from the sultan
than had his father; hence by 1034 he renounced his allegiance to Ghazna and in effect
declared his independence. He allied with Ālī Tegin of Bukhara and with the Seljuqs,
awarding the Turkmens further territories in Khwarazm.¹²

The return movement northwards to Khwarazm brought the Seljuqs close to their ances-
tral territories at the mouths of the Oxus (Amu Darya) and Jaxartes (Syr Darya), where an
Oghuz principality had remained in existence, based on Yengi-kent and Jand, and directed
by the family of the original Yabghu of the Oghuz people. By this time the office of the
original Yabghu had devolved upon Abu ’l-Fawāris Shāh Malik b. Ālī, who ruled from
Jand. Shāh Malik raided the Seljuqs, now in Khwarazm, and is said to have killed between
7,000 and 8,000 of their followers and carried back an immense booty of captives and
goods to Jand; efforts by Hārūn to mediate between the two groups of Turkmens failed.
Ālī Tegin, who had in general been favourably disposed towards the Seljuqs as allies
in his struggle to maintain his position against the Ghaznavids, died in 1034. His sons
Yūsuf and Arslan Tegin continued the anti-Ghaznavid alliance with Hārūn. A concerted
attack was planned, with the military assistance of the Seljuqs, in which Hārūn and the
Seljuqs were to invade Khurasan, and the sons of Ālī Tegin were to attack the Ghaznavid

¹¹ Nāzim, 1931, pp. 64–5; Cahen, 1949, pp. 56–7; Barthold, 1962, pp. 104–7; Bosworth, 1968, pp. 17–19;
dependent principality of Chaghaniyan along the upper Oxus, then crossing the river at Tirmidh (modern Termez) so that the two invading forces could link up at Andkhuy in what is now northern Afghanistan. Masʿūd of Ghazna procured the assassination of the Seljuqs’ protector Hārūn in 1035, and the double attack came to a halt when the forces of the sons of ʿAlī Tegin were unable to capture Tirmidh.¹³

Let us now return to the Seljuqs and their followers on the northern fringes of Khurasan. Sultan Masʿūd received the humbly worded request of the Seljuqs and their followers (at this time, in a wretched condition after their defeat and dispersal by Shāh Malik in Khwarazm) to settle on these fringes as frontier guards and auxiliaries. His vizier Ahmad b. ʿAbd al-Samad and his civilian advisers advised acceptance, at least until the Turkmens had openly shown their bad faith; but the sultan and his commanders, mindful of the depredations of the Turkmens in Khurasan towards the end of Mahmūd’s reign, replied by dispatching to Khurasan a powerful army under the Turkish commander Begtoghādī. The Seljuqs suffered initial defeats but then in August 1035, on the road to Nasa, they won a decisive victory over the Ghaznavid army. In this instance, as was to be the case later, the superior mobility and lighter equipment of the Turkmens enabled them to defeat the more heavily armed but cumbersome Ghaznavid forces, hampered as they were by their long baggage train and their inability to manoeuvre in the desert without extensive supplies. Begtoghādī only returned to Nishapur with difficulty. The Seljuqs acquired an immense booty of money, arms, clothing, horses, and so on, and were amazed at their own victory over the seemingly invincible Ghaznavids, ascribing their victory to Divine Providence and to Begtoghādī’s poor tactics rather than to their own abilities. Masʿūd now had no choice but formally to award to Toghrīl, Chaghri and Mūsā Yabghu the regions of Nasa, Farawa and Dihistan, with the insignia – standards, robes of honour, etc. – and style of dihqāns (here, governors on behalf of the sultan).

Mistrust nevertheless prevailed between the two sides. The sultan endeavoured to detach Mūsā Yabghu from the other leaders by, among other things, awarding him the additional title of Inanj, and marriage alliances were proposed, with wives from the Ghaznavid military and official class for the Seljuqs. But Toghrīl and Chaghri, in particular, remained suspicious. New demands were made, this time for a grant of the regions of Merv, Sarakhs and Abiward, on the grounds that the Turkmens’ existing pasturelands were inadequate. Masʿūd could certainly not agree to hand over a rich city like Merv to the nomads; moreover, the Seljuqs were making a nuisance of themselves in other ways, raiding through Khurasan as far as Sistan and entering into relations with enemies of the Ghaznavids.

like Ismāʿīl Khāndān (brother of the murdered Hārūn b. Altuntash), who had taken over Khwarazm and assumed the historic title of Khwarazm Shah, and the Karakhanid Bughra Khan Muhammad b. Yūsuf Kadîr Khan. Ghaznavid armies were now sent to Khurasan under the commander Sü-bashi and also to Herat, while the sultan himself, failing to comprehend the seriousness of the situation in the west, campaigned in India. Sü-bashi’s army was again soundly defeated in May 1038 and he fled with the remnants of his forces to Herat.\(^\text{14}\)

The way was now open for the Seljuqs to enter the capital of Ghaznavid Khurasan, Nishapur. Ibrāhīm Inal appeared there with 200 horsemen later in May 1038 as the advance guard for what was to be the first Seljuq occupation of the capital. According to the sources – which may, however, exaggerate the degree of political sophistication shown by the Turkmens at this time – Toghrîl proclaimed himself successor to the sultan. He seated himself on the latter’s own throne in the suburb of Shadyakh, performed such sovereign acts as presiding over the hearing of complaints (mazālim) and assumed regal titles including, it is related in the Malik-nāma, that of al-sultānal-muʿazzam (Exalted Sultan). Toghrîl is said to have tried to restrain the Turkmens from their natural instinct to pillage, but to have dissuaded his brother Chaghrî from this only with difficulty. The ʿAbbasid caliph al-Qāʿim (1031–75) subsequently sent an envoy to Toghrîl, implying some degree of recognition for the Seljuqs in Khurasan. The Seljuqs are said already to have styled themselves mawālī amīr al-muʾminīn (Clients of the Commander of the Faithful) when they were established on the fringes of northern Khurasan in 1035, but such phrases were stereotypes and need not have implied at this point any direct connection between the Seljuq chiefs and Baghdad.\(^\text{15}\)

Masʿūd now endeavoured to concert operations against the Seljuqs by allying with the original Oghuz Yabghu, Shāh Malik of Jand, against the rebellious Ismāʿīl Khāndān in Khwarazm and his Seljuq allies. (Shāh Malik was ultimately victorious in Khwarazm, in early 1041, but Masʿūd himself was killed shortly afterwards.) An army of 50,000 troops was prepared for Khurasan. Some of the Seljuq leaders were fearful of their position there, and of what they still regarded as Ghaznavid invincibility, and proposed a withdrawal westwards to Rayy and Jibal. It seems that the Seljuqs may still have placed Sultan Masʿūd’s name in the khutba (Friday worship oration) of Nishapur alongside their own leader’s name. The Seljuqs were defeated by the Ghaznavid army in summer 1039 and compelled to withdraw into the Kara Kum desert. Nishapur was reoccupied by the sultan and his army towards the end of 1039, and a great campaign against the Seljuqs was prepared for spring


\(^{15}\) Cahen, 1949, pp. 61–3; Bosworth, 1973, pp. 244–5, 252–68; Kafesoglu, 1988, p. 34.
1040. Khurasan had already been denuded of food and fodder by the incessant warfare and the trampling of the nomads’ herds. The Ghaznavid army, with all its impedimenta, including war elephants, was thus ill-equipped for the campaign, and suffered severely from the lack of water and supplies in the heat of the desert between Sarakhs and Merv.

A historic battle, which was to be decisive for the future of the Iranian lands and for the establishment of Seljuq power in the ancient lands of Islamic civilization, took place at the ribât (outpost) of Dandanqan in May 1040. In this clash, 16,000 lightly armed but mobile Turkmens overcame the ponderous Ghaznavid army, by now demoralized and badly affected by hunger and thirst. Masćûd fled and ultimately withdrew towards northern India, fearing the loss of the whole of his possessions in Khurasan and Afghanistan to the Turkmens – he was killed by a revolt among his troops while en route for Lahore. (Masćûd’s despair proved premature, for his son and eventual successor Mawdûd re-established the Ghaznavid position at least in the eastern half of Afghanistan: see above, Chapter 4, and below, Part Two.)

The victorious Toghrîl set up his throne on the battlefield of Dandanqan as amir of Khurasan. Letters announcing the victory were dispatched to various Karakhanid rulers, including to the sons of ĝ Ali Tegin, to Muhammad b. Nasr ĝ Ayn al-Dawla of Uzgend and to İbrâhîm b. Nasr Börî Tegin, who had been harrying the Ghaznavid lands on the upper Oxus; to the rulers of western and central Iran; and to the ğ Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. The fat’h-nâma (announcement of victory) to al-Qâ’îm detailed the oppression to which the Turkmens had been subjected at the hands of Mahmûd and Masćûd and promised faithful allegiance by the Seljuqs to the caliph and the cause of orthodox Sunni Islam; at the top of the letter was inscribed the ancient bow-and-arrow symbol of the Turks.¹⁶

Toghrîl was now a territorial sovereign and not merely a chief of nomadic bands. In accordance with the old Turkish practice of a patrimonial concept of power, with senior members of the ruling family sharing out governorships and territories, the supreme ruler Toghrîl now made various delegations of his authority in the form of grants. His brother Chaghri Beg Dâwûd was allotted all of Khurasan and all those lands north of the Oxus that he might conquer, while Merv was to become his capital. Mûsâ Yabghu was subsequently to make his headquarters in Herat and extend his power southwards to Sistan, where the local Nasrid Maliks became Seljuq vassals.

The Seljuqs were complete strangers to the business of ruling a territorial state which had long-established administrative traditions rooted in the Perso-Islamic past. They were therefore unable to do without the services of local Khurasanian secretaries and officials.

(just as the Turkish Ghaznavids had recourse to former officials of the Samanids of Transoxania and Khurasan) for the actual running of the extensive lands they now controlled. Many officials moved from the service of the Ghaznavids to that of the new regime. In his first occupation of Nishapur, Toghrîl had relied greatly on the aid of a local magnate, the Sâlâr of Buzgan, Abu 'l-Qâsim Bûzgânî. Various sources give lists of Toghrîl’s later viziers, including among others Abu 'l-Qâsim al-Juwaynî; the ra'îs al-ru'âsâ (head of the town notables) of Nishapur, Abû ʿAbd Allâh Husayn, from the distinguished local family of the Mîkalîs; and the ʿamîd al-mulk (chief secretary) Abû Nasr Muhammad al-Kunduri, a former official of the Ghaznavids, who went on to serve Toghrîl’s successor Alp Arslan. Chaghîrî had as his vizier Abû ʿAlî Shâdhân, and among the officials in his administration was a brother of the famous Ismâʿîli author and traveller Nâsîr-i Khusrâw.17

The next years were spent consolidating the Seljuq position in the eastern Iranian lands and making new conquests in central and western Iran. Responsibility for the first had been allotted to Chaghîrî Beg. He laid siege to Balkh (defended by its governor, Altuntash) on behalf of the Ghaznavids, and despite counter-measures by the new Ghaznavid sultan Mawdûd b. Masûd, captured it, together with other towns and fortresses of the regions of Badghis, Guzgan and Tukharistan. While Chaghîrî was preoccupied with affairs in Khwarazm (see below), Mawdûd was able temporarily to recapture Herat from Mûsâ Inanj Yabghu, but lost it again. Chaghîrî’s son Alp Arslan now undertook operations in the upper Oxus districts of Tirmidh, Qubadiyan, Wakhsh and Qunduz until a stable frontier was eventually established in northern Afghanistan during the 1050s between the Ghaznavids and the Seljuqs (see below, Part Two). Ertash, the brother of Ibrâhîm Inal, imposed Seljuq control over Sistan in the name of Mûsâ. Chaghîrî’s son Kâwurd was encouraged to expand southwards through Kuhistan and was able to set up in Kirman, in place of the local branch of the Buyid dynasty, a semi-autonomous amirate which was to endure for nearly one and a half centuries (see below, Part Two).

Shâh Malik of Jand had by 1041 driven out of Khwarazm the Khwarazm Shah Ismâʿîl Khândân, who was compelled to seek refuge with the Seljuqs. Chaghîrî led an army into Khwarazm in 1043 which expelled Shâh Malik from the province; he fled southwards through Khurasan to Makran on the Arabian Sea coast, but was captured by Ertash (who was then operating in Sistan), handed over to Chaghîrî and killed. In this way, the ancient rivalry between the senior branch of the Oghuz under the Yabghus of Yengi-kent and Jand and the new force of the Seljuqs was finally ended by the total victory of the latter. Khwarazm was placed under a Seljuq governor, and little more is heard of the province during Chaghîrî’s lifetime except for a revolt there whose suppression required Chaghîrî’s

presence. On this occasion, he also received the submission of the ‘amir of Kipchak’, who became a Muslim and married into Chaghri’s family.18

In the west, the lands for which Toghrïl made himself responsible, Toghrïl’s kinsman Ibrãhîm Inal overran Dihistan, Gurgan and Tabaristan. He brought under obedience to Toghrïl the Turkmens formerly headed by Arslan Isrâ’il who, under Kïzïl Beg, had established themselves in Rayy and northern Iran. Under new pressure, these Turkmens moved westwards towards Azerbaijan and the Byzantine and Armenian frontier. Hence in 1042–3 Toghrïl was unable to come to Rayy personally, receive the city from Ibrãhîm Inal and begin the reconstruction of the city’s buildings, which had been much devastated in the previous warfare. A new government headquarters (dâr al-imâra), was built, together with a mosque and a madrasa; Toghrïl now moved his capital from Nishapur to Rayy, and in this year (A.H. 434) began minting coins there.19

Ibrãhîm Inal moved westwards to conduct operations against the Kurdish ʿAnnazids and other local powers on the Iran–Iraq–Byzantium frontiers. Toghrïl himself marched against the Kakuyid ruler of Isfahan, Farâmarz b. ʿAlâ’ al-Dawla Muhammad, and made him his vassal, soon afterwards making Isfahan his own capital. In subsequent years, Toghrïl endeavoured to reduce the power in western and southern Iran of the Buyids, who were, fortunately for his purposes, undergoing a period of internal strife and rivalry between the contending princes, al-Malik al-Raḥîm Khusraw Fîrûz b. Abû Kâljîr of Iraq and his brother Fûlûd Sûtûn of Fars. By 1052 Turkmen raiders had penetrated into Buyid Fars. It was almost inevitable that one of the warring brothers should call on the Seljuqs for aid; hence in 1053 Fûlûd Sûtûn agreed to place Toghrïl’s name in the khutba of his capital Shiraz, and in the following years a group of Turkmens took over Khuzistan. Al-Malik al-Raḥîm’s seven-year rule in Baghdad (1048–55) was marked by continual violence and rioting. Hence in 1055 Toghrïl assembled forces in Jibal and Kurdistan with the proclaimed intention of making the pilgrimage to Mecca and of combating the Shiʿite Fatimids of Egypt and Syria. He entered Baghdad with his army in December 1055, deposed the Buyid ruler and undertook operations against the Fatimids’ supporters in Iraq. Eventually, in 1058, he appeared in Baghdad again and on this occasion, met for the first time the caliph al-Qâ’im. In a series of splendid ceremonies, the ʿAbbasid bestowed on Toghrïl the honorific titles rukn al-dawla (Pillar of the State), qaṣîm amîr al-muʾminîn (Partner of the Commander of the Faithful) and malik al-mashriq waʾl-magrib (King of the East and West), together with robes of honour in the ʿAbbasid colour of black and two crowns.

19 Miles, 1938, pp. 196 et seq.
signifying rule over the Arabs and the ā‘Jām or non-Arabs, and the khutba in the Great Mosque of Baghdad was made in Toghrīl’s name. In this way, the caliph was relieved of his enemies in Iraq, and Toghrīl’s position exalted as his deliverer.²⁰

There now begins the de facto dual arrangement, of such importance for the future constitutional development of the Islamic world, whereby the sultan is recognized as the secular ruler and the caliph–imam remains the moral and spiritual head of the Islamic community. This arrangement, although initially seen as novel and disturbing, was ultimately to be recognized by Sunni Muslim constitutional and legal theory.

Part Two

THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SELJUQ SULTANATE IN IRAN (1055–1118)

(C. E. Bosworth)

Historical survey

After his formal assumption of the sultanate at Baghdad in 1055, Toghrīl was during his latter years largely occupied with consolidating his family’s power in the Iranian lands west of Khurasan and in the Arab lands of Iraq and Mesopotamia. Khurasan and the east were left to his brother Chaghri Beg under Toghrīl’s supreme overlordship, even though in practice Chaghri seems to have been left very much to himself in his territories (in the sources, Chaghri remains a distinctly more shadowy figure than Toghrīl).

In Chaghri’s time, the province of Sistan, straddling what is now the border between Iran and Afghanistan, remained under the indigenous family of the Nasrid Maliks of Nimruz, as vassals of the Seljuqs, required on occasion to furnish troop contingents for the Great Seljuq army. By 1048 Kirman in south-eastern Iran had passed from the hands of its former masters, the Buyids, into those of the Seljuq prince Kara Arslan Kāwurd b. Chaghri Beg, and a line of Kāwurd’s descendants now followed in Kirman, forming an autonomous Seljuq dynasty. For well over a century, the province was to enjoy a period of peace and prosperity under its new rulers, favoured by its position on trade routes connecting Central

Asia and Khurasan with the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean ports. This favourable status was only ended when, after 1170, real power in the principality passed to Turkish slave commander atabegs (tutors to young Seljuq princes); also, the province was invaded by bands of Oghuz Turks deflected southwards from Khurasan by the fighting there between the Khwarazm Shahs and the Ghurids (see below, Part Three, and Chapter 8), so that the line of Seljuq princes was ended in 1186 when the Oghuz leader Malik Dinár took over in Kirmn.21

In the lands to the south of the upper Oxus, what later became northern Afghanistan, a rough, north–south boundary was established between the Seljuqs and the rulers whom they had supplanted in eastern Iran, the Ghaznavids. This was to remain substantially the boundary between the two great powers for over fifty years, since Ibrāhīm of Ghazna (1059–99) – with the exception of one or two occasions, see below – eschewed irredentist campaigns aimed at recovering the Ghaznavids’ lost Khurasanian provinces.

Since Toghril was childless, it was Chaghri Beg’s son Alp Arslan who in 1063 took over as supreme sultan of the Seljuq empire – like his uncle, with the formal approval of the cAbbasid caliph in Baghdad, who granted him the honorific titles of cAdud al-Dawla and Diyā’ al-Dīn. The decade of Alp Arslan’s rule, together with the twenty-years’ rule of his son Malik Shāh, represent the zenith of Great Seljuq power: their empire reached an extent unparalleled since the heyday of the cAbbasid caliphate in the later eighth and early ninth centuries. The two reigns of Alp Arslan (1063–73) and of Malik Shāh (1073–92) may be considered as a unity, the unifying factor being the directorship of the continued, day-to-day running of the state by the great vizier, Nizām al-Mulk. A native of Tus in Khurasan, he exemplified the class of professional Iranian secretaries and officials upon whom the Seljuq sultans—as incomers into the Islamic world from the Central Asian steppelands—wisely relied for the administration of their vast empire. Nizām al-Mulk had grown up in Ghaznavid Khurasan and had spent some years in Ghazna. Thus when he entered the service of Chaghri Beg and Alp Arslan he brought with him into the Seljuq administration an element of continuity, that of the old-established Perso-Islamic government tradition whose origins went back to the Sassanian period. He was to expound these traditions in a masterly and effective way in his treatise on statecraft, the Siyāsat-nāma [Book of Statecraft].22

At the outset, Alp Arslan secured his position in the east by placating his elder brother Kāwrud of Kirman, although an expedition thither was necessary in 1067 when Kāwrud withdrew his allegiance. Although he restored it in the face of Alp Arslan’s superior military might, Kāwrud was never fully reconciled to his subordinate position. On Alp Arslan’s

22 EFP, ‘Nizām al-Mulk’.
death he was to rebel against the new ruler Malik Shāh, only to be defeated and then executed by the victor in 1073. For most of his reign, Alp Arslan was occupied with affairs in the west, including the frontiers of the empire in the Caucasus, and it was in the west that he achieved his famous victory over the Byzantine emperor Romanus Diogenes at Mantzikert (Malazgird) in 1071. The eastern frontiers were strengthened by the granting out, in 1066 when the sultan proclaimed Malik Shāh as his heir, of various districts there as appanages for Seljuq princes: for example, Khwarazm to his brother Arslan Arghun, Balkh to his brother Sulaymān, Merv to his son Arslan Shāh and Tabaristan to Inanj Yabghu. Alp Arslan personally led expeditions into the Kipchak steppes of Central Asia, as far as Jand on the lower Syr Darya, and to the Mangīshlak peninsula on the eastern shore of the Caspian Sea.\textsuperscript{23}

On his father’s death, Jalāl al-Dawla Malik Shāh secured the support of the army by distributing wealth from the treasury of Nishapur, the capital of Khurasan. He continued Alp Arslan’s policies and in some ways surpassed the latter’s triumphs. As noted above, an equilibrium had been established between the Ghaznavid and Seljuq empires, and this was only briefly disturbed in 1073 when Ibrāhīm of Ghazna attempted, vainly as it turned out, to regain former Ghaznavid territory in northern Afghanistan. Seljuq cultural influence grew in the Ghaznavid empire during these decades, with the Ghaznavid sultans assuming for themselves the established Seljuq title \textit{al-sultān al-mu’azzam} (Exalted Sultan) in addition to their normal ones of amir and Malik. Marriage links were forged and Ibrāhīm’s son Masʿūd (the subsequent Sultan Masʿūd III, 1099–1115) married one of Malik Shāh’s daughters, Jawhar Khātūn.\textsuperscript{24}

Malik Shāh’s activities in the east of his empire mainly involved relations with the Karakhanids, except for the two occasions (in 1080 and 1084) when he had to deal with revolts in Khurasan by his brother Tekish b. Alp Arslan, the second one ending in the rebel’s imprisonment and blinding. One of Malik Shah’s most forceful wives was the Karakhanid princess Terken Khūtūn, who was, at the Seljuq court, for long the focus of opposition to the vizier Nizām al-Mulk and his policies. Soon after his accession, the sultan led an expedition to the capital of the Western Karakhanid Khanate, Samarkand, in order to punish Shams al-Mulk Nasr b. Ibrāhīm Tamghach Khan, who had tried to profit from the succession uncertainties on Alp Arslan’s death by invading Tukharistan to the south of the upper Oxus.

For several years, nothing is heard of Seljuq–Karakhanid relations (although we know that Seljuq cultural influence spread within Transoxania during this period, as seen in the Karakhanid adoption of Seljuq-type titulature) until towards the end of Malik Shāh’s reign.

\textsuperscript{24} Bosworth, 1977, pp. 50–8.
At this point, he was persuaded by the orthodox Sunni religious opponents of the Khan Ahmad b. Khidr in 1089 to invade Transoxania and depose the Khan. He then pushed on beyond the Syr Darya to Talas and into Semirechye in order to impose his overlordship on the eastern branch of the Karakhanids, receiving at Uzgend the submission of the Khan of Kashghar, Hasan or Hārūn b. Sulaymān Tamghach Bughra Kara Khan. Thus at this moment, the *khutba* was made in Malik Shāh’s name from northern Syria to East Turkistan. Tribal and family dissensions continued within the Karakhanid lands, requiring Malik Shāh’s intervention, and at some point restoring Ahmad b. Khidr to his former throne in Samarkand (he was later, in 1095, to be arraigned and executed by his old opponents, the religious classes in Samarkand, on the grounds that he had adopted Isma‘ili doctrines).  

Malik Shāh’s death in 1092 inaugurated some twelve years of confusion and internecine warfare within the western Iranian and Iraqi lands of the Seljuq empire, for the dead sultan’s two sons Berk-yaruk and Muhammad quarrelled over the succession. Berk-yaruk, the candidate of the Nizāmiyya, the sons and supporters of the vizier Nizām al-Mulk (who had been assassinated shortly before the sultan’s own death), eventually prevailed, but he was never to be undisputed master of the united sultanate. Various members of the Seljuq family seized the opportunity to intrigue or to assert their own claims, including the former rebel Tutush, Berk-yaruk’s uncle, now in touch with elements in his former appanage of Tukharistan, and his son, and another uncle, Arslan Arghun, in Khwarazm. Military campaigning by Berk-yaruk and his supporters eventually made firm his power in Khurasan, to which in 1097 the sultan appointed his half-brother Sanjar as governor, providing him with an *atabeg* and a vizier (see below, Part Three).

Affairs among the Karakhanids in Transoxania had been somewhat confused and troubled after the death of Ahmad Khan, but in 1097 Berk-yaruk, now suzerain, confirmed the succession in Samarkand of a succession of ephemeral rulers: Sulaymān b. Dāwūd b. Tamghach Khan, Kadīr Khan Ibrāhīm (1097), Mas‘ūd b. Muhammad (1097–9) (both of whom married daughters of Berk-yaruk) and Jibrā’il or Jibrīl b. ʿUmar (1099–1102). Later in 1097, however, Berk-yaruk had to leave the east for western Iran and Iraq, essentially the seat of his power. Before departing from Khurasan, he appointed as governor in Khwarazm the Turkish commander Qutb al-Dīn Muhammad b. Anūshtegin Gharcha’ī to replace the dead Ekinchi b. Kochkar, in this manner inaugurating the line of shahs in Khwarazm from the line of Anūshtegin which was to endure for over a century (see below, Part Three). It was Sanjar who was now to be responsible for the maintenance of Seljuq authority in

the east. He continued to exercise power there, from his capital at Balkh, when his full brother Muhammad Tapar b. Malik Shāh succeeded to the Great Seljuq throne after Berk-yaruk’s death in 1104. Sanjar continued to acknowledge his constitutional dependence on the supreme Sultan Muhammad, who enjoyed on his coins the title al-sultan al-mu‘azzam, and was content to style himself on coins malik al-mashriq (King of the East)–a subordination which was, however, to be abandoned on Muhammad’s death in 1118 (see below, Part Three).  

The structure of the Seljuq state in the east

The eastern Iranian lands of the Seljuq state were governed, like the rest of the empire, from the central Great Dīwān, the sultans’ executive organ, which was, for nearly thirty years, as noted above, under the direction of Nizām al-Mulk, aided by his sons and partisans. All of these made up the body which came to be known, especially after Nizām al-Mulk’s own death, as the Nizāmiyya. Hence during Malik Shāh’s reign, the vizier appointed several of his sons to strategically important provincial governorships, where trusty subordinates were required for putting his administrative measures into practice. Two of his sons, Shams al-Mulk ʿUthmān and Jamāl al-Mulk Mansūr, were governors in Merv and Balkh respectively at certain times.  

All through his official career, Nizām al-Mulk was concerned to buttress the authority of his masters, the Seljuq sultans, against such external foes as the Fatimid caliphs of Egypt and Syria and internal dissidents like the Isma‘ilis of Daylam and the Elburz mountains region and of Kuhistan in southern Khurasan. Military operations were undertaken on various occasions against the Isma‘ilis within the empire, but on the ideological and intellectual level, Nizām al-Mulk’s name is associated with the founding and the spread of Sunni orthodox madrasas, named Nizāmiyyas in his honour. The institution of the madrasa had flourished in the eastern Iranian lands for many decades before the vizier’s time, so he was far from being an innovator here. But Nizām al-Mulk may have hoped that his newly founded madrasas – which for the east were located in Balkh, Herat, Merv, Nishapur and Amul in Gurgan, according to the later biographer of Shāfi‘i scholars, Tāj al-Dīn al-Subkī–would produce theologians and lawyers who could uphold orthodoxy against sectarian currents like Mu‘tazilism and Isma‘ilism, and also officials and secretaries who could implement his own policies for the Seljuq empire’s future. For staffing these

29 On educational policies and the spread of the madrasa in general, see Volume IV, Part Two, Chapter 1, of the present work.
colleges, Nizām al-Mulk made especial use of scholars from Khurasan, for Khurasan and Transoxania had long been bastions of Sunni orthodox theology, law and scholarship.

The Seljuq military forces at this time comprised not only a professional army, with a nucleus of ghulāms (slave soldiers) but also contingents of free troops, mercenaries. Turks were naturally dominant, and held many of the high commands, but the professional army was multi-ethnic, and included Armenians, Greeks, Slavs, Arabs and others. In his Siyāsat-nāma, Nizām al-Mulk positively commends the use of Daylamites, Khurasanians, Georgians and Shabānkāra’ī (Kurds) from southern Iran in the army. But at the side of this professional, standing army – supported, at least in western Iran and Iraq, by a system of iqtāṣ (land grants) – the sultans still relied to a great extent on the descendants of their original, Oghuz tribal following, the Turkmens. The military power of these last was particularly important for the defence of Khurasan and the eastern marches, the border lands beyond which lay such powers as the Ghaznavids and the Karakhanids, and beyond the latter, the peoples of the Inner Asian steppes and forests. These frontier lands were often granted as appanages to Seljuq princes or to the protégés of Nizām al-Mulk, but their actual defence fell largely to the Turkmens. Since they had first appeared on the fringes of Ghaznavid Khurasan (see above, Part One), the Turkmens had been assigned grazing grounds and rights for their herds there, and these rights continued under the Seljuqs, since they provided the livelihood and the maintenance of these unpaid, auxiliary troops. The tribal nomads thus had a definite place within the economic and agricultural structure of such eastern provinces as Khurasan, Gurgan and Dihistan. It was felt that it should be the sultans’ care to conciliate and to look after the interests of their Turkmen supporters, since these had been the original mainstay of the Seljuq family’s power, states Nizām al-Mulk again in his treatise – possibly with the implication that the Turkmens’ complaints and just claims were no longer being listened to properly or dealt with immediately, now that a ruler like Malik Shāh relied increasingly on his professional, standing army. The sultans did, however, continue to give regular feasts (şölen) for their supporters, but Nizām al-Mulk states that Malik Shāh’s failure to provide such a feast for the Chigil tribesmen of the Karakhanid army, when he campaigned in Transoxania in 1089, caused him a loss of prestige there.

Part Three

THE EASTERN SELJUQ SULTANATE (1118–57)
AND THE RISE AND FLORESCENCE OF THE
KHWARAZM SHAHS OF ANŪSHTEGIN’S LINE UP
TO THE APPEARANCE OF THE MONGOLS
(1097–1219)

(C. E. Bosworth)

Historical survey

Adud al-Dawla Ahmad Sanjar (Turkish sanjar, ‘he who pierces, thrusts’) governed the eastern provinces of the Great Seljuq empire for some sixty years, being appointed in 490/1097, while still a boy, by his half-brother, the Great Seljuq sultan Berk-yaruk after the unsuccessful revolt in Khurasan and the death of Arslan Arghun b. Alp Arslan. He remained there, as boy and man, until his death shortly after escaping in 1156 from the custody of the Oghuz of Khurasan. During the civil strife in western Persia and Iraq between his elder brothers Berk-yaruk and Muhammad Tapar (see above, Part Two), Sanjar generally took the side of his full brother Muhammad, but from the constitutional aspect he regarded himself as governor only of the eastern provinces and as subordinate to the supreme sultan in the western lands, calling himself on his coins merely a Malik and acknowledging Berk-yaruk and then Muhammad as al-sultan al-mu‘azzam.32

When Muhammad died in 1118, however, Sanjar refused to consider himself subordinate to his nephew in the west, Mahmūd b. Muhammad. As the senior member of the Seljuq family, both his de facto power and his position under Turkish tribal custom gave him a claim to the supreme sultanate even though this had previously been held, for eighty years, by the Seljuq who controlled western Iran and Iraq. The squabbling sons of Muhammad b. Malik Shāh were too divided and militarily weak to dispute Sanjar’s position, and

they had generally to place Sanjar’s name plus his title of al-sultan al-mu'azzam on their coins before their own names and titles. At the outset, the only serious opposition to Sanjar’s claims came from Mahmud, but in 1119 Sanjar marched westwards with a powerful army (whose commanders included, besides Sanjar himself, four vassal rulers), defeated Mahmud near Sawa in northern Jibal and marched onwards to Baghdad. When peace was made, Mahmud agreed to Sanjar’s supremacy and was made the latter’s heir (in the event, he died long before Sanjar did), but he had to relinquish to Sanjar the Caspian provinces of Mazandaran and Qumis and the town of Rayy, the key point for control of northern Persia, and to agree to the reappointment of Sanjar’s shihna (military governor) in Baghdad.33

On Mahmud’s death in 1131, his brothers Mas'ud, Toghril and Seljuq Shah successfully disputed the succession of Mahmud’s young son Dawud, but were unable to agree among themselves as to who should be sultan. They laid the question before Sanjar, as senior member of the dynasty. Sanjar’s favoured candidate was Toghril b. Muhammad, but his preoccupation with events in Transoxania at this time (see below) prevented him from providing Toghril with much military support. Toghril died soon afterwards in 1134, allowing Mas'ud to succeed in the west and to reign for twenty years, the longest reign of a Seljuq there since Malik Shah’s time. Sanjar’s last major intervention in the affairs of the family in the west had been his defeat of Mas'ud at Dinawar in 1132, but thereafter affairs in Khurasan and Transoxania increasingly claimed his attention.34

Sanjar continued to exercise the overlordship over the Karakhanids of Transoxania first imposed by his father Malik Shah (see above, Chapter 6), but had on various occasions to intervene with his army across the Oxus against recalcitrant Khans. At Tirmidh in 1102 he had stemmed the invasion of a Karakhanid claimant, Kadhir Khan Jibrail or Jibril of Balasaghun and Talas, placing on the throne in Samarkand Muhammad II Arslan Khan. But towards the end of the latter’s long reign, in 1130, Sanjar came with an army to reinforce the Khan’s faltering authority in Samarkand. Disputes occurred, with the Seljuq army plundering part of the Karakhanid capital and with the sultan finally placing on the throne his nominees: first, Hasan Tegin b. AlI; then briefly in 1132 Muhammad Arslan Khan’s brother, Ibrahir Tamghach Bughra Khan (who had been brought up at Sanjar’s court); and then, possibly in the same year, Muhammad Arslan Khan’s third son, Mahmud. Mahmud was Sanjar’s nephew since his mother Terken Khatin, wife of Muhammad Arslan Khan, was Sanjar’s sister. The fortunes of Sanjar and Mahmud were to be closely interwoven over the ensuing years; when Sanjar was captured by the Oghuz in 1153, Mahmud was

recognized by the Seljuq army in Khurasan as interim sultan of Khurasan and, after Sanjar’s death in 1157, likewise as legitimate ruler there until his own death in 1162.\footnote{Pritsak, 1953–4, pp. 49–53; Köymen, 1954, pp. 158–63; Barthold, 1968, pp. 319–22; Bosworth, 1968, pp. 138–40.}

As ruler of Khurasan, Sanjar was also concerned with the neighbouring great power to his east, the Ghaznavids. They were ancient enemies of the Seljuqs during the period when the Seljuqs were taking over Persia and western Afghanistan but had largely been at peace with them since 1059 and the peace agreement – essentially one which divided Afghanistan with a north-south line between the two imperial powers – made by the Seljuq Chaghrï Beg and the Ghaznavid Ibrâhîm b. Mas'ûd I. Over the following decades, there was a considerable Seljuq cultural penetration of the Ghaznavid lands, visible for instance in numismatic patterns, titulature of the rulers and literary trends. The inaccessible and largely independent mountain region of Ghur in central Afghanistan passed into the Seljuq sphere of influence during the early part of Sanjar’s reign after a raid into it by the sultan. According to the Ghurid historian Minhāj-i Sirāj Jūzjānī, the Shansabānî Malik of Ghur, ʿIzz al-Dîn Husayn, sent to Sanjar as annual tribute the specialities of the region, including arms and armour and fierce dogs (see below, Chapter 8). The once-mighty Ghaznavid empire was by now moving towards what it in fact became in its final years, essentially a north Indian power rather than one of the eastern Iranian lands. A succession dispute between Arslan Shah and Bahrām Shah, the sons of the Ghaznavid sultan Mas'ûd III b. Ibrâhîm, allowed Sanjar to extend direct Seljuq suzerainty over the now somewhat truncated Ghaznavid empire (see above, Chapter 5). On Arslan Shah’s accession to the throne in 1115, Bahrām Shah had escaped to Khurasan and had appealed to Sanjar for help. The Seljuq ruler marched eastwards with a formidable army, defeated Arslan Shah outside Ghazna, despite the presence of awesome war elephants in the latter’s army, sacked the capital Ghazna and placed Bahrām Shah on the throne in 1117. Bahrām Shah agreed to become a vassal of Sanjar, and to pay an annual tribute of 250,000 dinars and to place Sanjar’s name first in the khutba and on the coinage - the first time that the Seljuq khutba had ever been heard in the Ghaznavid dominions. For some thirty years, Bahrām Shah acknowledged this subordinate status, only once becoming restive when in 529/1135 Sanjar and his other vassal, the Khwarazm Shah Atsïz, came with their forces from Balkh against Ghazna, expelling Bahrām Shah to India before the latter returned and agreed to reassume his vassalage.\footnote{Bosworth, 1968, pp. 157–9; 1977, pp. 89–100.}

Along the northern fringes of Khurasan, Sanjar found himself at odds for the first time with another line of his vassals, the Turkish Khwarazm Shahs. The old lines of
Iranian Afrighid and Ma’munid shahs had been swept away by the Ghaznavids in the early eleventh century; Mahmūd and Masʿūd I of Ghazna had appointed Turkish slave commanders from their own army, Altuntash and his sons, as governors there with the ancient title of Khwarazm Shah. The Seljuqs continued this pattern of domination over Khwarazm: jutting out as it did into the Central Asian steppes, the region was not only strategically important to the sultans as a bastion against the pagan Turks of the Kipchak steppe but it was also significant as the springboard for raids into the recruiting grounds for Turkish auxiliary and slave troops. Sultans like Alp Arslan and Malik Shāh had led punitive expeditions into these steppe regions on various occasions, such as that of the first ruler in 1065 into the Ustyurt area and the Mangīshlak peninsula to the east of the Caspian Sea against the Kipchak (see above, Part One).

In order to secure these important regions, Malik Shāh had appointed the keeper of the royal washing bowls (tast-dār), his slave commander Anūsh-tegin Gharcha’ī, as titular governor at least in Khwarazm. During Berk-yaruk’s reign, the sultan appointed in 1097 another Turkish ghulām, Ekinchi b. Kochkar, with the historic title of Khwarazm Shah. When, in that same year, Ekinchi was killed, Berk-yaruk nominated in his stead Anūshtegin’s son Qutb al-Dīn Muhammad as governor, and Muhammad’s tenure of power there (1097–1127) inaugurates the fourth and most brilliant line of hereditary Khwarazm Shahs. This dynasty eventually built up, as the Seljuq empire in the east tottered to its close, the most powerful and aggressively expansionist empire in the Persian lands, in the end defeating their rivals for control of Khurasan, the Ghurids of Afghanistan, threatening western Persia and Iraq and the ʿAbbasid caliphate itself, and only disintegrating under the overwhelming military might of the Mongol invaders in the opening decades of the thirteenth century.

Qutb al-Dīn Muhammad was a faithful vassal of Sanjar’s, assiduous in attendance at the Seljuq capital of Merv, but it was his son and successor ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Atsīz (1127–56) who was the real founder of the dynasty’s might and splendour. He also attended Sanjar’s court regularly, accompanying him, for example, on the campaign to Samarkand of 1130, and securing the northern and western frontiers of Khwarazm against the Kipchak and other marauders. But relations with Sanjar started to deteriorate as Atsīz gradually built up his own military strength and began identifying himself with the particular interests of his power base in Khwarazm. Sanjar later accused his vassal of indiscriminately killing, together with pagans, Muslim ghāzīs and murābitūn (dwellers in ribats and frontier fighters) in Mangīshlak and at Jand on the lower Syr Darya (although this could possibly be an a posteriori justification for Sanjar’s subsequent actions against Atsīz). The Khwarazm Shah rebelled openly in 1138, flooding lands in the Oxus valley to impede
the advance of the Seljuq army, but this failed to halt Sanjar’s progress. He defeated the Khwarazmian army at Hazarasp on the Oxus, executed Atsïz’s son Atlïgh, drove out Atsïz from Khwarazm, occupied the province and left a Seljuq prince there as governor accompanied by an atabeg. However, as on earlier occasions when the attempts of an outside power like the Ghaznavids to impose its authority on Khwarazm had provoked a national reaction there, the Khwarazmian people now showed their resentment of alien domination. As soon as Sanjar returned to Merv, they rose and expelled the Seljuq occupying troops. Meanwhile Atsïz returned from his refuge in Gurgan and took the offensive, invading Transoxania and attacking the Seljuq garrison in Bukhara in 1139–40.37

A new power now intervenes in the affairs of Central Asia: the Kara Khitay (the Kitan or Liao of the Chinese sources), possibly of Mongol origin and certainly stemming from the region of eastern Mongolia and northern China before they started to move westwards and southwards into Semirechye and Transoxania (see below, Chapter 11). From their base at Balasaghun, this pagan people began, under their Gür Khan (Universal Ruler) Yeh-lü Ta-shih, to attack the various Turkish tribes and amirs of western Turkistan, pagan and Muslim alike, inevitably coming up against the Karakhanids. Already in 1137 Mahmûd Khan of Samarkand had been defeated in a battle with the Kara Khitay at Khujand in Ferghana. Four years later, internal disputes within the Western Karakhanid amirate led to one side in the conflict, disaffected Karluk tribesmen, calling in the Kara Khitay. Mahmûd appealed to his kinsman and suzerain Sanjar, who invaded Transoxania with a large army, but he was defeated in 1141 by the Kara Khitay in a bloody battle on the Qatwan steppe of Usrushana, on the middle Syr Darya. Sanjar and Mahmûd Khan fled to Khurasan, abandoning Transoxania to the incomers, who went on to invade Khwarazm and to make Atsïz their vassal. Accordingly, while Sanjar’s defeat was clearly opportune for Atsïz, it seems improbable that the Khwarazm Shah had, as several of the Islamic sources state, incited the Kara Khitay to invade as an act of revenge on Sanjar for the sultan’s killing of his son Atlïgh. At this point, Atsïz himself raided into Khurasan, but was driven back by a Seljuq counter-invasion of Khwarazni which penetrated to the capital Gurganj and compelled the Khwarazm Shah to disgorge the treasuries which he had previously looted from Merv in 1143–4. Yet once again, Khwarazm proved too hostile for the Seljuq troops to remain there.38

The eventual downfall of Seljuq power in the east, however, did not result from the attacks of external foes like the Kara Khitay or from the rebelliousness of ambitious vassals like the Khwarazm Shahs, whose military strength was still inferior to that of

Sanjar – it was the result of an explosion of discontent within Khurasan itself, largely caused by the policies of Sanjar’s aides and officials there. Khurasan and the steppes to the south-east of the Caspian Sea, in Gurgan and Dihistan, contained extensive pasture grounds which supported numerous groups of nomadic, tribally organized Turkmen. Some of these had probably been driven southwards into the Khurasanian fringes by recent upheavals in the Central Asian steppes, including pressure from the Khwarazm Shahs and the Kara Khitay. Others were descendants of the Oghuz tribesmen whose dynamic had originally brought the Seljuqs to power in Khurasan a century before. The sultans had accordingly always felt certain obligations towards these kinsfolk of theirs, often making special administrative arrangements for them in the regions where they were particularly numerous, appointing special shihnas and ru’asāʾ (sing. ra’īs) (chiefs) to act as channels of communication between the nomads and the Seljuq state, whose dominating Perso-Islamic ethos was largely alien to the Turkmen (see below).

These arrangements now came under severe strain because of the financial exigencies arising from Sanjar’s military adventures, which became increasingly expensive and elaborate after 1135: he is said to have disbursed 3 million dinars for his Transoxanian campaign of 1141, not counting the cost of gifts and robes of honour for various local potentates. The burden of taxation in order to pay for these fell on sedentaries and nomads alike, but the Oghuz in the upper Oxus regions of Khuttalan and Tukharistan finally rebelled against the tax demands and the harsh collecting methods of the shihna over the Turkmens there, the slave commander ʿImād al-Dīn Kumāch of Balkh. Despite placatory approaches from the Oghuz, Sanjar insisted on mounting punitive expeditions against them, but he was twice defeated, forced to evacuate his capital Merv and finally captured by the nomads in 1153. The Oghuz bands swept through Khurasan, attacking the towns and showing particular violence and hostility towards members of the Seljuq administration and the religious institution, closely linked with the Seljuq state. A general climate of insecurity was created in both town and countryside, in which other anti-social elements, such as the ʿayyārs (bands of urban rowdies and vigilantes) took advantage of the breakdown of authority to advance their own interests.

Sanjar was carried round by his Oghuz captors for three years, apparently in humiliating circumstances and enduring hunger and deprivation, until he managed to escape in 1156 to Tirmidh and Merv. But a year later, he died at the age of 71, and with him, the authority of the Seljuqs in eastern Persia ceased; to his contemporaries it seemed like the end of an epoch. Only in western Iran, essentially in Jibal, and in Kirman, did members of the Seljuq family retain power for another thirty-eight and thirty years respectively. The western Seljuqs were increasingly circumscribed, however, by the growth of Atabeg
principalities in provinces like Fars, Azerbaijan, Arran and Armenia and by the later twelfth-century upsurge of Abbasid caliphal authority in Baghdad and Iraq, while the Kirman Seljuqs fell victim to similar Oghuz pressures to those which had affected Khurasan and which had caused Sanjar’s downfall, involving Oghuz plunder raids on Kirman.39

The Seljuq army in Khurasan had been left leaderless on Sanjar’s capture. It now offered the throne in Khurasan to the refugee Karakhanid Mahmūd Khan, the son of Sanjar’s sister Terken Khätūn, hence with Seljuq blood in his veins; the Seljuq sultan in the west, Muhammad II b. Mahmūd, agreed to this and sent an investiture diploma. In fact, real power in Khurasan was falling into the hands of the Seljuq princes, who over the next years parcelled out the towns and districts of the province among themselves, especially as Mahmūd was unable firmly to establish his authority – he was even prepared at one point to summon assistance against the Oghuz of Khurasan from the Khwarazm Shah Atsīz – and he died in 1162. Sanjar’s former slave commander, Mu’ayyid al-Dīn Ay Aba (d. 1174), had already risen to prominence in Nisha-pur. He established firm and just rule in the town, being termed by the contemporary historian of Bayhaq, Ibn Funduq, as ‘the emperor of Khurasan, king of the East’, and he eventually recognized Mahmūd Khan as his suzerain. Another of Sanjar’s former slave commanders, Ikhtiyār al-Dīn Ay Tak, took possession of Rayy and, as nominal vassal of the western Seljuq sultan Muhammad II, made himself a power in northern Persia; while yet another former Seljuq general, Bahā’ al-Dīn Toghril, took over Herat. These experienced and capable commanders were helped by the Oghuz bands’ own disunity and low level of political sophistication; the Oghuz could win individual battles but could not establish a state. The rule of the Seljuq princes was only curtailed in the 1170s by the westwards expansion of the Ghurid sultans, who then disputed control of Khurasan with the Khwarazm Shahs and with the pagan Kara Khitay, who had a foothold south of the Oxus in Balkh and Tukharistan. It was actually the Khwarazm Shahs who triumphed there in the first decade of the thirteenth century, but they were only to enjoy power for a short time before the whole dynasty was swept away by the incoming Mongols.

The Khwarazm Shah Atsīz remained loyal to Sanjar after the latter’s capture, and on his escape from the Oghuz sent Sanjar a message of congratulation; but Atsīz died shortly afterwards in 1156. He had by that date established the Khwarazmian state through his skilful adaptation to the superior military strength of the Seljuqs and the Kara Khitay and by the extension of his territories and his influence northwards into the Kipchak steppe as far as Mangīshlak. This region was to be important as a reservoir of manpower for the

Khwarazmian army when Atsiz’s successors embarked on grandiose policies of expansion throughout the Iranian world and beyond to the Near East and to India; according to one authority, Atsiz even entertained the plan of conquering the town of Saksin on the lower Volga in southern Russia.\(^{40}\)

Atsiz’s son Tāj al-Dunyā wa ’l-Dīn II Arslan (1156–72) had more potential freedom of action after the death of his Seljuq suzerain Sanjar, but was at first largely preoccupied with affairs in the lands north of the Oxus. Here, the Kara Khitay were his suzerains, but these last were little disposed to interfere in Khwarazmian affairs provided that the stipulated tribute was forwarded to the Gür Khans at their ordo (military camp) in Semirechye. The Khwarazm Shahs especially coveted the domains of the Karakhanids – who were likewise vassals of the Gür Khans – in Transoxania. Disputes within the Karakhanid dominions between the Khans and contingents of their Karluk tribal followers culminated in the murder of Mahmūd Khan’s brother Ibrāhim III Tamghach Khan of Samarkand, by the Karluk in 1156. When his successor Ālī b. Hasan Tegin Chaghri Khan took draconian measures against the tribesmen, II Arslan seized the opportunity to invade Transoxania in 1158, ostensibly on behalf of the Karluk, and the Khan was compelled to take back the Karluk chiefs into his service. II Arslan’s troops also appeared in Khurasan against the former Seljuq princes there, and Ibn Funduq mentions the Khwarazmian army’s presence at Bayhaq and Nishapur in 1166–7, although full-scale Khwarazmian intervention in Khurasan was only to come later.\(^{41}\)

It was the reign of Ālā’ al-Dīn Tekish b. II Arslan (1172–1200) which brought the Khwarazm Shahs to new heights of power. Khwarazmian arms vigorously combated Ghurid attempts to annex Khurasan for themselves, succeeded in bringing about the final demise of the Seljuq sultanate of western Persia and penetrated across Jibal and Kurdistan to the borders of Iraq. Tekish, who had been governor of Jand, owed his throne to support from the Kara Khitay in the succession struggle with his brother Sultān Shāh after II Arslan’s death. The outcome of this struggle was that Sultān Shāh was driven southwards from Khwarazm into Khurasan, where he attempted, with considerable success, to carve out a principality for himself at the expense of the local Turkish commanders in towns like Sarakhs, Nishapur, Tus and Merv. But once firmly on the throne in Khwarazm, Tekish sought an opportunity to throw off the Kara Khitay yoke – comparatively light though it was – by adducing the increasing harshness of the Kara Khitay tax-collectors and their


continuing paganism. This made possible an appeal to the local Muslim religious classes for support for the Khwarazm Shahs in the work of jihād (holy war).

The result was an alliance of Sultan Shâh with the Kara Khitay, who tried to invade Khwarazm but were blocked by the time-honoured expedient of the defenders opening the canal barrages and dykes of the Oxus valley irrigation network, thereby flooding the terrain. Later, however, in the 1190s, Tekish was to seek Kara Khitay aid in his struggle with the Ghorids, for the Kara Khitay hoped to regain control of Balkh and Tukharistan, formerly tributary to them. These hopes were dashed by a decisive victory of the Ghorids over the Kara Khitay on the banks of the upper Oxus, allowing the Ghorids to occupy the towns of Khurasan and to install at Merv Tekish’s grandson and rival for power, Hindū Khan b. Nâsir al-Dīn Malik Shâh (1198–1200).

Many of Tekish’s diplomatic and military efforts were to be devoted to the situation north of the Oxus and in the steppes and then, towards the end of his reign, to expansion westwards into northern Iran, with Iraq as his ultimate goal. In general, he aimed at conciliating the Turkmen of the steppes to the north and west of Khwarazm, partly through marriage alliances between members of his own family and the local Khans’ families; thus Tekish’s wife Terken Khâtûn, mother of his son and successor ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muḥammad, was from either the Kanglî or the Yemek Turkish tribe and was the daughter of Kîpchak Khan. Tekish drew on these Turkmen as troops for his forces, even though many of them were still pagan, and it was these unassimilated barbarians who made the Khwarazmian army a byword for cruelty and violence among the peoples of northern and western Iran. But diplomacy did not always work, and at least one punitive expedition by Tekish against the Kîpchak in the vicinities of Jand and Sîgnak on the lower Syr Darya is recorded (1195–6). In Transoxania also, there is mention of an expedition to Bukhara in 1182 and possibly another one with the same goal in 1198 (reported by the chronicler Ibn al-Athîr, but whose historicity was nevertheless doubted by Barthold), when the local population of Bukhara supported the Kara Khitay garrison until the town was stormed by the Khwarazmians.42

The disappearance of the Seljuqs from Khurasan and the shrinkage of the territory controlled by the last Seljuq sultans in western Iran, hemmed in as they were by various Atabeg principalities such as that of the Ildenizids of Azerbaijan and Arran and the Salghurids of Fars, led Tekish to dream of establishing a Khwarazmian empire which would dominate Iran proper as well as the lands north of the Oxus. The sultan who was to be the last of the Seljuq line in Persia, Toghrîl III b. Arslan, was a young, vigorous and effective commander, who by 1192 had made firm his control over Jibal and had defeated the Atabeg ruler in Rayy, Kughtugh Inanch. But the latter now appealed to Tekish for help, thus giving the

Khwarazm Shah a pretext to intervene in the affairs of Iran. Tekish came to Rayy with an army and demanded that his name should be placed in the khutba of western Persia immediately after the caliph’s name, but had to return to Khurasan in the face of a threatened invasion by Sultan Shâh. Toghrîl was accordingly able in 1193 to clear the Khwarazmian garrison out of Rayy. But when Tekish returned the following year, Toghrîl, having refused to negotiate with the shah, was defeated outside Rayy and killed in 1194; henceforth, the Seljuq dynasty survived only in Anatolia as the sultanate of Rum, centred on Konya.

Tekish now occupied the whole of Jibal and parcelled it out as iqtâ’s for his commanders. The proximity of the powerful and aggressive shah to the Abbasid territories in Iraq disquieted the caliph al-Nâsir (1180–1225). He nevertheless deemed it prudent to bow to Tekish’s evident military superiority and sent the shah an investiture patent for the sultanate of Iraq (i.e. Irãq Ajamî, or western Iran), Iran (i.e. the remainder of the country, essentially Azerbaijan, Fars, Khurasan and Kirman) and Turkistan. Tekish was active in northern Iran, especially against the Isma’ilis of Daylam, but died in 1200; on hearing the news, the people of Jibal rose and massacred all the Khwarazmians they could find.43

The new shah, Tekish’s son Alâ’ al-Dîn Muhammad (1200–20), continued his father’s anti-caliphal policy. At the end of his life, Tekish had demanded that his son’s name be placed in the khutba at Baghdad, but subsequent preoccupations in the east with the Ghurids, the Kipchak and the Kara Khitay prevented Muhammad from enforcing his claimed rights against al-Nâsir. Not until 1217, the very eve of the Mongol invasions, was Muhammad ready to march westwards. By now, he knew from captured diplomatic correspondence that al-Nâsir had in the past incited the Ghurids against him and had tried to have him assassinated by the Isma’ilis. Muhammad was aware that his anti-caliphal policies would deprive him of support from the Sunni majorities in Iran and Iraq. Hence he now adopted a pro-Shi’ite policy, obtaining a fatwâ (legal opinion) from compliant ulamâ’ that al-Nâsir was unfit to rule and that the Abbasids had usurped the caliphate from the house of Alî, and proclaiming a Sayyid as anti-caliph. His army proceeded to cross the Zagros mountains barrier down to the plains of Iraq, but snow-storms of unparalleled severity held it up in Kurdistan, and news of the appearance of the Mongols on the eastern fringes of his empire caused Muhammad to abandon his plans to overthrow the Abbasid caliphate.44

During the earlier part of his reign, Muhammad’s eastern policy involved conciliating the Kara Khitay in order to leave him free to eject the Ghurids from Khurasan, where Ghurid rule had proved unpopular. After the death of Mu‘izz al-Dîn Muhammad Ghûrî

in 1206, the power of the Ghurids declined perceptibly. The new sultan in Ghur, Ghiyath al-Dīn Mahmūd, had to acknowledge the Khwarazm Shah as his suzerain and place his name in the khutba and on the coinage. Khwarazmian control was now imposed over all the towns of Khurasan, and the Bawandid local ruler in the Caspian provinces was made a Khwarazmian vassal. Muhammad could therefore now dispense with Kara Khitay support, especially as the latter were distracted by the rebellion in Semirechye of the Naiman Mongol chief Küchlüg and the revolt of the Kara Khitay’s Muslim vassals in East Turkistan. Securing the northern frontiers of Khwarazm by a successful campaign against the Kipchak, Muhammad turned to Transoxania and allied with the last Karakhanid ruler of Samarkand, ʿUthmān Khan b. ʿIbrāhīm, and other local magnates who were discontented with Kara Khitay financial demands, against their suzerains. The fact that the Kara Khitay were distracted by Küchlüg’s revolt meant that the Gür Khan was unable to maintain his occupation of Samarkand (probably in 1209–10) and was defeated near Talas by the combined forces of ʿUthmān Khan and ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad. By this time, an advance force of Chinggis Khan’s Mongols had appeared in northern Semirechye; the Gür Khan died; and Muslim Khwarazmian rule was established throughout Transoxania. Yet this domination speedily proved unpopular. The people of Samarkand rose against the Khwarazmians there and slaughtered them. ʿUthmān Khan attempted to renew his connections with the Kara Khitay, but brought down on himself the Khwarazm Shah’s wrath. This culminated in a general massacre of Karakhanid family members in 1212, thereby extinguishing the western branch of the dynasty almost completely (a branch seems to have persisted in Ferghana, with its capital at Uzgend, for some years more: see above, Chapter 6).

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad asserted his power against the Kipchak and incorporated Sīnak into his empire, but he was less successful against Küchlüg, who had taken over most of the former Kara Khitay territories. Even after his Talas victory over the Naiman chief, Muhammad was unable to bring relief to the Muslim population of the town of Balasaghun in Semirechye or to protect Ferghana; and he was equally impotent to protect the Muslims of East Turkistan or Kashgharia against Küchlüg’s fiercely anti-Muslim policies there.45

The defeat of Küchlüg by Chinggis Khan’s forces in 1218, his flight into Badakhshan and his death there only postponed the hour of reckoning for the Khwarazm Shah. There had been relations between him and Chinggis in 1215, when ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad had sent an embassy to the Mongol Khan in northern China, and an indecisive military encounter in (?)1219 between Muhammad’s forces and Chinggis’ eldest son Jōchi in the

steppes to the north of the Aral Sea. But the immediate cause of large-scale intervention in Trans-oxania by the Mongols was Muhammad’s ill-advised execution of Chinggis’ envoys at Utrar, which brought down on his head the full violence of Mongol military might in the later part of 1219. The ensuing years saw the speedy disintegration of the Khwarazmian empire, culminating in the death in Diyar Bakr in 1231 of the refugee last Khwarazm Shah, Muhammad’s son Jalāl al-Dīn (?) Mingburnu; for all these events, see below, Chapter 12.

The structure of the eastern Seljuq state

As noted above, Sanjar was originally a Malik subordinate to the Great Seljuq sultan Berkyaruk and then Muhammad b. Malik Shāh. After the latter’s death, Sanjar acquired, by seniority, headship of the main line of Seljuqs in Persia and Iraq, with the title of al-sultān al-mu'azzam appearing on his coins minted at Isfahan and Rayy from 1118 onwards. Attached to his personal court, which was usually in the capital Merv, Sanjar had a fully developed administration headed by the diwān-i ālā (Supreme Ministry). It was presided over by a series of viziers, of whom eight are known, from Shihāb al-Islām ʿAbd al-Razzāq (in office 1117–22) to Nizām al-Mulk Hasan. Naturally, high officials like viziers were normally Persians or Arabs, though from 1122 to 1124 Sanjar had a Turkish vizier, Muhammad b. Sulaymān Kāshgharī Yīghan or Toghan Beg. The vizier’s colleagues included the usual array of officials concerned with accounting and financial checking procedures, the mustawfī (chief accountant) and the mushrif (inspector); those manning the chancery, under the tughrāʾī (chief secretary), combining the departments of the tughrā (official insignum on documents) and of inshāʾ (correspondence); and the ārid, the head of the diwān-i ārid (department of the army).

Administrative and military control over a town or province of the empire was exercised by the sultan’s appointee, the shihna, who was concerned with public security and the regulation of crime. Various religious and judicial officials, including the qāḍī (judge) and the khatib (preacher at the Muslim worship), were appointed directly by Sanjar. All these figures – as also the commanders of the army, mainly military slaves or freedmen – were supported materially by the system of iqtā’s, with the military holder of such an estate additionally being liable for military service; often, no duration is mentioned for these tenures, although one cannot thereby conclude that the grants were necessarily for life, still less that they were hereditary.

Provincial government (wilāyat, iyālat) under Sanjar was exercised through centrally appointed officials with designations like wālī, nāʾib, shihna or raʾīs. The last of these had an additional role as the representative of the urban notables – from the leading families
of whom the ra’īs was generally chosen – and of his fellow-townsmen vis-à-vis the central government, above all in matters relating to taxation. From Sanjar’s reign, we possess documents on the nomination of provincial governors for Gurgan and its dependencies, Mazandaran, Rayy, Balkh and its dependencies, Merv, Tus and Dihistan. There were also domains which belonged personally to the sultan, i.e. crown lands (amlāk-i khāṣṣ, amlāk-i khālisāt), with their own special administration, headed by a wakīl (intendant), and their own financial organs.46

The relations of Sanjar and his amirs with the Oghuz nomads, who were an appreciable element of the population in Khurasan, northern Jibal and the Caspian provinces, have already been touched upon, and special arrangements were made for the government of those areas where they predominated. The Oghuz felt that they had a particularly close relationship with the sultan, with a right of approaching him directly. At the time when Sanjar’s governor in Balkh, ʿImād al-Dīn Kumāch, was increasing his harsh demands on them (see above), the Oghuz protested, according to Rāwandi, the historian of the Seljuqs, ‘We are the specially close subjects [raʾīyāt-i khāṣṣ] of the sultans and we do not come under the jurisdiction of anyone else.’ Towards the end of Sanjar’s reign, the numbers of these Oghuz in Khurasan seem to have increased, and the problem of how to find a place for them in the administrative and social structure of the Seljuq empire became acute; Sanjar’s failure to solve it was a major factor in the decline and disappearance of the eastern Seljuq empire by the end of his reign.47

The structure of the Khwarazmian state

Material on the internal structure and administrative system of the Khwarazmian state of the line of Anūštegin is sparse. It stems mainly from the volumes of inshāʾ literature, comprising official letters, investiture diplomas, and so on, stemming from authors who worked under the Khwarazm Shahs like Bahāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad Baghdāḏī, who was head of the dīwān-i inshāʾ for ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Tekish and who left us an important collection, the Kitāb al-Tawassul ilāʾ l-tarassul; and, above all, the famous littérateur Rashīd al-Dīn Muhammad Watwāt (d. ?1182–3), who served Atsīz, Il Arslan and finally Tekish as chief secretary and who compiled two collections of rasāʾil (epistles), the ʿArāʾīs al-khawāṭīr and the Abkār al-afkār.

It is a reasonable assumption that the central and provincial administrations of the Khwarazm Shahs, who were themselves originally provincial governors for the Great

Seljuqs, were modelled on those of the Seljuqs in Iran and Iraq. The hub of the administration was undoubtedly the dvān-i ālā headed by the vizier, with its ancillaries, the chancery, the office of the mustawfī and that of the ārid-i lashkar (inspector-general of the army), as noted above. In the middle decades of the twelfth century the dvān-i inshā’ was headed by the great poet and stylist, Rashīd al-Dīn Watwāt. Only towards the end of the dynasty’s existence did Alā’ al-Dīn Muhammad decide – in c. 1218 according to Nasawī – to dispense, within the territories that he controlled (his estranged mother, Terken Khâtūn, was the real ruler in Khwarazm itself), with a vizier. He appointed instead, as an executive body, a council of six (sitta min al-wākulāriyya), who included the wakīl of the khas (crown domains) and the kātib al-inshā’ (chief secretary). The accelerated course of events after this year, with the irruption of the Mongols into Transoxania and beyond, does not allow us to estimate how these new administrative arrangements, involving a more direct personal management by the Khwarazm Shah, would have worked.

As mentioned above, provincial government was in the hands of wāls or shibnas appointed by the Khwarazm Shah: those of Farah (in northern Sistan), Turkistan and Bukhara are mentioned under Il Arslan, and those of Jand, Barjanlīgh-kent (= Barjlīgh-kent on the Syr Darya between Jand and Ṣignak) and its dependencies, Gurgan, Dihistan and Khwarazm itself under Tekish. The region of Jand, the base for Khwarazmian raids into the Kīchak steppe, was especially important and was often entrusted to the Khwarazm Shah’s eldest son and heir. One of the functions of the wālī was the organizing of corvée labour for state requirements (shāhkār, bīgār). As in Seljuq Khurasan, the ra’īs was the channel of communication with the local populations, and the appointment of ru’asā’ by the Khwarazmian chancery is recorded for Dihistan, Gurgan and Khwaf in Kuhistan.48

The historical sources say little of daily life and the condition of the ordinary people at this time. They report widespread devastation in the Khurasanian towns by the Oghuz towards the end of Sanjar’s reign. The reports of thousands of casualties may be exaggerated, but the destruction of several mosques, madrasas and important libraries in Nishapur is attested, such as that of the Sabuniyya madrasa, where a copy of the celebrated 100-volume compendium of Qur’anic sciences, made nearly two centuries before for the Saffarid amir Khalaf b. Ahmad, perished, according to the biographer al-Samā‘ānī. Similar losses continued in the ensuing disorders in Khurasan even after Ay Aba had restored some order. Khwarazm itself continued to flourish agriculturally at this time, while ethnically becoming more and more Turkicized, so that the indigenous Iranian Khwarazmian language shrank until it apparently disappeared in the fourteenth century. The geographer and traveller Yaqūt, writing just after the Mongol devastation of Khwarazm, stated that

when he had been in Gurganj in 1219, he had never seen a richer or fairer city in the world than the Khwarazmian capital; and he found the Khwarazmian countryside extraordinarily fertile, filled with settlements which had markets and an abundance of food. Soviet excavations there seem to show an extension of cultivation based on irrigation canals during the twelfth century.49

As the Khwarazm Shahs built up their realm into what was, by the end of the twelfth century, the most powerful empire of the eastern Islamic world, the pace of centralization within the state increased. The urgent need for money to finance military expansion led to much hardship and disaffection, certainly outside Khwarazm itself. Wherever the Khwarazmian armies penetrated, they established a reputation for violence and extortion which made them highly unpopular and a focus for popular hatred; in none of the provinces they conquered did the Khwarazm Shahs ever succeed in creating a bond of interest between themselves and their subjects. In their sporadic attempts to expand into Transoxania at the expense of the Karakhanids and Kara Khitay, the Khwarazm Shahs were nevertheless often at pains to conciliate the powerful orthodox Sunni religious authorities in the Transoxanian towns. At Bukhara, for instance, an influential line of local ‘ulamā’ the Āl-i Burhān, rose to power in the first half of the twelfth century as ru’asā’ of the city, holding also the religious title of sudūr (sing, sadr; ‘eminences’). At times, they held more authority within the town than the Karakhanid secular rulers, and in 1207, Burhān al-Dīn Muhammad b. Ahmad, called Sadr-i Jahān, actually collected taxation there on behalf of the Kara Khitay, as the real rulers in the town. When Tekish was at Bukhara in 1182, he acknowledged in his edicts the spiritual authority of the religious leaders there; and although, when Tekish and Ālā’ al-Dīn Muhammad embarked on their anti-caliphal policies in western Iran, they could no longer count on Sunni Muslim religious support, within Transoxania they were able to pose as the defenders of Islam against the pagan Kara Khitay.50

50 EIr, ‘Āl-e Borhān’.
The mountainous region situated to the east and south-east of Herat and the south of Gharchistan and Guzgan was known as Ghur. It comprised the basins of the upper Hari Rud, the Farah Rud, the Rud-i Ghur and the Khash Rud together with the intervening mountain chains. Geographic configurations had a profound influence on historical and cultural developments in Ghur. Geography led to the fragmentation of political power as the entire region could not be controlled from one centre. Each fortress exercised independent sway over the area immediately under its control and patriarchal traditions struck deep roots. It was as late as the time of Qutb al-Din Muhammad (d. 1146–7) that a portion of Ghur – the petty principality of Warshada on the Hari Rud – developed a capital at Firuzkuh. Ghur had no compact or continuous areas of habitation, but only scattered
population pockets. The landscape was studded with fortified places and towers where people could defend themselves. Cultural movements in the neighbouring areas had only a peripheral impact on the region. The waves of Muslim conquest touched the fringes of Ghur several times during the Umayyad period but the region did not come under Islamic cultural influence. As late as the tenth century, the people of the region were said to be ‘bad-tempered, unruly and ignorant’. The Iranian dialect of the people inhabiting Ghur differed from the dialect of Khurasan. During his campaign into Ghur in 1020, Prince Mas’ud of Ghazna had to employ local interpreters to communicate with the people. Since they pronounced the name of the Prophet Muhammad as ‘Hamad’, they became known as Hamadís after their conversion to Islam. The ethnic background of the Ghurid people is shrouded in myth and legend. After the Saffarid invasions of Zamin-Dawar and Bust, the region became exposed to tribes and peoples of different ethnic backgrounds. Contact with Ghazna led to the infiltration of Turkish tribes from the surrounding areas. Later on, Ghuzz and Khalaj ethnic elements settled on the fringes of the region, gradually breaking its cultural isolation and diversifying its ethnic composition.

The extension of Islam and its cultural institutions, and the conversion of Ghur, took a long time. As late as the end of the tenth century, the population of Ghur was for the most part heathen. According to the geographer al-Istakhri, it was the biggest pagan enclave within the borders of Islam. It was probably as the result of missionary activity from Khurasan that the movement of the Karrāmiyya, a pietistic and ascetic form of Sunni Islam especially strongly represented in Nishapur, was established in Ghur in the course of the tenth and eleventh centuries. It was followed by the Shansabānī Maliks, including in the later twelfth century the brothers Ghiyath al-Dīn Muhammad and Mu’izz al-Dīn Muhammad, until they later switched to the mainstream Shāfī’ī and Hanafi law schools of Sunni Islam. The nature of the imperfect conversion is best illustrated by the fact that sometimes the names were Muslim but the people led the life of pagans. The anonymous author of the Hudūd al-ṣālam [The Limits of the World] (c. 982) says, ‘In the days of old this province of Ghur was pagan (kāfir); now actually most of the people are Muslims.’ As the years passed, however, three centres came into prominence in the valley of Hari Rud: Firuzkuh (the capital of Shansabānī power), Jam and Chisht.

3 Bosworth, 1961, p. 118.
4 Anon., 1937, p. 110.
5 Bosworth, 1961, pp. 120–1.
6 For the Karrāmiyya, see Barthold, 1968, pp. 289–90; Bosworth, 1960; Ėfi, ‘Karrāmiyya’.
7 Anon., 1937, p. 110.
The mountains of Ghur had a large number of iron-ore workings and those of other metals. According to Togan, the entire mountain region from Ghur and Kabul to the land of the Karluk was metal-working.\(^8\) It exported armour, weapons and war equipment to neighbouring areas. The chief fortress of Ghur was known as Pul-i Āhangārān (Bridge of the Blacksmiths). The Ghaznavids and the Seljuqs exacted tribute from Ghur in the form of arms, cuirasses and the ferocious watchdogs bred locally. Sultan Mas\(^6\)ūd of Ghazna employed Ghurid officers as specialists in siege warfare. While it was still pagan, Ghur supplied slaves to the markets of Herat and Sistan.\(^9\) It was widely known for horse-breeding. The region of Ghur thus possessed two of the most important requisites of war in the Middle Ages – horses and iron – and the Ghurids took full advantage of them.

According to Ghurid legendary tradition, Zahāk was the first ancestor of the Shansabānī dynasty. Farīdun and Shansab, the eponymous founder of the dynasty, were said to be descendants of Zahāk. While no systematic account of the early history of Ghur is available, it appears that the penetration of Islam was a slow process. The Arab historian al-Tabarī refers to a campaign in 667 by al-Hakam b. cĀmir, the governor of Khurasan, and Ibn al-Athīr records details of an expedition undertaken against Ghur in 725. The purpose of these occasional incursions seems to have been to obtain slaves and booty, and no permanent implantation of Islam resulted.

The legendary tradition, as expressed by the early thirteenth-century historian of the Ghurid dynasty Jūjānī in his Tabaqāt-i Nāsirī, our prime source for the entire history of the dynasty, holds that a Shansabānī prince, Amir Banjī, subsequently came to prominence. He was the ancestor of all the Shansabānī amirs who occupied the Ghurid lands, and secured legal sanction for his authority from the caliph Hārūn al-Rashīd, who conferred upon him a covenant and a standard and gave him the title of qasīm amīr al-mu’mīnīn (Partner of the Commander of the Faithful). Jūjānī is silent about the successors of Banjī until the advent of Amir Sūrī, who in the later ninth century came into conflict with the Saffarids. Yaṣṣūq b. Layth, the Saffarid ruler of Sistan, conquered Zamin-Dawar, Bust and Rukkhaj, but Ghur was saved by the inaccessibility of its mountains.

In c. 979 the Samanid overlord of northern and eastern Afghanistan, Nūh b. Mansūr, dispatched a force to conquer Ghur, but except for a few forts, no significant conquests could be made. When Sebüktegin was governor of Ghazna and Zabulistan on behalf of the Samanids (977–97) (see above, Chapter 4), he made several attacks on Ghur. After some initial set-backs, he established his authority in eastern Ghur and was recognized as suzerain by Muhammad b. Sūrī of Mandish. After the death of Sebüktegin, Muhammad

---

\(^8\) Togan, 1936, pp. 33–4.
\(^9\) Bosworth, 1961, p. 118.
withheld the payment of tribute, plundered caravans and blackmailed the subjects of Sultan Mahmūd in the neighbouring provinces.

In 1011 Sultan Mahmūd sent Altuntash and Arslan Hājib, governors of Herat and Tus respectively, on an expedition into Ghur. The Ghaznavid forces marched on Ahangaran. Muhammad b. Sūrī entrenched himself in inaccessible hills and ravines, but the Ghaznavid army routed the Ghurids, and Muhammad b. Sūrī and his son Shīth were taken prisoner. Another of Muhammad b. Sūrī’s sons, Abū ʿAlī by name, had remained on good terms with Sultan Mahmūd when his own father was at loggerheads with him, so that Mahmūd rewarded Abū ʿAlī by placing Mandish under him. Mahmūd thus brought eastern Ghur under his control. Then in 1020, he sent his son Masʿūd, at that time governor of Herat, to subdue Nab, the north-western part of Ghur; according to the Ghaznavid historian Bayhaqī, Masʿūd was the first to penetrate to the interior of this part of Ghur.

Amir Abū ʿAlī was, however, overthrown at some date in the 1030s by his nephew Ābbās who established himself in Ghur. Some notables of Ghur approached ʿIbrāhīm b. Masʿūd of Ghazna, who marched on Ghur with a large army. As soon as his army appeared, the forces of Ghur went over to him and Ābbās was handed over to ʿIbrāhīm. He was removed and the government of Ghur was placed in the hands of his son, Muhammad, who now regularly paid the tribute to his Ghaznavid overlords. During the time of Muhammad’s son, Malik Qutb al-Dīn Hasan, tribal conflicts created chaos in Ghur; it was Hasan’s son and successor Malik ʿIzz al-Dīn Husayn (1100–46) who restored peace and order in the region. While Sanjar was Seljuq ruler of the eastern Iranian lands, he fought against the ruler of Ghur and took ʿIzz al-Dīn Husayn prisoner. Later, however, the sultan sent him back to his native land; and thereafter, ʿIzz al-Dīn Husayn regularly sent tribute – which included war equipment, armour and the finely bred guard dogs of Ghur – to Sanjar in his capital at Merv.

The rise of the Ghurids as an independent power

The period of Shansabānī expansion began with the seven sons of ʿIzz al-Dīn Husayn. They divided their patrimony among themselves and consolidated their authority in and around Ghur, so that the history of Ghur as an imperial power begins with them in the mid-twelfth century. Fakhr al-Dīn Masʿūd founded the dynasty of the rulers of Bamiyan and Tukharistan; Bahā’ al-Dīn Sām became the amir of Ghur and Firuzkuh; Sayf al-Dīn Sūrī established himself at Ghazna; Sultan ʿAlā’ al-Dīn Husayn became the sovereign over Ghur, Ghazna and Bamiyan; Shihāb al-Dīn Muhammad Kharnak established himself at

Maćdīn; and Shujać al-Dīn Ĕ Ali became the amir of Jarmas. The seventh son Qutb al-Dīn Muhammad’s adoption of the title of malik al-jībāl (Lord of the Mountains) was the first expression of his ambitions. He founded Firuzkuh and built a fortress there, while Sayf al-Dīn Sūrī made Istiyya his capital.

Relations between the brothers became strained, however. Qutb al-Dīn Muhammad went over to Bahrām Shah of Ghazna (1117–57), but he was poisoned there, leading to a war of revenge between the Ghurids and the Ghaznavids and the savage sacking of Ghazna (see below). When Qutb al-Dīn had left for Ghazna, Bahā’ al-Dīn Sām came to Firuzkuh from his territory of Sanga and gave orders for the construction of strong fortresses in Ghur, the Garmsir, Gharchistan and the mountain tracts of Herat. He further married a daughter of Malik Badr al-Dīn of Kidan, also of the Shansabānī family; she was the mother of the later sultans Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muhammad and Muçiizz al-Dīn Muhammad.

Bahā’ al-Dīn Sām had, when he set out for Ghazna, entrusted Ghur to his brother Ĕ Alā’ al-Dīn Husayn. The latter, on hearing of his brother Qutb al-Dīn Muhammad’s death in 1146–7, set out towards Ghazna to accomplish what his brother had not been able to achieve. Bahrām Shah alerted the troops of Ghazna and Hindustan. The two armies met and the Ghurids employed their defence tactics of the karwāb (a screen made of raw bullock hides with both sides stuffed with cotton and used as a protective wall). The stratagem worked: Bahrām Shah’s son Dawlat Shah was killed, and the army of Ghazna was routed. Ĕ Alā’ al-Dīn took Ghazna by storm, setting fire to it for seven nights and days, and at Bust he destroyed the palaces and buildings of the Mahmudi (i.e. Ghaznavid) dynasty. He thus came to be known as Jahān-Sūz (Incendiary of the World). Mahmud’s Ghazna, the ‘bride of cities’, and many of its fine buildings and libraries, disappeared in a bloodbath.

The apogee of the Ghurid sultanate

Malik Bahā’ al-Dīn Sām’s sons, Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Muçiizz al-Dīn, now come into prominence. Ghiyāth al-Dīn adopted a policy of fraternal co-operation and eventually gave the title of sultan to his brother Muçiizz al-Dīn and to his nephew Malik Shams al-Dīn Muhammad of Bamiyan, son of Malik Fakhr al-Dīn Mas<Test>. He also established contact with the Ĕ Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, whose moral support added to his prestige. Ĕ Alā’ al-Dīn Husayn had imprisoned the two brothers, but his son Sultan Sayf al-Dīn had set them free. Ghiyāth al-Dīn rendered great service to Sayf al-Dīn in dealing with the Oghuz (or

11 According to one historian, Qutb al-Dīn had once supported the previous ruler in Ghazna, Arslan Shah, against his brother Bahrām Shah. See Khan, 1949, pp. 44–5.
Ghuzz), and when Sayf al-Dīn died, the amirs and Malik of Ghur and Gharchistan gave their allegiance to him.

On Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s accession to the throne in Firuzkuh in 1163, Muḥizz al-Dīn was entrusted with the territories of Istiyan and Kajuran. The two brothers lost no time in devising a stratagem to kill their rival, Abu ʾl-ʿAbbās, who was supported by the refractory elements of Ghur. His death strengthened Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s position, but then his uncle Malik Fakhr al-Dīn Masʿūd coveted the throne of Firuzkuh. However, he was unable to achieve military dominance over the two brothers, who eventually allowed him to return to his principality of Bamiyan. Ghur was now firmly in the hands of Ghiyāth al-Dīn, who then extended his power southwards into Zamin-Dawar. After the death of Tāj al-Dīn Yıldız, a military slave of the Seljuq Sultan Sanjar, the leaders and notables of Herat invited Ghiyāth al-Dīn, and the latter established himself there also. Later, he married a daughter of Sultan ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Husayn in order to consolidate his family position. When Muḥizz al-Dīn returned from campaigns in Sistan, Ghiyāth al-Dīn made over Teginabad (i.e. the region of Kandahar) to him. Ghiyāth al-Dīn then dispatched exploratory raiding parties to Kabul, Zabul and Ghazna, which the Oghuz had wrested from the last Ghaznavid ruler Khusraw Malik (1160–86), by driving him to Lahore; Ghazna was recovered in 1173. Ghiyāth al-Dīn placed Muḥizz al-Dīn on the throne of Ghazna and himself returned to Firuzkuh.

Two years later, in 1175, the armies of Ghur and Ghazna advanced to Herat and occupied it, also conquering Pushang. These successes so enhanced Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s prestige that the Nasrid Malik of Nimruz (i.e. Sistan) became his vassal. The Oghuz Malik of Kirmān also submitted to him. Ghurid control was now extended over much of Khurasan and the sultan’s name was pronounced from the pulpits and inscribed on the coinage there.

Ghiyāth al-Dīn was at the height of his prestige when he became involved with the Khwarazmian claimant Sultan Ṣūlṭān Shāh, who had reached his court after having been driven out of his lands by his brother, the Khwarazm Shah Tekish. The conflict between the Ghurids and members of the Khwarazm Shah’s family went on for several months, during which Muḥizz al-Dīn defeated Sultan Shāh. On Tekish’s death in 1200, Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Muḥizz al-Dīn occupied Nishapur and assigned it to Malik Diyāʾ al-Dīn, son of Abū ʿAlī and son-in-law of Ghiyāth al-Dīn. In 1200 Merv was taken and Malik Nasīr al-Dīn Muhammad Kharnak installed there; Sarakhs was assigned to Tāj al-Dīn Zangi, the son of Malik Fakhr al-Dīn Masʿūd.

Ghiyāth al-Dīn died in 1202 aged 63 and was buried in Herat, but he was survived for four more years by his brother Muḥizz al-Dīn. The latter had won two historic battles in 1192, one on the banks of the River Murghab, which led to the rout of the Khwarazm
Shah, and the second at Tara’in in Panjab, which opened the gates of northern India for the Ghurid armies. The Ghurid conquests now extended as far as the frontiers of Kashmir.

The Ghurid incursions into India had begun in 1175 when Muʿizz al-Dīn marched towards Multan and overthrew the renascent Carmathians there. He then occupied Uchch and in 1178 led an army into Gujarat against the Hindu ruler of Nahrwala (the Anhilvāda of Indian geography), who had a formidable army. He defeated the Ghurid forces at Kayadra near Mount Abu and made their retreat extremely difficult. Thereafter Muʿizz al-Dīn changed his plans and decided upon a thrust through Panjab, which had been in the hands of the last Ghaznavid sultan, Khusraw Malik. In 1176 Peshawar was taken. In 1182 Muʿizz al-Dīn marched against Daybul in Sind and conquered the whole area up to the sea coast; the Sumera ruler there acknowledged his suzerainty. The conquest of Lahore was completed in 1186 after three successive expeditions and Khusraw Malik was induced, under the protection of a treaty, to surrender. He was treacherously put to death by the Ghurids, along with his son Bahrām Shah, thereby ending some two centuries of Ghaznavid power. All the strategic areas which provided the Ghurids with a springboard into India were now in the hands of Muʿizz al-Dīn.

A confrontation with the Chāhamanas, who ruled the territory extending from Ajmer to Delhi, now followed. In 1191 Muʿizz al-Dīn besieged and captured Bhatinda. The Chāhāmana ruler Prithvi Rāja appeared there to recover the fortress, however, and in a battle fought at Tara’in in 1191, Muʿizz al-Dīn was utterly defeated and seriously wounded. A Khalaj soldier rescued him from the battlefield and helped him to reach Ghazna, while Prithvi Rāja invested the fortress of Bhatinda and recaptured it after 13-months’ siege.12 Muʿizz al-Dīn refused to take this defeat as final. After making preparations extending over a whole year, he returned with a force of 120,000 cavalry. This time he defeated his Chāhāmana adversary. Govinda Rāja was killed and Prithvi Rāja captured, so that the Chāhāmana kingdom now lay at the Ghurid ruler’s feet. Important military points, like Hansī, Kuhram and Sarsuti, were occupied and garrisoned, and the whole of the Siwalik territory was brought under control. From Peshawar to Hansi, the entire region was now under the control of Muʿizz al-Dīn.

In 1196 Bhīma Deva, the ruler of Nahrwala, endeavoured to retrieve Ajmer from Ghurid control. The Ghurid commander Qutb al-Dīn Aybak was besieged in Ajmer for several months, but Muʿizz al-Dīn dispatched a relieving force. Bhīma Deva retreated to Gujarat, but Aybak pursued him towards Nahrwala and routed his forces. Bhīma Deva managed to escape, but thousands of his soldiers were put to the sword or taken prisoner. The victory

at Tara’in was a major triumph for the Ghurids in India. Their general Aybak occupied Meerut, Baran and Delhi in 1192. Soon afterwards Mu’izz al-Dīn again came to India and conquered Thankar and Vijayamandirgarh. The ruler of Gwalior accepted his suzerainty. In 1197 Aybak conquered Badaon and in 1199–1200 Malwa. Two other Ghurid generals, the Turkish slave commander Bahā’ al-Dīn Toghrīl and Muhammad Bakhtiyār Khaljī, played a significant role in the extension of Ghurid authority in India. Toghrīl consolidated the possessions of Gwalior and Bayana, while Muhammad Bakhtiyār Khaljī supplanted the Gahadavala chiefs and carried the Ghurid banners into Bihar and Bengal. Emboldened by his victories, he pushed ahead towards the Himalayas and Tibet, but this proved a disaster in his otherwise successful career.

Mu’izz al-Dīn was assassinated in India in 1206 and his Turkish slave generals – Qutb al-Dīn Aybak, Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz and Nāsir al-Dīn Qubācha – now rose to prominence. They speedily quarrelled among themselves, however, so that Ghazna became detached from the Ghurid possessions. According to the official Ghurid historian Fakhr-i Mudabbir, Aybak was formally invested with viceregal powers in 1206 and was appointed wali al-ṭāḥṣal (heir apparent) by his master, Mu’izz al-Dīn. For some three years he had to content himself with the positions of Malik and sipaḥsalar (commander-in-chief),13 at first clinging loyally to his background of service to the Shansabānis, but he then was able to establish his own authority in India when it became apparent that the unity of the Ghurid empire had been irretrievably shattered by the Khwarazm Shahs.

The Bamiyan amirate

The Shansabānis established their control over Tukharistan and the mountain tracts of Bamiyan soon after their successes in Ghazna. As noted above, this region was known for its treasures and its mines of gold, silver and precious stones. Ālā’ al-Dīn Jahān-Sūz installed his eldest brother, Malik Fakhr al-Dīn Mas’ūd, there in 1145. Subsequently, the latter’s son Shams al-Dīn Muhammad established his authority in Balkh, Chaghaniyan, Wakhsh, Jarum, Badakhshan and the hill tracts of Shughnan, acquiring from Ghiyāth al-Dīn the title of sultan for himself also. His son Bahā’ al-Dīn Sām, who succeeded him in 1192, was highly respected by scholars and literati alike; Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī, the famed Muslim philosopher, Qur’anic commentator and theologian, was associated with his court for many years. Bahā’ al-Dīn Sām became the focus of Shansabānī hopes, and the Maliks and amirs of Ghur, Ghazna and Bamiyan, who now looked upon him as their head, invited him to Ghazna; but he fell ill and died, almost simultaneously with the assassination of

Sultan Mu‘izz al-Dīn in 1206. Thereafter, Shansabānī fortunes in their own homelands began to wane.

The Ghurid army commanders invited ʿAlā‘ al-Dīn and Jalāl al-Dīn, the sons of Bahā’ al-Dīn Sām, to Ghazna in order to occupy the throne. Jalāl al-Dīn placed his brother on the throne and himself returned to Bamiyan. The fabulous treasures of Ghazna were divided between the two brothers, but during the following years, they quarrelled over the possession of Bamiyan. Finally, Sultan ʿAlā‘ al-Dīn Muhammad Khwarazm Shah marched against Jalāl al-Dīn and had him put to death in 1215, thus extinguishing the Ghurid dynasty in its homelands of Afghanistan.

The Ghurid sultanate as a world power

At the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth, the Ghurid state extended from Herat in Afghanistan to Lakhnawti in Bengal and touched the borders of Tibet and Kashmir. Barthold rightly observes that, ‘the brothers Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Shihāb al-Dīn . . . raised their kingdom to the rank of a world power’.14 They had to deal, with varying degrees of success, with a number of powers – the Ghaznavids, the Seljuqs, the Oghuz, the Kara Khitay, the Khwarazm Shahs, the Hindu Chalukyas and Chāhamanas, and the Khokars, among others – taking full advantage of the decline of the Seljuqs and the Ghaznavids. Following the death of Seljuq Sanjar in 1157, they struggled hard, but ultimately unsuccessfully, for the control of Khurasan.15 When Ghurid power in its own homelands declined, their Indian acquisitions flourished and paved the way for the emergence of the Delhi Sultanate. This was to be the most powerful state in northern India until 1526, when Bābur replaced it by the Mughal empire (see below, Chapter 14). Thus Ghurid Dehli became the repository of the Muslim culture of Central Asia.

The decline of the Seljuqs and the Ghaznavids, noted above, created a political vacuum that the Khwarazm Shahs and the Ghurids struggled to fill. Ghurid ambitions in Khurasan were blocked by the Khwarazmians, who also coveted the province and who, in the long run, could bring greater military resources to bear in the struggle. Ghiyāth al-Dīn sought the Khwarazm Shah, Tekish’s help against the latter’s rival Sultān Shāh, but the Ghurids had to deal single-handed with Sultān Shāh. In 1190–1, however, Sultān Shāh and his Turkish ally Toghrīl of Herat were defeated and Herat was annexed to Ghur. Sultān Shāh died the following year and his possessions in northern Khurasan were annexed by Tekish, so the latter for a while controlled the whole of Khurasan. His advance into western Iran

15 Ibid., p. 339.
worried the ʿAbbasid caliph, who sent emissaries to the Ghurid sultan urging immediate war against the Khwarazm Shahs. The opportunity came in 1200 when Tekish died, his enterprise in western Iran was aborted and his son ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad succeeded to power in Khwarazm. In 1201 Ghurid troops entered Khurasan and captured Nishapur, Merv, Sarakhs and Tus, reaching as far as Gurgan and Bistam. Kuhistan, a stronghold of the Ismaʿilis, was plundered and all Khurasan was brought temporarily under Ghurid control.

This success proved to be short-lived: ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad recovered Nishapur and other Ghurid acquisitions, and Herat came under his control in 1201. He was, however, anxious for peace with the Ghurids so that he could combat the threat from the steppes of the Kara Khitay (see below, Chapter 11). The Ghurids, for their part, were anxious to recover Khurasan. They occupied Herat and other towns, but ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad took advantage of Muʿizz al-Dīn’s brief absence from Herat due to the death of his brother Ghiyāth al-Dīn in 1202, defeated the Ghurid army besieging Merv and relieved the city. In retaliation Muʿizz al-Dīn invaded Khwarazm and besieged the capital of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad, but had to retreat. The Kara Khitay pursued him and inflicted a crushing defeat on the banks of the Oxus near Andkhud (modern Andkhoy) in 1204. Muʿizz al-Dīn managed to reach his capital Firuzkuh safely, but Andkhud was a disaster for the Ghurids, who now retained only Herat and Balkh of their conquests. Muʿizz al-Dīn did not lose heart, and was planning a full-scale invasion of Transoxania when developments in Panjab attracted his attention. He ordered his kinsman, the ruler of Bamiyan, to prepare for the campaign and to arrange the construction of a bridge over the Oxus, but he could not undertake this campaign as he was assassinated in 1206 at Damyak, while on his way back to Ghazna.

The death of Muʿizz al-Dīn heralded the end, a few years later, of his Ghurid empire which had spanned the Hindu Kush. Not long afterwards, his nephew and successor at Ghur, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Mahmūd, had to acknowledge the suzerainty of the Khwarazm Shah. When Mahmūd died, the Shansabānī lands were absorbed into the Khwarazmian empire, and the dissolution of Ghurid power was complete when Muʿizz al-Dīn’s governor, Yıldız, was driven out of Ghazna.

The political and social organization of the Ghurid state

The Ghurid political authority, initially organized on a patriarchal basis in an inaccessible mountain region, slowly acquired some of the features of a state and briefly became one of the greatest empires of the Islamic Middle Ages, stretching from Herat in Afghanistan to
western Bengal in India. Its diversity at the height of its power is an interesting sociological phenomenon. The Firuzkuh area was essentially patriarchal, with strong tribal traditions; the Ghazna region had for two centuries nurtured the traditions of the Turco-Iranian monarchy; and Hindustan was under a decentralized feudal system of government. The rise of the Kara Khitay in Transoxania and the Oghuz of Khurasan added a new dimension to the situation.\textsuperscript{16} Thus the Ghurid empire, from Ghur to Lakhnawti, comprised a multiplicity of cultural traditions. The Ghurids, with their political skill, used this cultural situation to their advantage so that when the Mongols devastated Central and Western Asia, the Ghurids’ Indian acquisitions became the repositories of their cultural heritage. Thus it was in early thirteenth-century Lahore that the littérateurs Muhammad cAwfī and Fakhr-i Mudabbir worked.

Like other Sunni powers of the eastern Islamic world, the Ghurids, beginning with Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn, thought it expedient to establish contact with the cAbbasid court and receive further confirmation of their authority. Al-Mustadī (1170–80) and al-Nāsir (1180–1225) both granted robes of honour to Ghiyāth al-Dīn and the imperial nawbat (military band salute) was introduced five times a day; all these acts of recognition enhanced the sultan’s prestige.

The idea of a capital could arise only when some sort of integration had been effected among the tribal pockets of power and when the network of castles and towers had acquired a level of administrative cohesion. The fact that Firuzkuh only emerged as a Ghurid capital in the time of Qutb al-Dīn Muhammad shows the protracted nature of efforts necessary for this. The title of sultan was assumed by Amir Sūrī after his accession to the throne of Ghazna, where the institution of monarchy had earlier taken a new shape under the Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmūd. The usual titles in Ghur had been the modest ones of amir and Malik. The extension of authority beyond Ghur necessitated the creation of a winter capital, and one in the warm region of Zamin-Dawar was adopted for this purpose.

Tribal traditions, ethnic considerations and the exigencies of the situation all influenced Shansabānī principles of succession. Malik Fakhr al-Dīn Masḵūd, though the eldest of the seven brothers, was not allowed to occupy the throne of Ghur because his mother was of Turkish origin. The two brothers Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Muḥizz al-Dīn simultaneously enjoyed the title of sultan, and Muḥizz al-Dīn accepted the seniority of his brother, who was known as al-sultān al-ażam (Supreme Sultan). After Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s death, Muḥizz al-Dīn came to be called al-sultān al-ażam. The Shansabānī amirs shared political power and often worked in collaboration, under the over-lordship of a leading member of the family. That the vassal–master relationship was frequently under strain reveals, however, the

The political and social organization

fragile nature of the system. The vassals were expected to pay regular tribute and inscribe the name of the suzerain on the coins; otherwise, they exercised all authority in their territories. At a time when political loyalties were frequently opportunistic, the system of vassalage ensured some sort of political collaboration, if not loyalty. The administrative arrangements visualized by Mu'izz al-Dīn for his Indian acquisitions seem to have comprised three or four local commanders who were independent of each other, but subject to himself. Later, the institution of the iqtā' (revenue assignment) developed in India and helped the integration of feudal units into a central organization.17

The Turkish military slave Qutb al-Dīn Aybak showed respect for legal forms and tradition when he waited for a letter of manumission from Ghiyāth al-Dīn Mahmūd, on whom the legacy of Mu'izz al-Dīn had devolved. Both Aybak and another commander after him, Iltutmish, firmly demonstrated that they were not prepared to share political authority with anybody and stood for a centralized power in northern India. They recast Ghurid political traditions in the light of the Indian situation, and when the 'Abbasid caliph granted a manshūr (patent of authority) to Iltutmish, the Ghurid possessions in India achieved recognition as an independent political entity.

Militarily, the Ghurids had certain advantages. First, as noted above, they had iron and horses in abundance. The Ghaznavids appreciated their production of arms and the Indians hailed them as aśvapatis (Lords of the Horse).18 Second, the Ghurid sultans could dispose of a nucleus of bellicose Ghuri and Khalji tribesmen from the core of their empire, Afghanistan. Their numbers were limited, however; hence they had to be supplemented by purchasing Turkish military slaves, presumably stemming ultimately from the Inner Asian steppes. With all these forces, the sultans were able to make headway in northern India against the strenuous resistance of Rajput and other military elements in the armies of the Indian princes. However, the sultans chose to fight on two fronts, one in northern India and the other in Khurasan and Central Asia. In the long run, they were not able to sustain prolonged warfare in both spheres of action; and in the second sphere, they were at a numerical disadvantage compared with their enemies the Khwarazm Shahs, who could call upon vast reserves of Turkish manpower from the steppes around Khwarazm and beyond. Hence the Ghurids failed to make permanent conquests in Khurasan and eventually lost even their heartland of Ghur to the Khwarazm Shahs; but their commanders, as epigoni of the Ghurid sultans, successfully laid the foundations of the first large-scale, dynamic implantation of Islamic political and military control in the Indus–Ganges plains

18 Nizami, 1961, p. 82.
of northern India, an achievement of lasting significance for the history of the subcontinent (see below, Chapter 14).

The institution of the slave household assumed importance under Muʿizz al-Dīn, who treated his slaves as his sons, and in course of time they became the linchpin of post-Ghurid organization in India. Government machinery in the earlier period was confined to the management of essential government functions, but when Ghazna came under Ghurid control, it was natural that the administrative institutions as developed by the Ghaznavids should be adopted. A certain number of features of the Seljuq administrative system were also taken over. Thus in India the Ghurid, Ghaznavid and indigenous Indian traditions coexisted.

The vizier was the head of the civil administration. He had no judicial functions but had a supervisory jurisdiction over the army. The qādī al-qudāt (supreme judge) was the head of the judiciary, with numerous subordinate qādīs, including a qādī for the army. In India the office of sadr-i jāhān (or sadr al-sūdr) looked after religious affairs. The most important officer of the household was the amīr-i hājib, the master of ceremonies at court who conducted notables and officials to the royal presence. During the time of Sultan Nāsir al-Dīn Mahmūd of Delhi, the office of wakīl-i dār is also mentioned. The amīr-i shikār was the chief huntsman. The sar-i jāndār commanded the king’s bodyguards. The sipāhsālār was the supreme commander of the forces, and in India the actual organization of the army and its commissariat was the responsibility of the ārid-i mamālik. As noted above, the Ghurid armies were multi-ethnic, so that the army of Qutb al-Dīn Aybak in India comprised Turks, Tajiks of various kinds and also locally recruited Indian soldiers.

Cultural developments

Ghur lacked any urban life until a comparatively late date. It was contact with Ghazna, the hub of the intellectual world on the eastern fringes of Islam, which initiated the Ghurids into the cultural life of Iran and Central Asia. Amir Abū ʿAlī ordered the construction of many public buildings, including mosques and madrasas. Malik ʿAbbās built numerous fortress-like villages in Ghur. Qutb al-Dīn Muhammad founded the fortress and city of Firuzkuh. Bahāʾ al-Dīn Sām erected strong fortresses in Ghur, the Garmṣir, Gharchistan and Herat, keeping strategic needs in view. A castle constructed at Wadawajzd by Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn was so impregnable that it survived the onslaught of the Mongols. The remains of a Ghurid madrasa, constructed in 1165–76, have recently been unearthed by archaeologists in Gharchistan. It ‘exhibits numerous parallels to many structures of the

twelfth century in western Khurasan, Central Asia, Ghazna and Sistan’. The discovery by André Maricq in 1957 at Jam in Ghur of what are possibly the minaret and citadel of Firuzkuh has also thrown valuable light on Ghurid architectural traditions.

The earliest Shansabānī ruler to take any interest in academic pursuits was Amir ʿAbbās, who was interested in astrology and raised a lofty castle with twelve towers for his astrological studies. His son, Amir Muhammad, extended his patronage to men of culture and learning. Sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn founded many institutions for the Shāfiʿīs. Bahāʾ al-Dīn Sām was respected for his patronage of scholars: according to the Ghurid historian ʿUzjānī, ‘there was no Muslim sovereign who was a greater cherisher of learned men’. As mentioned previously, Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī was associated with Bahāʾ al-Dīn Sām’s court for a considerable time and wrote his Risāla-yi Bahāʾīyya in his name, while during the time of Ghiyāth al-Dīn he wrote another treatise entitled Latāʾif-i Ghiyāthīyya.

The religious life of the people of Ghur passed through interesting phases: as noted above, the pietistic sect of the Karrāmīyya was influential for many years. Initially, the followers of the Karrāmīyya had received encouragement in Khurasan from Sebūktegin and Mahmūd of Ghazna. But contact with Ghazna, Herat and other centres of Muslim culture slowly changed the religious complexion of Ghur and its adjoining territories, and during the course of the twelfth century, the Shansabānīs started to abandon their patronage of the Karrāmīyya. There were a number of encounters with the Karrāmīyya leaders, who were strongly opposed to Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī but who had a considerable popular following in Ghur. In the end, Ghiyāth al-Dīn adopted the Shāfiʿī school of law, while Muʿīzz al-Dīn became a Hanafī.

The Ghurids destroyed Ghazna, but in India their role was more constructive. The intellectual heritage of Central Asia, both in the form of scholars and of books, reached India during this period and flourished under Ghurid patronage. Thus the Ghurid occupation of northern India had a social and cultural significance in the broader framework of Central Asian history.

---

21 See Nizami, 1961, p. 85.
The first mention of the Uighurs (under the name Hui-ho and various graphic variants) appears in Chinese sources and refers to the early seventh century A.D. when this people lived on the banks of the Selenga river and was subjected to the Türks. The Chinese viewed the Uighurs as the descendants of the Hsiung-nu, the dominant power on the steppe from

* See Map 2.
about 200 B.C. to A.D. 48. This may indeed have been the historical truth, but there is no way to substantiate it, since the Chinese sources tend to ascribe Hsiung-nu origin to any of the numerous steppe peoples with whom the Chinese had contacts over succeeding centuries. It is thus not surprising that the description given of the Uighurs by the Chin T’ang-shu [Old T’ang Annals] follows the traditional pattern of characterization of the steppe peoples:

They have no chiefs, no permanent dwellings; they wander in search of water and pasture. These men are of an evil disposition and cruel. They are excellent riders and archers and most rapacious. Brigandage is their livelihood.

More specific, and certainly trustworthy, is the information that the Uighurs were subjects of the Türks, who relied on them ‘to govern the wild northern regions’.¹

Around 630, at a time when Türk power was on the wane, under the leadership of P’u-sa the Uighurs became more assertive. Although the Chinese characters used to write his name are identical with those transcribing the Buddhist term bodhisatva, there is no other indication that he or his family were Buddhists. On P’u-sa’s death his son T’u-mi-tu assumed the title of Kaghan; he was murdered in 648. His son P’o-juan (for him, as for his father, we have names only in Chinese transcriptions) died some time between 661 and 663, leaving the reins of government to his sister who, defeated by the troops of the Chinese emperor T’ai-tsung, disappears from the stage. Nothing is said about the activities of the four Uighur chiefs whose names are known for the period between 680 and 741; their people, together with other tribes of the T’iêh-le confederation to which they belonged, lived within the borders and under the sway of the Eastern Türk empire.

In 744 the Karluk, Basmil and Uighur tribes formed an alliance to overthrow Türk rule. The victorious coalition was first headed by the Basmil Alp Bilge Kaghan, but he was soon eliminated by an Uighur–Karluk joint action. Shortly afterwards, it was the turn of the Karluk to be ousted, but they were still a force to be reckoned with and remained hostile to the Uighurs. The action undertaken by the three peoples should be labelled ‘revolt’ rather than ‘invasion’. The first Uighur rulers considered themselves continuers of the Türk tradition, and claimed legitimacy by linking themselves with Bumin Kaghan, the founder of the First Türk empire. The difference separating Türks from Uighurs must have been purely political. As is clearly shown by the inscriptions commemorating the deeds of their great men, Türks and Uighurs spoke the same language, used the same runic-type script and lived within the same geographic boundaries. Were it not for their name, the Uighurs would be indistinguishable from the Türks. The Uighur state in Mongolia was, in fact, the Third Türk empire. Its first ruler, Kutlugh Bilge Kül Kaghan (744–7), and his son and successor El-Etmish Bilge Kaghan (747–59), also known as Bayan Chur, made a point

¹ Chavannes, 1903, p. 87.
of cultivating friendly relations with China. Uighur troops were instrumental in the T’ang reconquest in 757 of Lo-yang, which had fallen into the hand of the rebellious An Lu-shan. A year later, in recognition of his services, the Kaghan received for his wife the Princess Ning-kuo, daughter of Emperor Su-tsung.

We might pause here for a moment to direct our attention to a process of urbanization gaining strength among the Uighurs. The Shine-usu inscription – written in Uighur in 759 or 760 and celebrating the deeds of El-Etmish Bilge Kaghan – mentions two Uighur cities. One of these, located at the confluence of the Orkhon and Balïklïg rivers, was the Kaghan’s residence. It is usually referred to by its recent Mongol name, Karabalghasun. Its foundation probably goes back to the times of the Türk empire. The Shine-usu inscription also reports that El-Etmish Bilge Kaghan entrusted some Chinese and Sogdians with the building at the Selenga river of a city called Bay Balïq. The city of the Uighur Kaghan, most likely Karabalghasun, was described in some detail by the Arab traveller Tamīm b. Bahr, who visited it, probably in 821.² Located within a conurbation which included cultivated tracts, the town itself had twelve huge iron gates and must have been a bustling place. ‘The town is populous and thickly crowded and has markets and various trades,’ writes Tamīm b. Bahr about the city, though he does not give its name. The majority of its inhabitants were Manichaeans. One cannot establish with any certainty what prompted the Uighur rulers to engage in the building of cities. Of course, both of the two dominant foreign influences – Chinese and Sogdian – must have favoured this development, but, for reasons of prestige, the Kaghan might have felt the need for an official, fixed place of residence. He himself – so we are told – might have preferred to stay in a tent, though admittedly a luxurious one. Some sixty years after the decision to build Bay Balïq had been taken, Tamīm b. Bahr would find the Kaghan’s ‘golden tent’ at a distance of some 30 km from Karabalghasun.

From the marriage of El-Etmish Bilge Kaghan and Princess Ning-kuo issued Bögü Kaghan (759–79), possibly the central figure in Uighur history. Following in his father’s footsteps, he gave substantial aid to the Chinese, once more recovering on their behalf the city of Lo-yang in 762, though at a price: the devastation wrought upon the city by the unruly Uighur troops. The story of their behaviour in China, which they were supposed to help, is a miserable record of brutality and destruction. It is to be observed that the Uighurs now held a position of vantage in regard to the Chinese empire that none of the other nomadic powers of Mongolia ever occupied. If the emperor was able to cope with his internal foes, it was because he could rely on the Uighurs.

Without any doubt, the most important event of Bögü Kaghan’s stay in Lo-yang was his conversion by Sogdian religious to Manichaeism. In his subsequent actions, Bögüs Kaghan

² On Tamīm b. Bahr’s journey, see Minorsky, 1948.
displayed the zeal usually shown by recent converts. An Uighur Manichaean text gives a highly idealized picture of the enthusiasm with which the Uighurs are said to have accepted their ruler’s announcement of his conversion:

At that time when the divine Bögü Kaghan had thus spoken, we the Elect and all the people living within the land rejoiced. It is impossible to describe this our joy. The people told the story to one another and rejoiced.3

The most troublesome aspect of the Kaghan’s conversion was that it resulted in the Sogdians gaining overwhelming influence in matters of policy. The above-mentioned text attributes to the Kaghan the promise: ‘If you, the Elect, give orders, I will follow your words and requests.’ Such an attitude might have justified the title zahan-i Mani (Emanation of Mani) given to Bögü Kaghan in a Pahlavi fragment,4 but was unlikely to impress either the shamans who felt that their influence was being threatened, or indeed the rank and file of a Turkic people of warriors who resented the arrogant meddling of a bunch of foreigners in the affairs of their state. Bögü Kaghan had fallen under the influence of Sogdians who were more interested in their own prosperity than in that of the state. According to the Hsin T’ang-shu [New T’ang History], the Sogdians’ ‘property flourished and they accumulated a very large amount of capital’. Ultimately, they overplayed their hand by attempting to induce Bögü Kaghan to invade China. When he remained impervious to the arguments put forward by his uncle Tun Bagha Tarkhan against such an adventurous undertaking:

Tun Bagha became annoyed and attacked and killed him and, at the same time, massacred nearly two thousand people from among the kaghan’s family, his clique and the Sogdians.5

Uighurs and Sogdians had developed a commensalism that, most of the time, benefited both as long as the latter did not overstep the rules of prudence dictating that a parasite should not exploit its host to the point of death, for the destruction of the host entails its own death. Commensalism presupposes a moderation in greed by the parties involved that was not always displayed by the Sogdians. Following Tun Bagha’s coup d’état in 779, some of them (one wonders whether these were the real culprits) had to pay dearly for their past actions, but the severe measures taken against the Sogdians produced only a temporary eclipse of their role. They were soon back, wheeling and dealing, acting as intermediaries between Uighurs and Chinese, self-appointed diplomats representing their own interests first of all. It should be remembered that, although Sogdians were instrumental in the spread

---

3 See Bang and Gabain, 1929, p. 8, lines 52–6.

4 Müller, 1912.

5 Mackerras, 1972, p. 89.
of Manichaeism among the Uighurs, international trade was typically their principal field of activity.

As with so many other features of Uighur political life, symbiosis with the Sogdians was inherited from the Türks. It will be remembered that under the First Türk empire, the Sogdians attempted to secure for themselves the monopoly of the silk trade, and with this aim in view they were ready to send to war none other than the Türks. There is no evidence that under the Uighurs attempts were made to sell silk directly to Byzantium, but it seems unlikely that the vast quantities obtained from the Chinese were absorbed by the internal market. To obtain silk, two ways were open for the Uighurs, and they made use of both. The most marketable commodity produced by the Uighur economy was, of course, the horse, for which there was a permanent demand among the Chinese military. The Uighurs were ready to provide the mounts in exchange for silk – a conventional transaction. But they were not satisfied with supplying a genuine want; they had recourse to what must be called forced trade, foisting on to the Chinese more horses than were needed by them and of lesser quality. In most instances, the Chinese sources give only the number of silk ligatures paid to the Uighurs but rarely indicate the horse/silk ratio. The *Hsin T’ang-shu* gives the following picture of this pseudo-trade as practised under Emperor T’ai-tsung:

The Uighurs took even greater advantage of their services to China by taking as a price forty pieces of silk for every horse they brought in as tribute. Every year, they sought to sell several tens of thousands of horses … The horses were inferior, weak and unusable. The Emperor gave them [the Uighurs] generous presents, wanting by this means to shame them, but they did not recognize this. They came again to the capital with 10,000 horses, but the emperor could not bear to place this burden on his people once again, so he paid for only 6,000 of them.°

There is reason to think that, though heavy, the burden was not as unbearable as the Chinese wanted the Uighurs to believe. According to their own records, between 780 and 829 the Chinese paid 2,012,000 pieces of silk to the Uighurs.° If we reckon 40 pieces of silk per horse, the silk delivered by the Chinese would have sufficed for the purchase of only 50,300 horses over a period of almost half a century. Yet we know that trade was much more brisk, since under T’ai-tsung the number of horses to be imported officially was set at 10,000 per annum.° The discrepancy may be explained by the Chinese habit of being in arrears with the payments, a practice greatly resented by the Uighurs. According to Uighur reckoning in

° Mackerras, 1972, p. 87.
° Jagchid, 1989, p. 177.
781, the Chinese owed them 1,800,000 pieces of silk, corresponding to the price of 53,000 horses.9

An unpleasant and by no means negligible concomitant of the horse–silk trade was the overbearing, arrogant, unruly behaviour of the Uighur and Sogdian merchants in China. It led to numerous conflicts and, among the officials as well as the people, it left a lasting dislike of these greedy barbarians. It was to manifest itself to the detriment of the Uighurs and Sogdians once they ceased to be shielded by the might of the Uighur empire.

Traditionally, the Kaghan’s leadership was dependent on what he could deliver to his followers, but none of the coveted goods were home-produced; they had to be obtained from or in China, either through loot or trade. Another way to satisfy the ‘insatiable greed’ of his entourage was to allow them to participate in the lavish embassies that were sent to the T’ang court with or without proper justification. In less than 100 years – between 745 and 840–116 such embassies came to China on the pretext of ‘rendering tribute’;10 some of them comprised more than 1,000 members, among them the wives of the more important dignitaries. The jockeying for a place in these diplomatic missions must have been intense. To some extent, the visits of privileged Uighurs and Sogdians to the splendour of the T’ang court were counter-productive; they whetted rather than satisfied the participants’ appetite for luxury goods.

Let us now return to the reign of Tun Bagha Tarkhan, who ruled under the name or title Alp Kutlugh Bilge Kaghan (779–89) and did his best to remain on good terms with the Chinese. His was not an easy task, since Emperor Te-tsung (779–805) had no sympathy for the Uighurs, having been humiliated by them in his youth. Patient diplomacy and the advice of his counsellors slowly overcame the emperor’s hostility and, as a token of renewed confidence, the princess of Hsien-an was given in marriage to the Kaghan in 787. Alp Kutlugh Bilge Kaghan died in 789, but the princess remained among the Uighurs until her death in 808, the Khâtûn (consort) of four successive Kaghans. Te-tsung had good reasons to make conciliatory gestures towards the Uighurs and their help was sorely needed in the quasi-permanent conflict between the T’ang and the Tibetans. The two immediate successors of Alp Kutlugh Bilge Kaghan were murdered. A measure of stability returned only under the rule of A-ch’o, whose regnal title was Kutlugh Bilge Kaghan (790–5), and who was probably still a child on his accession to the throne.

At about this time, there appeared on the scene of Uighur history a new dignitary called the ta-hsiang (Grand Minister) or ta-chiang-ch’un (Grand General) by the Chinese. He is probably identical with the il ögäsi (Glory of the Land/Nation) appearing in a Uighur text.

9 Mackerras, 1972, p. 93.
10 Ibid., pp. 221–38.

201
There is clear evidence to show that, at least under Kutlugh Bilge Kaghan, effective power rested with the *il ögäsi*. It should not then come as a surprise that, at the death of the youthfu Kutlugh Bilge Kaghan, the *il ögäsi* ascended the throne under the grandiloquent regnal title of *Ai tängirdä ülug bulmïsh alp qutluugh ulugh bilgä huai-hsin* Kaghan (795–805 or 806). The death of Kutlugh Bilge Kaghan spelled the end of the Yaghlakar dynasty, which had ruled ever since the establishment of the Uighur empire; the *Huai-hsin* Kaghan (to use the short form of his name) belonged to the Ādiz clan. There is some doubt concerning the very existence of his successor who, if the *Huai-hsin* Kaghan indeed ruled until 808, might be a ‘ghost’ created by the confusion of our sources.

The period of rule of *Ai tängirdä qut bulmïsh küchlüg bilgä pao-yi* Kaghan (809–21), on the other hand, is quite well documented. It was during his reign that the trilingual (Chinese, Uighur and Sogdian) inscription of Karabalghasun was erected, bearing witness, *inter alia*, to a renaissance of Sogdian and Mani-chaean influence among the Uighurs. It might be that this was one of the reasons why the Chinese – deeply distrustful of the Sogdians – refused the *Pao-yi* Kaghan’s request for an imperial bride, on the flimsy pretext that they could not afford the expenses of such a wedding. The true cost of the marriage of a princess was estimated at 200,000 pieces of silk, the annual tax revenue of a large sub-prefecture of the south-east. It was the view of Li Chiang, president of the Ministry of Rites, that the benefits of a marriage alliance with the Uighur Kaghan would amply justify such expenditure. By the time the emperor ceded to persistent Uighur demands, the Kaghan had died and, finally, Princess *T’ai-ho* became the bride of the new Uighur ruler, *Kün tängirdä ulugh bulmïsh küchlüg bilgä ch’ung-te* Kaghan (821–4). The third princess to marry an Uighur ruler, *T’ai-ho* was to stay among the Uighurs for some 22 years, a pawn in the complicated end-game of Sino-Uighur relations. She became the wife successively of *Ai tängirdä qut bulmïsh alp bilgä chao-li* Kaghan (824–32), murdered by his entourage, and of his successor *Ai tängirdä qut bulmïsh alp külug bilgä chang-hsin* Kaghan (832–9), who – menaced by an attack of the Sha-t’o tribes and by a conspiracy engineered by one of his ministers – committed suicide.

Uighur fortunes had sunk very low. Exceptionally heavy snowfalls, causing widespread famine, contributed to the disintegration of the Uighur body politic. The rule of *Ho-sa* (839–40) was too short to allow him to receive an appointed name. He lost his life when the Kyrgyz, who had been engaged for twenty years in a struggle with the Uighurs and were this time led by the renegade Uighur general Külug Bagha, attacked and destroyed Karabalghasun, the Uighur capital. This sequence of events marks the end of the Uighur

11 Chavannes and Pelliot, 1911–12, p. 282.
12 Mackerras, 1972, p. 113.
empire of Mongolia, though mopping-up operations were to continue for some time. Two Uighur factions sought Chinese help. One of these was led by Ögä Kaghan (841–7), who had the support of thirteen tribes and in whom we must see the last legitimate Uighur ruler. There is a whiff of Shakespearian tragedy in the destinies of these men, their swords broken, seeking help from the Chinese who had never seen in the Uighurs anything but rapacious barbarians. Chinese efforts were limited to repeated attempts to rescue Princess T’ai-ho. Once she was safely back among her people, Li Te-yü, a distinguished civil servant of the T’ang, summarized well the policy to follow: ‘Now that we have obtained the princess, we should do battle with the Uighurs again, exterminating them completely, so that none remain to cause later calamities.’ The fall of the Uighurs, so often praised by the Chinese as their staunchest ally, caused no regret in China.

The Kyrgyz who put an end to the Uighur empire on the Orkhon represented a different type of civilization. Although their language was Turkic, fairly close to Türk and Uighur, the Kyrgyz chapter of the T’ang-sku (217B) describes them as strong and tall people, red-haired, white-faced and green-(or blue-)eyed, with a dislike for dark hair and dark eyes. The Persian historian Gardızī, writing in the mid-eleventh century, confirms this description. Individuals with dark features were thought by the Kyrgyz to be the progeny of the renegade Chinese general Li-ling, who in the first century B.C. defected to the nomads. Unlike the Uighurs or the Türks, the Kyrgyz were not considered descendants of the Hsiung-nu by the Chinese. In fact, one of the earliest detailed mentions of the Kyrgyz (called Ch’ien-kun at that time) refers to their defeat in c. 49 B.C. at the hands of the Hsiung-nu ruler, the shan-yü Chich-chih.

The T’ang-shu remarks that the Ch’ien-kun – ancestors of the Kyrgyz called in T’ang times Hsia-ch’ia-ssu – were ‘mixed Ting-ling’. This indication is of little help and has caused much confusion among superficial historians. It was assumed that the Ting-ling constituted the ‘blond’ element among the Kyrgyz. Probably the opposite is true since, in Maenchen-Helfen’s words, ‘there is not the slightest evidence for attributing to the Ting-ling the characteristics of the white race which the T’ang-shu gives to the Ch’ien-kun’. There seems to be general agreement that Ting-ling is the Chinese rendering of the same name which later appears in the form of T’ieh-lê, the designation of a tribal confederation to which, as we have seen, the Uighur (among other Turkic peoples) belonged. One could then speculate that the Turkic element was brought into the process of Kyrgyz ethnogenesis by the Ting-ling. (Archaeological publications – based on the acceptance of the unjustified theory proposed by historians – usually attribute to the Ting-ling the Europoid

14 Maenchen-Helfen, 1939, p. 83.
The population of the Tashtïk culture (first century B.C.–fifth century A.D.) in the Yenisei valley was an amalgam of Europoids and Mongoloids, as is clearly shown by the clay death masks discovered. It is also beyond doubt that the Mongoloid component of the Tashtïk population was superimposed upon the Europoid population which it had probably conquered. While it seems unlikely that the Kyrgyz adopted a Turkic language as late as the eighth century, it is certain that their language contained non-Altaic (Samoyed or Palaeoasian) elements, such as the name of a special type of iron.

Some aspects of their civilization clearly set the Kyrgyz apart from the rest of the Turco-Mongol inhabitants of the steppe. Thus, for instance (and the T’ang-shu makes a special point of this), when mourning, the Kyrgyz did not lacerate their faces. Also, the original title of their ruler was a-je, not in use by any known Inner Asian people. The title Kaghan came to be used only following the victory over the Uighurs. The description of their customs in T’ang times clearly shows that the Kyrgyz were a forest-dwelling people, very different in their lifestyle from the ‘Hsiung-nu type’ steppe-dwelling pastoral nomads. We are informed that, in their forests, the pine trees grew so tall that an arrow could not reach their peaks. Their land was marshy in the summer and covered with deep snow in the winter, so that the Kyrgyz could use skis (mu ma, or ‘wooden horse’) for the hunt. In the winter, when the cold was so severe that the rivers froze to half their depths, the Kyrgyz lived in huts covered with bark. Their tribute to the Chinese consisted of pelts. They practised tattooing. They were shamanists, and the shamans were called by their Turkic name, gam or kam. The early twelfth-century geographic treatise of Marvaz¯ı describes in some detail the doings of a shaman, and he notes that the Kyrgyz burn their dead.\(^{15}\) Gold, tin and iron could be found in their land, and the Kyrgyz were skilled in the manufacture of arms which they purveyed to the Türks in lieu of tribute. Chinese information concerning Kyrgyz prowess in the manufacture of arms is confirmed by archaeological finds and also by petroglyphs on which the representation of plate armour is clearly visible. The Kyrgyz used caparisons to protect their horses, and their pointed helmets are reminiscent of the ‘lion helmets’ used in T’ang China.

Without doubt, in the course of their early history, the Kyrgyz moved from west to east. At the time when the Hsiung-nu shan-yü defeated them, the Ch’ien-kun (as the Kyrgyz were then called) were located to the north-west of the Western Hsiung-nu and to the north of K’ang-chü. According to the Han shu [History of the Former Han] (Ch. 94B), in the middle of the first century B.C. the Ch’ien-kun lived at a distance of 7,000 li to the west of the Hsiung-nu headquarters. The location of K’ang-chü poses some problems – at some periods the name was applied to Sogdiana, at others to Samarkand itself – but it is beyond

\(^{15}\) Minorsky, 1942, p. 30.
doubt that it lay far to the west and, most probably, somewhat to the north of the T’ang-period country of the Kyrgyz. Muslim historians tend to place the Kyrgyz in the north-eastern extremity of the known world. According to the anonymous Persian geography, the *Hudād al-ʿālam* [The Limits of the World] (A.D. 982), only China and the Eastern Ocean were east of the Kyrgyz, while to the north of them lay the ‘Uninhabited Land of the North where people cannot live on account of the intensity of the cold’. The distance separating the Kyrgyz from the Chinese made any contact tenuous, and communications were made difficult and often cut off by the Türk or Uighur empires wedged between the two. According to the *T’ang-shu*, caravans needed 40 days to cover the distance separating Karabalghasun from the Kyrgyz country.

It is difficult to assess with any degree of certainty to what extent the Kyrgyz actually ruled over the ancient land of the Uighurs. For demographic as well as economic reasons – they were not numerous enough and they were not a typical steppe people – they did not fill the vacuum left by the disappearance of the Uighur empire. Although, perhaps for lack of any contender, nominal Kyrgyz rule over Mongolia lasted for about a century, their power base remained in the Yenisei region, in present-day Tuva, where was located their capital Kemjkath (uncertain reading). Savinov distinguishes five cultural groups within the Kyrgyz empire, namely those of Tuva; east Kazakhstan; the Gorno Altai; the Minusinsk basin; and the Krasnoyarsk region.

From about 924 onwards, the Kitan had effective control of the land that used to be the centre of the Uighur empire. This is evidenced by the offer made to the Uighurs of Kanchou by A-pao-chi (alias T’ai-tsu), ruler of the Kitan, to return to their former homeland. By then happily settled in their new country, the Uighurs declined the offer. The arrival of the Kitan and the withdrawal of the Kyrgyz from that region marks the end of Turkic preponderance in what was to become Mongolia.

---

16 Anon., 1937, p. 96.
17 Savinov, 1984.
Part Two

THE UIGHUR KINGDOM OF KOCHO

(Geng Shimin)

After the destruction of the Uighur Khanate in 840, some tribes migrated west to Gansu, where they established the Uighur kingdom of Ganzhou (later, in 1026 to be conquered by the Tangut. The Yughur nationality in the vicinity of Jiuquan, Gansu province, are their present-day descendants). Another important branch (fifteen tribes) migrated westward to the area of Beshbalik (in Chinese called Beiting; its ruins are at Hubaozi in Jimsar county, Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region) north of the T’ien Shan mountain range, crossed the T’ien Shan southward and occupied the Turfan basin where the Uighur kingdom of Kocho was established (c. 860–1284). Shortly afterwards the Uighurs expanded their power to include the Yanqi (Argi, Karashahr) and Qiuci (Kuci, Kuchar) areas. Historical records concerning the Uighur kingdom of Kocho are very sparse. The Chinese records are fragmentary because the chaotic situation in China during the period of the Five Dynasties or Ten Kingdoms (907–60), and the weak government of the Sung dynasty (960–1279), did not allow much attention to be paid to the Western Regions. Arab and Persian sources had little interest in a land that was not yet Islamic and the records written in Uighur were mostly destroyed after the introduction of Islam into the Tarim basin.

The Uighur name ‘Kocho’, originating from the Chinese ‘Gaochang’, refers to the city as well as to the area. The ruins of the ancient city of Gaochang, with its imposing walls, stand 40 km east of the Turfan county administrative centre. The Turfan region, located in the north-eastern part of the Tarim basin, was an important line of communication between East and West and had since ancient times been a key post on the Silk Route.

In the north of the area lies the T’ien Shan, with its snow-capped peaks such as Bogda and Qara-uchin. The streams and rivers, formed by melting snow, provided abundant water that was conducted to the fertile farmlands by underground aqueducts called by the Persian term kārīz. As early as the second century B.C., Turfan became a prosperous oasis with a developed agriculture, producing wheat, barley, rice, maize and beans as well as cotton,
grapes, melon, Hami melon (a kind of musk melon), sesame, and so on. To the north of the T’ien Shan, there are vast tracts of excellent natural (alpine) pasturelands, where large herds of horses, sheep, cattle and camels can graze. There are also many wild animals such as Asiatic wild ass, yak, large-headed sheep, Mongolian gazelle and antelope.

The earliest identifiable inhabitants of the Turfan area were probably the Yüeh-chih (Juzhi), speaking a particular Indo-European language formerly called in the scholarly literature ‘Tokharian A’. During the period of the Northern and Southern Dynasties (420–581), a large number of Chinese entered the Turfan area from inland China. One of them named Jujia of Jincheng, Gansu, founded the Ju dynasty (493–640), which lasted for nearly one and a half centuries. Chinese civilization had a great influence upon the local people. According to Chinese sources, during the fifth–sixth centuries, in the Turfan area the ‘barbarian’ script (i.e. the local script) as well as Chinese characters were used. In schools, the Chinese classics like The Book of Songs, The Confucian Analects and The Book of Filial Piety were taught, but they were all recited in the native ethnic language. Judging from Turkic manuscripts dating from the eighth century, it seems that even before the Uighur immigration, there was a Turkic presence in the Turfan region. The arrival of large numbers of Uighurs accelerated the Turkicization process. There was also a substantial Sogdian population living in the area.

The original inhabitants of Karashahr and Kucha also spoke Tokharian (those living in Karashahr speaking dialect A, those of Kucha using dialect B). From ancient times, Karashahr and Kucha, two city-states on the northern edge of Tarim basin, have had a developed economy and culture. The Chinese pilgrim Hsüan-tsang (600–40) gives a vivid description of Kucha in his famous Da Tang xi-yu-ji [Records of Travels to the Western Regions in Great T’ang] (Ch. 1):

The Kuci state measures over 1,000 li [1 li = 500 m] from east to west and more than 600 li from south to north. The capital has a circumference of 17–19 li and produces millet, wheat, rice, grapes, pomegranates, pears, peaches and apricots; gold, copper, iron, lead and tin are mined. The climate is mild and the manner of the people is polished. Their script originated in India, but a few changes have been made. Their music and dance are famous. They wear brocade or plain cloth, cut their hair short and wear turbans. They use gold or silver coins and small copper coins as currency . . . There are more than 100 Buddhist temples, and more than 5,000 monks and novices, and all belong to the Sarvastivadin sect of Hinayana.

The indigenous inhabitants of all these three areas were Europoids. In the words of the Pei-shih [Annals of the Wei Dynasty] (Ch. 97), ‘The people of the states west of Turfan all have deep-set eyes and high noses.’

After the Uighurs moved into these three areas, a process of fusion of different ethnic groups began through intermarriage. Because the Uighur and other Turkic groups enjoyed
both political and numerical superiority, the indigenous population was gradually Turkicized and the Uighur language triumphed over the native Tokharian language and became a kind of lingua franca in these areas. The languages of the indigenous population gradually fell into disuse and died out, though the indigenous substratum had a great influence on the Uighurs in ethnological, cultural and linguistic respects. Under the influence of the relatively advanced economic system and culture of the native people, the Uighurs gradually gave up their nomadic life and turned to a settled, urban or agricultural existence and created in Kocho a brilliant civilization.

The sovereign of the Uighur kingdom of Kocho took the title idiqut ( < iduq qut, His Holy Majesty). It seems that this title was taken from another Turkic tribe, that of the Basmil, who lived in the Beshbalik area before the Uighur immigration. To foreign countries, the Uighurs of Kocho called their land ‘Great, Good-Fortunate State’. Under the idiqut there were high-ranking officials such as nine ministers, īlchi, tarqan, šāngun, tutuq as well as many officials of middle and lower rank such as the īlchi, bāği, and so on. Further, there were freemen, craftsmen and merchants. In the countryside, the landlords possessed extensive farmlands and water resources, with a class of poor peasants and tenant farmers beneath them. Uighur civil documents show that the remains of a slave system existed.\(^{18}\) The Manichaean and Buddhist monasteries also owned extensive farmlands, with many dependent households.

As far as relations with neighbouring countries were concerned, in the east, after the Liao dynasty (907–1125) and the Sung dynasty (960–1279) were established, there were frequent diplomatic and commercial contacts between them and the Uighurs of Kocho. In the west, relations between the Karakhanids (c. 960–1213, founded by the Turkic Karluk) and the Uighurs of Kocho were strained. Although both sides were Turkic, speaking a common language (with only some dialectal differences) and at the outset using the same Uighur script, the former were Muslims while the latter were Buddhists. Because of the difference in religion, the two sides were extremely antagonistic. The idiqut of Kocho put up a determined resistance to the expansion of the Karakhanids; until the thirteenth–fourteenth centuries the influence of Islam could not be felt beyond Kucha.

At the beginning of the twelfth century, Kocho came under the rule of the Western Liao (1124–1211), who installed a jianguo (supervisor). In the early thirteenth century (1209), the Uighur king Barchuk Art Tegin voluntarily submitted to Chinggis Khan, founder of the Mongol empire. Because of this, his realm was particularly well treated by Chinggis, and preserved its original boundaries.

\(^{18}\) Geng Shimin, 1984, pp. 7–18.
In the second half of the thirteenth century, the Haydu-Duwa rebellion, lasting for nearly forty years, gave the Uighur kingdom of Kocho its death blow. In 1270 the summer capital, Beshbalïk, was taken by the rebels, and the Uighur idigut retreated to Kocho city. Some years later, in 1284, he was forced to flee to Yongchang in Gansu. By this time, the kingdom existed in name only; its domain was incorporated into the Chaghatay Khanate.

In A.D. 982 the Sung envoy Wang Yande had visited Kocho. His account in the Shi gaockang ji [Records of an Embassy to Kocho] constitutes the most important historical source for the study of the Uighur kingdom during this period. He gives a vivid description of Kocho in the Sung shi [History of the Sung dynasty] (Ch. 490):

The area has no rain or snow and is extremely hot, and when the hottest season arrives the inhabitants all move into caves dug in the earth . . . Their houses are whitewashed, and water from Jinling [Golden Mountain] flows through them and is circulated through the capital city to water the gardens and turn mills. The area produces the five cereal grains, but it lacks buckwheat. The nobles eat horse-meat and the common people eat goat or fowl. In music they make much use of the pipa [a kind of four-stringed lute] and the konghou [an ancient plucked instrument with seven strings like the harp]. They produce sable, cotton and brocaded cloth. They are fond of archery and riding. The women wear oiled caps which are called sumuzhe. They use the calendar promulgated in the seventh year [719] of the reign of Kaiyuan of the T’ang dynasty . . . They are fond of excursions and always take along musical instruments. There are more than fifty Buddhist temples with inscribed boards given by the T’ang imperial court. In the temples are kept The Buddhist Tripitaka, Rhyming Book of T’ang, The Dictionary of Chinese Characters, The Chinese Buddhist Dictionary . . . and other works . . . There is an imperial library which holds imperial letters and orders from Tang Taizong (627–49) and Tang Xuanzong (712–56), which is very carefully locked. In addition, there are Manichaean monasteries and Persian monks . . .

When Wang Yande arrived in Kocho, the Uighur king Arslan Khan was away in his summer quarters north of the T’ien Shan, leaving his maternal uncle to take care of state affairs. Thus Wang and his party crossed over the T’ien Shan to go to Beshbalïk. On the road, he saw many herds of horses belonging to the royal family grazing on the steppes which stretched as far as 100 li. Horses of different colours were divided into separate herds for grazing, an indication that the Uighur upper classes still maintained the old, traditional nomadic habits.

According to the accounts of Uighur sources, on ceremonial occasions the Uighur king sat on a golden chair (örgin) placed on a platform (Uighur tauccang < Chinese daochang) and decorated with pearls and jewels. He wore a red robe and a crown (Uighur didim < Greek diadéma).

Among the Uighurs who moved into the Turfan region, the Uighur script gradually replaced the Old Turkic so-called ‘runic’ alphabet. As urban life and trade developed, the
use of the Uighur language and script became general. Not only were a large number of religious (Manichaean, Christian and Buddhist) works translated into Uighur, but the language was also extensively used in everyday life, which was strongly influenced by Chinese culture. Regarding the calendar, for example, the Uighurs used the Chinese system of the tiangan (Ten Heavenly Stems) as well as the dizhi (Twelve Earthly Branches) to designate years. In this period, Uighur borrowed many Chinese words, such as mäkä or ‘ink’ (< Medieval Chinese mak), kuin or ‘scroll, volume’ (< M. Chin, kuian), etc.

As early as the time of the Uighur Khanate in Mongolia, in 762, Manichaism was accepted by the Uighur nobility. After their migration to the Turfan region, Manichaism was still maintained for a period among the Uighurs, as shown by the many Manichaean mural paintings as well as Uighur Manichaean manuscripts (often decorated with beautiful miniatures) found in the Turfan area. Nestorian Christianity also had followers among the Uighurs. In the Nestorian sites of Turfan, a fresco depicting the rites of Palm Sunday has been discovered. In addition, several Uighur fragments, some Nestorian writings and a story about three Persian Magi visiting Bethlehem have been unearthed. The ‘Iranian monks’ mentioned by Wang Yande must refer to Nestorian priests. The translation into Uighur of Aesop’s Fables might also be related to the spread of Nestorianism among the Uighurs.

The religion that spread most widely among the Uighurs, however, was Buddhism. Under the influence of the original inhabitants, the Uighurs gradually converted to that religion and large numbers of Buddhist classics were translated into Uighur. During Buddhist festivals, at mass gathering places around temples, a variety of activities such as storytelling, as well as dramas with Buddhist content, were performed. The ‘banquet with dramatic performance’ attended by Wang Yande, and the discovery of the primitive Buddhist drama the Maitrisimit written in Uighur testify to this point. Many Buddhist sites, grottoes (such as Bezeklik, Tuyok, Kirzel and Kumtura), as well as the large quantity of Uighur manuscripts, further indicate that Buddhism flourished extensively in the Uighur kingdom. Since the ‘more than fifty Buddhist temples’ in Turfan were given boards inscribed in Chinese, indicating that Buddhist works were kept there, we may conclude that Chinese Buddhism had a profound influence on Uighur Buddhism. Having originally spread from Xinjiang to inland China, Buddhism now returned to the area from China.

Because of their conversion to Buddhism, the Uighur nobility and even the common people took to building temples, making statues, painting frescoes and copying sutras as a kind of charitable and pious deed (in Uighur called buyan < Sanskrit bunya). These are precious works of art representing the high level attained in art and culture by the Uighurs at

---

that time. The frescoes give a vivid picture of the daily life of the Uighurs. Their residences are enclosed by walls; flowers and trees are planted in the courtyards. Men and women hold long-stemmed flowers in their hands. Men have garments and headdresses in T’ang style, they wear half-length boots and have various daily utensils hanging on their waistbands. Women wear long gowns with T’ang floral patterns in Transoxian style.

If the mural paintings depicted the lifestyle of the rich families, the Uighur commoner’s life was reflected in a variety of civil documents written in Uighur. They are prime sources for the study of the socio-economic condition of the Uighur kingdom of Kocho. Through these documents (up to now several hundred of them have been discovered), we can clearly see how peasants and farm labourers were exploited by the landlords.

In the Uighur kingdom of Kocho, large numbers of Buddhist works were translated into Uighur, mostly from the ancient Karashahr-Kuchaean language as well as from Chinese. During the Yüan or Mongol dynasty (1279–1368) some were also translated from Tibetan. The surviving corpus of Uighur Buddhist texts shows that nearly all the main Buddhist works (including sutras, vinayas and abhidharmas) were translated into Uighur. Important among them were Mahayana works such as The Golden Light Sutra, The Lotus Sutra, The Garland Sutra and Sthiramati’s Commentary on the Abhidharmakosa, all translated from Chinese. But there are also Hinayana texts, such as the Maitrisimit Nom Bitig, translated from ‘Tokharian A’ and many fragments of Āgamas. Also during the Yüan dynasty, many tantric works were translated from Tibetan and Chinese. Among the Uighur Buddhist translators, Master Singu Säli is worthy of particular mention. Born in Beshbalïk, he lived in about the tenth-eleventh centuries. From the Chinese he translated into Uighur The Golden Light Sutra, The Biography of Xuan-zang and many other Buddhist works. His translations read smoothly, his vocabulary is rich; he not only had a good command of classical Chinese, but was a master of his own mother tongue; it seems that he also knew Sanskrit.

The coexistence of various religions resulted in a fusion of different faiths. For example, in Uighur Buddhist texts the Indian gods Brahma and Indra are called by the Manichaean names Azrua and Hormuzd respectively, indicating a degree of fusion between Buddhism and Manichaeism. Furthermore, a type of calendar written in Sogdian and used by the native Manichaean believers indicates an assimilation of Sogdian, Chinese and Uighur cultural elements. The name of every weekday was written in Sogdian and then each name was supplemented by the transcribed Chinese names of the ‘Ten Heavenly Stems’ such as jia, yi, bing, and so on. Then again there were written in Sogdian the twelve animal names, such as mouse, ox, tiger, rabbit, and so on, which were used by the Uighurs. Finally, the names of the Chinese wuxing (five elements), metal, wood, water, fire and earth, were translated into Sogdian and matched with two-day periods.
In sum, it may be said that during almost 400 years of the Uighur kingdom of Kocho’s existence, great achievements in the social, economic and cultural areas can be credited to the Uighurs. At the same time, the period was characterized by further fusion in ethnic, linguistic, religious and cultural elements within Uighur society.  

Part Three

THE TANGUT HSI HSIA KINGDOM (982–1227)

(Y. I. Kychanov)

The active rivalry between Tibet and China from the seventh to the ninth century altered the destinies of the Qiang and Xianbei populations occupying the area of the modern provinces of Qinghai and Sichuan. The Tuyühun state of the Xianbei, which had lasted for more than 300 years, was destroyed by the Tibetans; and some of the Dangxiang, a people of Tibetan-Burman ethnic origin living in the Sunpan region in north-western Sichuan, moved north under the pressure of the Tibetans, eventually reaching the Ordos. In the ninth century, the ruling clan of the Dangxiang – better known to European scholars by their Mongol name, the Tangut – became firmly established in the centre of the Ordos with their capital in the town of Siachou (in the western part of the modern Heng Shan district of Shanxi province). The centre of the Ordos, known as the Land of the Five Regions, had acquired almost full independence during the tenth century. The Tangut population formed an absolute majority there and the consolidation of the independence of the region with its Tangut population contributed, first, to China’s breakup into a number of states during the period of the Five Dynasties and, second, to the emergence in the north of the powerful Kitan Liao state which supported the ruling Tangut house of Toba in its striving for independence.

The unification of China under the Sung dynasty in 960 naturally raised the question of what would happen to the Tangut possessions of the Toba. When, in the year 982, the Sung court attempted to bring those regions under its control, one of the members of the ruling Tangut Toba clan, Jiqian, openly opposed China and, following the example of the

20 For the genealogy of the kings of the Uighur kingdom of Kocho, see Geng Shimin and Hamilton, 1981, pp. 10–54.
independent Kitan state, began the struggle to establish a Tangut state. He banked on conflict between the Liao and the Sung, and this proved to be justified since in 989 the Kitan court gave Jiqian the hand of a Kitan princess and recognized him as Wang of the Hsia state. In 997 Jiqian succeeded in establishing his authority over the area of the Five Regions. In the year 1002 the Tangut captured the town of Linchow (the modern town of Lingwu in the Ningxia-Huizu Autonomous Region). Some time at the end of the tenth century or the beginning of the eleventh (1001 according to the Sung shi) the term Hsi Hsia began to be employed to designate the Tangut state. The new state could only expand to the west and south-west, although there was quite a large ethnically similar Dangxiang (Qiang) population in the areas of China to the east of Hsi Hsia bordering on Jiqian’s domain and in the southern Liao regions bordering on Hsi Hsia. These regions could not be wrested by force from the Sung and the Liao. Throughout the first third of the eleventh century, the Tangut therefore waged war to the west.

Jiqian was killed during a war with the Tibetans in the year 1004. His successor Li Deming, realizing that without peace with China it would be difficult to achieve any success in the west, concluded a peace treaty with the Sung in 1006. He agreed to accept from the Sung the post of tzedushi (military governor), thus acknowledging himself to be in Chinese service, and received the title of Wang Xiping (Pacifier of the West). The treaty of 1006 between Hsi Hsia and the Sung was, however, a sworn treaty which signified Sung recognition of the Tangut state or, as modern Chinese historians have written, ‘the Sung emperor Shen Zong recognized the special position of Li Deming’.21 Li Deming began to prepare for official acceptance of the title of emperor. In 1016 he declared his father Jiqian emperor posthumously and in 1028 declared his son as heir to the imperial throne and his son’s mother as empress. Xingqing, the modern town of Yinchuan (Ningxia–Huizu Autonomous Region), was declared to be the state’s new capital.

Peace with China and the support of the Liao enabled the Tangut to conduct successful wars against the Tibetans and the Uighurs. In 1028 territories including the towns of Lanzhou (Wuwei) and Hangchou (Chane) and the modern province of Gansu were added to Hsi Hsia. In 1036 the Hsi Hsia dominions were extended further westwards to the area of modern Dunhuang and the edges of the Hami oasis. The territory of the Tangut state included the entire province of Gansu in its western part, the western aymaks of the modern Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region located to the south of the Gobi desert, the Ala Shan and the Helan Shan as well as the entire area of the Ningxia-Huizu Autonomous Region and the western regions of the modern province of Shanxi in the Ordos. The border with the Kitan ran along the southern edge of the Gobi desert and the northern branch of

21 Zhong Kan et al., 1979, p. 25.
the Yellow River, where it forms the Ordos bend. The western branch of the Yellow River was entirely within Hsi Hsia territory but the border with China did not extend as far as its eastern branch, as Sung forces not only denied the Tangut access to the river but even, in 1067, took from them the town of Suizhou (the modern town of Suide in Shanxi province).

In the year 1136, following the defeat of the Jurchen by the Sung, the Tangut incorporated into their state the area of the modern town of Xining in the province of Qinghai. Altogether this was a vast territory, containing fertile land that was suitable for agriculture (the valley of the Yellow River, the valleys of the rivers Heitui and Xining, the northwestern edge of the loess plateau) and good pastureland on the plains of the Ordos and Ala Shan and in the mountain regions. The present-day climate of these regions is continental with a cold winter, a very hot summer and insufficient precipitation. There is evidence, however, that the climate was milder and more humid in the period from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. Rice, cotton and apricots were grown in a number of regions within the territory of the Hsi Hsia. The mainstay of the economy consisted of agriculture and the raising of livestock. The country was self-sufficient in grain, with the possible exception of rice, and exported livestock and livestock products. Camels and horses from Hsi Hsia were particularly highly valued. The extensive mountain regions provided a reliable source of ores and the country experienced no shortage of iron although, according to some evidence, the Tangut lacked sufficient quantities of copper. Salt extraction was a flourishing activity and salt from the Ordos lakes was exported to China.

In the year 1031 Li Deming died and was succeeded by his son, Yuan Hao. The first Tangut emperor and a reformer, he was to play an outstanding role in the ultimate consolidation of the Tangut state deep in the interior of Asia. In 1032 Yuan Hao abandoned the use of the Sung reign titles, used for the purpose of chronology, and adopted as the title of his reign Xiandao (Clear Path). This was an important step towards the formation of the imperial system of administration and the first of Yuan Hao’s reforms, of which there were ten according to historians. The second reform was the decree of 1033 concerning the introduction of a single hairstyle (tufa) for all men. This was the Kitan male hairstyle in which most of the hair on the head was shaved off, leaving only a forelock and locks on the temples. This was an important political act as a single hairstyle (similar to the later Manchu requirement for all Chinese adult males to wear pigtails) was a symbol of the submission and unity of all the sovereign’s subjects.

Under the third reform, the area of the country’s capital was elevated to the status of fu (conventionally, a ‘department’), the same status as the capitals of Liao and Sung. The city was renamed Xingqing (Celebration of the Ascendancy). At the same time, central government institutions on the Chinese model were introduced: a state secretariat (chunzhu)
for the administration of civil affairs; a privy council (shumi) for the command of the army and the conduct of military matters; and a censor’s office (yushitai), an organ of control. The Tangut did not introduce the system of ‘six ministries’ (liu bu) adopted in Liao, for example, but the ministries or departments established by Yuan Hao met all the requirements for the household administration and record-keeping of the imperial court; for the economy, especially agriculture and livestock-raising; and for the maintenance of law and order throughout the country. The fifth reform introduced uniforms for officials. These reforms were enacted in 1033 and were followed three years later by a precise definition of the system of compulsory military service (the sixth reform), the ordering of the country’s administrative subdivisions into twelve military-political districts (the seventh reform) and the introduction, also in 1036, of an original Tangut script.

The Tangut language was tonal and rich in homonyms. The Tangut therefore devised a logographic-syllabic hieroglyphic script. This script looked very unlike Chinese, but its resources were based on the Chinese writing system and the characters were constructed using the six methods for the formation of characters laid down by Chinese philology of the period. Chief among these were the ideogram (huii) and the phonogram (hsing shen) methods. This eighth reform was not only the most important event in the cultural history of the Tangut people but also a milestone in the cultural history of East and Central Asia. During the previous stage in the cultural history of East Asia, the Koreans, Japanese and Vietnamese merely adopted the Chinese script, perhaps introducing some of their own indigenous characters and methods of transcribing their mother tongue, but the tenth to the twelfth century saw the Kitan, the Tangut and the Jurchen adopting the resources of Chinese writing to create their own original scripts. The invention and introduction of the script led directly in 1038 to another event of enormous cultural significance extending beyond the limits of Tangut culture, when a special group of thirty-two Buddhist monks was entrusted with the translation of the Buddhist canon into the Tangut language. The ninth and tenth reforms were also cultural in nature. In 1037 Tangut (the Tangut’s own self-appellation was Mi-nyag) and Chinese schools were established; the year was also marked by the introduction of Tangut music to the court as official music for ceremonial purposes in the belief that ‘the wise ruler should conform to popular customs’.

On 10 November 1038 Yuan Hao officially declared himself emperor and bestowed posthumous imperial titles on his grandfather, Jiqian, and his father, Li Deming. Since the Tangut state organized itself as an empire on the Chinese model during the reign of Yuan Hao, who was also the first openly to adopt the title of emperor, a number of contemporary historians have put the date at which the Tangut Hsi Hsia state was first established at 1032 (the year in which Yuan Hao was enthroned) or 1038 (the year in which he took the title
of emperor). His assumption of that title created a new situation in East Asia and in east
Central Asia. A third Son of Heaven appeared alongside the Sung and Liao emperors. The
Sung emperor recognized the imperial title of the Liao emperor and, by the Xianyuan treaty
of 1005, Sung China paid the Kitan a sizeable tribute under the guise of ‘assistance’. The
recognition of one more Son of Heaven would have further undermined Chinese views
of universal monarchy and the exclusive position of the Son of Heaven on Earth. The
Sung court therefore refused to recognize the imperial title of Yuan Hao. This led to the
Tangut–Chinese war of 1040–4.

The war demonstrated that neither side could count on a definitive military victory. The
title became the subject of negotiations which turned on whether Yuan Hao would adopt a
traditional title (kaghan, shan-yü) rather than the Chinese imperial title of huang-ti. Matters
were further complicated by the interference of the Kitan, who threatened the Sung in 1042
and forced China to increase the payments to Liao. Having obtained what they wanted from
the Sung, the Kitan also began to threaten Hsi Hsia. In the circumstances, Hsi Hsia and the
Sung concluded a peace agreement whereby Yuan Hao renounced the use of the title of
huang-ti (emperor) in the international arena and in relations with China, retaining the
imperial title (utszu in the Tangut language) within the boundaries of Hsi Hsia. The Sung
court recognized him as chou (sovereign) and paid an annual tribute of 255,000 units of
silk, silver and tea. Yuan Hao acknowledged his status as ‘junior’ or, as the translation has
it, ‘vassal’ (chen), and received a seal from the Sung emperor. Although the Hsi Hsia state
preserved its actual independence, the outcome of the war ultimately favoured the Sung.

A final peace with the Sung had still not been concluded when Yuan Hao was drawn into
a war with Liao. China, for which the Kitan state represented the main enemy, occupied a
position in the Tangut–Kitan war which, on the whole, was more favourable to Hsi Hsia.
The Tangut inflicted a military defeat on Liao and the two sides made peace in 1045. In
January 1048 Yuan Hao was killed. There followed a period in the history of the Tangut
state, during the minority of the emperors Liangzu (1048–67), Pinchang (1067–86) and
Qian-shun (1086–1139), when power was held by empress–regents and the Lian clan to
which the mothers of Pinchang and Qianshun belonged. China attempted to exploit the
internal disturbances in Hsi Hsia in order to destroy the Tangut state. Of the three major
wars between the Sung and Hsi Hsia (1069–72, 1081–6 and 1096–9), the war of 1081–6
proved the most serious for the Tangut state. An army of over 300,000 invaded the territory
of Hsi Hsia. Nevertheless, the overall outcome of the war did not favour the Sung and,
according to one source, ‘the Sung forces perished ingloriously (Sung shi, Vol. 486, p.
3792). In 1094 the young Emperor Qianshun mounted something resembling a coup d’état
and destroyed the Lian clan, restoring to power the imperial clan of Toba (the Tangut Weimin or Ngwemi).

The economy and culture of the Tangut state began to flourish from the beginning of the twelfth century. To a certain extent, this was due to the emergence of a new power to the north-east, that of the Jurchen, which contained the activity of Liao and attracted the attention of the Sung as China hoped to use the Jurchen to destroy the Kitan. The destruction of Liao in 1125, the subsequent fierce struggle between the Sung and the Jurchen, and the emergence of the Jurchen Chin state with which Hsi Hsia managed to establish friendly contacts, led to the flowering of the Tangut state in the middle and second half of the twelfth century during the reign of Qianshun’s son, Emperor Renxiao (1139–93), who was half-Chinese by birth.

The problem of Hsi Hsia’s ‘own path’ was finally resolved during the reign of Renxiao. Under Yuan Hao the concept of their ‘own path’ had been expressed in the establishment of the Tangut state’s ideology on the twin pillars of Buddhism and the copying of the principles of the Chinese state system. This was accompanied by propaganda advocating their own path as opposed to the Tibetan and Chinese paths. Chinese official and bureaucratic customs (ritual, clothes) were openly rejected in favour of Tangut customs. Under Yuan Hao’s successors, the empress-regents and their supporters inclined towards Buddhism and the reduction of Chinese influence. In contrast, the ruling house, after recovering real power, demonstratively returned to Chinese ways. Qianshun assigned equal status to Buddhist and Chinese influences in his policy but Renxiao attached greater importance to the Chinese Confucian model in state administration. The cult of Confucius was officially adopted in Hsi Hsia in the year 1146. Orders were given to construct Confucian temples in all regions of the country and Confucius was venerated, receiving the homage due to an emperor; he was accorded the title of Emperor Wenxuan. Confucian canonical texts were industriously translated into Tangut. Buddhism also continued to develop actively during the reign of Renxiao but could no longer claim to be the principal state religion. It was assigned a role as preserver of the well-being of the dynasty. In the history of the Tibeto-Burman peoples there were three major states: Tibet, Burma and the Tangut state. Two of these states chose Buddhism as their sole ideology and developed as theocratic states. This did not happen in the case of the Tangut state, which was able to choose its ‘own path’ in this area. The main reason was the proximity of Hsi Hsia to China, whose institutions exerted an overpowering influence on the Tangut.

The Tangut state was multinational in the modern sense. The peoples forming the bulk of its population were the Tangut (self-designation, Minyag), Chinese, Tibetans and Uighurs. There was no difference in the rights enjoyed by these peoples in the area of
public life since in terms of hierarchical precedence, the official with the higher rank was always considered senior. Only among officials of the same rank was the Tangut always considered senior. The codex of the Tangut state, a 20-volume collection of the country’s laws amounting to 1,460 articles, came into force during the reign of Renxiao. The text, which has been preserved to the present day, testifies to the highly developed legal system of the Tangut state. While Tangut law developed along the lines of Chinese law (as did Korean, Japanese and Vietnamese law), like those legal systems it exhibited certain original features.

Tangut society was made up of people with and without personal freedom (pkhinga, or men without personal freedom, and nini, or women without personal freedom). Free people were divided into those who served (‘those of rank’ in Tangut terminology) and those who did not serve (‘ordinary people’ in Tangut terminology). Members of the ruling dynasty of the Ngwemi clan and the emperor’s kin occupied a particular position in society. According to Chinese law, the aristocracy had no rights deriving from their origin but it is thought that there were a number of Tangut clans/families, membership of which, while it did not constitute an entitlement to additional legal rights, nevertheless ensured respect and preference in state service. The nucleus of the ruling class consisted of the emperor’s clan, his relations and the greater part of the Tangut bureaucracy. Attached to them were the rich ‘proprietors’, landowners and livestock owners who were not in state service. They exploited the slaves (pkhinga and nini) and ordinary peasants to whom they evidently leased land. The trend towards the establishment of tenancy relations, which was also very evident in the neighbouring state of Sung China, was possibly dominant. The landowners paid a land tax in grain, hay and brushwood and performed compulsory labour for the state. Land, livestock and other belongings were either the property of individuals or of the sovereign (the state). In accordance with the traditions of Chinese law, certain restrictions were sometimes placed on the sale of land by landowners, especially with regard to the choice of purchasers. Irrigation played a major role in agriculture. The service responsible for the maintenance of the canals was state-run, and these canals were repaired and built by people working under the system of compulsory labour. The length of the period of service depended on the amount of land held by the worker. Livestock-raisers paid a tax in livestock, wool and milk products. Depending on the number of their livestock, they supplied both horses and military equipment, or military equipment alone for their army service. The army was divided into regular and auxiliary forces who provided support for the activities and guaranteed the fighting efficiency of the regulars. The auxiliary troops may have included engineers.
The twelfth century saw the flourishing of Tangut culture. The entire Tripitaka, preserved to the present day in material from the dead town of Kara-Koto (rediscovered in 1909 by P. K. Kozlov) and in a small number of texts from the period of the Mongol Yüan dynasty, was translated into Tangut. Printing by means of wood engraving developed within the country and a proportion of what was printed were state texts produced by a special Printing Office. Although Buddhist painting developed under a strong Chinese and Tibetan influence, it none the less retained an independent identity. Various types of Tangut dictionaries have been preserved to the present day: the Tangut were proud of their mother tongue, literature and sayings. In addition to the Buddhist canon and the Confucian classics, Chinese military treatises and a number of moralizing texts were translated into Tangut. It may be assumed that there was a fairly high level of literacy among the population of Hsi Hsia, particularly among officials and, more generally, among people connected with state service (for which literacy was essential) or with Buddhist communities. Literate people were apparently bilingual (with a knowledge of Tangut and Chinese) and information has survived indicating that a knowledge of three languages (Tangut, Tibetan and Chinese) was required of Buddhists. A clear strain of patriotic pride in their culture and state is evident in the works of Tangut authors.

During the reign of Renxiao’s successor, Chunyu (1193–1206), a new threat appeared to the north of the Tangut state, the power of Chinggis Khan. At the end of the twelfth century, the Tangut intervened in the internal struggles of the Mongols and it was possibly for this reason, as well as their obvious weakness in comparison with the Jurchen state of Chin, that Hsi Hsia was the first state against which the Mongols conducted campaigns outside Mongolia. They devastated the western regions of the Tangut state. Defeat in war against the Mongols cost Chunyu his throne. He was succeeded by Anquan (1206–11). The Mongols attacked Hsi Hsia again in the winter of 1207–8 and in 1209 laid siege to the capital of the Tangut state. The Tangut endeavoured to establish a military alliance against the Mongols, requesting aid from Chin, but they received no assistance. Anquan secured peace by acknowledging himself to be a vassal of Chinggis Khan and by giving him his daughter in marriage. He saved the country but lost his throne. His successor Eunxu (1211–23) was drawn into a war with Chin by the Mongols in the year 1214. That war lasted until 1224 and, although it was not conducted intensively, it none the less appreciably weakened the forces of both states in the face of the Mongol onslaught. In 1217 the Mongols again besieged the capital of the White High Great State of Hsia (such was the splendid official title of the Tangut state) but the siege dragged on and they left after demanding that the Tangut should take part in Chinggis Khan’s westward campaign. The Tangut refused and Chinggis swore to settle his score with them on his return from the campaign. In the spring
of 1226 the main force of the Mongol army, led by Chinggis Khan in person, fell upon Hsi Hsia. In the autumn of 1227 the Mongols accepted the capitulation of the last ruler of Hsia and swiftly executed him. The downfall of Hsia coincided with the death of Chinggis Khan himself and the population of Hsi Hsia was therefore massacred with particular brutality.

Tangut culture perished with the Tangut state and the process leading to the disappearance of the Tangut as a people was initiated. The Mongols replaced the Tangut state with a Tangut region and the capital of Hsia was renamed Ningxia (‘Peaceful Xia’ in Chinese). The Mongol prince who ruled the region of Tangut at the end of the thirteenth century was a follower of Islam and made every effort to convert the population under his control to that religion. Various peoples who settled in the Tangut region adopted Chinese as their lingua franca, accepted Islam and formed a unified group of Chinese-speaking Muslims. During the Ming dynasty they developed into the ethnic and religious group of Muslims in north-west China which to the present day constitutes the core of the population of the Ningxia–Huizu Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China.
THE WESTERN HIMALAYAN STATES*

A. H. Dani

Contents

The Trakhān dynasty of Gilgit .................................................. 222
The Maglot ruling family of Nager ........................................... 225
The Ayash ruling family of Hunza ............................................ 225
The Kator royal family of Chitral ............................................. 225
Baltistan ................................................................................. 225
Relations with Tibet, Kashgharia and the trans-Pamir regions .......... 227
Relations with Kashmir ............................................................ 227
Long-term socio-economic developments ................................... 228
Socio-religious developments .................................................... 231

The western Himalayan states, better described as the trans-Himalayan states,¹ lie practically south of the ranges of Chinese Turkistan. Sandwiched between high ranges, the entire region is unaffected by the monsoon climate and protected from northern blizzards. Although the Indus river runs across it, this does not make for the unity of the region. The river is too deep and rocky for navigation and its banks are too high and sloping for normal habitation. The hill ranges subdivide the region into smaller river valleys, with the human population organized into smaller communities and forming separate cultural units. Each of them also developed petty states in the course of history; hence we talk in terms of Himalayan states and not of one state. They all lie in the western Himalayan zone to the south-west of Tibet.²

¹ See Map 7.
² See Dani, 1989a, Ch. 1, for details.
There is no one historical name for the entire region. Leitner coined the term ‘Dardistan’ in the nineteenth century, since the languages spoken in the different valleys have all been grouped under the Dardic family – with the exception of Balti, spoken in Baltistan, which is affiliated to Tibetan. Jettmar has argued for ‘Bolor’, a term known to Arabic scholars and also to the Chinese of the medieval period. But its exact connotation is not clear, nor is it comprehensive enough to embrace the whole region. During British rule, two terms, ‘Gilgit’ and ‘Baltistan’, were applied to two political divisions, and ‘Chitral’ was placed under the Malakand Political Agency. The Government of Pakistan refers officially to the region as the Northern Areas, but that excludes Chitral, which is now a district of the North-West Frontier Province.

The medieval history of the region begins with the emergence of the Turkish ruling families, whose dates are not certain. However, they appear to have replaced the ancient dynasty of the Patola Shāhīs in Gilgit some time in the middle of the eighth century. At this time, several historical events may be noted in the region. The Tibetans are known to have advanced into Gilgit via Baltistan. To counter them, a Chinese general of Korean origin, Kao-Hsien, marched with his army into the region in 743. He restored the rule of the Patola Shāhīs, but how long thereafter the Shāhīs ruled is not certain. According to the anonymous author of the *Hudūd al-ʿālam* [The Limits of the World], the king Balurin Shāh regarded himself as the son of the sun god. Al-Biruni calls them Bhatta Shāh and refers to them as Turkic tribes. An Arabic inscription attributed to the time of the Abbasid caliph al-Ma’mūn (813–33) speaks of a victory over the rulers of Wakhan and Bolor. These items of information do not clarify the issue of the origin of the Turkic tribes, but they certainly speak of the change of dynasty that must have taken place long before the time of al-Biruni.

**The Trakhān dynasty of Gilgit**

According to traditional history, the main ruling dynasty in Gilgit is known as the Trakhāns. It is from this dynasty that the rulers of Nager and Hunza derive their origin. Similarly, the rulers of Yasin, Punial and Chitral had close connections with them. It is only the history of Baltistan which had its separate role to play, although that also had links with Gilgit on several occasions. Tradition traces the origin of the Trakhāns to an imaginary Kayān prince of Persia, by name Āzur Jamshīd, who is said to have fled here after the Arab

---

---

3 Jettmar, 1979, pp. 39–70.
conquest of Persia and secretly married Nūr Bakht Khātūn, the daughter of the Buddhist king Śrī Badat. A son was born, who was named Kark or Garg. Although Āzur Jamshīd is credited with having overthrown Śrī Badat and succeeded to his throne, he chose to abdicate sixteen years later, after handing over the throne to his queen, who ruled until her son grew up. The son, Kark, held power for fifty-five years and was succeeded by Rajah Sau Malik.

There was a quick succession of rulers after this event. Rajah Sau Malik was succeeded by his son Rajah Shāh Malik, also known as Glit Kalika (or Malik), i.e. Malik of Gilgit, followed by Glit Kalika’s son Deng Malik, and finally the latter’s son Khusraw Khan. The rule of this last king is said to have ended in 997, a date that may be accepted. Khusraw Khan married a princess from Badakhshan and the presence of a Badakhshāni princess must have led to some social changes in the Gilgit ruling family. It is important to note that this Turkic family came from the north; thus there was a strong northern influence in the royal house of Gilgit by the end of the tenth century.

Rajah Khusraw Khan’s son, Rajah Haydar Khan, succeeded to the throne in 997. His cousin, Shāh Hatam (or Shāh Tham), governed the Nager and Hunza valleys. Shāh Tham tried to assert his independence, but being pressed by Haydar’s forces he fled to Baltistan via the Hispar glacier. Rajah Haydar Khan was succeeded in 1057 by his son Nūr Khan, who spent his time in religious devotion and entrusted the work of administration to his ministers. In 1127 he abdicated in favour of his son Shāh Mirza, who died in 1205, leaving the throne to his son Tartora Khan, who had two queens. The first, called Shāh Begam, was of the royal family and gave birth to Torrā Khan, but the second queen, a commoner from the Dareli valley, proved to be jealous and cunning. She managed to poison the king and snatch the throne for herself in 1236, but ruled only for five years. All her attempts to kill her stepson Torrā Khan were foiled by a minister hailing from the Hodur valley. She met her death and was succeeded in 1241 by Rajah Torrā Khan, who is supposed to have started the dynastic name Trakhān. Before this ruler the dynasty was known as the Kayānīs.

Rajah Torrā Khan’s reign (1241–75) was marked by great events. His own stepbrother, Shāh Ra’īs Khan, born of the Dareli queen, fled from Gilgit and took shelter with the king of Badakhshan, whose name is given as Tāj Mughal, perhaps to be corrected as Tājdār-i Mughal, who is said to have been a follower of the Ismaʿili Shiʿite sect. The Badakhshan ruler invaded Gilgit, snatched Chitral from Torrā Khan and placed Shāh Ra’īs Khan on Chitral’s throne. This was the beginning of the Ra’īsiyya dynasty there. According to tradition, Ismaʿilism was introduced into the Gilgit region by Tāj Mughal, but this lacks confirmation. In any event, the ruler of Gilgit is said to have abandoned Ismaʿilism. As a result, there was a second invasion, but Gilgit forces defended their territory steadfastly. In the
course of this campaign, Rajah Torrā Khan died; he was succeeded by his son, Sau Malik II (1275–1345).

The Mongol invasion of Gilgit appears to be related to two invasions of Kashmir, the first by Dulcha (or Zulchu) in c. 1319 and the second by Urdul (or Achal) in 1326. As a result of these invasions, there was a dynastic change also in Kashmir and we note there the foundation of an independent Muslim sultanate by Shāh Mir. Seen in this perspective, this interrelation of events brings the histories of Gilgit and Kashmir together and confirms that Sau Malik II and Shāh Mir were contemporaries. From this time on, there was a close relationship between the rulers of Gilgit and those of Kashmir. Sau Malik II was succeeded by his son Chilis Khan (1345–59). He also enjoyed good relations with Kashmir and encouraged commerce with the neighbouring countries of Badakhshan, Transoxania, Kashmir and Afghanistan. He married Malika Hāshim Begam, a daughter of Shāh Ra‘īs Khan of Chitral. His own daughter was later married to Shāhzada Shāh Khan, a grandson of Shāh Ra‘īs Khan. Chilis Khan was succeeded by Rajah Firdaws Khan, who ruled until 1397. He brought large numbers of artisans and craftsmen from Kashmir and built the Qilī-yi Firdawsiyya in Gilgit. Firdaws was succeeded by Khusraw Khan II, who ruled until 1422. He added a tower to his father’s fort at Gilgit, which was known as Khusraw Khan-i Shikar.

Khusraw Khan II had two sons, Rajah Malik Shāh and Dula Shāh. While the first ruled from 1422 to 1449, the second became his commander-in-chief. The latter had a handsome son, called Lili Ghashpur, who married the king’s daughter. According to tradition, they had twin sons whose backs were joined together at birth. When they grew up, they became bitter rivals. One of them called Jamshid, also known as Maglot, obtained Nager as his possession, while the second (called Sāhib Khan alias Girkis) received Hunza. This is the mythical story of the creation of the Nager and Hunza states.

The next ruler of Gilgit, Torrā Khan II (1449–79), son of Rajah Malik Shāh, was a man of great consequence. He continued good relations with Kashmir and was so fond of Kashmiri arts and crafts that he invited a group of Kashmiri craftsmen to settle in Gilgit in Mohalla Kishrot. He was followed by a quick succession of rulers, the most important of whom, Shāh Ra‘īs A‘zam, ruled until 1561.

---

9 For details, see Dani, 1989a, pp. 170–4.
The Maglot ruling family of Nager

The ruling family derived its name from Maglot, a nickname of Prince Jamshid, ruler of the Nager valley and founder of a royal house from about 1440. At first the Maglot rulers built a fortified village, called Muko-Kot or Nager Khan, where they lived until 1894, when it was destroyed by the Nager river. There was a perpetual struggle between the rulers of Nager and Hunza until Shāh Kamal came to the throne in 1559 and began a line which in general had peaceable relations with the rulers of Gilgit.

The Ayash ruling family of Hunza

The origin of the Hunza royal house has been traced to the earlier Girkis. This state, being close to Wakhan and Xinjiang, had many historical links with them. As Hunza was always at war with Nager, their mutual struggle constantly affected the royal house. The succession to Girkis is variously given in different traditions. Finally, Ayasho (alias Shāh Khan) was brought from Wakhan and placed on the throne. He was succeeded by Silum (or Salim) Khan. Another account gives Mayhuritham as the next ruler. Mayhuritham fled to Wakhan and gave his daughter in marriage to the ruler of Wakhan. A son born to them bore the name of Ayasho II and was crowned in Hunza; he married a Skardu princess, a daughter of Ābd al-Khān. Ayasho II also sent artisans from Baltistan, who built the palatial forts of Baltit and Altit in Hunza; the tower of the Altit fort gives the date 955/1548. The local historian Qudrat Allāh Beg accordingly states that, after this marriage of Ayasho II, contacts between Hunza and Baltistan increased.

The Kator royal family of Chitral

We have earlier seen how Shāh Ra‘īs Khan became the ruler of Chitral and founded the Ra‘īsiyya dynasty. This dynasty continued to rule in Chitral for nearly 300 years. According to the unpublished manuscript, the Shāhnāma-i Chitral, this dynasty came to an end in the sixteenth century and was succeeded by that of Sangin Ālī. His grandson, Shāh Kator I, founded the Kator dynasty in Chitral in 1585 by usurping power from the Ra‘īsiyya family.

Baltistan

Baltistan spreads upwards from the Indus river and is separated from Ladakh by the Siachen glacier. The river makes a great lake around the city of Skardu, the headquarters of Baltistan.
district. Three ruling families were important: the Makpons of Skardu, the Amāchas of Shigar and the Yabghus of Khaplu.

THE MAKPONS OF SKARDU
Francke has related the history of the Tibeto-Dard kingdom (500–1000). The involvement of the Tibetans in this region must have followed the consolidation of the dynastic rule in Tibet by its founder, Songtsen-gampo (d. 649 or 650). We have distinct evidence of Tibetan inscriptions and the existence of the Tibetan form of Tantric Buddhism all over Baltistan. Only towards the end of the ninth century or at the beginning of the tenth, after the dissolution of this dynastic power, could a new power arise in Baltistan. It was linked with the implantation there of a new ethnic element. Two factors are important here: first, the expansion of the Uighur Turks in Xinjiang and their interest in controlling the trade across the Karakorum pass towards India; and second, the establishment of Turkish authority in Gilgit, Hunza and Nager. The local traditions speak of an immigrant from Kashmir, who, after marrying a local princess, started the line of Makpon rulers of Skardu. Seven generations of rulers followed the founder of the dynasty in Skardu. This ruler was followed in turn by Khokhar Singa, then Ghotachon Singe, next Bahrām Shāh and finally Makpon Bokha, whose date of accession to power is given as c. 1500. He is credited with having been the real founder of the state power of Skardu and he in fact founded the city of Skardu, so-named because it means ‘low land between high places’, those of Shikri and Satpara. His residential seat was at Kharpocha fort, towering high above the surrounding plain. He is also known to have provided a new socio-economic base for the district by importing people and craftsmen from Chilas and Kashmir.

THE AMĀCHAS OF SHIGAR
Shāh Tham came to Shigar from Hunza and accepted service with the last local ruler, Mashido. It is quite possible that he was his minister, i.e. amātya (a word of Sanskrit origin), from which the family title Amācha is possibly derived, although others take the title to be of Chinese origin. Ten generations separate Shāh Tham and Gorī Tham. It was in the time of this last ruler that Sayyid Ālī Hamadānī came to Shigar, converted the local ruler, spread Islam and built the Ambariq mosque. Gorī Tham was followed by Ghāzī Tham, then Ālī Mir and then Ghāzī, who ruled from 1490 to 1520. He was a contemporary of Makpon Bokha of Skardu and it was during his time that the famous Sufi, Shams al-Din

10 Francke, 1907, Chs 3, 5.
Irāqi, came to Shigar; he died there in 1525. Subsequent rulers became subject, in the seventeenth century, to the Mughal emperors in Delhi.

THE YABGHU RULERS OF KHAPLU

The very title Yabghu suggests a Turkish origin for the rulers of Khaplu. Tradition gives the history of these rulers as starting with Bag Nanthal in c. 850 and continuing with a list of nineteen rulers up to Açı zam Khan Shah. In the fifteenth century an invasion of Baltistan by the Timurid Abū Saʿīd Sultan is mentioned.

Relations with Tibet, Kashgharia and the trans-Pamir regions

It was after the expulsion of the Tibetan forces from Gilgit and Baltistan that the new states of the medieval period came into existence. Thereafter, the Gilgit region was almost cut off from Tibet, but the Baltistan states were in close contact with Ladakh, which was then a close ally of Tibet. The rulers of Skardu and Khaplu waged many wars against those of Ladakh. The state of Hunza and the Baltistan states were likewise in direct contact with Kashgharia. In the earlier history of Hunza, the Hunza princes went to Yarkand and obtained territorial rights in the Raskam area. The most important event, however, was the invasion of the Timurid Abū Saʿīd Sultan into several parts of Baltistan, particularly Khaplu and Shigar, and the imposing of his temporary suzerainty. It was probably threats from the north that later persuaded the Mughal emperors of Delhi to advance into Kashmir and still later into Baltistan and Ladakh. But the most important relationship of the local rulers was that established with the royal family of Badakhshan.

Relations with Kashmir

In the medieval period, there was no warfare between Kashmir and the states of this region, although some of the local rulers on occasion fled to Kashmir, and with military help from there, were able to reconquer their former kingdoms. On the other hand, right from the beginning there were numerous cultural and commercial relations with Kashmir. We have seen earlier how the rulers of Gilgit and Baltistan imported artisans and craftsmen from Kashmir and settled them there, and these introduced the Kashmiri style of architecture and also brought in decorative elements to ornament the wooden mosques and tombs. Of great cultural and religious importance was the advent of the Sufi Shaykh Sayyid ʿAlī
Hamadānī and his disciples through Kashmir into Baltistan, thereby injecting a new element of mysticism into the religious life of the local people.

Long-term socio-economic developments

All the ruling families from Chitral to Gilgit, Hunza, Khaplu and Skardu were of Turkic ethnic origin, although they came to speak the languages of the regions where they settled. These Turkic tribes migrated here soon after the Arab conquest of Central Asia in the eighth to the ninth century, retaining at this time their shamanist and Buddhist beliefs; only later were they converted to Islam in this very region. However, the local population is not ethnically Turkic, nor does it have any ethnic relationship with the Chinese. Except for the Balti-pa, i.e. those who speak the Balti language in Baltistan and Burushaski, they all belong to the Indo-Aryan group as far as their languages are concerned. In this wide group, the particular sub-branch has been termed Dardic. This penetration of Indo-Aryan tribes into the far-flung region of western trans-Himalaya has kept Chinese political and cultural influence out of this region. Moreover, the Aryan character of the land has been further shielded by the Turkic peoples of the neighbouring Xinjiang province of western China. It is likely that the relationship with these Turkic tribes has been a factor in the cultural connections of the population of this part of these areas and Xinjiang; this may explain the acceptance of Turkish royal families as rulers.

Apart from the ethnic penetration from the north, however, there is a deeper linkage with the Buddhist and Hindu south as far as cultural and religious aspects are concerned. Yet this cultural penetration did not establish close, friendly relations with Kashmir, probably because of political rivalries. Linguistic, palaeographic and even socio-cultural differences can be traced to this one main factor. On the other hand, a connection with Taxila and Gandhara and even with the Indo-Gangetic plains is more firmly based. In spite of these discrepancies, the influence of Sayyid ʿAlī Hamadānī and his disciples from Kashmir became an enduring feature in the Islamic penetration of the region. Yet we find northern influences imperceptibly breaking the cultural unity, and it is this peculiar feature that explains the distribution pattern of Muslim sects in the northern areas of modern Pakistan.

At present, three distinct socio-political patterns are easily recognizable. Starting from the west, we first meet with the so-called ‘republican’ tribes localized in the valleys of Tanigr, Darel and Chilas. These may be extended still further south-west on either side of the Indus river, which, in British times, was referred to as Yaghistan (Land of Rebellion, i.e. no-man’s-land), but is today included in Kohistan district. This is the hard-core area of the orthodox Sunni Muslims. Some early epigraphic evidence reveals the existence of
small kingdoms here, but at some point in the medieval period these kingdoms disappeared and the different tribes established their own tribal system of political management, which the British Indian records characterized as ‘republican’. These political units had no kings, but tribal elders negotiated political relations with superior military powers. Local defence was organized by able-bodied young men hailing from various families. When these tribes moved into Gilgit, however, they accepted the authority of the local rājā. It appears that the rājās of Gilgit, Yasin and even Chitral raided into this territory, and, depending on their might, exercised control over the area. It was probably under these circumstances that these tribes moved into Gilgit. At a later period the British encouraged the migration of Pashtun tribes from the direction of Swat into the no-man’s-land in order to create a manageable political force in that area. It was probably as a result of this Pashtun penetration that the jirga system of tribal assemblies became widespread in this sub-region. Even the ruler of Swat advanced right up to Kandia valley with his soldiers, and finally the western part of the Indus river fell under his control. However, the social system of the indigenous local tribes is fundamentally different from that of the Pashtuns.

The second important sub-area contains the Burushaski-speaking population in Hunza. (There is also the Wakhi-speaking population, who migrated from across the Pamirs at a much later date.) The Burushaski-speaking population had a much wider distribution in the past but, according to the latest research, they have been pushed into their present home by the Shina-speaking population. The Burushaski population is fundamentally different in behaviour patterns, attitudes, traditional customs, and even in social categorization, from the population in Gilgit, Chilas and other western areas. Burushaski society is freer. The women have greater mobility and better social standing and status; they move freely in society and share equal responsibility with the men. The ruling families and their associated élites have established a political authority, but the gulf between this upper structure and the mass of the Burushaski population is easily recognizable to anyone who lives in this society and notes the great influence exercised by the local population on the ruling élite. The difference between the Hunzakuts on the one hand, and the Gilgit and Chilas on the other, was so great that early British Indian writers applied the term ‘Yashkum’ to the Hunzakuts and ‘Shin’ to the western tribes, although these two terms have nothing to do with ethnic groups; they have, rather, socio-economic and feudal connotations. It is this Burushaski-speaking population who are now Isma‘ilis.

The third important sub-area is Baltistan, which is a melting-pot of influences from Tibet, Ladakh, Kashmir and even beyond from the further Indian side. The Tibetan and Ladakhi influence is largely seen in the local language, geographic names, physical types and probably also in the social behaviour patterns. As it is open to Kashghar through the
Soltoro and Karakorum passes, the northern influence is no less important. Its relationship with Kashmir, however, is known to date back to the Mughal period. Nevertheless, the ruling families have had a blood relationship with those of Hunza because the Hispar glacier on the north permits a direct route from Shigir to Nager and Hunza. With all these geographic features and political connections, it is mainly Kashmir and Kashghar that have left an indelible influence as far as Islam is concerned. That is probably because Baltistan lies midway on the direct route between Kashmir and Kashghar. Although as a result of Kashmir’s influence Islam arrived here quite early, it is probably the Kashghar channel that introduced both Shi’ism and the Nūrbakhshī Sufi order, the two dominant religious currents that now exist. It would be interesting to discover how much of the Tibetan social system is still current among the original population of this sub-area. But the ruling élite, which extended its political authority here, made many compromises with the local population.

The three divisions given above show the socio-cultural cleavage between the Shina-speaking people and the Burushaski-speaking people; at the same time, these two differ from the Baltis in physical type as well as in various aspects of cultural life. In social classification, apart from the professional groups, the two dominant classes are those of Shins and Yashkuns, who exhibit a deep-seated rivalry and hatred for each other. The origin of this hostility is not known, but it appears to be rooted in some kind of landowning overlordship, a system that has survived from the pre-Muslim period. These two categories are not much known in Baltistan. As against them, there is the class known as doms, who are low-class immigrants from Kashmir.

As the traditional economy depended primarily on agriculture and pastoralism, the two systems are unevenly distributed in the different valleys. River irrigation is not much developed since it is difficult in a hilly country. Instead, melted glacier water is distributed and channelled from great heights to the lowest-level fields, which range in terraces from top to bottom. The amount of such cultivable land is very limited, hence there have been constant wars among tribes for the possession of land. Ownership is common rather than individual, but within the common lands, individuals have their own rights and privileges. It is these rights that are disputed by Shins and Yashkuns. However, common ownership is limited within a particular valley. It is this system that has led to perpetual rivalry and wars; the enmity between Nager and Hunza is proverbial. Similarly the Chilasis, Gilgitis and people of Yasin have traditionally been bitter rivals.
Socio-religious developments

At present, the entire population of the Northern Areas is Muslim, but Islam did not spread here all at one time and from one direction. Islamization was a gradual process, and as a result of the influences from the neighbouring areas of north, south and west, the nature of Islamic beliefs and practices differs from one sub-region to another. These practices are themselves greatly influenced by surviving cultural rituals and behaviour patterns inherited from the past. Thus we may note the legacy of pre-history in the form of rock art that has continued up to the present day; in the beliefs in fairies and their hold in the minds of the local people; in the reverence paid to the standing rocks, monoliths and high mountains, including the devastating effect of the glaciers; in the animal sacrifices, ceremonies and dances that are quite distinct from the Islamic ʿĪd-i Qurbān; in the manner in which graves and tombs are built, and the dead interred there; and in the local dress, ornaments, forms of pots and pans, and many household objects that are firmly interwoven into the pattern of a socio-economic life that is rooted in the horticultural and pastoral productive system of the region. Each one of these aspects deserves a special study, as they have continued to characterize socio-cultural practices differently in the different sub-regions.

Today, the Muslims of the region are either Sunni, Ismaʿîli, Twelver Shiʿite or adherents of the Nürbakhshī Sufi order. There is no definite information on the advent of Ismaʿilism before c. 1830. However, the disciples of Sayyid ʿAlī Hamadānī reached the region in late medieval times. Credit must go to Shams al-Dīn ʿIrāqī and his family members, now lying buried in Skardu, Shigir and Kiris in Baltistan, for their continued missionary activity in this area. Although it is disputed whether Shams al-Dīn was a Nürbakhshī adherent or a Shiʿite, his connection with Kashmir is well established. There is another family of missionaries – Mawlānā Sayyid Mahmūd Shāh Tūsī and his brother, Mir Sayyid ʿAlī Tūsī, now buried at Skardu and Kuwardu respectively – who are known to have come from Persia through Yarkand in the sixteenth century and are mainly responsible for the spread of Shiʿism. It is from Baltistan that five preachers – Sayyid Sultan ʿAlī Ṭārif, Sayyid Shāh Wall, Sayyid Shāh Afdal, Sayyid Akbar Shāh and Sayyid Shāh Ibrāhīm – are known to have travelled towards Gilgit and spread Shiʿism there; their tombs are found at Gilgit, Danyor and Gulmit.
The rise of the Kitan

Kitan history does not fit easily into the usual pattern of national histories. The subject of this chapter is not the history of one nation-state defined by more or less stable geographic frontiers; rather, we shall follow the destiny of one people which, though maintaining its feeling of identity over a period of some eight centuries, has not only twice changed its country but has also undergone a remarkable cultural and linguistic metamorphosis.

Before the fifth century, under a different name or names, the Kitan belonged to the heterogeneous group called by the Chinese T’ung Hu (Eastern Hu), where Hu may be considered a generic name for barbarians. Chinese sources first mention the Kitan, under this name, in connection with a defeat inflicted on them in 406 by the Chinese Wei dynasty. At that time the Kitan lived on the upper course of the Liao river, but the military reverse prompted them to move into the Sung-mo area of what was to become Jehol, the northeastern province of China. The Wei–Kitan conflict was, one might say, almost a family feud. The Northern Wei dynasty (386–538) was of alien (Tabgach) origin, a name better known in its Chinese transcription: t’o-pa. The Tabgach, Kitan, and Shih-wei were all

---

* See Maps 2 and 5, pp. 427 and 432–3.

1 Or Karakitay. Editor’s note: the form ‘Kara Khitay’ is used throughout this Volume for consistency with the Islamic sources.
detached clans of the Hsien-pi. Their language was Mongol with some archaic features and they may have spoken different dialects.

The Kitan tribes occupied a region which incorporated the eastern slopes of the Khingan mountains and also the plains crossed by the Shira Muren. Their ancestral territory was marginal to the rich pastures of the steppe but still suitable for pastoralism. The Kitan took full advantage of this, concentrating on horse-breeding, with horned cattle and sheep being of secondary importance. There was also land suitable for agriculture, and the forests and rivers of Manchuria provided for extensive hunting and fishing, both activities being pursued on a grand scale. More importantly, the Kitan’s country was an ore-rich land; mining and metallurgy in general were to play a major role in Kitan history. All in all, the land on which they lived allowed the Kitan to develop a diversified economy, with a modicum of industrialization unparalleled anywhere in medieval Inner Asia.

From the outset, the Kitan appear as a conglomerate held together by economic or political interests rather than by sharing the same culture. The composite character of their civilization is reflected in their ancestral legend, according to which the Kitan descended from the union of a man riding a white horse along the Lao-ha river and a maiden travelling in a cart drawn by a grey ox along the Shira Muren. At Mount Mu-yeh, at the confluence of the two rivers, the man and the woman united; the descendants of their eight sons were to form the original eight tribes of the Kitan. It should be noted that the text of the Liao-shih [History of the Liao] which provides this information allows the interpretation that procreation resulted from the union of the two rivers. A white horse and a grey ox remained sacrificial animals among the Kitan, probably symbolizing the two main components of their culture. The motif of the birth of a mythical ancestor at the confluence of two rivers appears also in connection with Buqu Khan, legendary ruler of the Uighurs.

Fragmentary legends recorded by understandably sceptical Chinese historians would suggest that at least some of the early Kitan rulers led a segregated life and remained inaccessible to the people. One was said to be a mere skull, covered with felt, emerging from his tent and taking human shape only for the ceremonial occasions when the white horse and the grey ox were sacrificed. Shamans played an important role in the ceremonies connected with these sacrifices. The habit of covering the ruler with a felt rug survived in the investiture ceremony of the later Kitan (Liao) emperors. Another ruler, equally sequestered and appearing only when the need arose, was reported to have had a boar’s head and was dressed in pigskin; clearly he was perceived as a pig, an animal which places at least some of the Kitan tribes firmly in a forest-dwelling, eastern Tunguz cultural group. Both rulers vanished when their secret identity was improperly interfered with. A third mythical ruler was said to have owned twenty sheep. Each day he ate nineteen of them, but the next day
there were twenty again. The story of ‘King Skull’ and ‘King Boar’ permits the assumption that early in their history, the Kitan were ruled simultaneously by two men: one, a purely ceremonial, sacral king living in seclusion; the other, perhaps an elected individual, in whose hands real power lay.

In the middle of the eighth century, the Kitan are often mentioned in the exploits of the celebrated rebel Ngan Lu-shan, sometimes as enemies and at other times as allies. By the ninth century, the eight Kitan tribes were governed by a chieftain elected from among the members of the Yao-lien family for a period of three years. This term could be cut short if, while he was at the helm, extraordinary calamities struck the community. The Yao-lien family gradually lost its grip, and in 872 A-pao-chi of the Yeh-lü (also called I-la) clan was elected. He became the founder of the Kitan empire. Twice re-elected, at the end of his third term A-pao-chi was reluctant to abandon the reins of power, and, with the consent of the tribes, organized an independent tribe centred on the ‘Chinese City’, situated on the Luan river. Inhabited by Chinese who had fled the disorders which marked the fall of the T’ang empire, the region was not only suitable for agriculture, but also had considerable mineral resources such as iron, copper, gold and salt. A-pao-chi’s father had already a keen perception of the advantages to be derived from industrial progress. He had paid particular attention to the development of metallurgy and, combining the skills of the Shih-wei tribe (reputed specialists in working metal) with those of the recently settled Chinese, he established iron smelters. Perhaps even more important was A-pao-chi’s acquisition of the lake which provided the salt used by the Kitan tribes. The economic power of A-pao-chi enabled him to gain the support of an ever-increasing group of Kitan; the killing in an ambush of all the rival chieftains secured his power. In 907 A-pao-chi assumed the Chinese name T’ai-tsu and declared himself emperor of the Kitan. It should be noted that there is some doubt whether A-pao-chi ever used the title Kaghan, certainly not current among the early Kitan rulers.

A-pao-chi (T’ai-tsu) thus became the first ruler (907–26) of a dynasty which in 947 took the name Liao – adopted in memory of the Kitan homeland located at that river – and ruled over northern China until 1115. The investiture of the ruler followed practices well attested among other Inner Asian peoples. In the course of the ceremony the future emperor gallops off, ‘falls’ from his horse, to be covered – as mentioned above – with a felt blanket. In the Türk ceremony of investiture, as recorded by the Chou shu, the order of events was reversed, the future Kaghan being first bundled in a felt rug and then put on horseback. In Kitan practice, having faced what must be viewed as an ordeal, the ceremony culminated in the emperor being raised on a felt carpet.
The *Liao-shih* also records the precursory signs marking the birth of a proper founder of a dynasty. Born of a sun-ray, so our sources tell us, A-pao-chi had the body of a 3-year-old and could, from the moment of his birth, crawl on all fours. It took him but three months to walk and one more year to speak and to foresee the future. He was undoubtedly an exceptional man: the ancestral hero of an ascending dynasty. Similar signs of precocity characterize the legendary Oghuz Kaghan, eponymous ancestor of the Oghuz tribes.

The diplomatic skills of A-pao-chi were considerable. In the words of the *Liao-shih*, he:

> treated all tribes kindly, made the rewards and punishments equitable and abstained from wanton military campaigns. He benefited his people by pursuing their interests. The herds flourished and both the government and the people were sufficiently provided for.²

Kitan history did not unfold in a vacuum and, from the very beginning, the relationship with China was the dominant factor in external relations. The first recorded Kitan embassy reached the Wei court in 468. In 479 some Kitan tribes, fleeing a Juan-juan invasion, submitted to the Wei. Contacts became more frequent in T’ang times when, as we have seen, the Kitan were increasingly inclined to take advantage of the weakening of central power. A-pao-chi’s rise coincided with the fall of the T’ang dynasty, followed by a period of political upheaval known in Chinese history as that of the Five Dynasties (907–60). The growing importance of the Kitan is shown by the fact that in 906 the founder of the short-lived Liang dynasty (907–12) thought it opportune to send envoys to A-pao-chi.

It was with Kitan help that in 936 the Later Chin (one of the Five Dynasties) could establish their rule. In 938 they had to repay this service in kind by ceding to the emperor T’ai-tsung (T’ai-tsu’s successor; 927–47) sixteen prefectures located in northern China, thereby extending Kitan territory well into China proper. In 938 Peking became the Kitan Southern Capital (Nan-ching) for which in 1012 they revived its old name, Yen-ching. With the founding of the (Northern) Sung dynasty in 960, a barrier to further south-ward Kitan expansion was erected, and the treaty of Shan-yüan (1005) established a long-lasting peace on the basis of equality between Liao and Sung. The history of Liao rule over China is beyond the scope of the present chapter.

There is evidence of Kitan contacts with the great nomad empires centred on Mongolia. In the first part of the sixth century, under attack by the Kao-chü-li (called somewhat later Kao-li, i.e. the Koreans) and the Juan-juan, at that time the dominant power in Mongolia, some Kitan sought refuge with the T’o-pa dynasty of the Northern Wei. Gaining strength, the Kitan then invaded the short-lived Northern Ch’i dynasty (550–70) but in the process they suffered the loss of some 100,000 men. By that time the Türks held sway in Mongolia. The Köl Tegin inscription in Mongolia lists the Kitan among the peoples hostile to

² Wittfogel and Fêng, 1949, p. 127.
the Turks though they were represented at the funeral of that Turk prince. The Tonyuqu inscription, of a slightly later date, speaks of a Tokuz Oghuz–Chinese–Kitan triple alliance against the Turks. It is impossible to establish the exact nature of Turk domination over the Kitan. Interestingly, Kitan–Turk hostility survived the fall of the Turk empire of Mongolia; we know of Kitan attacks against the Western Turks in 916 and 983. It is not clear what was meant by the ‘Turks’ since by that time their states, both Eastern and Western, had long since disappeared. However, it is known that some Turk groups survived the dissolution of their empire. In the middle of the tenth century, Hu Ch‘iao, a Chinese in Kitan service, mentions two groups of Turks: one, called the ‘Turks of the shan-yü’, living to the west and north of the Kyrgyz; the other far to the north in a very cold country. It seems likely that it was with the former group that the Kitan had their conflicts.

Relations with the Uighurs, whose empire succeeded that of the Turks in Mongolia in 745, were more friendly and more complex. Theoretically at least, the Kitan were subjects of the Uighur empire of Mongolia. But Uighur rule may have rested light on the Kitan, as may be concluded from the following anecdote. In 924, on the occasion of a visit to Karabalghasun, the old capital of the former Uighur empire, A-pao-chi ordered that an inscription in honour of the Uighur Bilge Kaghan be erased and replaced by a trilingual (Kitan–Turkic–Chinese) text extolling the deeds of the defunct Kaghan. If the historian may be allowed to suggest a seemingly far-fetched analogy, many former subjects of empires that no longer exist – such as those of the British or of the Habsburgs – look with a measure of nostalgia on the days of their ‘subjugation’. It was in this frame of mind that A-pao-chi offered the Uighurs of Kocho the possibility of returning to their former homeland from which they had had to flee when, in 840, the Kyrgyz put an end to their empire in Mongolia. By 924 the Uighurs had been settled for almost a century in a land where they were content and so they did not take up the offer. Unfortunately the inscription erected by A-pao-chi has not survived nor do we know which of the several Bilge Kaghans it was intended to honour; the text might have thrown light on the conjectures just adumbrated. The date of 924 is often referred to in the scholarly literature as that at which the Kitan, having defeated the Kyrgyz, took possession of Mongolia. It may be more accurate to suggest that A-pao-chi took advantage of a political vacuum created by the gradual withdrawal of the Kyrgyz into their homeland in the Yenisei region. What is certain is that by 924 the Kyrgyz evacuation of the Orkhon region must have been completed. Kitan–Uighur political co-operation continued over the years and, almost a century later, a joint diplomatic action was undertaken aimed at establishing contact with the Ghaznavids. About this more will be said later in this chapter.
Beyond strictly political links, the Kitan and the Uighurs were connected in more than one way, particularly following the Uighurs’ expulsion from Mongolia. The Kitan tribal confederation comprised several tribes of Uighur origin, such as the I-shih, second in rank only to the imperial Yeh-lü clan. Also of Uighur origin was the Hsiao clan which provided consorts to the ruling Yeh-lü. The power of the consort was almost as great as that of the emperor. The empress accompanied her husband at ceremonial hunts and participated in public ceremonies such as the annual sacrifice at Mount Mu-yeh where, it should be recalled, not only the male but also the female ancestor of the Kitan was duly honoured. T’ai-tsu’s widow refused to follow her deceased husband into the grave – as tradition would have demanded – and got away with it. Her act of defiance marked the end of the custom. Among the powerful women in the Liao-shih mention should be made of Hu-lien, wife of the second son of T’ai-tsung. In 994 she led a campaign against the Tatar and ten years later founded K’o-tun ch’êng, i.e. the ‘city of the Khattūn [the empress]’ near the Orkhon river. Kitan women of her stature presage the long-ruling female regents of the Kara Khitay and the forceful Chinggisid consorts of the thirteenth century.

The Liao-shih records for 924 the arrival of Uighur messengers to the Kitan court. Since the short notice raises several questions, it is given here in the translation of Wittfogel and Fêng:

Uighur messengers came [to the court], but there was no one who could understand their language. The empress said to T’ai-tsu, ‘Tieh-la [a younger brother of the emperor] is clever. He may be sent to welcome them.’ By being in their company for twenty days he was able to learn their spoken language and script. Then he created [a script of] smaller Ch’i-tan charac-
ters which, though fewer in number, covered everything.3

The first, somewhat surprising, fact that emerges from this notice is the seeming ignorance of the Uighur language in the Kitan court. Yet one should not attach too much importance to the statement, which may simply indicate that, at the precise time of the messengers’ arrival, and in the emperor’s immediate entourage, there was no one who could speak Uighur. For all his cleverness, Tieh-la could not have learned Uighur in twenty days; it must be assumed that he knew it already.

The second part of the statement has been widely interpreted to mean that the ‘small’ characters of the Kitan script were, in fact, those of the script used by the Uighurs. Recent research4 indicates otherwise. The Kitan created two scripts, at present neither of them completely deciphered, which in the sources are called respectively ‘large’ and ‘small’. Texts written in each of them have survived, and to the layman’s eye both are similar to

4 See Ch. 9 by György Kara in Vol. IV, Part Two, of this History
Chinese characters. The superficial similarities notwithstanding, the systems underlying the two scripts are different and the ‘small’ script has nothing to do with any of the scripts used by the Uighurs. Tieh-la is probably justly credited with the invention of the ‘small script’; the link with the arrival of the Uighur messengers is coincidental.

Uighur cultural influence on the Kitan manifested itself in various ways and included the teaching of the cultivation of melons, a rather sophisticated process, since it involved the fertilizing of the plants with cow dung and their protection with mats. Important and cordial as Kitan–Uighur relations may have been, the Kitan took care to keep their distance from the politically insignificant Uighurs of Kocho. On two occasions Uighur requests for imperial brides were rejected.

The rise of Kitan power did not go unnoticed in the Islamic world. In 923 a Persian delegation, and in 924 an Arab embassy, arrived at the court of T’ai-tsu. The Kitan seem to have been slow to respond to these overtures; the first recorded Kitan embassy to the west visited Ghazna in 1026 or 1027. It was clearly prompted by the news reaching the Kitan that Mahmūd of Ghazna (998–1030) had embarked on a series of conquests which brought the eastern limits of the Ghaznavid state close to the Kitan sphere of interest. The Liao emperor Sheng-tsung (982–1031) decided to send an exploratory mission which was joined by an Uighur mission. Arabic sources mention their arrival which they interpret either as proof of the Kitan’s fear of Ghaznavid might or even as their desire, in Gardīzī’s words, ‘to place themselves at his service’. In his work written c. 1120, the geographer and ethnographer Marvazī gives the text of Sheng-tsung’s letter to Mahmūd:

The Lord of Heavens has granted to us (many?) kingdoms upon the face of [this] wide earth and placed us in possession of regions occupied by numerous tribes. In our capital we enjoy security and act according to our will. Anyone in the world who can see and hear cannot help seeking friendship and close relations with us. Our nephews from among the amirs of the nearer regions constantly and without exception send their envoys, and their letters and presents follow upon one another. [Only] he [Mahmūd] until now has sent no envoy or messenger, while we hear of his excellence in strength and courage, of his outstanding position in might and elevation, of his supremacy over the amirs by awe, of his control of the provinces by might and authority and of his peace in his homeland according to his own will. As he enjoys such a glorious position it is a duty for him to write his news to the Supreme Khan than whom there is none higher beneath the heavens, and to treat him with consideration according to his state. So we have taken the initiative, limiting ourselves to the dispatch of this lightly equipped envoy rather than someone who would exceed him in rank and equipage, in view of the greatness of the distance and the length of time [necessary] for covering it.5

Marvazī also gives the text of the message of the Uighur Khan, much more modest in tone but equally friendly. ‘We ardently desire’, writes the Khan, ‘that love and respect should be

established between [us].’ Judging by Marvazī’s text, Mahmūd was certainly not overawed by the Kitan initiative. In Marvazī’s words:

> When the two letters were presented to Mahmūd and he saw what stupidity they contained... he did not find it possible to grant what was requested with regard to the establishment of sincere relations and correspondence, and he dismissed the envoys, saying to them: ‘Peace and truce are possible only so far as to prevent war and fighting. There is no faith uniting us that we should be in close relations. Great distance creates security for both of us against perfidy. I have no need of close relations with you until you accept Islam. And that is all.’

Harsh though Mahmūd’s reply was, it certainly contained a core of realism. There was little likelihood of a Ghaznavid–Liao conflict.

The fate of the Liao was not sealed by any distant menace, nor by a sudden change in the modus vivendi established with the Sung. The danger arose in the Kitan’s own Manchurian hinterland where the Tunguz Jurchen, for many years subjects of the former, revolted and under the leadership of A-ku-ta (1068–1123) conquered most of northern China. The short-lived Jurchen dynasty of the Chin (1115–1234) was established by A-ku-ta’s younger brother, known as the emperor T’ai-tsung.

The rise of the Kara Khitay

Thus, following a rule of just over two centuries, Kitan dominion over northern China ended. Needless to say, the demise of the Liao did not imply the disappearance of the Kitan people in its homeland or even in the conquered territories. The integration of the Kitan into the new Jurchen Chin state does not belong to the history of Central Asia and, hence, cannot be dealt with in this chapter. We must, however, follow the destiny of the Kitan in Central Asia where, showing a remarkable resilience, they embarked on the foundation of a new state, the third in the course of their known history.

The success of the enterprise was due to the extraordinary determination, as well as the political and military skills, of Yeh-lū Ta-shih, a descendant in the eighth generation of T’ai-tsu. A highly educated man, Yeh-lū Ta-shih was put on his mettle in a number of military engagements with the Sung in which he revealed an uncommon military talent. He fully realized the plight of the Liao, taken in the fearful pincer of the Jurchen Chin advancing from the north and the Sung from the south. With more than half his territory occupied by the Jurchen, and one major city after the other taken, the emperor T’ien-tsu had to flee and in 1125 was eventually captured by the Chin. In the general maelstrom of war, amid intrigues and counter-intrigues and contending, ephemeral, self-styled emperors, Yeh-lū

---

6 Minorsky, 1942, p. 21.
Ta-shih operated with great skill and a good measure of ruthlessness, putting expediency above every other consideration. Captured by the Chin, and perhaps toying with the idea of collaboration with the victors, he escaped and made his way to T’ien-tsu. Appalled by the emperor’s incompetence and unwilling to undertake military operations that were doomed to failure, in 1124 – while T’ien-tsu was still alive – Yeh-lü Ta-shih set out with a small band of followers to create a state of his own. According to Chinese sources, he started out with 10,000 horses. Since one must count at least 2 horses per warrior, his following, though fast growing, was very small indeed.

There is some doubt whether, at this moment, he took the title of king or emperor; but what is certain is that, simultaneously, he had himself called Gür Khan, a dignitary title he was the first to use. It is a composite of the conventional term Khan and the adjective gür (universal). It could well be that by the adoption of an unusual title, at the outset of his second career, the Kara Khitay ruler wished to distinguish his regime from those customary in Inner Asia. There is a twentieth-century parallel in Hitler’s and Franco’s choice of the unconventional terms Führer and Caudillo respectively. In later years, the title Gür Khan was assumed by Jamuka, an erstwhile companion of Temüjin (later to be known as Chinggis Khan), who became his principal antagonist. Gür Khan was also the title of the ruler of the probably Turkic-speaking Kerait, who in or about 1008 adopted Nestorian Christianity.

Among the many qualities of Yeh-lü Ta-shih, his powers of persuasion must have ranked second only to his steely determination. As a fugitive with no territorial base, in order to gain any credibility he had to raise an army willing to follow him on a road not yet charted leading to a state not yet founded. That he brilliantly succeeded in this undertaking gives the measure of his genius. First, Yeh-lü Ta-shih turned north where he obtained the modest support of the White Tatars. He then advanced towards Mongolia where, in K’o-tun city by the Orkhon, to an assembly of tribal chiefs and heads of Kitan prefectures, he delivered a rousing speech requesting their help in the extermination of the Chin and the re-establishment of the Liao empire. It is a matter for speculation whether, at that time, Ta-shih’s prime objective was the restoration of the Liao or the creation of a new empire resting on the military resources of the steppe peoples. His immediate further actions would suggest that he opted for the second alternative.

As an outcome of the successful meeting in K’o-tun, Yeh-lü Ta-shih now had an army of some 10,000 horsemen – a respectable force when well led, but insufficient for large-scale operations against the Chin or any other major power. There was a need for further allies and, to avoid risky confrontations, Yeh-lü Ta-shih decided to proceed westward. The sources report that before embarking on the long expedition, Yeh-lü Ta-shih dutifully
performed the traditional sacrifice of the grey ox and the white horse, a telling sign of Kitan cultural continuity carried from the Manchurian forests, through two centuries of rule over China, towards the steppes of Central Asia. In 1125 – the date is uncertain – he requested permission from the Uighur ruler of Kocho to pass through his territory towards the west. Referring to the erstwhile Kitan offer that his ancestor T’ai-tsu had made to the Uighurs to re-establish them in Mongolia, Ta-shih emphasized the time-honoured friendship between Uighurs and Kitan. The Uighur king of Kocho agreed to the passage of the Kitan troops through his territory. According to the Liao-shih:

He presented him with six hundred horses, a hundred camels, and three thousand sheep; and to prove his sincerity gave some of his sons and grandsons as hostages; and declaring himself a vassal of Ta-shih, accompanied him as far as the boundary of his realm.7

Whether the co-operation between the kingdom of Kocho and the Kitan was really as harmonious as the sources wish us to believe is of secondary importance. It can be taken for granted that, at a minimum, the advance of Yeh-lü Ta-shih towards the west was not impeded by the Uighurs. How long this crossing took cannot be established; it might have taken a few years during which Yeh-lü Ta-shih prepared his forces for the conquest of West Turkistan.

Before we follow this Kitan advance, we should pause for a moment to examine a change in their name that occurred almost concurrently with this migration. First, it should be mentioned that, although Chinese historians shed few tears over the fall of alien, conquest dynasties, that founded by Yeh-lü Ta-shih has continued to be listed also in the Chinese annals under the name of Hsi (Western) Liao.

For reasons unknown, in Muslim sources the Kitan who migrated to the west appear under the name of Kara, i.e. ‘Black’ Kitai or Kitay. The first question that emerges is: why has the final -n in the name been replaced by a -y? (The value of the final -i as written in the conventional spelling of Kitai is, in fact, that of a -y as in the English ‘yes’.) The ‘Kitan’ pronunciation of the name is vouchsafed by the Türk, Chinese and Tibetan transcriptions, though the first of these suggests a palatalized ň sound, similar to gn in French ‘agneau’. It so happens that the final -n or -ń became -y in the language of the Uighurs of Kocho. Most probably the populations of West Turkistan became acquainted with this name through the intermediary of Uighur and adopted its Uighur form. The fact that the Mongols of the thirteenth century continued to use the original ‘Kitan’ form supports this explanation. The exact significance of the epithet ‘black’ (kara) in tribal or personal names is not fully established, but the more likely interpretation is that it is an honorific of sorts widely used among Central Asian peoples in conjunction with other ethnonyms.

We have seen that the first Kitan attempt to establish contacts with the Islamic world foundered on Ghaznavid arrogance. Now, almost exactly one century later, Ghaznavid power was a shambles and the Kitan ruler a virtual fugitive. Yeh-lü Ta-shih was now faced by the Turkic tribal confederation ruled by the Muslim Karakhanid dynasty. Since about the middle of the eleventh century there were in fact two Karakhanid states (see above, Chapter 6) and, through geographic necessity, the advancing Kitan first had to face the eastern branch ruled since 1103 by Ahmad b. Hasan Arslan Khan. The two foci of this state were the cities of Kashghar and Balasaghun, the latter located in the Chu valley and, in subsequent centuries, completely destroyed.

It should be emphasized that the reconstruction of Kara Khitay history is, at best, tentative. The relevant Chinese and Muslim sources are often in contradiction and it is possible that occasionally both are wrong. It would appear that, advancing in the Tarim basin, at least one wing of Yeh-lü Ta-shih’s army met with little luck and, probably in 1128 near Kashghar, suffered a defeat at the hand of the Karakhanid ruler Ahmad b. Hasan (Arslan Kara Kaghan). Ta-shih was more successful in another push westward, through Kyrgyz territory. The character of this move, whether peaceful or warlike, cannot be determined; a Khitay tribe still lives in southern Kyrgyzstan. Nor is it known with any degree of certainty which of the two Kara Khitay wings – if indeed it is justified to speak of such a division – built the city by the River Emil of which, in the mid-thirteenth century when the Persian historian Juwaynī wrote his work, ‘some traces still remained’. 8

Yeh-lü Ta-shih left his country and moved westward with the avowed intent of gathering sufficient forces to re-establish Liao power over China. Perhaps, as time passed, he found this aim unrealistic. The dispatch in 1134 of an expeditionary force which he did not join himself was more an empty gesture than a real effort to achieve this aim. It could also be that he thought that the creation of a new empire further west offered him a better opportunity to leave his mark on history. Whatever the true motive, he made no serious effort at a reconquest. Unmistakably, Yeh-lü Ta-shih’s ambition was to carve himself an empire in the west.

Internal dissent within the Eastern Karakhanid state facilitated Yeh-lü Ta-shih’s search for a territorial base. The Karakhanid ruler, Ibrāhīm II b. Ahmad, unable to cope with his unruly Kanglï and Karluk subjects, sought and obtained Yeh-lü Ta-shih’s help. This assistance, if this is what it was, took the form of the occupation of the Karakhanid capital Balasaghun in the Chu valley and the de facto elimination of Karakhanid rule in the region. In Juwaynī’s words, ‘the Gür Khan proceeded to Balasaghun and ascended the throne that

had cost him nothing’. 9 Yeh-lü Ta-shih had thus acquired a capital city; the marauding refugee was now in possession of a fixed territorial base. Unfortunately, the date when this happened cannot be established with any degree of certitude. IBRĂHİM II, while recognizing Kara Khitay suzerainty, was allowed to remain in place, occupying the more modest position of Iļi-gi Türkmen (Ili-gi Türk?), perhaps a concession to the predominantly Turkic population of the Kara Khitay empire.

The neutralizing of the Eastern Karakhanids did not satisfy the ambitious Gür Khan, who now embarked on a western expansion of his domain. In 1137, near Khujand, he defeated the Karakhanid Mahmūd II, a nephew of Sanjar, the powerful Seljuq sultan. Clearly, Yeh-lü Ta-shih was bent on further conquest. Taking advantage of a conflict between Mahmūd and his Karluk subjects, in which the latter called on him for help, the Gür Khan inflicted a crushing defeat on the joint forces of Mahmūd II and Sanjar at a battle fought north of Samarkand in the Qatwan steppe in September 1141. News of this débâcle reached participants in the Second Crusade and, it is usually assumed, became the basis of the creation of the legend of Prester John, a fictional Christian king of the east bringing sorely needed relief to the Crusaders battling with the Seljuqs. Despite his victory at Qatwan, which brought the whole of Turkistan under Kara Khitay control, Yeh-lüh Ta-shih did not assume direct governance; Karakhanid amirs, recognizing his suzerainty, continued to rule. Effective power was in the hands of the Burhān family of Bukhara, the so-called sudār (‘eminences’), Sunni religious leaders who dealt directly with the Gür Khans.

Yeh-lüh Ta-shih died in 1143 and was succeeded by his widow, T’a-pu-yen (the empress Kan-t’ien by her honorific title), who acted as regent for 8 years until Ta-shih’s son Yeh-lü I-lieh (1151–63) could ascend the throne. During his reign, Kara Khitay involvement in the perennial conflicts in Transoxania continued. In 1158, answering a request for help from the Khan of Samarkand, a Kara Khitay contingent of 10,000 men was sent to his rescue. It was headed by the Iļi-gi Türkmen, the deposed Karakhanid Ibrăhım II. He showed no more courage this time than when he had yielded to Yeh-lü Ta-shih; faced by the forces of the Khwarazm Shah II Arslan, he sued for peace.

A census taken under I-lieh counts 84,500 households with men aged 18 or older. This figure probably does not include the population of the conquered territories. According to Kitan traditional reckoning – which the Kara Khitay probably followed – each household had 2 adult, arms-bearing men. In the decisive battle fought on the Qatwan steppe, the Kara Khitay forces numbered probably fewer than 20,000 men. Whatever the value of these figures, it is certain that the Kara Khitay element constituted a small fraction of the population under its control. It could not influence in any significant way either the

9 Ibid.
economy or the cultural structure prevailing in the land. While ruling over China, the Kitan (Liao) had operated within a fairly homogeneous Chinese population whose vast majority did not object to the alien rule for the simple reason that it did not seriously interfere with their way of life. The tasks faced by the Kara Khitay state were very different. Here too, the Yeh-lü clan and its followers represented a minority within a much larger population which, however, was far from homogeneous. Here, in Wittfogel’s words, ‘a limited imperial domain [was] surrounded by a vast agglomeration of vassal peoples, sedentary as well as nomadic’.\textsuperscript{10} The tradition and the values of this Kara Khitay island constituted a conglomerate of Chinese and Kitan customs, the latter kept alive by the Yeh-lü clan, inheritors of a centuries-old tradition and know-how of government.

Very little is known about the cultural fabric of the Kara Khitay. For lack of evidence, even their language cannot be established with certainty. It seems unlikely that the use of Mongol, if at all present, was widespread and possibly the language in Yeh-lü Ta-shih’s entourage was Chinese. The chancery used Chinese script, and Kara Khitay copper coins were minted on a Chinese pattern and carried Chinese characters. What is known for certain is that the Kara Khitay were not Muslims and that, by replacing the Karakhanids in Balasaghun, they superimposed an alien culture on the local population. The vast majority of the Kara Khitay subjects were Muslims, speaking a Turkic or Iranian language.

One might argue that with the appearance of the Kara Khitay state, an alternative political structure to the traditional Inner Asian Kaghanate was emerging, a process symbolized by the claim to universality as expressed by the title of the ruler. It was to respond to the needs of a state in which ethnic, religious and cultural diversity excluded the possibility of a strong sense of solidarity. In this, as also in chronological order, the Kara Khitay were the precursors of the Mongols. Both demanded little other than recognition of their rule and, beyond this, the payment of taxes. By the side of the native ruler stood the vigilant Kara Khitay official whose task it was to ensure regular payment. The political aims of the Kara Khitay appear to have been modest, based, as they probably were, on a correct assessment of their military strength. There is every indication to show that in organization and combativeness the Kara Khitay armies were on a par with their Central Asian counterparts: they won some battles, they lost others.

In vivid contrast to some of their Muslim vassals, the Kara Khitay rulers followed a policy of religious tolerance, a feature which was also to characterize the rule of the Mongols. The Yeh-lü dynasty was probably Buddhist but did not try to impose this persuasion on its subjects. Of particular interest is the florescence of the Nestorian Christian Church, whose missionary activity continued unhampered by the Gür Khans. In the twelfth century the

\textsuperscript{10} Wittfogel and Fêng, 1949, p. 665.
city of Kashghar was a Nestorian metropolitan see and followers of this creed were still encountered in the region by Marco Polo in the thirteenth century. Among the Christian gravestones with Syriac inscriptions discovered in the Chu valley, the earliest were erected in the Kara Khitay period.

At the death of I-lieh, power was assumed by his younger sister P’u-su-wan, known as the Empress Ch’êng-tien (1164–77). The Kara Khitay continued the tradition of strong female participation in the running of state affairs mentioned above in connection with T’ai-tsu’s widow. Ch’êng-tien did not see her role as merely that of caretaker until such time as I-lieh’s son could ascend the throne. Under her rule, hostilities against Il Arslan continued until his death in 1172 and she even intervened in the struggle for the throne of his sons. Ch’êng-tien’s demise was not caused by any political or military actions on her part, but by her sentimental involvement with her husband’s younger brother. She had her husband murdered and, in turn, fell victim to the vengeance of her father-in-law. He staged a coup in which both the empress and her lover perished. I-lieh’s second son, Yeh-lü Chi-lu-ku (1179–1211), then became the ruler.

Under the new Gür Khan, Kara Khitay involvement in Khwarazmian affairs continued to follow the earlier pattern: interference in struggles for the succession and more or less successful attempts at collecting taxes. There is no need to enumerate here the battles fought with Kara Khitay participation on behalf of or against successive Central Asian rulers. Let us just mention the Kara Khitay help given to the Khwarazm Shah ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad in 1204 in his struggle against the Ghurid Muʿizz al-Dīn. Since Yeh-lü Tashih’s arrival in Balasaghun, the Gür Khans had been deeply influenced by and, in their turn, had been able to influence events in Semirechye, Transoxania and even south of the Oxus. But the winds of history were blowing from the east and were soon to disturb the usual pattern of Kara Khitay politics.

Simultaneously with the events just described, far away in the foothills of the Altai, in a decisive battle fought in 1204, Chinggis Khan (still called Temüjin) crushed the Mongol-speaking but Christian Naiman. Their leader Tayang Khan fell in the battle, but his son Küchlüg escaped. In 1208 Chinggis Khan, implacable, led another raid against the Naiman, then living on the upper Irtysh. Once again, Küchlüg escaped the general massacre and sought refuge with the Kara Khitay. He was well received, married the Gür Khan’s daughter and abandoned Christianity in favour of Buddhism.

However hurried Küchlüg’s flight might have been, he was accompanied by a substantial number of Naiman whose arrival upset the delicate internal balance prevailing within the core of the Kara Khitay empire, and thus posed a serious threat to its very existence. Historians, relying mainly on Juwaynî’s description of the events, usually depict a scenario.
in which the Kara Khitay fell victim to a joint, concerted attack led from the east by the Naiman under Küchlüg, and from the west by ‘Ala’ al-Dīn Muhammad. This was not the case. Perhaps the best summary of the events is given by Li Chih-chang in his narrative of the Taoist sage Ch’ang-chun’s journey to the west, where he was to join Chinggis Khan:

When the Naiman tribe was defeated, they took refuge with the Ta-shih [i.e. the Kara Khitay]; but having recuperated their strength they presently seized the land that had sheltered them, while the western part of the empire was shorn off and allotted to the Khwarazm Shah.11

Indeed, Küchlüg’s grab for power is more like a classical palace coup led by a vigorous son-in-law against his aging father-in-law than a military attack from the outside. Armed clashes between their respective followers did occur, but when in 1211 Küchlüg emerged the victor in the conflict, he did not assume the title Gür Khan, and Yeh-lü Chi-lu-ku, who remained the nominal ruler, was allowed to die a peaceful death in 1213, two years after Küchlüg’s revolt. For the Franciscan John of Plano Carpini, who travelled through the region in 1246 and was generally well informed, the Naiman and the Kara Khitay were allies who had been defeated by the Mongols.

It could be that it was the threat of a new conflict with the Mongols that prompted Küchlüg to strengthen his position within the Kara Khitay polity by eliminating the Gür Khan. One of Chinggis Khan’s leading generals, Khubilay Noyan (not to be confused with the Great Khan Khubilay), who operated in the Semirechye region around 1210, must certainly have been aware of Küchlüg’s ascent to power and it can be taken for granted that he warned Chinggis, unless – a distinct possibility – Khubilay had already been sent to the region to report on Küchlüg’s actions. A revival of Naiman strength was not something Chinggis Khan would tolerate and steps were taken to eliminate Küchlüg, who had escaped him twice. This time the restless Naiman was to meet his fate at the hand of the Mongols.

Küchlüg was unable to hold together the Kara Khitay inheritance. Internally, his anti-Muslim religious policy alienated his Muslim subjects; in his external affairs he found himself in a desperate situation, trapped as he was between the Khwarazm Shah and the Mongols. The Uighur ruler Barchuk, whose predecessors had been so friendly to Yeh-lü Ta-shih, exasperated by Küchlüg and sensing the approaching Mongol tide, changed his allegiance, killed the Kara Khitay governor in 1209 and submitted to Chinggis. A Mongol army under the command of Jebe, another of Chinggis Khan’s chief lieutenants, advanced on Kashghar, where the population, incensed by Küchlüg’s religious persecution, rose in revolt. To meet the challenge, Küchlüg went to Kashghar but found that the forces against him were too strong to be mastered. To save his life, Küchlüg fled for a third time, but on this occasion his luck deserted him: captured in Badakhshan, he was decapitated.

Küchlüg was neither a great statesman nor a great warrior. Moreover, the legitimacy of his rule was doubtful and he certainly lacked the charisma so characteristic of the Yeh-lü clan. One could speculate as to what would have happened had the Mongol advance reached the Kara Khitay state still ruled by a Yeh-lü. The advancing Mongol armies contained important Kitan contingents. Let us also recall that Yeh-lü Ch’u-tsai (1189–1243), trusted adviser of Chinggis Khan and Ögedey, belonged to the same clan. He accompanied the conqueror on the campaign to the west that would destroy Khwarazm. Ch’u-tsai’s record of his journey, though far too short, informs us that in November 1221 he was in Balasaghun, of which he briefly notes that it used to be the capital of the Hsi Liao, i.e. the Kara Khitay. One wonders what his thoughts might have been there, just ten years after his relative, the last Gūr Khan, had been deposed. Ch’u-tsai had a keen interest in and feeling for the various cultures – Kitan, Mongol, Chinese – all of which he served with great distinction. On his above-mentioned journey, the Taoist sage Ch’ang-chun met another member of the Yeh-lü clan, namely A-hai, the civil governor of Samarkand installed by the Mongols. His son and successor Yeh-lü Mien-ssu-ko was governor of Bukhara.

Clearly, the Yeh-lü were great survivors, a quality that was apparently characteristic of the Kitan people whom they had served with such distinction. Following the collapse of their second great state, that of the Kara Khitay, for centuries to come the Kitan were able to preserve a measure of their national identity in a diaspora that extended well into eastern Europe. References to the Kitan can be found in the heroic poetry of such northwest Siberian peoples as the Voguls and the Ostiaks, and in hydronyms of the same region. As a tribal name, Kitan, Katay, Kitay and their variants can be found among the Kalmucks of the seventeenth century, located to the west of the Ural river; among the Bashkirs of the Volga region; and even among the Tatars of the Crimea. Toponyms found as far west as Moldavia testify to the former presence of Kitan groups and Hungarian chronicles of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries locate the Kitan on the banks of the Don.12

The most enduring trace of Kitan power, however, is the very name Cathay, China’s medieval Latin appellation, still current in many modern usages and in the Russian name of that country. The search for fabulous Cathay was a principal incentive for the great discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. The history of the Kitan constitutes a truly extraordinary chapter in the history of the world.

The geographic setting of Mongolia was of vital importance in shaping its unique history and civilization. The vast mountainous-steppe zone of Mongolia forms part of two important regions of world civilization, the oases of Central Asia and the so-called Eurasian steppe belt stretching from the Danube to the Great Wall of China. From early times, Mongolia was at the crossroads of world communications. Two great highways, the Great Silk Route and the Eurasian steppe corridor, also known as the Silk Route of the Steppes, linked Mongolia with the centres of civilization of East and West. The birth of nomadic civilization was an appropriate response to the physical challenges in that specific part of Central Asia.

It was in the late twelfth and early thirteenth centuries that the Mongols proper appeared on the stage of history. Occupying the main regions of Mongolia, they represented the great majority of its inhabitants. The problem of the genesis of the Mongols is not yet settled, but what is most probable is that the Mongol ethnic group of people had been formed as a result

* See Map 6, pp. 434–5.
of the long historical and ethno-cultural processes in which various peoples who inhabited
the Mongolian steppes took part from very early on, and which was likely to have been of
Altaic provenance (Proto-Mongol, Proto-Turkic and Proto-Tungus). The name ‘Mongol’ is
apparently mentioned in Chinese sources from the fourth century A.D. as Shi Wei Meng-gu
or Shi-Wei Mongol. In the period of the rise of the Mongols, the most important fact was
that the greater part of the tribes living in Mongolia were sufficiently alike, both ethnically
and in their way of life, for them to be moulded together into a highly organized nomadic
society.

The socio-economic and political situation

By the thirteenth century, the traditional social system of the nomads in Mongolia had
undergone considerable change, with a decay of the primitive clan system held together
by blood relationships; consciousness of membership and a sense of solidarity with the
nomadic society now tended to be determined by shared socio-economic interests.1 The
clan lineage or the common descent group, usually referred to as obuq in Mongolian,
had already fallen into decay as a nucleus of social structure in Mongolia. The more the
clans propagated themselves, the more they developed into other groups and subdivisions
(yasuns). The Secret History of the Mongols and Rashid al-Din’s history give many con-
crete examples of the splitting of clans into subgroups and their reassembling into larger
units and tribes (aymaks). On the other hand, the great changes in the traditional nomadic
system could not but cause the centripetal tendencies that encouraged the development of
another process, i.e. the unification of all separate social groups or divisions into larger units
or tribal confederations, or even state formations of varying size, under the supremacy of a
leading clan lineage, such as that of the Borjigids. With the development of Mongol soci-
ety, the coalescence of clans and their subdivisions into tribes and tribal confederations had
become ever more vital.

The decay of the kinship structure in Mongolia went hand in hand with a process of
social stratification. Private ownership of the country’s main wealth – cattle – became the
basic criterion for social position within Mongol society; this was concentrated in the hands
of a small group of people, while the greater part of the population remained as depend-
ants. Hence there developed two main classes: the nobility (noyad) and the commoners
(karachu). In its initial stage, the nobility might have largely consisted of those who held
various traditional titles – Khan (chief, king), mergen (meaning ‘an excellent archer’, later
‘a wise man’), baghatur (brave, hero), sechen (wise), ejen (lord), beki (honoured shaman),

1 Vladimirtsov, 1938; Jagchid and Hyer, 1979, Ch. 6.
singgūm, and so on. The authority of the Khan, the highest rank in the hierarchy, grew with the increase in the common interests of the nobility. Whenever a confederation of tribes emerged, a supreme leader with the title of Khan was declared.

The majority of the population comprised the commoners, karachu or irgen and haran (aran); the last two terms are mentioned in The Secret History and other sources. They included different categories of people: boghol (so-called slaves), members of defeated aymaks (jadaran) and poor cattle-breeders. The Mongol term boghol included various different categories. Corresponding to the real meaning of slaves were the so-called ötög boghol (prisoners of war), who were used as servants in the households of the privileged. Another category, the unaghan boghol, may be interpreted as ‘slaves by origin’. This category of boghol had almost nothing to do with real slaves. In nomadic society, the practice existed of families or individuals presenting young men to a prominent leader, usually a qan, as a token of friendship or submission. Here, the institution of boghol reflected a vassalage-type relationship rather than the subordination of slavery. The so-called ömchi boghol (personal slaves) in effect represented the followers or vassals of their lord, and were different from the institution of nüker. Nüker (pl. nüküd) means ‘friend’, and the term referred to a member of a group of warriors who freely declared themselves to be the ‘men’ of a chosen leader, irrespective of their origin or tribal affiliation. In the beginning, a nüker was a loyal companion in battle, but later he assumed the special character of vassal; the institution played an essential role in the formation of vassalage-type relations in Mongolia.

The transformation of the clan system in Mongolia caused great changes in the country’s economic structure. Under the conditions of a primitive kinship society, in which cattle, its main wealth, were the common ownership of clans, the nomads moved collectively or by küriyen, i.e. the community of clans tied together by blood. The küriyen (or ‘circle’) was the traditional form of economic organization of the nomads, reflecting the nomadic custom of erecting tents in the form of a circle, with the tent of the clan leader in the centre. The küriyen was a specific collective institution for the joint ownership of cattle and pasturelands, but when private cattle ownership developed and the clan system fell into decay, this form of economic structure did not meet the requirements of daily life; private cattle-owners preferred to nomadize by smaller groups, i.e. by ayil. Hence the küriyen form of management of the cattle-breeding economy changed into the ayil form, suitable for the private ownership of cattle and grazing land. Thus by the advent of Chinggis Khan in the latter half of the twelfth century, most of the Mongols had adopted the aymak tribal system of social order. Numerous nomadic tribes are known to have inhabited the main parts of
Mongolia. Some of them formed separate and often rival tribal confederations, for example the Kerait, Naiman, Merkit and Tatar, each with its own Khan.²

Special mention should be made of the Mongols whose pastures were in the southern valleys of the mountain of Burqan Qaldun in the Khentei mountains, the headwaters of three rivers, the Onon, Kerulen and Toul, a region considered to be the cradle of the Mongols. The Daychud and Jalayr, who may be called the ‘Three River Mongols’, constituted the virtual nucleus of the Mongol people; they had started to play a prominent role in the country’s history well before the time of Chinggis Khan. Tribal tradition attributes the major events pertaining to the initial period of Mongolian history solely to the Mongols of these regions. According to The Secret History, from the very beginning the ancestors of the Mongol Khans had chosen the lands of Burqan Qaldun for their principal camping ground. The legendary forefather of Chinggis Khan’s clan, Bürte-chinua, who is said to have been born ‘having his destiny from Heaven above’, together with his spouse Go’aamaral, came from over the sea and encamped at the head of the Onon river, at Burqan Qaldun.³

The centre of gravity of Mongol history in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries had already shifted to the eastern regions of Mongolia. It was during the reign of Qabul Khan, who probably lived in the first half of the twelfth century and was the great-grandfather of Chinggis Khan, that the Mongols of the Three River regions became powerful enough to be united into a state-like confederation (ulus). It is not certain when Qabul Khan died, but there is no doubt that this ulus continued to exist after his death. He is known to have been succeeded by at least two Khans, Ambaqay and Qutula. But soon after the death of the latter in the late twelfth century, the confederation of the Three River regions disintegrated due to the constant feuds between the Mongols and the Tatar. The Chin dynasty of China’s policy of playing off one group of the ‘barbarians’ against another contributed to this decline.

Chinggis Khan and the founding of the Mongol state

Qutula was probably the last Khan of the Mongols of the Three River regions. In any event, the historical records do not mention any other Khan up to the rise of Chinggis. Yesügey, Chinggis Khan’s father, although he was the grandson of Qabul Khan and one of the most influential noblemen, was not of sufficient stature to be called Khan. He served Qutula Khan loyally and displayed courage in numerous battles, and held the title of Baghatur, which he must have inherited from his father, Bartan Baghatur.

² Shirendev et al., 1966.
³ Cleaves, 1982, p. 11.
It is not certain when the future Chinggis Khan was born. According to most Chinese and Mongolian records, he was born in 1162 (a Year of the Horse) on the Delügün-Boldog watershed on the upper reaches of the River Onon. Rashīd al-Dīn and other Persian sources place his birth in 1155 or 1167 (a Year of the Pig). The date of his death in 1227 is, however, certain. He is said to have been born at the moment when his father returned from a successful campaign against the Tatar. Following an ancient custom, Yesügey gave his son the name of the captured chief of the Tatar, i.e. Temüjin, which may have meant ‘blacksmith’. Although the extensive information on the early life of Chinggis Khan in The Secret History is almost certainly romanticized, it is likely that he had to overcome numerous difficulties and hardships in the steppe, left to the mercy of fate after losing his father in early childhood. As Lattimore has pointed out:

Chinggis Khan was a genius but not a savage, illiterate but not ignorant. He was born into a tradition that embraced war as a profession and also included a sophisticated knowledge of the political and economic uses of power. All his natural talent would not have got him very far, however, if he had not been born into this tradition at a propitious moment and in just the right geographical region.

Indeed, Chinggis Khan was a real son of his time, for his advent coincided with crucial changes in the nomadic society of the Mongols, as mentioned above, and the appearance of such an able figure possibly accelerated the development of this historical process. The secret of his unprecedented career was perhaps that he could make the best use of the situation that prevailed in the nomadic society of his time. This last engendered both centrifugal and centripetal tendencies. On the one hand, different tribes tried to be separate and to provide for their independence existence, which led to mutual feuding. On the other hand, the more powerful a tribe became, the more it endeavoured to incorporate others, resulting in fewer but larger tribal units.

To achieve his purpose, Chinggis Khan resorted to a great variety of means and tactics. First, he was clever in manipulating traditional tribal politics, deriving great benefit from his skilful use of some old tribal institutions, such as those of the nüker, the anda and others. Thanks to such tested devices, the young Temüjin was able to save his family from the humiliating position in which it found itself after it was deserted by its tribesmen following the death of Yesügey. He was further able to restore the leading role of the Borjigids. The anda was the oldest form of alliance in the kinship society, by which warriors were sworn to blood loyalty with one another. In Chinggis Khan’s time, the oath of anda lost its primary feature and could be found among warriors belonging to different tribes or clans.

---

4 At present, this is known as Gurban-nuur in Dadal-sum territory, Khentei-aymak, in eastern Mongolia.
5 Lattimore, 1963a, p. 57.
What was needed was that those who wanted to become *andás* shared common interests; they had to confirm their oath by tasting each other’s blood in order to symbolize their close brotherhood. At the beginning of his career, Temüjin was able to win over to his side many talented and loyal *nükers* and *andás*.

The fact that the young Temüjin enjoyed the patronage of the mighty Toghrïl Khan greatly enhanced his position. The Kerait Khan placed a considerable force at his disposal; and several kinsmen of Temüjin and some tribal chieftains, like Jamuka of the Jajirad, joined him and were ready to help. In 1185 Temüjin, with his united forces, easily defeated the Merkit and secured abundant loot, freeing his wife Börte (who had previously been abducted by them). This was the first serious victory which Temüjin achieved over his enemy with the aid of his *andás*, Toghrïl Khan and Jamuka. After his victory over the Merkit, Temüjin became a notable figure among rival chieftains in the steppe. He renewed his *anda* brotherhood with Jamuka, who was at this time stronger than Temüjin and no less ambitious and energetic: in the future, these two young men were to become the main rivals for power.

The *anda* brotherhood between Temüjin and Jamuka did not last long. According to *The Secret History*, after the victory over the Merkit they lived together for one and a half years on very friendly terms. But it seems more probable that during this period they kept an eye on each other and did their best to increase their forces by attracting adherents. When the *anda* alliance between them broke up, Temüjin found himself in a much stronger position. Altogether, twenty-three groups of kinsmen and noblemen from some twenty-three clans and tribes had come over to Temüjin when he encamped at Ayil Qaraghana on the Kimuragha stream. Among those who rallied to his rising standard were such hereditary representatives of the Mongol nobility as Da’aritay, the grandson of Qabul Khan, the fourth son of Bartan Baghatur, his uncle Altan Odchigin, the third son of Qutala Khan, Quchar, Yesügey’s nephew, the son of Neken-taysi, Sacha-beki, Qabul Khan’s grandson and others. Temüjin had become virtual overlord of the Borjigids, the noblest clan, from which the Mongol royalty derived its origin. He was again in possession of the original home of his tribe. It was the Mongol nobility which provided both moral and physical support for Temüjin to become Khan. Thus it says in *The Secret History*, ‘When Altan, Quchar, and Sacha Beki took counsel with one another together and spoke unto Temüjin, saying “We shall make thee to become khan”’.⁶ Temüjin’s accession to the throne took place in 1189 at Lake Kökö of Qara Jürügen, on the Senggür stream, within Mount Gürelgü in the upper reaches of the rivers Onon and Kerulen, near Burkhan Qaldun. The official title ‘Chinggis’

⁶ Cleaves, 1982, 123.
was conferred on Temüjin by the shaman Kököchü Teb-Tenggeri. The etymology of his name has been explained differently by scholars, but the most convincing interpretation is that ‘Chinggis’ means ‘fierce, hard, tough’; thus ‘Chinggis Khan’ means ‘the Fierce Ruler’, not ‘the Universal Ruler’. One has also to assume that the Mongol shaman called his militant leader by the name Saqiyusun (Defender).

According to The Secret History, Chinggis Khan then instituted ten court offices, but, with the exception of that of Cherbi, the names of the officials are not given and only their duties are indicated, even though without precision. As the chief advisers of the Khan, the duty of maintaining order in the meetings very probably devolved upon them. The two offices of ‘guardians of the assembly’ were occupied by Bo’orchu and Jelme, to whom Chinggis reputedly said, ‘Being my shadow, this settles my mind, so let this be in my thoughts.’ Chinggis’s guard was organized more formally in 1203, after the victory over the Kerait, when Chinggis became the chief personage in eastern Mongolia. Seventy men were selected for the day guard and eighty for the night guard; altogether, they constituted the protective guards or kesigten (sing. kesik, meaning ‘turn’, ‘relief’).

The enthronement of Chinggis meant the restoration of the state confederation of the Mongols of the Three River regions which had fallen into decay after Qutula Khan. From now on, Chinggis Khan could act as the lawful ruler of all the Mongols. But to become the genuine lord of the nation in Mongolia, he had to achieve the real unification of all the people on a country-wide scale, and this took him from 1189 to 1206. The majority of the tribes continued to be separate and were not initially disposed to recognize Chinggis Khan’s rule over the whole country. Among them were such powerful tribes as the Tatar, the Kerait, the Naiman and others, but by manoeuvring between the conventions and oppositions of the tribal system, Chinggis was finally able to unite all the peoples living under felt tents.

The second stage in Chinggis Khan’s rise to power began with his victory over the Tatar as a result of the successful campaign that he had undertaken in 1196 in alliance with Toghrïl Khan of the Kerait and the Chin dynasty of China. By subjugating the Tatar, Chinggis not only took vengeance on his family’s enemy but eliminated the threat to the southern side of his domain. However, these successes alarmed his rivals, first of all Jamuka. In 1201 Jamuka was proclaimed Gür Khan at the kurultay (general council) of the leaders of the Daychud, Qonqirad, Ikira, Qorlo, Qatagin, Oyirad and Naiman, against the Wang Khan (Toghrïl) of the Kerait and his son, the allies of Jamuka. Chinggis Khan was victorious over

---

the Wang Khan and the latter was killed, but Chinggis still had to overcome an alliance of opponents led by Jamuka until the latter was also killed. Thus Chinggis finally triumphed in the tribal wars which had continued for more than twenty years.

Chinggis Khan now held all Mongolia, having subjugated all the tribes of the Mongolian steppe. To guarantee his right to rule over the entire country, in the Year of the Tiger (1206) he called a kurultay at the head of the Onon river, where he ‘set up a white standard with nine tails’ and was once again proclaimed Chinggis Khan. This event signified the birth of a Mongol power that stretched some 1,600 km from east to west, from the Khingan mountains to the Altai range, and more than 960 km from north to south, from Lake Baikal to the southern margins of the Gobi desert along the Great Wall of China.

Between 1206 and 1211 Chinggis Khan was engaged in establishing and reorganizing the civil and military administration. The head of state was the Khan, who was declared to have a mandate from Möngke Tengri (Everlasting Heaven). The second most important office was that of Guiong (Chinese Kuo-Wang), or ‘Prince of the Realm’. This title was conferred on Muqali, the most devoted companion of Chinggis. The office of Supreme Justice or jarghuchi was introduced: it was given to Sigi Qutuqu, a Tatar by extraction, who had been adopted as a boy by Chinggis Khan’s mother and was one of the best-educated men of his time. The office of beki, which designated the chief shaman, the highest religious authority, was also set up; it was occupied by Üsün-ebügen. He was instructed ‘to ride on a white horse, wear white raiment’ and ‘choose a good year and moon’. The Uighur Tatatungha, the keeper of the seal of the Naiman Khan, held the same office at the court of Chinggis Khan and was also commissioned to teach the Khan’s sons reading and writing.

The Khan’s guard, or kesigten, was also reorganized. It consisted of kebote’ul (night guards), qorchin (day guards) and turgha’ud (bodyguards). The number of each of these corps of guards was raised to 1,000 men, making a total of up to 10,000 men. It was decreed that each son of a ‘leader of a 1,000’ had to bring with him 1 kinsman and 10 companions; the son of a ‘leader of 10’ and freemen in general had to bring 1 kinsman and 3 companions. The guard was subject to severe discipline, but its members enjoyed great privileges: a combatant private in the guard stood higher in rank than a ‘chief of 1,000’ in the army, non-combatants in the guard stood higher than a ‘chief of 100’. Members of the guard who committed a crime could not be punished by anyone except Chinggis himself. The bodyguard was not only the personal guard of the Khan and the core of the army; it was also a sort of military school which allowed the Khan personally to test the future leaders of

---

11 Cleaves, 1982, 216
his military forces. The army was reorganized according to the traditional decimal system. Chinggis Khan appointed 95 ‘noyans (chiefs) of 1,000’; the names of these noyans are listed in The Secret History.\textsuperscript{12}

Administratively, Mongolia was divided into three large tümens (‘myriads’): the Left, the Right and the Centre, each of them in turn consisting of tens, hundreds and thousands. The main tümen was the Left tümen commanded by Gui Ong Muqali. The other two tümens were headed by Bo’orchu and Naya. The Central tümen occupied the main area of Mongolia; the Right tümen, the lands near the Altai mountains; and the Left tümen, the lands up to the Khingan mountains.\textsuperscript{13} Chinggis appointed leaders for all the tribes and clans from among his personal followers and his family, thus laying the framework of the new Mongol empire and destroying the old tribal system; Chinggis Khan’s own clan, the Borjigids, with its vassals and followers, now became the supreme clan of the Mongols.

One of the most important measures undertaken by Chinggis Khan in the field of the civil administration was the codification of laws under the title of Yeke Jasa (The Great Law). Although this work has not yet come to light, data from various sources prove beyond doubt the existence of a written version. According to an authoritative source, the history of Ātā’ Malik Juwaynī:

\begin{quote}
In accordance and agreement with his [Chinggis’s] own mind, he established a rule for every occasion and a regulation for every circumstance, while for every crime he fixed a penalty. And since the Tatar peoples had no script of their own, he gave orders that Mongol children should learn writing from the Uighurs, and that these Yasas and ordinances should be written down on rolls. These rolls are called the Great Book of Yasas and are kept in the treasury of the chief princes. Whenever a khan ascends the throne, or a great army is mobilized, or the princes assemble and begin to consult together concerning affairs of state and administration thereof, they produce these rolls and model their actions thereon, and proceed with the disposition of armies or the destruction of provinces and cities in the manner therein prescribed.\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

In general, the Great Jasa represented a code of laws which is said to have been prescribed by Chinggis Khan for the various spheres of social life and in military, organizational and administrative affairs. It also dealt with religious beliefs, court ceremonial, civil rules, general conduct and justice, and so on. Thus it laid down the juridical basis for the newly born Mongol state. Moreover, with the creation of the Mongol empire, it eventually became the most authoritative handbook of Mongol jurisprudence, to be strictly followed throughout the expanse of the empire. Its authority was so great that, even after the fall of the empire, it had some appeal for statesmen in the countries of Central Asia (as for Timur, known

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 202.
\textsuperscript{13} Ishjamts, 1974, pp. 59–61.
\textsuperscript{14} Juwaynī, 1958, Vol. 1, p. 25.
to the West as Tamerlane, and others), serving as a political and moral instrument for the justification of their expansionist ambitions.

According to the Sino-Mongolian inscription of 1346, in the fifteenth year of Chinggis Khan’s reign, i.e. in 1220, the capital city of Mongolia, Karakorum, was founded in the valley of the Orkhon river, demonstrating that Chinggis wished to rule his empire from Mongolia.

**Chinggis Khan’s campaigns of conquest: The foundation of the Mongol empire**

Shortly after the creation of the political and military machinery in his own country, Chinggis Khan embarked on an expansion of his power. It is difficult to say whether from the outset he had any serious intentions of conquering the great settled civilizations outside Mongolia. The order of his conquests shows that, having settled internal affairs, he first incorporated within his state all other nomadic peoples who lived outside Mongolia and whose way of life was similar to that of the Mongols, rather than any of the settled peoples. In 1207 the nomadic tribes in the valleys of the Selenga and the Yenisei were added to his dominions. In 1209 the Uighur Türks, who had some four centuries earlier created their own empire in Mongolia, with a capital in the valley of the Orkhon river, and who had migrated south-westwards to the oases of the Tarim basin after the fall of their empire, were peacefully incorporated. It is true that Chinggis Khan twice (in 1210 and in 1214–15) campaigned against the Chin empire of China. But by doing so, he probably wished to demonstrate his might and fame rather than to subjugate China, for he soon desisted; but he continued to bring under his control the nomadic tribes of the Eurasian steppes. He conquered practically all the nomadic peoples of Turkic origin up to the north-eastern fringes of Persia. In 1218 the Kara Khitay of Transoxania submitted to his power almost without opposition. Thus the lands of East Turkistan and some other areas of Central Asia came under the rule of the Mongols.

Chinggis Khan’s domains now bordered directly on the great empire of the Khwarazm Shah ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad, who at this time controlled most of northern Persia and Transoxania (the latter having been largely taken over from the Kara Khitay in 1210). Central Asia in this period was divided into an eastern part ruled by the Mongol Khan, while its western part was under the power of the Turkish Khwarazm Shahs. It was perhaps natural, though not inevitable, that these two political forces should be rivals. Chinggis Khan is said to have recognized the Khwarazm Shah as ruler of the west, as he himself

---

15 Cleaves, 1952.
was the ruler of the east, and to have expressed the hope that peace would be maintained and trade promoted between the two empires. But the Mongol Khan pointedly addressed the Khwarazm Shah as his ‘son’, hardly the treatment of an equal by an equal. There is no material available to ascertain the real intentions of Chinggis Khan towards his neighbour.

Whatever his true motives, between 1219 and 1224 Chinggis Khan embarked on his campaigns of conquest against the Khwarazmian empire, which was at the time affected by internal discord and feuds. As a result, such Transoxanian and Khurasanian cities as Samarkand, Bukhara, Urgench, Utrar, Nishapur, Balkh and Merv were devastated by the armies of Chinggis Khan.

Thus the people of the north-eastern Islamic world, mostly of Turkic stock, were brought under the rule of the Mongol Khan. In their pursuit of the defeated Khwarazm Shah, two Mongol generals Jebe and Sübetey reached the Caucasus in 1221, defeated the Georgian king George IV Lashen and emerged on to the southern Russian steppe. In the spring of 1223, at the battle of the River Kalka, the Mongols crushed the combined Russian and Kipchak forces, but did not really exploit their success. At the end of that year, the armies of Jebe and Sübetey rejoined the forces of Chinggis Khan. The Khan himself returned to Mongolia in 1225. Chinggis Khan’s last campaign ended with the subjection of the Hsi-Hsia (Tangut) in 1227. Soon afterwards, he fell ill and died in the same year. His body was taken home to be buried in the Khentei mountains.

It is likely that at the outset Chinggis Khan did not have a clearly formulated policy of conquest; but if one judges his wide-ranging conquests by their practical outcome, it is possible that what we might now call a grand strategy lay behind his military actions. In Lattimore’s view, Chinggis was anxious to avoid the classic mistake of previous barbarian rulers of the steppe who, as soon as they had formed an effective nomadic confederation, succumbed to the temptation to invade northern China and to establish themselves there. This sequence of events generally created, Lattimore suggests, a power vacuum within the steppe. This was duly filled by the next nomadic general to form a confederation, and he in his turn would then invade China and expel his predecessor. By contrast, Chinggis Khan’s strategy was first to form his confederation, secondly to neutralize temporarily the danger from China, and then to return to the steppe to mop up and incorporate all the remaining Turko-Mongol peoples, thus ensuring that no power vacuum would be created and that, when China was conquered, the steppe would be retained as well.16

Indeed, Chinggis, a true son of the nomadic culture, remained loyal to the ideals of his background until the very end of his life and resisted the allurements of settled civilization. He bequeathed to his successors a great empire consisting mostly of the nomadic peoples

16 Lattimore, 1963b, pp. 6–7; Morgan, 1986, p. 73.
who inhabited the vast area extending throughout Central Asia with its centre in Mongolia. He knew how to take advantage of those achievements of the sedentary civilizations which could be beneficial to his empire; thus the Sogdian-Uighur script was adopted for the writing of Mongolian and use made of it in his chancery. With the conquest of the Uighurs and the Kara Khitay, Chinggis could use the administrative skills of these peoples, who had much in common with the Mongols as regards their nomadic mode of life – and these were the intermediaries who transmitted the acquisitions of Islamic and Chinese civilization to the Mongols. Muslims played a particularly prominent part in the service of the Mongol Khan; their activities were greatly stimulated by the atmosphere of religious toleration and the policy of unhampered trade and communications.

There were, of course, many factors behind the successes of Chinggis’s conquests, not least the role of the Khan himself, a shrewd politician and a military genius. Light cavalry, comprising tough, swift-footed Mongol horses and archers, was always the main force, but Chinggis also took over military techniques and improved them with the help of Chinese and Muslim experts. He even used gunpowder in siege warfare, sapping and mining operations, during his western campaigns.

The Mongol empire during the reign of Chinggis Khan’s successors

Contrary to Alexander the Great, whose Graeco-Asian empire did not even survive his death, Chinggis Khan left a great empire which was capable of continuing to function in both time and space, and had many successors from his own family to continue his imperial policy. During their reign, the Mongol empire became the largest continuous land empire that had so far existed in history. At its greatest extent, it stretched from the Far East to eastern Europe. Military expeditions were mounted into mainland South-East Asia, and even against Java and Japan, but without success. As a whole, the empire lasted for well over a century, and some parts of it survived for much longer.

The successors of Chinggis Khan, although they proclaimed on every occasion their adherence to the commandments of their great predecessor, in fact departed from his fundamental principle of staying outside ‘civilization’ and not sacrificing the ideals of the nomads for their sake. Ögedey (1229–41), Güyük (1226–48) and Möngke (1251–9) went on expanding their empire into the sedentary lands (for further details, see Chapter 13 below).

The unprecedented territorial expansionism of the Mongol nomads undoubtedly caused great upheavals and distress for large numbers of people, although the bloodshed and
destruction caused to the settled civilizations may not have been so widespread as some terrified contemporaries depicted it. Like all conquerors, Chinggis Khan could calmly exterminate people by the thousands if he considered it necessary for the consolidation of his rule, but none of his actions shows any sign of useless or stupid cruelty, and he was far from being a savage warrior, blindly ferocious and conquering for the sake of plunder. At the same time, we must understand the feelings of hatred and horror that the conquered peoples naturally had – and still have today – towards their enemy.

The problem of consolidating and administering such a great empire was the most difficult task the Mongols had ever faced. Nevertheless, judging by their actions, it is clear that they did their best to secure their rule for as long as possible. Characteristically, the first successors of Chinggis Khan tried to keep the centre of their empire in Mongolia itself. But to do this proved much more difficult for them than for Chinggis Khan. The conquest of Persia and China involved them in the governance of two great sedentary societies, and it was then that the Mongol Khans encountered the problem of reconciling two incompatible ways of life – a nomadic existence and a sedentary civilization. This was a problem that had never previously been solved and it proved to be a major cause of the decline of the Mongol empire.

Nevertheless, Chinggis Khan’s successors managed to set up an imperial organization whose unity endured for forty years after the death of the founder, with the supremacy of members of Chinggis Khan’s family extending over several generations in the successor states. How was this achieved? Yeh-lü ch’u-ts’ai, the great Kitan adviser of the Mongol Khans, is said to have repeated to Ögedey Khan the old Chinese admonition: although the empire had been conquered on horseback, it could not be ruled from horseback. No doubt the Mongol Khans realized this when faced with the problem of how to maintain their rule over the conquered lands. First of all, they depended on what had already been achieved by their great predecessor in the field of empire-building, while modifying and developing some of its institutions.

In ideology, the first successors of Chinggis Khan followed tradition and maintained the belief that the Khan ruled by the mandate of Heaven (Tengri); the forefather of the Altan Urugh (Golden Kin) Bodonchar was considered to have been born from Light. They also paid attention to spiritual factors in their policy for the subjugation of different peoples, adhering to the following instruction: ‘Having seized the body, hold the soul. If the soul

18 Lattimore, 1963a, p. 62.
is held, the body will not go anywhere.’ In this connection reference should be made to the religious policy of the Mongol Khans. Religious fanaticism was alien to the Mongols; they pursued a policy of religious tolerance in their multinational empire. Some scholars have held that this was determined simply by the Mongols’ indifference or ignorance; but it may rather have been a premeditated approach necessitated by ‘holding the soul’ of the subjugated peoples belonging to different ethnic groups and beliefs. It may well be that the Mongols’ religious tolerance was influenced by the attitude of their nomadic predecessors, like the Uighurs and the Kitan, towards the great variety of religions coexisting in Central Asia.

The first Chinggisid rulers endeavoured to strengthen their control all over the conquered countries by consolidating the rule of their sons and relatives in their own domains, granted as appanages. But the more the empire expanded, with its various parts ruled by different agents, the more necessary it became for the supreme imperial power to avert the danger of discord and disunity. In this connection, some traditional institutions of the nomadic society acquired particular significance and were modified and strengthened in conformity with the new requirements. Thus the kurultay, the ancient political institution of the nomads, now assumed greater importance than it had ever had previously. It became a true assembly of the Mongol élite, princes and nobles acting on the basis of old traditions and customs in order to handle the most important matters of state, such as the election of a Khan, the question of war, the establishment of law and issues of policy. All the great Khans, including Chinggis himself, had to be proclaimed at a kurultay especially convened for this purpose, and quite a number of kurultays are known to have been convened in order to discuss other important military and governmental affairs of the Mongol empire.

The Mongol empire was created through military conquest and the Mongol Khans regarded the army as the basic institution of the empire. The organization based on the decimal system was not only maintained for several generations of Mongol Khans, but also served as the model for the armies of their followers and pretenders to the heritage of the members of Chinggis Khan’s family. An important new element of the Mongol army structure during the Chinggisid period was the institution of the tamma. Tamma forces were originally established by order of the central imperial government for the purpose of maintaining control of the conquered territories. Some tamma armies ultimately became

---

20 According to Lubsan-Danzan, 1937, p. 46, this instruction emanated from Chinggis; but according to another source written in the so-called ‘Square script’, it came from Qubilay or Khubilay Khan (album *Najm al-ṣajāʾib*, in Istanbul University Museum, in Ligeti, 1972, p. 123).
the nuclei of the permanent military forces of the empire’s subsidiary Khanates, such as Hülegü’s Il Khanate in Persia.\textsuperscript{21}

Among the numerous institutions facilitating control within the empire, the communications system should be mentioned. The Mongols were among the first to introduce a transcontinental network of communications, thus encouraging the movement of peoples and ideas. The real initiator here was Ögedey Khan: ‘I made one to establish post stations for that Our messengers, hasting on the way, make speed, and again for that We make them to convey Our needs and necessities.’\textsuperscript{22} Having consulted with his brothers, Ögedey instituted the \textit{jam} (\textit{yam}) system, setting up post-stations within his dominions. It was further extended by his brothers Chaghatay and Toluy and by his nephew Batu to include the lands under their direct rule. For the first time in history, a network of post-stations was established covering the whole of Central Asia; its efficient functioning impressed European travellers such as Marco Polo.\textsuperscript{23} The structure of the system was based on post-stations (\textit{jams}), established at stages equivalent to a day’s journey. The stations held horses and stocks of fodder for those who travelled. Official envoys or messengers had to carry a special authorization tablet called in Mongolian \textit{gerege}, made of wood, silver or gold, in order to make use of the system. Normal traffic might travel some 40 km a day, but express messengers could go very much faster, covering up to 300–500 km a day.\textsuperscript{24}

As regards Mongol rule over the great sedentary societies of Persia and China, it should be noted that the Mongols invented several institutions and offices which not only functioned efficiently, but left a noticeable imprint on the civil administration and the government of the conquered countries. One of the key institutions in local administration was the office of the \textit{darughachi}. This system was set up in all the Mongol-ruled regions of Inner Eurasia, i.e. Persia, China and Russia, with the purpose of controlling the conquered territories. The term \textit{darughachi} (in Russian, \textit{darugha} or its Turkic equivalent \textit{baskak}; in Persian, \textit{darūghā}) was widely known all over the empire. The Mongol preference for the hereditary transfer of the office of \textit{darughachi} was valid in all the parts of the empire. But in most cases, for instance in China, where problems arose due to the insufficient numbers of Mongols capable of holding the office, the Mongol Khans enlisted the services of Western Alans and Central Asians in order to guarantee Mongolian and non-Chinese predominance in the local civil bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{25} This made it easier for Uighur, Persian and other Asian Muslims to gain high positions in the Mongol bureaucracy in various parts of

\textsuperscript{21} Morgan, 1986, pp. 94–5.
\textsuperscript{22} Cleaves, 1982, 281.
\textsuperscript{23} Ricci, 1931, pp. 152–7.
\textsuperscript{24} Ibid., p. 157.
\textsuperscript{25} Endicott-West, 1989.
the empire. Although the office of darughachi was first entrusted by Chinggis Khan with mostly military tasks, its main function gradually developed into that of the chief civil official stationed in the conquered territories; thus one of the primary duties of darughachis in Persia, Russia and Central Asia was the collection of tribute.

The Khans introduced various forms of taxation in the regions of their empire. From his examination of the Persian sources of the Mongol period, Petrushevsky has concluded that some forty-five different terms for taxation were used, though this does not imply that there were forty-five distinct taxes, since the terminology varied at different times and places.\(^26\)

The original Mongol taxation may be divided into tribute (alba) and levy (qubchighur or qubckur). In 1229 Ögedey Khan issued the first decree with the aim of regulating the alba:

\[
\text{[As we are] sitting on the [throne made] ready by Our father the Kaghan, not making the people to suffer, for [lack of] broth, from these peoples, in year after year, let one give one sheep of two years old of [every] flock. Let them, bringing forth one sheep from one hundred sheep...}^27
\]

Alba and qubchur were paid in kind. With the conquest of the sedentary populations of Persia and Central Asia, however, qubchur gained a rather different meaning and it became the term used for a poll tax, either flat-rate or graduated, fixed and imposed on the conquered sedentary peoples.\(^28\)

The first three successors of Chinggis Khan were committed to making Mongolia the centre of their empire. Such a policy could not but favour the political, economic and cultural revival of the country, although this did not continue for long. Mongolia had become a vortex of great events and innovations, with extended relations with other countries, particularly those of Central Asia. For a while, it became a meeting-place of different peoples, cultures and religions. Its capital Karakorum was a cosmopolitan city where Christians, Muslims, Buddhists and such nationals as Hungarians, Alans, Russians, Georgians, Armenians and, of course, Chinese and Central Asians, mingled freely. The city itself was mainly built by captured artisans. Thanks to their knowledge and abilities, Uighur, Persian and other Central Asian Muslims occupied high posts in the Mongol bureaucracy; their role in the ruling of the empire was no less essential than that of the military leaders and their strategies for conquering other countries. Mongolia became directly involved in the caravan trade between East and West, with a liberal policy by the Mongol Khans towards trade. The jam system of communication greatly favoured commercial travel, and the caravan trade was generally protected and encouraged. Muslim merchants of western

\(^26\) Petrushevsky, 1968, p. 529; Morgan, 1986, p. 100.
\(^27\) Cleaves, 1982, 279.
\(^28\) Morgan, 1986, p. 100.
Central Asia co-operated with Mongolian Khans and the nobility and were particularly active in money-lending and tax-collection. All this tended to come to an end with the creation of the Yüan empire in China, however, and the centre of trade, as of most other activities shifted from Karakorum to Khanbalïk.

The Yüan empire of the Mongols and its fall

After the death of Möngke Khan in 1259, internecine disputes broke out among the Toluyids themselves. In 1260 the two sons of Möngke, Arig-böke and Qubilay, simultaneously had a kurultay convened and each declared himself Khan. In the Mongol traditionalist view, Qubilay’s rise to power was illegal and a four-year fratricidal war between the two brothers ensued, with Arig-böke wishing to retain the centre of the empire in Mongolia. After his defeat, the struggle was continued by Qaydu until his death in 1303.

During the reign of Qubilay Khan (1260–94), the Mongol empire underwent a great transformation. The transference of the empire’s capital from Karakorum to Khanbalïk (or Dai-du) in northern China, and the adoption of the Chinese title Yüan (The Origin) for the Mongol reign in China, meant a change in the traditional policy of Qubilay’s predecessors. Theoretically, Qubilay Khan was the ruler of the whole empire and tried to avail himself of his rights in all the subjugated countries. But in reality, in his time and particularly in the reign of his successors, the component parts of the Mongol empire progressively achieved such a degree of independence that it was difficult for the Khan to claim the status of universal ruler. It is probable that Qubilay Khan realized this and regarded himself more as a Mongol-Chinese emperor than as a universal sovereign. Despite having settled in China, Qubilay did not forget that he was a Mongol emperor and did his best to make the Mongols an élite group in the conquered country. Having thus secured Mongol rule in China, it became possible for a small, non-Chinese ethnic group to govern the huge Chinese sedentary society for almost a century.
As a result of both major and minor wars waged with great effectiveness between 1188 and 1206, Chinggis Khan (1155–1227) laid the foundations of a new state destined to play a major role in the history of the peoples of Central and East Asia, and of eastern Europe. Chinggis Khan liquidated the Tangut state of Hsi Hsia (982–1227), located on the frontiers of the contemporary Chinese province of Gansu and the western part of Shanxi, and the Jurchen Chin empire which covered the territory of north-east and northern China. Having defeated the Chin, the Mongols directed their conquest against the powerful state of the Khwarazm Shahs. On their way, they crushed the Kara Khitay empire, which was by then under the leadership of Küchlüg. Between 1219 and 1224 the Mongols conquered, one after the other, Utrar, Binakat, Khujand, Bukhara, Samarkand, Gurganj and other Transoxanian towns, garrisons of the Khwarazm Shah ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad (1200–20), and established their rule in Transoxania and Khwarazm.

Already during his lifetime, the vast empire of Chinggis Khan was divided into domains (ulus) which he assigned to his sons Jöchi, Chaghatay, Ögedey and Toluy. His eldest son Jöchi (who predeceased his father) received an appanage ranging from the Irtysh river ‘as far as Mongol hoofs had beaten the ground’, and the lower Syr Darya (the towns of Sïgnak, Barchkent and Yengi-kent) and north-western Khwarazm. Jöchi’s summer seat was on the Irtysh, while his winter quarters were on the lower Syr Darya. Chaghatay received Kashghar, Yeti Su and Transoxania. Later, under Baraq Khan (1266–c. 1271), the Chaghatayids were to spread their power over northern Afghanistan as well. Chaghatay’s seat was on the Ili river. Western Mongolia and Tarbaghatai were assigned to Ögedey, who

* See Map 6, pp. 434–5.
resided in Chughuchak. The youngest son Toluy inherited his father’s former ulus, i.e. Mongolia proper. His seat was on the banks of the Kerulen river.

The founder of the Golden Horde was Jöchi’s son Batu (1236–56), the conqueror of eastern Europe who also played an important role in the political life of the entire Mongol empire under the Great Khans Ögedey (1229–41), Güyük (1246–8) and Toluy’s son Möngke (1251–9). Batu and his successors ruled over vast territories not only in Transoxania but also in Iran; it was a huge empire, whose exact frontiers cannot be exactly defined. In the northeast, the Golden Horde included Volga Bulgharia; in the north the frontier followed that of the Russian principalities. In the south, the territory of the Golden Horde included the Crimea, the Caucasus up to Darband, occasionally Baku, and also northern Khwarazm with the town of Urgench. The frontier followed the steppes from the Dniestr to western Siberia and the lower Syr Darya. The capital of this state under Batu was Saray-Batu (Old Saray), located not far from Astrakhan, while under Berke Khan (1257–66) it was Saray-Berke (New Saray), located on the Aktuba, a branch of the Volga.

As far as the ulus of Chaghatay (1227–42) was concerned, initially it comprised only the lands from the country of the Uighurs in the east to Samarkand and Bukhara in the west. But Chaghatay held it from the Great Khan, or Kaghan, only as injü (crown land), civil power being exercised, on his behalf, by the Khwarazmian Mahmūd Yalavach and, after his transfer to China (after 1239), by his son Masʿūd Beg (d. 1289). Military power, including duties such as taking a census of the population and collecting taxes and exactions, was in the hands of Mongol officials called darughachi or tammachi (see above, p. 292). Judging by the fact that Mahmūd Yalavach was able to prevent the Mongol commanders Ildiz-noyon and Jighan-khorchi, who had crushed the rebellion in 1238 of Mahmūd Tārābī (see below), from plundering Bukhara and slaughtering its inhabitants, he must have enjoyed great power in the ulus of Chaghatay, and the local Mongol officials were clearly obliged to abide by his orders. Mahmūd Yalavach and his son Masʿūd Beg were accountable only to the Great Khan Ögedey. The following story by the historian Rashīd al-Dīn is characteristic:

It is said, that during the reign of Ögedey kaghan, Chaghatay... gave some of the provinces of Transoxania, which, by the command of the kaghan were under the control of Yalavach, to someone else. Yalavach reported the matter to Ögedey who sent an order to Chaghatay rebuking him and ordering him to write an answer. Chaghatay wrote in his reply: ‘I acted from ignorance and without guidance. I have no answer that I can write, but since the kaghan has ordered me to write I dared to write this.’ The kaghan was pleased and accepted this excuse; and he gave that province to Chaghatay as injü. Thereafter Yalavach came to visit Chaghatay,

1 A name apparently given to them by the Russians, although Russian and Polish-Lithuanian sources usually refer to it simply as ‘the Great Horde’, see Bosworth, 1996, p. 253.
who rebuked and abused him. Yalavach said to Vazir [one of Chaghatay’s viziers]: ‘I should like a word with you in private.’ And when they were closeted together he said to Vazir: ‘I am the kaghan’s minister and Chaghatay cannot put me to death without consulting him. If I complain of you to the kaghan he will put you to death. If you will set matters to right with me, well and good; otherwise I shall denounce you to the kaghan. And if you repeat these words to Chaghatay I will deny them however much I am questioned, and you have no witness.’ On this account, Vazir was forced to put the matter to rights.  

Soon afterwards, around 1239, probably because of his strained relations with Chaghatay, Mahmūd Yalavach was transferred to China and his son Mas’ūd Beg was appointed governor-general of Turkistan.

The political position of the Chaghatay ulus until the reign of Kebek Khan (1309; 1318–26) was unstable. Chaghatay’s grandson, Qara Hülegü (the son of Mötöghan, killed at the siege of Bamiyan in 1221), did not rule for long (1241–7) and he was deposed by the Great Khan Güyük (1246–8), who enthroned Yesü Möngke (1247–52), Chaghatay’s son. Yesü Möngke was Güyük’s intimate friend, but he spent his time carousing and, like many Khans of the house of Chaghatay, did not effectively participate in governing the country. All power was in the hands of his wife Toqashi and of the Tajik vizier Bahā’ al-Dīn Marghīnānī, son of the Shaykh al-Islām of Ferghana.

After Güyük’s death his widow Oghul Qaymish acted as regent until 1251. In the forthcoming election of the Great Khan, Batu decided to lend his support not to one of her sons but to Toluy’s son Möngke, and had him elected at a kurultay (general council) held in Karakorum in 1251. As might have been expected, the princes of Ögedey’s lineage opposed this decision and were supported by Yesü Möngke, Chaghatay’s fifth son and the ruler of the Chaghatay ulus. Following Möngke’s accession to the throne, many of those who had opposed his election were executed, including Oghul Qaymish. The deposition of Yesü Möngke was also proclaimed and Qara Hülegü was appointed in his place. However, on his way to the ulus Qara Hülegü died and it fell to his widow Orqina Khāţūn to have Yesü Möngke put to death. Toqashi Khāţūn was also executed. Qara Hülegü’s widow and her under-age son Mubārak Shāh were appointed to the Chaghatay ulus, but they were considered only nominal rulers. In fact, power was in the hands of Mas’ūd Beg, who ruled in the name of Batu and Möngke.

Hence, after the Karakorum kurultay of 1251, the Chaghatay ulus came to be split into two: East Turkistan, the Kulja region and Yeti Su (Semirechye), apparently, together with the north-eastern part of Ferghana, came within the Kaghan’s sphere of influence. In Transoxania and the western part of Ferghana the Golden Horde’s influence was preponderant,

2 Boyle, 1971, p. 156.
judging by the indirect evidence, in particular the returning by Batu of all Temür-Malik’s properties in Khujand to his son. In the words of the Franciscan William of Rubruck, the frontier between Möngke’s and Batu’s domains followed the steppe between Talas and the Chu river, east of the Alexander mountain range.

To save the Chaghatay ulus from annexation by the Golden Horde, Alughu (1260–4), son of Baydar, son of Chaghatay, continued the struggle against Berke Khan. Finally, a serious blow was delivered to the Golden Horde: a 5,000-strong garrison of the Golden Horde encamped at Bukhara was, in the words of Wassāf, ‘withdrawn from the town to the steppe and exterminated; their property, wives and children were confiscated’. An account by Rashīd al-Dīn also deserves attention. He relates that under Alughu, the Chaghatayid army defeated Berke Khan’s troops encamped near Utrar: ‘He [Alughu] assembled the dispersed troops, and then fought with Berke, crushed him and pillaged Utrar.’ Thus Alughu brought Transoxania under Chaghatayid rule. Alughu’s successor, Mubārak Shāh, a Muslim, was, as already mentioned, a weak ruler, who soon after his enthronement was deposed by his cousin Baraq.

Under Baraq (1266–71), the Chaghatay ulus became somewhat stronger. Baraq tried to carry on an armed struggle against Qaydu (Ögedey’s grandson), and Möngke-Temür (1267–80) of the Golden Horde, who were allies. Once, on the banks of the Syr Darya, he succeeded in defeating them, but subsequently suffered a defeat himself. The war with the Il Khan Abaqa (1265–82) did not bring Baraq success either. But in the last years of his life, the Chaghatay ulus was once again divided into distinct spheres of influence, those of Qaydu, in the 1260s, of Möngke-Temür of the Golden Horde, and of Baraq who received only about two-thirds of Transoxania.

Following the short reigns of Negūbey (Nikpay in the Persian sources; c. 1271) and Toqa-Temür (1272–91), Qaydu enthroned in the Chaghatay ulus Baraq’s son Duwa Khan (c. 1282–1307), with whose name the restoration of Andijan and its becoming the capital of Ferghana are associated. Duwa Khan was a true ally of Qaydu and actively participated in his military campaigns in Mongolia proper; he also interfered in the internecine struggles of the Jöchids in the White Horde and, after Qaydu’s death (in the autumn of 1301), he enjoyed great authority within the territories of his successor Chapar. Accordingly, Duwa Khan can be seen as the true founder of the Chaghatayid state. After his death, disturbances again began in the Chaghatay ulus. The reigns of Könchek Khan (son of Duwa Khan), who was enthroned near Almalīk, in a small town of Sabqu-bala, and Talighu (son of Qadami, 3 Barthold, 1968, p. 490.
4 Ibid.

268
son of Böri, son of Mitügen, son of Chaghatay) were not long. They ruled for hardly more than two years, marked by a revolt of princes led by Kursabe, a descendant of Ögedey.

To some degree, Duwa Khan’s son Kebek Khan succeeded in curbing the separatist tendencies of his relatives. At a kurultay held in 1309, he had his elder brother Esen Buqa-Böge (1309–18) elected as Khan. Kebek Khan and his brother Yesü-Böge were able to annex the largest part of Qaydu’s domains and to some extent stabilize, at least temporarily, the socio-political situation in the country. Kebek Khan (who succeeded his brother and ruled from 1318 to 1326) holds a special place in the history of the Chaghatay ulus. For example, his name is linked to the currency and administrative reforms which played an important role in the development of feudal statehood in Central Asia. His name is also linked to the building and restoring of the towns of Transoxania. Among his new constructions there was, for example, a palace (in Mongolian, qarshi) located near Nasaf around which a whole town later grew up. Among the towns restored by Kebek Khan was ancient Balkh, ‘which, from the time of the Great Sāhib-Qirān [i.e. Chinggis Khan] was deserted and turned into a tangle of reeds’.

The administrative and monetary reforms of Kebek Khan were aimed at putting an end to confusion and checking the abuse by the various officials and speculators. The administrative reform divided the country around Bukhara and Samarkand into tümens, and in Ferghana and East Turkistan into orchins (literally ‘near’, ‘around’, ‘surrounding’), i.e. a region located around the capital. As for the monetary reforms, the systems of Il Khanid Iran and the Golden Horde were utilized as models. The weight of 1 kebek dinar was 2 mithqāls and 1 kebek dirham was equal to 1/3 of a mitbqāl. The administrative and currency reforms of Kebek Khan were only superficial, however, and internal problems remained. The new monetary unit became known as kebek, a term that survives in the Russian word kopek.

The paucity of sources makes it difficult to give a detailed picture of the social, economic and cultural aspects of life within the Chaghatay ulus. Fragmentary evidence provided by historical sources such as the works of Juwayni, Rashīd al-Dīn, Wassāf and Jamāl Qarshī allows us to say only the following. The Chaghatay ulus was a decentralized state, with governors appointed by the Kaghan (for the settled regions, until 1289) and rulers of provincial districts, i.e. princes assisted by special officials, the darughachi or tammachi, the representatives of Mongol power. Leaders of local origin such as Mahmūd Yalavach and Masʿūd Beg from Khwarazm, Habash ʿAmīd from Utrar, Bahāʾ al-Dīn Marghnānī, the vizier Yesünte Mōngke from Ferghana and others actively participated in government. Transoxanians were also involved in the political life of China under the Yüan dynasty (1279–1368). Among them there were, for example, Mahmūd Yalavach, his son ʿAlī Beg
and Ya‘qūb son of Ālī Beg, Khwarazmians by origin, Shams al-Dīn Sayyid Aja and his son Ālā’ al-Dīn who came from Almalīk, Bahā’ al-Dīn from Qunduz and others.

Because of favourable climatic conditions, Transoxania had long been a region of developed agriculture based on artificial irrigation. The principal crops were cotton, grain, gourds, alfalfa and grapes. Furthermore, the region played a major role in the transit trade linking China, the Near and Middle East and Europe. Crafts and trade had developed in the towns there: besides Bukhara and Samarkand, there were also Khujand, a residence of the Kaghān’s deputies in Transoxania such as Mahmūd Yalavach and Mas‘ūd Beg; Uzgend where, as under the Karakhanids and the Kara Khitay, the Kaghān’s treasury was kept; Andijan, developed by Duwa Khan and turned by him into the capital of Ferghana; Marghīnan, which was a centre for many scholars and poets; Isfara, the home of a talented poet of the thirteenth century, Sayf al-Dīn Isfarāghī (d. between 1261 and 1267); and Kuba (the present Kuwa), the home town of Rukn al-Dīn Qubānī (thirteenth century) and others.

As mentioned above, the Chaghataiids had only injū rights in the ulus, that is, they had only the right to make use of the revenues. As far as the taxes and duties levied on the subject population are concerned, we have only very general indications. For example, Rashīd al-Dīn gives information on the main taxes levied on landowners and nomads. Thus the amount of māl (land tax) was 10 per cent of all the harvest yield, and a tax levied on nomads (qubchighur) was 1 per cent of 100 head of cattle. The targhu, a kind of trade duty, was also collected. At first, taxes and duties were paid in kind, but from the 1250s, after the introduction of various types of Mongol monetary units and the coinage issued by Möngke (1251–9), and later, particularly from 1270 onwards, duties came to be paid in cash. Coinage was minted in many large towns, such as Almalīk, Bukhara, Samarkand, Utrar, Taraz, Kashghar, Tashkent, Ush, Marghīnan, Ak-tepe, Uzgend and Khujand.

With regard to the socio-economic life of the people of Transoxania under the Chaghataiids, the revolt of the population of the Bukhara district, which took place in 1238 and was led by an artisan called Mahmūd Tarābī, is worthy of attention. The cause of the revolt was the suffering of the masses caused by the oppression of local landowners, further aggravated by the outrages of the Mongol officials and tax-collectors. As related by Juwaynī and, following him, Ulugh Beg, the revolt began in the village of Tarab near Bukhara and very quickly spread throughout the region. Several thousand rebels, armed with sticks, spades and axes, moved towards Bukhara. Some Mongol high officials fled to Karmina, others pretended to side with the rebels. These officials planned to kill Mahmūd Tarābī on his way to Bukhara and thus to stifle the revolt, but the plot was unsuccessful. Eventually, the rebels occupied Bukhara and encamped on the height of Ābū Hafs, situated on the northern side of the city. Mahmūd Tarābī was brought to Malik Sanjar’s
palace and proclaimed caliph. The rich Mongol high officials who had no time to flee were arrested and executed and their properties were distributed among the poor. The Mongol commanders who had fled to Karmina assembled several scattered Mongol detachments and came out against the rebels, but were defeated. Nevertheless, because the rebel leaders – Mahmūd Tarābī, his brothers Muhammad and ʿAlī, the scholar-theologian Shams al-Dīn Mahbūbī and others – were inexperienced, the revolt did not spread beyond Bukhara. Taking advantage of this, Mahmūd Yalavach sent out forces from Khujand and defeated the insurgents; altogether some 21,000 men were killed. Thus the revolt was suppressed, but it showed the Mongols that the people hated the regime and could muster enough strength to challenge the entire establishment.

An essential feature in the life of the Chaghatay ulus in the middle of the thirteenth century was a growing conflict between Chaghatay’s descendants who governed the various regions. As far back as the times of Mubārak Shāh (1266) and Baraq (1266–71), some princes had aspired towards the establishment of stable links with the settled population of Transoxania. Thus Mubārak Shāh moved from Yeti Su to the valley of Ahangaran, and Baraq at first moved to Chaghaniyan, where in 1266 his election took place. Conversely, a strong group of the military-nomadic aristocracy headed by Qaydu, Yasaʿur and Buzan favoured a nomadic way of life; they repeatedly attacked the settled regions of the country, pillaged the population and burned towns and villages.

After Kebek Khan, the Chaghatay ulus was again involved in internecine warfare. Thus in one single year (1326), Elchigidey and Dua-Temūr, both sons of Duwa Khan, followed each other on the throne. Tarmashīrīn (1326–34), who, because of his adherence to Islam, was called ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn (Grandeur of the Faith), finally settled in the western part of the Chaghatay ulus and no longer came to Almalīk. The eastern part of the ulus, which also included a part of Fergana, fell under the power of nomadic feudal lords and Khans: Buzan (Dua-Temūr’s son) and Changshi (Abughan’s son), both of them grandsons of Duwa Khan, and Yesūn-Temūr (Changshi’s brother; 1334–8) ruled in name only.

In the 1340s the Chaghatay ulus finally disintegrated into two parts: Moghulistan (which included Yeti Su, the eastern part of Ferghana and East Turkistan) and Transoxania proper. The western part of the ulus also included eastern Khwarazm. The years 1340–70 witnessed an aggravation of disturbances and internecine wars and the feudal disintegration of the ulus into smaller, independent domains. In the main regions of the western part of the ulus, power was seized by tribal leaders. Thus Kish and its regions fell into the hands of the amir Hājjī Barlas; Bāyazīd Jalāyir took possession of the Khujand region; the Balkh region passed into the hands of Husayn, grandson of the Turkish amir Kazaghan, killed in 1358 while hunting; and in Shiburghan, the standard of independence was raised.
by Muhammad Khwāja Apendi, the leader of the Naiman tribe. There were also regions where power was in the hands of local feudal nobles: the sadrs (leaders of the Muslim religious class) took possession of Bukhara and its regions, the local Kaykhusraw Sayyids of Termez took possession of Khuttalan, etc. A similar situation prevailed in the eastern part of the ulus in Moghulistan. Here also, in spite of the firm hold of the family–tribe tradition, disturbances and internecine struggles began. The Khans no longer wielded real power: it was wholly in the hands of nomadic feudal lords. It was of this state of affairs that the clever and enterprising Timur (known to the West as Tamerlane), the son of Barlas Beg Taraghay, took advantage.
## Contents

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SULTANATE IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY  
AND THE NATURE OF THE NEW STRUCTURES IN INDIA .......... 274

Background ...................................................... 274
Qutb al-Dīn Aybak (1206–10) ........................................ 275
Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish (1210–36) ............................... 275
Nāsir al-Dīn Mahmūd (1246–66) and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban (Ulugh Khān) (1266–87) 276
The end of Turkish supremacy ..................................... 277
Jalāl al-Dīn Fīrūz Khaljī (1290–6) and Ālāʾ al-Dīn Khaljī (1296–1316) ............ 277
Income levels among the ruling and scholarly élites .......... 281
Agrarian conditions in the fourteenth century ................. 282
The political structure of the state ............................. 283
Social and economic developments ............................... 283

THE DELHI SULTANATE, 1316–1526 ........................... 284
The Tughluqids (1320–1412) .................................... 284
The Sayyids (1414–51) ............................................. 291
The Lōdīs (1451–1526) ............................................. 293

* See Map 7, p. 437.
Part One

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE SULTANATE IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY AND THE NATURE OF THE NEW STRUCTURES IN INDIA

(Riazul Islam)

Background

Under the Ghaznavid Sultan Mahmūd and later the Ghurid Muʿizz al-Dīn, during the period lasting from the death of Harsha (646–7) to the Turk invasions of northern India, the socio-political configuration was dominated by a number of factors which help to explain the rapidity of the Muslim conquest. First, the feudal-like system clearly favoured the rulers and the ruling classes at the expense of the peasantry. Second, the Rajputs – mostly of foreign origin, but gradually absorbed into the fighting caste of the Hindus – who emerged as a political force after the fall of the Pratīhāras, had a passion for war and often went to war to enhance their prestige. The Rajput political structure, feudal and hierarchic in character and lacking a strong central force, encouraged fissiparous tendencies. The Rajputs’ narrow vision, even narrower loyalties, and endless and purposeless internecine fighting, contributed to the military and political particularism which prevented a collective response against foreign invasions during the eleventh and twelfth centuries. Third, no strong central authority for the entire subcontinent existed. The Rāṣṭrakūṭas of the Deccan extended their authority to the north; the Pratīhāras, with Kanawj as their seat, from Panjab eastward; and the Pālas from Bengal westward. This led to the formation of three large and separate kingdoms in the Deccan: one in the north, one in the east and one in the west. Much of their strength was wasted in mutual warfare. The predecessors of the Pratīhāras, the Gurjāras who had ruled over Panjab and Marwar, are given credit for stalling the Arab eastward expansion from Sind. The Pratīhāra dominance of northern India, which had acted as a shield against external aggression during the major part of the ninth and tenth centuries, now disintegrated, leaving India exposed to foreign invasions. After the Ghaznavid
and, especially, the Ghurid invasions (see above, Chapters 5 and 8), Islam spread from its foothold in the extreme north-west of the subcontinent into much wider regions.

Qutb al-Dīn Aybak (1206–10)

Muʿizz al-Dīn Ghūrī’s leading slave generals succeeded him: Yildiz at Ghazna, Qutb al-Dīn Aybak at Lahore and Qabācha at Uchch. Aybak was undoubtedly the late sultan’s most trusted lieutenant and thus his main successor in India. But his four years of stewardship of the Ghurid Indian dominions were marked by his struggles against Yildiz, the Turkish ruler of Ghazna; against Qabācha, who controlled Sind and Multan; and against the rebellious Hindu Rajahs, who wanted to throw off the Muslim yoke. Aybak’s accidental death during a game of polo in 1210 ended a promising career, but his role as lieutenant during Muʿizz al-Dīn’s life, and later as his successor, entitles him to an important place in the formative history of the Delhi Sultanate.

Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish (1210–36)

Iltutmish ascended the throne of Delhi in difficult and markedly uncertain circumstances. The defiant attitudes of the senior slave generals like Qabācha and Yildiz, the revival of resistance among the Hindu ruling classes, and above all, the threat from the growing power of the Chinggisid Mongols across the North-West Frontier, posed great challenges. The Khaljīs in Bengal and Bihar withdrew their allegiance. Iltutmish displayed great intrepidity in the face of all these difficulties and showed a shrewd sense of strategy and timing in tackling the various problems. He humbled the hostile Turkish generals; overcame Hindu resistance; re-established his authority in the eastern provinces; and, through a combination of strategy and luck, succeeded in saving his kingdom from the Mongol onslaught.

Iltutmish, the first sovereign ruler of Delhi, is rightly considered the founder of the Sultanate of Delhi. He is given credit for creating durable foundations, organizing the administration and evolving statesmanlike basic political policies. In 1229 al-Mustansir, the ‘Abbasid caliph of Baghdad, conferred a mandate of authority on Iltutmish; this was an event of considerable significance, for it made the Sultanate of Delhi a legally and morally recognized state in orthodox Muslim eyes. Himself a man of piety and learning, Iltutmish maintained cordial relations with the ‘ulamāʾ and the mashāyikhs (Sufi leaders and saints), thereby achieving acceptability and legitimacy for his new sultanate.

None of Iltutmish’s five successors – two sons, one daughter and two grandsons who followed each other in quick succession – proved to be capable leaders. The Mongols kept pressing on the frontier and both Lahore and Multan were subjected to raids and spoliation.
Provincial governors found an opportunity to extend their autonomy and the Hindu rulers, in particular the Rajputs, showed signs of disaffection.

Nāsir al-Dīn Mahmūd (1246–66) and Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban (Ulugh Khān) (1266–87)

One of the notable developments in the post-Iltutmish period is the emergence of a group of nobles – all slaves of Iltutmish – called the Ghulāmān-i Chihilgānī (possibly meaning ‘the slave commanders who each commanded forty slaves’), who attained a dominant position in the court. For thirty years the ‘Forty’ held the royal power in commission and reduced the sultan to a figurehead. Among the powerful ‘Forty’, the dominant figure of Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban emerged. He had gained considerable power even before the accession of Sultan Nāsir al-Dīn Mahmūd, the last ruler of the line of Iltutmish. Shortly after Nāsir al-Dīn’s accession, Balban, now called nā‘ib-i mamlakat (viceroy), in effect assumed power as regent, reducing the sultan to a titular ruler. During the two decades that he was at the helm as nā‘ib-i mamlakat, Balban tried to stem the rot that had set in during the decade of anarchy (1236–46).

Having served the sultanate at all levels, Balban had an intimate knowledge of the manner in which it functioned and its sources of strength and weakness. He was thus able to identify its core problem. He believed that the weakness of the crown lay at the root of all the maladies of the state. His ideas on monarchy, government and religion, expressed in his speeches to his sons and nobles, are sometimes labelled his ‘political theory’. The various elements of his thinking, though not elaborate or comprehensive enough to be considered a theory, are nevertheless coherent. Balban displayed great vigour and ruthlessness in crushing political rivals and rebels and punishing refractory governors and local chiefs. The ordinary people, in general, were not affected. With his blind belief in the supreme value of nasab (good birth), however, Balban would not employ men of ordinary birth in the army and the administration.

REORGANIZATION OF THE ARMY

The government depended essentially on force, or the threat of force, in order to preserve its authority. Thus it was natural for the army to receive the utmost attention. With a view to improving its efficacy as a striking force, Balban gave high priority to the reorganization and expansion of the army. There is also an indication that Balban endeavoured to change the payment of the soldiers’ salaries from iqtā’s (assignments of land; what in later, Mughal times were to be called jāgīrs) to cash payments.
The decades following the end of Iltutmish’s reign saw a marked increase in Mongol pressure on the western frontiers of the Delhi Sultanate. The governors of these regions, ill-supported by the central government, were helpless in the face of Mongol inroads. By the time that Balban came to the throne, large parts of Sind and Panjab were under Mongol occupation. With his reorganized army, Balban made the defence of the frontiers a priority, his contribution here being twofold. First, he cleared Sind of the Mongol adventurers, recovered Lahore and Multan and built a special force to protect the frontiers. Thus he held a firm line against the Mongols. Second, following a realistic defence policy, he compromised by holding a line between the Beas and the Ravi rivers, leaving large parts of western Panjab in Mongol hands. During Balban’s reign, the Mongols never attempted to proceed beyond the Ravi and the security of Delhi and the central provinces was never under threat.

The end of Turkish supremacy: The Khalji revolution

Balban was succeeded in 1287 by his grandson Kay Qubâd, who took the title of Mu‘izz al-Dîn. This young, handsome, pleasure-loving and inexperienced sultan paid little attention to the administration and soon lost all control of the affairs of state. The rising Khalji clan soon replaced the house of Balban, and Jalâl al-Dîn Fîrûz Khaljî, an old officer of Sultan Balban, ascended the throne of Delhi. The Khaljis, too, it is now fairly certain, were originally of Turkish origin, but were Iranized because of their long stay in the steppelands of Afghanistan. (The Turks did not consider the Khaljis their peers.) The fact that the Khaljîs did not demonstrate any racial élitism of their own enabled them to build a wider political and social base for their ‘new monarchy’. The change in the social base of power was so pronounced as to justify the term ‘Khalîj revolution’.

Jalâl al-Dîn Fîrûz Khaljî (1290–6) and ʿAlâ’ al-Dîn Khaljî (1296–1316)

Jalâl al-Dîn Fîrûz Khaljî’s six-year reign was marked by incompetence and pusillanimity. His lenience towards robbers and rebels, his half-hearted fight against the invading Mongols, and his failure to seize the prestigious Ranthambor fortress from the Rajputs, marked him as a ruler unsuited to the times. His ambitious nephew and son-in-law ʿAlî Garshâsp showed little compunction in disposing of his uncle and ascended the throne as ʿAlâ’ al-Dîn Khaljî.

To understand fully the reign of ʿAlâ’ al-Dîn, one should look back at the thirteenth century and take note of the salient socio-economic trends. The striking motif is the continuity of the institutions. Not only were the conventional Indian methods of revenue-collection
(mainly a simple produce-sharing system) largely left unchanged by the new rulers, but even the collection agents, the ra’īs (chief), the chaudkṛīs (heads of parganas, groups of villages) and the patwāṛīs (village accountants), were mostly retained. The new rulers who had taken over the immense lands were short of manpower and in need of funds; thus they adopted the methods most likely to ensure rapid success. The state’s demand for revenue was deliberately kept at a low rate – one-fifth of the produce – and the countryside was largely left undisturbed.

Forewarned by a number of rebellions early in his reign, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn took prompt measures to forestall further trouble. First, in order to keep himself posted of all important occurrences in the capital and the provinces, he strengthened the dīwān-i barūd (intelligence department). Next, acting on the idea that ‘wealth and rebellion are twins’, he adopted measures to extract as much wealth as possible from his subjects. From the rural chiefs he demanded full taxes, while for the peasants the state demand for revenue was increased. Finally, in order to keep the nobles from uniting against him, he issued strict orders forbidding them to assemble or intermarry without royal permission.

In the military sphere, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s achievements fall into two categories: the war against the invading Mongols and the conquest of the unsubdued Indian territories. During the thirteenth century, the Mongols were so powerful that even a strong ruler like Balban had to adopt a defensive policy and accept a frontier line that was not particularly favourable. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn faced two Mongol attacks on Delhi, including a siege of the city; but on both occasions the Mongols retreated. Other Mongol invasions directed at Panjab and the Ganges valley were also defeated. Hence by the end of the first decade of his rule, he had ensured protection from external aggression for his dominion. The death in 1306 of Duwa Khan, the Chaghatai ruler of Transoxania and the main inspiration behind these invasions, may have also contributed to the decrease of Mongol pressure on India.

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s twenty-year reign entailed ceaseless military activity in India. The resulting acquisitions can be classed under three headings: areas recovered, territories freshly conquered and annexed, and states subdued but not annexed. The most noteworthy recovered areas were Jaysalmir, Ranthambor and Malwa. The most substantial and significant newly conquered territory was Gujarat, for its annexation brought the sultanate a province rich in natural resources as well as the benefits of extensive maritime trade. Chitor, too, was conquered and annexed, but after a short period was placed under a loyal Rajput dynast. The states subdued but not annexed include the three kingdoms of the Deccan and southern India: Deogir ruled by the Yadavas; Telingana ruled by the Ganāpatis; and Dwarsamudra ruled by the Hoysalas. ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s main goals regarding these rich kingdoms were to obtain as much tribute as possible and to secure their submission to Delhi’s suzerainty.
Otherwise, the Rajahs were left free to manage their internal affairs. The general Malik Kāfur, who was thrice sent to subdue the three kingdoms, met with unqualified success and ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s policy of establishing imperial hegemony, rather than direct rule, over the distant Deccan proved eminently successful. There is no adequate explanation as to why ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn made no attempt to conquer and annex Bengal, which was still ruled by Balban’s descendants; but for a reign of twenty years, his military achievements were substantial.

A factor of paramount importance in ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn’s far-reaching conquests and his success in dealing with the problem of the Mongols was the quality and size of his army. First of all, he did not suffer from the constraints which Balban had imposed in order to limit the strength of the cadre of commanders. Talent and loyalty were the only criteria by which ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn judged the men of the armed forces. He increased the strength of the main wing of the army, the cavalry, to 475,000 well-equipped troops who were paid directly from the treasury. Furthermore, he made the rules of annual muster more stringent, thereby ensuring the preparedness of the troops. However, the expense of the salaries for an army with such a large cavalry element would soon have exhausted the treasury. To overcome this problem, ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn introduced price controls to ensure that a soldier could live reasonably well on a lower scale of pay.

ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn was the first sultan to give serious thought to the reorganization of the revenue system. While devising a plan, he kept in mind the following well-considered objectives: to maximize the government’s revenue, to equalize the burden of taxation on the various sectors of the rural population, and to minimize the dangers of a rebellion by the nobles and of rural discontent. He also introduced the rule of measurement of land (which of course was familiar in India); this largely replaced the rule of sharing the produce, known for many centuries as batāʿī. Being a realist, he did not impose the rule of measurement on the entire realm, but only on a well-defined and carefully chosen core of the sultanate. Clearly, a fixed and stable rule of measurement was in the government’s interests as it helped to ensure a stable level of revenue. Batāʿī, on the other hand, favoured the peasants, for under it they paid in proportion to what they produced. By shifting to the land-measurement method, the sultan increased the pressure on the peasants to produce more. Furthermore, he increased the rate of the state’s demand to 50 per cent of the calculated produce, thereby more than doubling the rate (compared to 20 per cent under Iltutmish and later Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq). However, he also made provisions for revenue exemptions in cases of crop failure resulting from natural calamities. Firmly insisting on the principle that ‘the burden of the strong shall not fall on the weak’, he lightened the tax burden on the peasants. In effect, he forced the superior rural classes (variously called kāt,
muqaddam and chaudhrī) to pay their taxes themselves rather than pass the burden on to the peasantry. He also abolished all the tax exemptions that they had previously enjoyed. As a result, they were no longer in a position to oppress the peasantry at will. Thus although the peasants lost under ʾAlāʾ al-Dīn, they also gained some advantages. The evidence is the fact that, during the two decades of the sultan’s reign, no rebellion occurred in the rural areas.

ʾAlāʾ al-Dīn’s strong rule alone cannot, however, account for the absence of articulated discontent, but recorded cases of harsh treatment and punishment under his administration mostly refer to urban political rebels and corrupt administrators, and not to rural malcontents. In any case, the peasants were left enough of their produce to enable them to survive from one year to the next. The muqtaʾs (executive heads of provinces responsible for the collection of revenues) and the staff of the diwan-i wizarat (revenue department) were, if found guilty of laxity or dishonesty in the fulfilment of their duties, treated with marked severity; even governors were not spared physical beatings. As a result, first, the collections became effective and regular; second, the lag between collections and deposits was reduced; and third, the village people were saved from the extortions of the revenue staff.

IQTAʾS (ASSIGNMENTS OF LAND)

In lieu of salary, an assignment of land, or iqtāʾ (sometimes simply a portion of the land revenue), was granted to state employees. It saved the administration from having to keep ready cash for the monthly salary payments, and substantially reduced the amount of paperwork. The sultans of Delhi prior to ʾAlāʾ al-Dīn had followed this convenient and simple method. Its main disadvantage, however, was that it enabled the recipients of large iqtāʾs to gain extensive personal influence and thus became an impediment to the operation of state power. It also provided loopholes for recipients to enjoy the benefits of the iqtāʾs without fulfilling their obligations. ʾAlāʾ al-Dīn strongly disliked the system. Within five years of his accession, he issued orders for the withdrawal of iqtāʾs, as well as other grants, and their inclusion into khālisa (state-administered lands). This was a far-reaching change. Financial benefits aside, it increased the authority wielded by the state over the bureaucracy and the nobility. It seems, however, that the practice of giving iqtāʾs was not completely abandoned, but was now restricted to special cases in which the sultan wanted to emphasize the executive authority of a minister who had been entrusted with an important and difficult task.
MARKET-CONTROL REGULATIONS

One of  ālā’ al-Dīn’s most important measures – and one which has attracted a great deal of attention – was the control of prices. It was introduced for the purpose of employing a larger army on a lower scale of pay. Of all the requisites of the troops, the most important single item was food. It therefore constituted the first of the four sectors of price control. The prices of wheat and other commodities were fixed and elaborate arrangements were made to ensure adequate supplies in the markets and to maintain huge reserves. The other three sectors of price control were: (a) horses, ponies, cattle and slaves; (b) cloth and fruit; and (c) articles for domestic consumption and personal use.

The prices of the various items in the four sectors were not changed during the rest of the sultan’s reign. Aside from the firmness of  ālā’ al-Dīn’s administration, other features supported the system. First, prices were only fixed after very careful consideration and were generally reasonable. The price of the most important item, wheat, was fixed at 7-1/2 jītals per man (1 man of 14 seers = approx. 13 kg). From the days of Balban to the reign of Firūz Shāh Tughluq towards the end of the fourteenth century, the price of wheat remained stable, ranging from 7 to 8 jītals per man (except during periods of famine). Second, in another controlled sector, we learn that prices were so fixed as to ensure a fair margin of profit for the producer/seller. Both these features, namely the approximation of the fixed price to the normal price and the allowance of profit to the producer, greatly contributed to the stability of  ālā’ al-Dīn’s market-control arrangements. In addition, the sultan took care to ensure that the market was never short of supplies. During periods of scarcity, rationing was enforced. Through these devices, prices were kept steady at the fixed rate, even under famine conditions.  ālā’ al-Dīn also made sure to appoint men of honesty and impartiality to the hisba (market control) staff. Apart from the troops stationed in Delhi, the main beneficiaries of the system were men of modest income and of the lower salary group in the capital. This explains the concentration within Delhi of a large number of scholars, craftsmen and men of the various professions.

Income levels among the ruling and scholarly élites

During the initial phase of conquest, large areas and entire provinces were assigned to the nobles, in order to collect revenue and consolidate the sultan’s hold on the territory. The muqta’s (assignee-governors of these territories) tended to wield a wide range of powers. Iltutmish rectified the situation by bringing the provincial governors under the central authority and subjecting them to a certain financial control. But in general, the nobles continued to enjoy the benefits reaped from the iqtā’s. Out of the revenues collected from the
territories assigned to him, the muqta’s kept a portion for himself and his household, used another portion towards maintaining his contingent of troops and sent the balance (jawādil) to the central exchequer. The muqta’s obligations included maintaining military contingents and placing them at the sultan’s service when needed. By the time of ʻAlā’ al-Dīn Khaljī, the muqta’s had been made fully accountable to the central revenue department, and in general, the nobles were no longer given iqtā’s but cash salaries. Subsequently, under the Tughluqids (see Part Two below), the system of iqtā’s was revived, but some restrictions were introduced. The nobles lived in great luxury and style. They comprised three main grades: the Khans, who were paid 1 lac of tankas, the Maliks, who were paid 50–60,000 tankas, and the amirs, who received 30–40,000 tankas. At the beginning of the thirteenth century, even soldiers (called iqtā’-dārs) were given iqtā’s; but when it was found that they converted the land into milk (private property), the practice was gradually discontinued. Payment to ʻulamā’ and mashāyikhs was made in various forms: regular stipends, assignments of ‘dead land brought to life’, assignments of cultivable land and assignments on the jizya (poll tax on non-Muslims) of a particular locality. Land not given in assignment and reserved for the state treasury was known as khālisā. Specific amounts of land were assigned for the sultan’s personal and household needs, but were not treated as royal property.

Agrarian conditions in the fourteenth century

The evolution of agrarian conditions during the thirteenth century and the agrarian reforms of ʻAlā’ al-Dīn Khaljī have already been noted. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq (1320–5) reverted to the ‘produce-sharing’ method which, as noted earlier, favoured the peasantry. He lowered the rate of state revenue demand and abolished several agrarian excesses. He mitigated the harshness of ʻAlā’ al-Dīn’s measures concerning the kūts, the muqaddams and the muqta’s. His short reign probably brought considerable relief to the rural population. The impact of Muhammad b. Tughluq’s (1325–51) experiments with the agrarian economy, such as the sudden increase of the rate demanded in the Do’āb, the rotation of crops and the granting of loans to the peasants, was lost in the plethora of revolts; in the agrarian sector, as in other sectors, Muhammad b. Tughluq left only confusion and anarchy. It took Firūz Shāh Tughluq (1351–88) six years to survey the entire land and prepare new estimates of revenue. He too decided to adhere to the ‘produce-sharing’ method. By making a substantial addition to the water supply through canals and innumerable wells, he made an enormous contribution to gardens and cultivable land and thus ensured a substantial increase in the supply of cereals and fruit.
Firūz Shāh made extensive assignments to the nobility, officers, and men and institutions of learning and piety; these inevitably diminished the khālisa lands, thereby weakening the state financially. The impression of overall prosperity – in which the village peasants were also beneficiaries – is due to the notable and sustained increase in production and to the long period of general peace. At the same time, it was also a period of lax administration, during which nobles and officers would misappropriate public funds, fail to pay dues and thus become rich and powerful at the expense of the state.

The political structure of the state

Dynastic monarchy was a structure with which Indians had long been familiar. From 1210, when the Delhi Sultanate was formally founded, the sultans steadily gathered more and more powers; it can fairly be stated that a sultan was generally a more powerful ruler than a Hindu ruler of earlier centuries. The process reached its climax under Ālā al-Dīn Khaljī, who effectively controlled the empire and ran it as if it were a village. Muhammad b. Tughluq, however, went too far and suffered a set-back.

The sultan was assisted by a body of ministers who managed their respective departments under royal orders. The most important departments were those of religion and justice, of the army, of the intelligence service and the imperial post, and of finance and revenue, which was looked after by the most important minister, the vizier. For administrative purposes, the sultanate was divided into provinces, with the executive head of each province serving as governor. His powers were considerable, yet limited by the central government, especially in financial matters. When the government at Delhi was weak, the governors, especially those of the distant provinces, tended to assume more powers and run their provinces autonomously; some were tempted to declare independence. Depending upon the circumstances, a rebel governor might face the gallows or become the founder of a new provincial dynasty.

Social and economic developments in the fourteenth century: urbanization, crafts, etc.

The trend towards urbanization, which had begun in the thirteenth century, continued apace during the following century. Both the state chronicles and the accounts of foreign visitors such as the Moroccan ālim (scholar) and traveller Ibn Battūta confirm this. Two interesting pieces of evidence are the constantly increasing size of the congregational mosques and the organization of regular transportation into the city of Delhi, with fixed charges from and
to various points; the latter indicate the growth in the size of the city. Ibn Battūta declared that Delhi was the largest city not only in India, but in the entire Islamic East.

The increase in population and the growth of a large number of cities led to the development and diversification of industries and crafts. Of particular importance were cotton fabrics, silken stuffs, carpets, woollens, ironware, leatherware and sugar-making. Indian hardware achieved great fame, producing damascened steel which had a worldwide reputation. Many other industries and crafts are mentioned in the context of the royal workshops or of the taxes imposed on the industries. The scale of diversification of food production can be grasped from Ibn Fadl Allāh’s *Masālik al-absār*, with its mention of 21 varieties of rice and 65 varieties of sweets. In trade and commerce, the most notable groups were the *karwāniyān* (*banjāras*), who distributed large quantities of grain all over the land and are continually mentioned in chronicles and in Amīr Khusraw’s historical *mathnawīs*. The merchants, especially the famous Multani merchants, who were concerned with internal as well as foreign trade, also played an important role. They organized the import of fine cloth for ālā’ al-Dīn’s Saray-i ād market. The *sāhas* (bankers), the Multani money-lenders and the *sarrāfs* (money-changers) provided banking services which greatly facilitated commercial transactions in the country. The increased pace of production led to certain technological advances. The introduction of the cotton-carder’s bow and the spinning wheel, for example, contributed to the expansion of the textile industry. The introduction of the true arch, dome and vault facilitated the construction of large buildings; Diyā’ al-Dīn Barānī mentions that ālā’ al-Dīn Khaljā employed as many as 70,000 craftsmen for the construction of his buildings.

Part Two

THE DELHI SULTANATE, 1316–1526

(*C. E. Bosworth*)

The Tughluqids (1320–1412)

With the murder of Qutb al-Dīn Mubārak Shāh in 1320, the line of the Khaljī sultans of Delhi came to an end, and his assassin, his Hindu convert slave Khusraw Khan Barwārī,
ascended the throne as Sultan Nâsir al-Dîn. But his reign was cut short by the rebellion
of Ghâzî Malik Tughluq, governor of Dipalpur in Panjab, who had risen to prominence
under the Khaljis, utilizing resentment against the ascendancy of the Hindus in the state
under Khusraw Khan: in 1320 Nâsir al-Dîn was defeated and killed by Ghâzî Malik, who
ascended the throne as Ghiyâth al-Dîn (1320–5). The line of sultans which he inaugurated
is conveniently referred to as the Tughluqids, although Tughluq was almost certainly a
personal name of Ghâzî Malik rather than a Turkish ethnic or tribal name.¹

Ghiyâth al-Dîn thus came to power posing as the saviour of the faith from Hindu threats
to subvert Islam, although Nâsir al-Dîn’s failure had stemmed from his personal incapacity
to rule rather than from outraged Islamic sentiment. Hence Diyâ’ al-Dîn Baranî presents
Ghiyâth al-Dîn as the paragon of Islamic rulers,² although the Sufi hagiographic tradition
is less enthusiastic because of the new ruler’s differences with the Chishtî mystic Nizâm
al-Dîn Awliyâ’.³ Ghiyâth al-Dîn’s main tasks were to restore internal order and to pull
together the empire after the financial chaos and the centrifugal administrative forces at
work during the previous reign. These he achieved by recovering land grants (iqtâ’s, or
jâgîrs) which had been lavishly distributed by his predecessor, by campaigning against
the Hindu rulers of Orissa and Maªbar (Madura) (this last province conquered in 1323)
and by securing the vassalage of the Muslim sultanate of Bengal in 1324. Thus on his
death in 1325, the sultanate had been once more consolidated and its frontiers extended
considerably beyond those of Khalji times.⁴

Ghiyâth al-Dîn’s son, Muhammad b. Tughluq (1325–51), consummated this work of
consolidation and expansion during his long reign, and under him the Delhi Sultanate
reached its greatest extent; his reign marks a watershed in the history of the sultanate.
He is certainly one of the great figures of medieval Indo-Muslim history, yet Professor K.
A. Nizami has written of him:

His reign of twenty-six years is a fascinating but tragic story of schemes and projects correctly
conceived, badly executed and disastrously abandoned. His ingenious mind was as quick in
formulating new plans as it was slow in understanding the psychology of the people. He
could never establish that rapport and mutual understanding with his subjects, which was so
necessary for the implementation of his schemes.⁵

Historians such as ÊIsâmî and Baranî adopted hostile attitudes to him and stigmatized him
as an impractical visionary. Yet Muhammad was in fact a vigorous commander and man of

¹ Habib and Nizami, 1970, p. 460.
² Hardy, 1960, pp. 35–6.
³ Habib and Nizami, 1970, p. 482.
⁴ Ibid., pp. 460–83.
⁵ Ibid., p. 484.
action. In 1327 he embarked on one of his most controversial and innovatory actions, the founding of a second capital of the sultanate in Deogir, renamed Dawlatabad, in the northern Deccan (near modern Awrangabad in Maharashtra province), in which many members of the Muslim administrative and religious élites of Delhi were willy-nilly resettled. In this way Muhammad parted company with the Khalji policy of exercising suzerainty over the Deccan from outside, and, from this new military base, he apparently planned a more activist policy within the Deccan. Whether this was his express intention or not, the policy speedily proved a failure and the division of central authority within the sultanate has been criticized by later historians as having had, in the longer term, an adverse effect on the sultanate’s unity and effectiveness.

Soon after Muhammad’s accession, the Tughluqid army raided Peshawar and the mountains beyond, but had to retire because of the lack of food and fodder there. It seems to have been this raid which in c. 1329–30 provoked the last major invasion of India by the Chaghatayids, whose territories in the North-West Frontier region and eastern Afghanistan had just been threatened. Under their Tarmashirin Khan, the Mongol forces entered Panjab and reached the Jumna. Peace was made, but Muhammad seems to have entertained the grand design of attacking the Chaghatayids in ‘Khurasan’, a vague term in Indo-Muslim usage of the times. Barani speaks of a campaign against the ‘Qarachil mountains’, which has often been taken to refer to the Himalayan regions of Garwhal and Kumaon but which might well refer to Kashmir, at that time considered to be within the Chaghayatid sphere of influence; the venture was, at all events, unsuccessful. One side-effect of Muhammad’s policy vis-à-vis the Chaghatayids was that his realm became a haven for many Turco-Mongol chiefs and soldiers fleeing from Tarmashirin’s strongly anti-Muslim measures within the Khanate, and contingents of Turco-Mongols appeared in the Tughluqid army later in his reign.

After a certain number of successes, however, a reaction set in and in the latter part of his reign, Muhammad had to deal with no fewer than twenty-two rebellions in different parts of the empire. These involved the permanent loss to the sultanate of several provinces. Bengal and Macbar (Madura) regained their independence; Multan, Sind and Gujarat were disaffected; above all, the new policy towards the Deccan clearly failed when Ala’ al-Din Hasan Bahman Shah constituted the Bahmanid sultanate there after 1347. Hence at
Muhammad’s death, the sultan of Delhi possessed no authority in central and southern India beyond the Vindhya range.9

The causes of this decline are various. Muhammad had clearly aroused discontent in the state by his policy of opening the doors of the army and the administration to new sectors of talent. In pursuit of this broadening of his power base, he did, as mentioned above, encourage dissident Mongol amirs to come to his court. He further admitted converts from Hinduism – as of course had his predecessors – and this was resented by the old Muslim Turkish families and by the ʿulamā’, both classes ever jealous of their own positions and interests. The sultan’s policy of attracting strangers to India and of honouring them for their capabilities was approved by Ibn Battūta (mentioned above), who reached India in 1333 and the Delhi court in the following year (as an outsider himself, he benefited greatly from it).10 Muhammad was keen to establish links with the ʿAbbasid fainéant caliphs now living in Cairo under the tutelage of the Mamluks, receiving their emissaries and placing their names on his coins, presumably in the hope of strengthening the aura of Islamic legitimacy for his rule; but the caliphate was by this time such a pale and ineffectual shadow of its former self that ʿAbbasid approval does not seem to have brought Muhammad any tangible benefits in the eyes of his contemporaries.11

Of more immediate damage to Muhammad’s image as a divinely mandated ruler were, first, his strained relations with the religious classes of India (although the accounts by contemporary chroniclers of a decline in religious life at Delhi as a consequence of the move to Dawlatabad are clearly much exaggerated) and, second, his general reputation as a stern, even bloodthirsty ruler, whose anger and violence did not spare recalcitrant religious scholars and Sufis – as Ibn Battūta notes in a fair-sized list of those executed by the sultan.12 But Muhammad’s attempts to encourage agriculture, especially in the wake of a disastrous famine in the Delhi–Do’ab region in 1335–6, to reform the coinage by introducing a low-denomination copper and brass coinage (perhaps in response to heavy drains of precious metal resulting from military campaigning and/or to some economic crisis not made explicit in the sources)13 and to establish a secure base for the Islamization of the Deccan at Dawlatabad show him as a man of some vision who was trying to follow a

coherent policy but was held back by inadequate resources, refractory human material and personal failings.\textsuperscript{14}

Muhammad’s nephew Firūz Shāh (1351–88) had a more pacific and conciliatory temperament and his thirty-seven-year reign gave India a period of general relaxation and peace after the storm and stress of Muhammad b. Tughluq’s reign. This newfound tranquillity was signalled by the prohibition, on Firūz Shāh’s accession, of what Barānī calls 
\textit{siyāṣat}, i.e. the infliction of harsh punishments and torture which the severe and blood-thirsty Muhammad had used with such abandon as instruments of state policy.\textsuperscript{15}

The new sultan was nevertheless by no means averse to military glory and success, and aimed at restoring the control lost by Delhi over the provinces. Unfortunately, he lacked military skill and the ruthlessness required of a great commander. His two invasions of Bengal (in 1353–4 and 1359–61) gained virtually nothing. He attacked Hindu rulers in Orissa and at Nagarkot-Kangra and led a long and costly campaign against the Sāmīnā chiefs of Thatta on the Indus and lower Sind and against Gujarat (in 1365–7), asserting the suzerainty of Delhi there; but the whole enterprise was later regretted by the sultan for the losses in manpower and treasure involved. An invitation from discontented elements in the Bahmanid sultanate to intervene in the Deccan was, on the advice of the sultan’s veteran vizier, the Khān-i Jahān Maqbul, wisely refused and Firūz Shāh henceforth abstained from military adventures.\textsuperscript{16}

In general, Firūz Shāh showed himself more concerned with the arts of peace, and this inevitably led to a decline in the organization and fighting qualities of the army during the last twenty years or so of his reign. Much of the army’s preparedness and military effectiveness had rested on the periodic reviews (\textit{cārd}) of the cavalry, their weapons and their mounts by the official entitled the \textit{rōwat-i cārd}. The standards attained were recorded in the registers of the \textit{dīwān-i cārd} (military department) of the administration; it was on the basis of performance on these occasions that salaries and allowances were issued.\textsuperscript{17}

The system had been rigorously upheld by such sultans as Ālā’ al-Dīn Khaljī, Qutb al-Dīn Mubārak Shāh and Muhammad b. Tughluq, when military efficiency had been the criterion for financial rewards. Firūz Shāh, however, granted extensive hereditary \textit{iqtā}s to the army commanders rather than paying them in cash, a reversal of previous practice; and since the troops now collected their salaries directly from the cultivators, the door was open to extortion, oppression and corruption throughout the countryside, as the state could no longer threaten to withhold salaries in the case of military unpreparedness or inadequate

\textsuperscript{14} See on his reign in general, Husain, 1938.
\textsuperscript{16} Habib and Nizami, 1970, pp. 562–600.
\textsuperscript{17} Qureshi, 1958, pp. 136 et seq.
The sultan, meanwhile, buttressed his personal authority by the acquisition of a large body of personal slaves, the bandagān-i Fīrūz-Shāhī: their numbers stationed in the capital and in the provinces were implausibly put by Āfīfī at 180,000. It is true that the more deleterious effects of the new trends in military organization and payment were delayed by the abilities of Fīrūz Shāh’s ministers, who included men of high calibre such as the two Khān-i Jahāns, father and son, and Āyn-i Māhrū.

The adverse effects of the new system took time fully to emerge. It was only after Fīrūz Shāh’s death in 1388 that it became apparent that the decay of a highly trained, centrally paid, salaried army meant that assignees of lands often had inadequate military force with which to collect the revenues from their iqtās in the face of rebellious provincial governors, recalcitrant Hindu chiefs, and others. For the same reason, the central administration in Delhi could not collect its own share of the iqtās, that proportion which was kept back from the assignees for the expenses of running the state. Hence when the Turco-Mongol conqueror Timur (Tamerlane) appeared in India from Central Asia a decade after Fīrūz Shāh’s death, the Delhi Sultanate’s military and financial resources were totally inadequate for opposing him.

Fīrūz Shāh’s relaxation of central control in several spheres of state activity, and his amelioration of the harsh and oppressive policies of the preceding reign, were meritorious measures, although one consequence of them seems to have been a spread of corruption in the administration once fears of draconian punishment had disappeared. In religion, the sultan held strictly orthodox Sunni views. He deferred to the šāykh al-šamāl; he was the last Delhi sultan to receive formal investiture from the puppet Ābāsid caliph in Cairo; he destroyed newly erected Hindu temples; he persecuted the extremist Shi‘ites and the Ismā‘īlīs; he exacted the jizya, albeit at a low rate, from Brahmans, hitherto exempt; and he abolished mukās (pl. of maks; non-Qur‘ānic taxes), although it is reasonable to assume that, as had always happened on previous occasions when these were abolished, the state soon found itself unable to do without the revenue and the old taxes and abuses crept back in.

The sultan’s pacific policies may have brought some beneficial results for the masses of the population, if only because of the decreased need to finance military campaigns. Whether the price of provisions remained stable and affordable during his reign has been disputed by modern historians; prices were certainly much higher than they had been in, for example, Šāh ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Khaljī’s time half a century or so before (see Part One above). It

---

19 Ibid., pp. 600–1, 619.
was as a builder of public buildings and endower of charitable institutions that the sultan achieved particular fame. Around Delhi, he laid out many gardens and orchards, and within the city he completed a Friday mosque and the Madrasa-yi Fīrūz-Shāhī in 1352, as well as a Sufi khānaqah-cum-madrasa (convent-cum-college) for the noted Sayyid Najm al-Dīn Samarqandī. In 1359 Fīrūz Shāh founded the city of Jawnpur, possibly named after his kinsman Muhammad b. Tughluq’s pre-accession title of Jawnā Khan, and he further built a new city in the Delhi district, named Firuzabad after himself; it did not, however, survive the Timurid onslaught soon afterwards.21

After Fīrūz Shāh’s death in 1388, the remaining twenty-five years of Tughluqid rule were filled with a series of ephemeral sultans; none save one of the last, Nāṣir al-Dīn Mahmūd Shāh II (1394–5; 1399–1412) ruled for more than two or three years. The sultanate was, in fact, in a state of disintegration, racked by disputes over the succession and the allocation of power; thus in 1395 Mahmūd Shāh II was ruling in Delhi while his rival, Nāṣir al-Dīn Nusrat Shāh (like Mahmūd Shāh a grandson of Fīrūz Shāh), held power at Firuzabad. By this time, many of the muqta’s had achieved virtual independence. The Bahmanid sultanate had flourished under its able second ruler, Muhammad Shāh I (1358–75), and his successors. The Hindu ruler of Vijayanagar in the south-eastern tip of the Deccan had already succeeded in extinguishing the petty Muslim principality of Maṭbar (Madura) soon after 1378. The governor of Malwa in central India, Hasan Dilāwar Khan, ceased to forward any tribute to Delhi after 1392. He sheltered the fugitive Tughluqid sultan Mahmūd Shāh II when Timur invaded India in 1398, but in 1401 proclaimed his independence, thus inaugurating the powerful sultanate of Malwa, based on its capital Mandu, which was to endure for over a century until conquered by the sultans of Gujarat. In Jawnpur, the eunuch commander of the sultanate, Malik Sarwar, who already held the title of sultan al-skarq (Ruler of the East), was in 1394 sent to Jawnpur to quell disaffected Hindus there; he extended his power over most of the Ganges valley east of Delhi, including Bihar, as an independent ruler. The progeny of his adopted son and successor, Malik Mubārak, founded the principality of the Sharqī sultans which was to last for some eighty years until Sultan Bahlūl Lōdī reincorporated Jawnpur within the Delhi Sultanate. In Gujarat, the sultanate commander Zafar Khan had been sent to restore order there, but first his son Tatār Khan assumed power in 1403 and then Zafar Khan himself in 1407 – at a time when the Tughluqid dynasty was largely impotent, the sultans not having minted coins for six years – assumed independent authority as Sultan Muzaffar I. He reigned in

Gujarat until his death in 1411, after which his descendants enjoyed power for almost two centuries until the Mughal conquest of Akbar the Great in 1583.\(^{22}\)

The catalyst for all these losses and secessions from the empire, which reduced Tughluqid control virtually to the Delhi region alone, so that it became a capital city without an empire, was Timur’s invasion of 1398–9, which culminated in the sack of Delhi and the flight of the sultan.\(^{23}\) When the Turco-Mongol armies at last withdrew, real power in Delhi lay not so much in the hands of the restored Tughluqid Mahmūd Shāh II as in those of his Afghan minister, Mallū Iqbāl Khan. The former north-western provinces of the empire, including Panjab and Multan, gave their allegiance to Timur and then to his successor Shāh Rukh. The governor of the western frontier region, Sayyid Khidr Khan, was in 1414 to seize power at Delhi and inaugurate the shortlived Sayyid line of rulers there.

### The Sayyids (1414–51)

Mahmūd Shāh II died in 1412, and there was a two-year interlude during which power in Delhi was held by a former Tughluqid commander, Dawlat Khan. Delhi was then captured by Sayyid Khidr Khan, who had since the early 1390s governed the province of Multan and had maintained himself there against Mallū Iqbāl Khan when the latter was governor of Lahore and Panjab; now, in 1405, Khidr Khan defeated and killed Mallū at Ajodhan. As long as a legitimate Tughluqid, Mahmūd Shāh II, reigned in Delhi, Khidr Khan could make no headway, but the sultan’s death provided him with an opportunity.

Whether Khidr Khan really was a sayyid (descendant of the Prophet) is doubtful. The reference to this status in the near-contemporary Tārīkh-i Mubārak Shāhī of Yahyā Sirhindī is at best vague; in its favour, however, may be Timur’s earlier appointment of Khidr Khan as his governor in Delhi, suggesting that he was regarded as a sayyid, given Timur’s special regard for the descendants of the Prophet. The growth of the claim may have been encouraged by Khidr Khan’s undoubtedly benevolent rule (1414–21) and his skill as a military commander.\(^{24}\)

It is not easy to characterize the Sayyid dynasty, with its four members only, but early fifteenth-century Muslim India clearly shows the transition from a strong centralized rule by the early Delhi Sultanate dynasties to a more diffused system of government, with strong tendencies to particularism and regionalism and a much reduced role of Delhi in Indo-Muslim political and military affairs. The period of the Sayyids was full of military campaigns, often against petty rebels and chieftains who had withheld taxation, but the

\(^{22}\) Husain, 1963; Habib and Nizami, 1970, pp. 620–9; \(EF^2\), Dīlawpūr; Gujjarāt; Mābar; Mālwā; Shārkis.

\(^{23}\) Roemer, 1986, pp. 69–70.

\(^{24}\) Habib and Nizami, 1970, pp. 635–6; \(EF^2\), Sayyids.
Sayyid rulers showed little vision in extending their power beyond the vicinity of Delhi, the upper and middle Do’ab, with a more tenuous authority over Panjab and Multan. Thus the amount of revenue available to the state depended largely on the success or failure of these punitive expeditions and holding operations, and also on the rulers’ ability to control a powerful and ambitious Turkish military nobility which had benefited from the power vacuum at the centre under the last Tughluqids to increase its own influence. The Sayyids were themselves conscious, it seems, of enjoying a lesser status and prestige than their predecessors. Khidr Khan ruled as a Timurid vassal and Shâh Rukh was recognized in the khutba (Friday worship oration) and on the coinage of Delhi. Only after 1417, and with the Timurid monarch’s permission, did Khidr Khan add his own name to the coinage, previously having been content to restamp the coins of Fîrûz Shâh Tughluq and his successors.25 Nor did he ever claim the exalted title of sultan but only that of râyat-i ad‘lâ (Most Exalted Standard[-bearer]).

Khidr Khan’s seven-year reign was full of campaigns localized, however, in the northern Indian plain and on its fringes: against Hindu Rajahs in Katahr (in the later Rohilkhand), Gwalior, Itawa (in the Kanawj region) and Mewat (in Rajasthan); in repelling an attack on Nagawr by the sultan of Gujarat, Ahmad I (1411–42), son of Zafar Khan Muzaffar I; and against rebellious Turkish troops of the sultanate, the Turk-bachchas.26 Khidr Khan’s son and heir, Mubârak Shâh (1421–34), was the ablest ruler of his line. It is clear that he felt himself in a stronger position than his father from the fact that he adopted the title of sultan, placed his own name in the khutba and issued coins. Even so, he faced much the same problems, with additional challenges from the Khokars of Panjab (in 1421–2 and 1428), and with further campaigns required against Katahr, Mewat and Gwalior – on more than one occasion, against all of these places. The provincial Muslim kings of India were now strong and ambitious enough to challenge Delhi, and Mubârak Shâh clashed with Alp Khan Hûshang of Malwa (1405–35), who was menacing Gwalior, in 1423; and with the Sharqî ruler of Jawnpur, Shams al-Dîn Ibrâhîm (1402–40), who was threatening Bada’un and Itawa, in 1428. He was successful in repelling incursions of Turco-Mongols from Kabul, instigated by Shâh Rukh’s governor there, Masûd Mîrza, in concert with their Khokar allies (in 1431 and 1433), and in relieving pressure on Lahore. Like certain other previous rulers in Delhi, Mubârak Shâh had the idea of founding a new city on the banks of the Jumna, Mubarakabad, in 1433, but his plans were cut short when he was assassinated in 1434 by partisans of his discontented vizier, the Hindu convert Sarwar al-Mulk.27

25 Wright, 1936.
27 Ibid., pp. 641–58.
The dead sultan’s adopted son was raised to the throne in Delhi as Muhammad Shāh (1434–45), but was not given full allegiance by the great men of the state until Sarwar al-Mulk, regarded as the instigator of Mubarak Shāh’s murder, had himself been killed. Muhammad Shāh ruled over a reduced, disordered realm with powerful rival princes on its fringes. In 1440 the ruler of Malwa, Mahmūd Shāh I Khaljī (1436–69), marched almost to the gates of Delhi and was only defeated and repulsed with the aid of the governor of Sirhind in Panjab, the Afghan Bahlūl Lōdī. Bahlūl’s power was increased by the grant to him of Lahore and Dipalpur, and in the last two years of Muhammad Shāh’s reign he rebelled and at one point even besieged Delhi.

When Muhammad Shāh died, his son ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn ʿAlam Shāh (1443–51) was recognized in Delhi, but with even less power than his father; his inability to control any territories beyond those within a 30-km radius of Delhi led to the witticism, (az Dihlī tā Pālam/pādshāhī Shāh ʿĀlam) [ʿAlam Shāh’s rule extends only from Delhi to Palam] (Palam being the site of the modern international airport of Delhi). In 1448 he decided to withdraw to Bada’un, where he had previously been governor, abandoning Delhi. The military leaders then took over power and in 1451 offered the throne to the most vigorous figure in the now truncated sultanate, Bahlūl Lōdī. Since ʿAlam Shāh was content with the par-gana of Bada’un, Bahlūl left him there in peace until the former Sayyid ruler died in 1476, when Bada’un was briefly annexed to Jawnapur by the Sharqī Husayn Shāh (1459–79). The Sayyid dynasty thus came to an end after a somewhat unremarkable thirty-seven years, notable only as a further stage in the disintegration of the Delhi Sultanate.28

The Lōdīs (1451–1526)

The Lōdī sultans represent the first Afghan dynasty ruling in Delhi – the heart of Indo-Muslim authority in northern India – since the time of the Ghurid sultans (originally from Ghur in central Afghanistan) some three centuries previously. Even before the rise to fame in the eastern Iranian lands of these Shansabānī Maliks of Ghur (see above, Chapter 8), Afghans had taken part in the Muslim raids and forays down to the Indian plains, attracted by prospects of rich plunder, and the ‘Afaghīna’ are mentioned among the troops of Mahmūd of Ghazna (see above, Chapter 5). The constituting of the Ghurid empire, transient though it was, brought in its wake large numbers of Afghan soldiers of fortune to India, with especial areas of concentration in the middle Indus valley, Panjab and parts of the Do’ab. They played a role in political and military affairs under the Khaljis and Tughluqids second only to the predominant Turks in the forces of these ethnically Turkish

sultans. During the Timurid invasions of India, Afghans fought on both sides. Sultān Shāh Lōdī aided the founder of the Sayyid line of Delhi sultans, Khidr Khan, against Māllū Iqbal Khan and was rewarded with the governorship of Sirhind and its dependencies in Panjab, plus the title of Islām Khan.

During the reign of Sayyid Mubārak Shāh, the Lōdī power base was extended, and after Sultān Shāh Lōdī was killed, his younger son Bahlūl inherited this. Bahlūl managed to fight off an attack by Sayyid Muhammad Shāh’s army and was diplomatic enough to conciliate the ruler in Delhi and thereby to retain Sirhind and its adjuncts; and when in 1440 Sultan Mahmūd Shāh I Khalji of Malwa attacked Delhi (see above), Bahlūl provided a force of 8,000 Afghans and Turco-Mongols to ward him off, receiving in return the title Khān-i Khānān. Nevertheless, Bahlūl shortly afterwards revealed his own designs on Delhi and the heart of the sultanate, fruitlessly besieging the city and assuming for himself the title of sultan. The death of Sayyid Muhammad Shāh and the accession of the even weaker Ālā’ al-Dīn Ālam Shāh facilitated the fulfilment of his ambitions, as recorded above, so that in 1451 Bahlūl was able to ascend the throne in Delhi as Abu ’l Muzaffar Bahlūl Shāh (1451–89), the first in a line of three Lōdī sultans, the first and second of whom enjoyed what were by contemporary standards long reigns.29

Initially, Bahlūl’s position as sultan was by no means firm. The tribal and social traditions of his Afghan supporters favoured a more diffused allocation of powers in the state rather than a centralized monarchy on the Khalji or early Tughluqīd pattern, and Bahlūl had to take this into account; there are, in any case, no indications that Bahlūl wished to be an autocrat, withdrawn from his own folk, and he handled with care the body of permanently ambitious nobles and military commanders around the Delhi court. Moreover, there was still a representative of the Sayyid family at Bada’un as a possible focus of discontent, especially as the Sharqīs in Jawnpur, whose territories marched with those of Delhi, viewed themselves, because of matrimonial links with the Sayyids, as in large measure heirs of the Sayyids in northern India. It thus behove Bahlūl to proceed with caution. He gained an access of prestige from defeating a Sharqī invasion at Narela outside Delhi in 1452 and hostilities with Mahmūd Shāh (1440–57) and Husayn Shāh (1458–79) were to fill the greater part of his reign. His success attracted considerable numbers of Afghan troops from Roh (i.e. the North-West Frontier region and the adjacent mountain regions of eastern Afghanistan), and with these, Bahlūl inflicted a series of defeats on Husayn Shāh in 1479, culminating in the expulsion of the Sharqī ruler from Jawnpur to Bihar and Bengal. Jawnpur was now reunited with the Delhi Sultanate after an independent existence of nearly ninety years. This success allowed Bahlūl to mount an invasion of Malwa and to

humble various Hindu princes at Gwalior and in the middle and lower Do’ab, such as the ruler of Itawa.

When Bahlūl died in 1489 he had reigned for thirty-eight years and had, by his crafty diplomacy and military skill, placed Lōdī authority on a firm footing. Occupied as he was with frequent wars, he seems to have been content to let the administrative and revenue-collecting system run on the same lines as those of later Tughluqid and Sayyid times; but he did introduce, at a time when gold and silver for minting had already become scarce under the Sayyids, a billon tanka, the bahlūlī, which remained current until the time of Akbar.30

Before his death, Bahlūl had allocated various parts of his realm as appanages for his sons and other Afghan relatives and connections. Thus his son Bārbak received Jawnpur; Aʿẓam Humayūn received Lucknow and Kalpi; Khān-i Jahān received Bada’un; Nizām Khan was given Panjab, Delhi and the upper and middle Do’ab, and so on. It was Nizām Khan who finally emerged on his father’s death as head of the Lōdī family, taking the regnal name of Sikandar and ruling for nearly thirty years (1489–1517). His most formidable task was to make his rule acceptable to his numerous relatives, many of whom had their own ambitions for the throne, and to the Afghan military classes at large. This he achieved by campaigns which reduced his relatives to submission, by defeating the dispossessed Sharqi of Jawnpur, Husayn, near Benares in 1494 and by humbling the latter’s ally, Husayn Shāh (1494–1519), sultan of Bengal, these successes enabling him to take over the province of Bihar. In the direction of central India, he twice successfully attacked Rajah Mān Singh of Gwalior (in 1501 and 1506). When Malwa was racked by succession disputes on the death there in 1511 of Sultan Nāsir al-Dīn Shāh, Sikandar was tempted in 1513 to intervene on behalf of a rival to Nāsir al-Dīn’s successor Mahmūd Shāh II (1511–31) and his Rajput adviser Mēdīnī Rāʿī; but he achieved little beyond the capture of Chanderi (on the borders of Malwa and Bundelkhand).

When Sikandar died in 1517, he left behind a prosperous kingdom with a considerable degree of internal security. Being himself a poet in Persian, with the takhallus (nom de plume) of Gulrukhi, he was also a patron of scholars and literary men. Among the most tangible legacies of his reign was his re-foundation in 1504 or 1505 of the ancient town of Agra and his decision to turn it into his capital city and military headquarters.31

Sikandar’s eldest son Ibrāhīm (1517–26) succeeded him, but he could only make firm his power after a succession struggle with his brother Jalāl Khan of Kalpi. The latter had originally been assigned the governorship of the former kingdom of Jawnpur in a

power-sharing agreement which Ibrāhīm speedily abrogated, driving Jalāl Khan into Gwalior and Malwa, eventually to be captured and killed. Ibrāhīm’s overbearing behaviour soon aroused the fears and resentment of the military nobility, apprehensions strengthened by such arbitrary acts as the sultan’s arrest and imprisonment of the respected religious leader Miyān Bhu’ā. Ibrāhīm had already lost much prestige and military matériel in a disastrous conflict with the Rajput potentate of Mewar, Rānā Sāngha. Various rebellions of the Afghan commanders now erupted. That of Islām Khan, son of A‘zam Humāyūn Sarwānī, was subdued, but a focus of opposition arose around Bahādur Khan Nuhānī in Bihar, where Bahādur Khan himself assumed the title of Sultān Muhammad and minted his own coins. Further, the commanders of Panjab wrote to the Mughal Bābur at Kabul in 1525, inviting him to invade India. Bābur occupied Lahore and came to face Ibrāhīm on the battlefield at Panipat (the first of three important battles in Indian history there) in April 1526. Despite an inferiority in numbers, Bābur’s effective use of his cavalry and of a protective laager of linked carts carried the day and Ibrāhīm was killed on the field, the only Delhi sultan thus to die. The Delhi Sultanate accordingly expired, with the ending of the Afghan line of the Lōdīs (although Afghan domination in northern India was to be briefly revived by the Sūrīs). It was eventually to be replaced by the Mughal empire created, after some vicissitudes, by Bābur’s son Humāyūn and his successors.\(^{32}\)

The Lōdī sultanate had provided prosperity and stability until Ibrāhīm’s failure to work with the Afghan nobility, who provided the military basis for the regime, brought about military defeat and the dissolution of the whole sultanate. There had been a considerable renaissance of learning during Sikandar’s reign, including the translation into Persian of Sanskrit works. He had encouraged the Persianization of the administration, which entailed a wider learning of Persian by its Hindu officials, some of whom attained a high degree of proficiency in that language. Sikandar had a particular interest in music. On the other hand, he had a reputation for fierce Sunni orthodoxy and intolerance towards the Hindus, despite the fact that his own mother was a Hindu. He had temples torn down, and erected in their place mosques and other buildings or else he turned them into caravanserais. At Nagarkot, he is said to have had idols broken up and the pieces used as butchers’ weights. The chance of securing more general support for the sultanate in northern India, outside the Muslim ruling class, was thereby lost. It was to be the Mughal Akbar who, half a century or so later, was to endeavour to establish a greater community of interest between rulers and ruled.\(^{33}\)

\(^{33}\) c-Abdu ’l-Halim, 1961; \(E F\), Lōdīs.
THE REGIONS OF SIND, BALUCHISTAN, MULTAN AND KASHMIR: THE HISTORICAL, SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC SETTING

N. A. Baloch and A. Q. Rafiqi

Contents

THE RULERS OF SIND, BALUCHISTAN AND MULTAN (750–1500) 298
The ʿAbbasid period and the Fatimid interlude (mid-eighth to the end of the tenth century) 298
The Period of the Ghaznavid and Ghurid Sultanates (eleventh and twelfth centuries) 301
The era of the local independent states 304
KASHMIR UNDER THE SULTANS OF THE SHĀH MĪR DYNASTY 310

* See Map 4, 5 and 7, pp. 430–1, 432–3, 437.

297
Part One

THE RULERS OF SIND, BALUCHISTAN AND MULTAN (750–1500)

(N. A. Baloch)

From 750 to 1500, three phases are discernible in the political history of these regions. During the first phase, from the mid-eighth until the end of the tenth century, Sind, Baluchistan and Multan – with the exception of the interlude of pro-Fatimid ascendency in Multan during the last quarter of the tenth century – all remained politically linked with the ʿAbbasid caliphate of Baghdad. (Kashmir was ruled, from the eighth century onwards, by the local, independent, originally non-Muslim dynasties, which had increasing political contacts with the Muslim rulers of Sind and Khurasan.) During the second phase – the eleventh and twelfth centuries – all these regions came within the sphere of influence of the powers based in Ghazna and Ghur. During the third phase – from the thirteenth to the early sixteenth century – they partly became dominions of the Sultanate of Delhi, which was in itself an extension into the subcontinent of the Central Asian power base. Simultaneously, local sultanates independent of Delhi also emerged. Besides, the explosion of Mongol power in Inner Asia had repercussions in these regions.

The ʿAbbasid period and the Fatimid interlude (mid-eighth to the end of the tenth century)

When the ʿAbbasids supplanted the Umayyads in 750, Sind, the easternmost province of the caliphate, included Makran and Turan and Qusdar (western and central Baluchistan), Sind proper (including Kachh) and Multan (southwestern Panjab). Further expansion and consolidation followed, beginning with the conquests of the caliph al-Mansūr’s (754–75) energetic governor, Ḥishām b. ʿAmr al-Taghlibī. During his six-year tenure of power (768–74), Ḥishām achieved several victories. Throughout the early ʿAbbasid period, Sind continued to receive regular governors and the province enjoyed internal peace. Later,
the authority of the caliphate grew weaker, leading to the establishment of some five independent Arab principalities in Mansura, Multan, Turan and Qusdar, Makran and Mashkey.

**THE HABBĀRĪ AMIRATE OF MANSURA**

In the strife that erupted in Sind in 841–2, the local chief ʿUmar b. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Habbārī emerged victorious. In 854 al-Mutawakkil appointed him as governor and he held this position during the caliph’s reign, but in the wake of the disorder following the death of al-Mutawakkil in 861, ʿUmar, though continuing to read the khutba (Friday worship oration) in the name of the ʿAbbasid caliph, established himself as an independent ruler in Mansura. Thus ʿUmar became the founder of the Habbārī dynasty. He, his son ʿAbd Allāh (who was ruling in 883) and his grandson ʿUmar (who was in power at the time that al-Masʿūdī visited Sind in 914–15) were effective rulers. Caravan routes from eastern Persia led to Mansura and further on into the subcontinent. During the tenth century, the capital of the Habbārīs continued to flourish, as confirmed by the reports of al-Istakhri, Ibn Hawqal and al-Maqdisī, who all visited it. In Mansura, the Habbārī dynasty lasted until 1025, when Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna overthrew their last ruler, Khafīf.

**THE BANū MUNABBĪH AMIRATE OF MULTAN**

The Banū Munabbīh, who claimed to be of Qurayshite stock, had established themselves in Multan at about the same time that the Habbārīs had done in Mansura. At the opening of the tenth century, Ibn Rusta was the first to report on the well-established rule of the Banū Munabbīh in Multan. According to a report recorded by al-Bīrūnī, one Muhammad b. al-Qāsim b. Munabbīh established himself in Multan after his victory there. He probably belonged to the house of Jahm b. Sāma al-Shāmī, who had allegedly settled in ‘Kashmir’ (sic) as far back as 712–14 and whose descendants had reportedly continued to flourish there. Muhammad b. al-Qāsim attained prominence in the later ninth century and wrested power, probably from a rebel deputy of the ʿAbbasids, around 861–4. He and his successors gave allegiance to the ʿAbbasids and recited the khutba in the caliph’s name. During their long dynastic rule, which remained unchallenged for over a century, the Banū Munabbīh brought power, prestige and prosperity to Multan, as confirmed by the geographers who visited it. After the middle of the tenth century, the power of the dynasty began to be eroded due to ‘Carmathian’ (i.e. pro-Fatimid) propaganda, which was gaining momentum. Thus it seems that the rule of the Banū Munabbīh came to an end during the years 982–5.

In Turan–Qusdar and Makran, the two westernmost divisions of Sind, central ʿAbbasid authority broke down earlier than in Mansura and Multan. ʿImrān al-Barmakī was the last ʿAbbasid governor who, under the caliph al-Muṭasim (833–42), had led his forces from
Mansura to Qusdar and asserted his authority in that turbulent region. But Imrān was killed in Mansura in 842; the provincial administration collapsed and the two amirates, Qusdar and Makran, and the third smaller one of Mashkey (see below), emerged as independent entities.

THE RULERS OF TURAN

Turan (central Baluchistan), with its capital at Qusdar (Khuzdar), was governed by the Habbārīs of Mansura until the end of the ninth century. Then, early in the tenth century, the chief Mughīra b. Ahmad established himself independently in Turan, changing its capital from Qusdar to Kijkanan (Kalat), a fertile district producing grapes, pomegranates and other winter fruit, but no dates. Mughīra did not recognize the supremacy of the Habbārīs since he read the khutba ‘only in the caliph’s name’. Mughīra was succeeded by his brother Muḥīn b. Ahmad, who ruled during the time in which Ibn Hawqal wrote (mid-tenth century). During his reign, the administration was far from satisfactory; his deputy, Abu ‘l-Qāsim al-Basrī, had appropriated all powers – administrative, judicial and military – and under these circumstances the radical, egalitarian sect of the Kharijites occupied the region soon afterwards. These hard-pressed sectarians had sought refuge in the far-away fringes of the caliphate ever since al-Muhallab b. Abī Sufra had expelled them from Iraq and southern Iran. From the ninth century onwards, they succeeded in establishing themselves in the regions between south-eastern Iran and Sind.

The Kharijites occupied Qusdar in about 971, set up their own principality and ruled independently, without recognizing the ‘Abbasid caliph. Writing in 982, the anonymous author of the Hudūd al-‘alam [The Limits of the World] observed that the residence of the ‘king of Turan’ was in Kijkanan (Kalat). The fact that soon afterwards, these ‘kings’ changed their capital from Kalat to Qusdar is confirmed by al-Maqdisī. That these just sovereigns were Kharijites who were then being called ‘caliphs’ is borne out by a contemporary report recorded by the qādī Abū ʿAlī al-Tanūkhī (d. 994), according to which a Kharijite ‘caliph’ was ruling the country from Qusdar, which was at that time (before 994) a stronghold of the Kharijites.

THE BANŪ MAḤDĀN DYNASTY OF MAKRAN

The Kharijites apparently became significant in Makran towards the end of the ninth century so that al-Masūdī observed, ‘Makran is the land of the lawless Kharijites.’ Soon afterwards, in about 951, Makran fell into their hands and the ruler ʿĪsā b. Maḥdān was called by the Indian title Mahārāj by the people. Coastal Makran had trade links with the
Indian towns of the littoral and the fact that Mahārāj meant ‘Supreme Sovereign’ led the Kharijite ruler to assert his independence by taking this exalted Indian title. Obviously, his being recognized as ‘Great King’ contravened the ʿAbbasid caliph’s position as sovereign. ʿIsā thus became a notable member of the independent Banū Maʿdān dynasty that ruled Makran from Kiz/Kej (Kech) for at least a century and a half, from Saffarid to Ghaznavid times.

MASHKEY

Situated between Kirman and Makran, the petty principality of Mashkey existed in the middle of the tenth century. Its independent ruler, Mudar b. Rajā’, read the khutba only in the name of the ʿAbbasid caliph. Later, by about 985–6, when al-Maqqāisi was writing, the principality seems to have been annexed by the ruler of Makran and to have become a part of the administrative district of Panjgur.

The Period of the Ghaznavid and Ghurid Sultanates (eleventh and twelfth centuries)

Under pressure from the strongly orthodox Sunni new powers of the Ghaznavids and then the Ghurids in what is now Afghanistan (see above, Chapters 5 and 8), neither the Kharijite rulers of Makran and Qusdar (who recognized no sovereign but God) nor the Multan rulers (who came to recognize the Fatimids of Egypt) were able to continue their sectarian independence much longer; they compromised by submitting when vanquished, but then reasserted their independence when left to themselves. In 971, when the Buyid ʿAdud al-Dawla’s military power prevailed in Tiz and Makran, the Maʿdānid ruler accepted Buyid suzerainty. After 977–8, however, with the decline in power of the Buyid dynasty and when Sebüktegin had attacked and annexed Qusdar, Maʿdān transferred his allegiance to the Ghaznavids, first to Sebüktegin and then to Sultan Mahmūd. However, Maʿdān soon involved himself in the politics of Central Asia. The Karakhanid conqueror of Bukhara, the Ilīg Nasr, entered into a secret pact with the ruler of Qusdar, stipulating that Maʿdān would rise in rebellion against Ghazna when the Karakhanid invaded Khurasan. This accordingly happened in 1011, but Sultan Mahmūd marched against him, laid siege to the town of Qusdar and seized the ruler, who now paid tribute and delivered fifteen elephants and a substantial indemnity in cash. In return, the sultan allowed him to retain his principality as a vassal of Ghazna.

On Maʿdān’s death in 1025, his younger son ʿīsā usurped power, forcing the elder son Abu ʿl-ʿAskar Husayn to flee to Sistan. In 1031 Sultan Masʿūd sent a powerful army
against Ėsā, who was killed. Abu 'l-Askar Husayn, who now succeeded him, eschewed Kharjijism, extended his power and read the *khutba* in Mas'ūd’s name. This prince was a man of learning, well-versed in medicine, and wrote a treatise on left-side hemiplegia (i.e. paralysis). He ruled Makran successfully and for a long time, until a date beyond 1058(?). After his death, one might assume that the Kharijite faction would have reasserted its power, but subsequently the Ghurid sultan Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muhammad (1173–1203) attacked and annexed Makran, putting an end to the local dynasty.

**MULTAN: THE FATIMID INTERLUDE**

Ismā'ili propaganda was introduced into Sind and Hind from Yemen in 883. In Sind it did not become effective while the Habbāris were ruling there. In Multan, the Fatimid *dā'īs* (propagandists) sent by al-Mu'izz (952–75) succeeded by the middle of the tenth century. In 965 al-Mu'izz wrote an encouraging letter and sent seven mission flags to the *dā'ī* Jalam, who subsequently gradually subverted the power of the Banū Munabbih. At the time when Ibn Hawqal was writing, power was still in the hands of the ‘Qurayshite ruler of the Banū Sāma’ (i.e. the Banū Munabbih). According to the report in the *Hudūd al-ʿālam*, by about 982 the Qurayshite ruler of the Banū Sāma dynasty was still ruling in Multan, but was reciting the *khutba* in the name of the Fatimid caliph. By then the pro-Fatimid forces under Jalam had presumably come to dominate, compelling the ruler to change allegiance from the ʿAbbasids to the Fatimids. Subsequently, during 982–5, Jalam attacked, defeated and killed the Banū Sāma ruler. This is to be inferred from the following statement of al-Maqdisī: ‘They read the *khutba* in the name of the Fatimid and do not do anything except by his order.’ He makes no mention of the Qurayshite/Banū Sāma/Banū Munabbih ruler in Multan, and also confirms that the famous Multan idol in the temple of the sun god was still there.

Jalam’s next target was this temple of Aditya. In order to gain sufficient power to fight back in case the destruction of the idol brought avenging forces from Kanawj and other Hindu states against him, he seems to have proceeded slowly. It was some time after 985 that Jalam destroyed the idol. According to the report preserved by al-Bīrūnī:

> Jalam broke the idol into pieces, killed its priests, converted the temple mansion, which stood on an elevated platform, into a new Jāmi’ Mosque, and ordered the old Jāmi’ Mosque to be shut down, from hatred against anything that had been built under the Umayyads.¹

It is not known how long Jalam governed Multan, but there being no further mention of him in any record, one can assume that he soon died or was eliminated by rival *dā'īs*. Shaykh

Hamīd, who was possibly heading a less intransigent faction, rose to power and won the confidence of Sebüktegin, who left him to rule Multan. But his grandson(? ) Dāwūd b. Nasr b. Hamīd later aligned himself with Anandpāl, the Hindūshāhī ruler of Wayhind, against Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna, who then stormed Multan in 1006. Dāwūd escaped, with his treasure, to an island in the Indus. The city elders in Multan sued for peace on payment of the tribute, which was granted. However, the Carmathians (pro-Fatimid elements) were not spared and their mosque was razed to the ground. The sultan appointed Sukhpāl, ‘the nephew of the Shah’ (of Kabul), as his governor and he himself hurried back to Khurasan to repel the Ilig Khan’s invasion. Thereupon, Dāwūd returned to Multan and wrested the fort from Sukhpāl. Early in 1011–12, as disturbances flared up again, Sultan Mahmūd attacked Multan, captured Dāwūd, imprisoned him and annexed Multan to the Ghaznavid sultanate.

Sultan Mahmūd’s two expeditions had broken the power of the pro-Fatimid elements in Multan, though some remained underground and continued to foment the occasional rebellion. Back in Egypt, with the disappearance of al-Hākim in 1017, the power of the Fatimids was shaken and consequently the strength of their agents in distant Multan also declined. Al-Hākim’s partisans of the Druze faction, founded by Hamza b. ʿAlī in 1017, made some attempts to reinvigorate pro-Fatimid elements in Multan through Bahāʾ al-Dīn al-Muqtanā. On Sultan Mahmūd’s death in 1030, al-Muqtanā found it opportune to revive contacts, and in 1034, addressed a letter to the influential local chief Ibn Sumar (i.e. ‘Rājpāl son of Sumar’, of the house of Abu ’l-Futūh or Abu ’l-Fat’h Dāwūd (see above, Chapter 5). But Ibn Sumar’s faction had already dissociated itself from pro-Fatimid elements and had gained the confidence of the new Ghaznavid sultan, Masʿūd, so that the Younger Dāwūd (al-Asghar) was granted a pardon and freed from prison on Ibn Sumar’s recommendation. In his letter, al-Muqtana praised Ibn Sumar and reminded him of the fidelity of his elders, Dāwūd al-Akbar and others, and, warning him not to be misled, urged him to rise and play an active role. Ibn Sumar’s response is not recorded, but the elements led by Dāwūd the Younger remained active underground and rose in open rebellion when they found the local administration weak. Thus on the death of Sultan Masʿūd in 1041, they succeeded for a while in capturing the fort of Multan, but fled before the forces dispatched by the new Sultan Mawdūd. The people of Multan surrendered the fort and agreed to perform the khutba in the names of the ʿAbbasid al-Qādir and of the Ghaznavid Mawdūd.

Subsequently, during the period of the Ghurid sultanate, Multan remained peaceful except for one rebellion attributed to the Carmathians, against whom Sultan Muʿizz al-Dīn Muhammad took action in 1175 and delivered Multan from their hands.
The era of the local independent states (thirteenth to early sixteenth century)

THE SULTANATE OF MAKRAN

The sultanate of Makran, with Kej as its capital, emerged out of the Ghaznavid/Ghurid dependencies of Makran and Qusdar by the turn of the twelfth century and included both the former amirates. In Jüzjānī’s Tabaqāt-i Nāṣirī, Tāj al-Dīn Abū Makārīm of Makran is referred to as a Malik of the two Ghurid sultans Ghiyāth al-Dīn and Muʿizz al-Dīn. The foundation for the emergence of the Makran sultanate was laid in the twelfth century by Malik Hasan, who was succeeded by his son Abu’l-Makārīm Khusraw Shah. The latter’s own two sons Tāj al-Dīn and Nusrat al-Dīn, after the death of Muʿizz al-Dīn in 1206 assumed the title of sultan and ruled jointly for a long period. With the integration of Makran and Qusdar, a strong power emerged with maritime and commercial trade links and the pastoral resources from the vast hinterland. The religious base of the society was apparently now orthodox Sunni. No one drank wine, but both the ʿĪds and the Nawrūz festivals were celebrated with enthusiasm. Both the Persian and the ‘Makrani’ (Baluchi) languages were used. With the Baluch as the backbone of their military power, the sultans of Makran were able to inflict a crushing defeat on the invading Oghuz. This victory added to the power and prestige of the Makran rulers, and Makran was soon compared to Khurasan. The rulers actively promoted maritime commerce, and merchants and mariners from Makran reached the east Asian shores. According to one tradition, the main port became popularly known as ‘Jawadar’ (Gwadar), i.e. gateway to Java. Among others, the learned Abū Is’hāq of Makran settled at Pasai in Sumatra, where he became known as Abū Is’hāq al-Makrānī al-Fāsī (i.e. of Makran and then of Pasai). Thus Makran, like Sind, contributed to the early commercial and cultural contacts between the region and South-East Asia.

The references in the court poet Sirājī’s panegyrics to the four sons of Sultan Tāj al-Dīn and the two sons of Sultan Nusrat al-Dīn indicate that the line of successors probably continued; there is nothing to show that Makran was under any other rulers up to the fourteenth century.

MULTAN UNDER NĀṢIR AL-DĪN QĀBĀCHA (1206–28)

After its annexation to the Ghurid sultanate, Multan became an administrative province of the succeeding Sultanate of Delhi. On Sultan Qutb al-Dīn’s death in 1210, Nāṣir al-Dīn Qābācha, the governor of Multan, became independent. He ruled successfully, extended his power and consolidated the kingdom; and he succeeded in blocking the Mongol inroads
into Multan which commenced with their pursuit of Sultan Jalāl al-Dīn Khwarazm Shāh in 1222. The Khwarazm Shah wanted a foothold in Multan, but Qabācha stood firm until the sultan left for Sind on his way to Iraq. In 1222 Qabācha faced the Mongols, who besieged the Multan citadel for forty days but failed to occupy it, and then withdrew. During Qabācha’s reign (1206–28), education developed and colleges were founded; his court became a rendezvous for the learned, and some of the earliest Persian works in the subcontinent, such as Āwfi’s literary anthology Lubāb al-albāb and ʿAlī Kūfī’s Fat’h-nāma on Sind history (translated from Arabic) were produced. In 1228 Sultan Iltutmish of Delhi attacked Qabācha, and on the latter’s death in that same year, Multan was once again annexed to Delhi.

THE LĀNGĀH SULTANATE OF MULTAN (1437–1525)

With Iltutmish’s victory, Multan became a province of the Delhi Sultanate and remained so for the next two centuries. Timur’s sack of Delhi in 1398 shook the sultanate and led to the collapse of the central administration and the province of Multan passed into the hands of the Lāngāhs and the whole of Sind was possessed by the sultans of Sind.

There is much confusion in the sources about the identity of the Lāngāhs and the beginning of their rule in Multan. According to the historian Abūl Haqq, the author of the Tārīkh-i Haqqī (written in 1592–3), with the decline of the power of the sultans of Delhi, Budhan Khan of Sind, the chief of the Baluch tribe of the Lāngāh, assembled his force at Uchch and invaded Multan. He expelled the khān-i khānān, occupied the fort, took the title of Mahmūd Shāh in 1437 and became the first ruler of the independent state of Multan. He ruled for sixteen years and laid the foundations of the Lāngāh sultanate. His son Sultan Qutb al-Dīn succeeded him and further consolidated its power. On his death in 1469, his son Shāh Husayn ascended the throne and became the most illustrious ruler of the line, bringing peace and prosperity to the country during the thirty years of his reign (1469–98). Shāh Husayn increased his military power by inviting and settling in his territory a considerable body of Baluch. He wrested the principality of Shorkot from Ghāzī Khan and extended his control up into Chiniot. His prestige rose when he repelled the invasion of Multan by the Delhi forces under Bārbak Shāh and Tātār Khan. However, his grandson Mahmūd was killed when the ruler of Sind, Shāh Hasan Arghūn, invaded Multan in 1525: having lasted for almost ninety years, the rule of the Lāngāhs came to an end.

SŪMARĀ RULE IN SIND (c. 1050–1360)

The Sūmarās, who had long been settled in south-western Sind had, through their fraternization and alliance with the Banū Tamīm Arabs in Sind, gained political influence under
the Habbārī rulers of Mansura. With the fall of the last Habbārī ruler Khafīf in 1025, Sind came under Ghaznavid rule, though effective authority was not maintained. During the reign of Sultan ʿAbd al-Rashīd (1049–52), the Sūmarās met together in their stronghold of Thari (in the present Badin district) and declared their independence. They chose a leader called Sūmarā as their first ruler.

The exact chronology of the Sūmarā rulers is obscure. According to later histories and traditions, there were between nine and twenty-one rulers, but no unanimity exists concerning their regnal periods. As verified by external sources, the earliest Sūmarā ruler whose name figures in history was Sinān al-Dīn Chanesar, who was ruling Daybul (in southern Sind) in 1224 when Jalāl al-Dīn Khwarazm Shah passed through Sind. The last Sūmarā ruler, Hamīr, son of Doda, was killed by the Sammās some time before 1365 (see below).

The Sūmarā amirate of Sind lasted for more than three centuries (c. 1050–1360). For most of this period the Sūmarās held southern Sind and the territories east of the Indus, which extended northwards and halfway to Multan, and included the western part of Bikaner and Cutch in the south. At the peak of their power, during the reign of Hamīr I, their rule is said to have extended up to Marwar in the south-east and to the boundaries of Gujarat in the south. The later Sūmarā rulers remained under constant pressure from the sultans of Delhi, who controlled Sind’s northern provinces of Bakhar and Siwistan and, on occasion, intervened in the Sūmarās’ internecine disputes. In general, Sind under the Sūmarās remained independent and the people united in resisting outside interference even when their rulers were at odds with each other. This is confirmed by the tradition which is epitomized in the epic of Dodo Chanesar. Composed in different versions and narrated by professional minstrels over the centuries, it may be counted among the world’s most famous epics. The Sūmarā period was one to which Sind tradition traces the origin of some of the great romances and stories, which became the pillars on which the edifice of classical Sindhi poetry and literature rests.

The fall of the Sūmarās was mainly due to their dwindling economic base. Their prosperity had depended on the waters of the Puran channel, which was then the main course of the Indus. As the Indus began to flow along a more westerly course, the volume of water in the Puran diminished, adversely affecting the agricultural prosperity of the Sūmarā lands. On the other hand, the changed course brought prosperity and power to the Sammās who supplanted them.

THE SAMMĀ SULTANATE OF SIND (1350–1520)

The sultanate was founded by the Sammā chief Unnar, an erstwhile functionary of the Delhi Sultanate. He first rose in revolt in Shewan in 1333–4, a few days before Ibn Battūta’s
arrival. Later, he assumed the title of Sultan Firūz al-Dīn and became the undisputed ruler of Thatta after Sultan Muhammad b. Tughluq of Delhi died while attacking Thatta in 1351, so that the imperial army returned to Delhi. To preserve their independence, the Sammā rulers now had to contend with pressure from both Delhi and Central Asia.

Unnar was jointly succeeded by his son Sadr al-Dīn Shāh Bānbhnia and his brother Alā’ al-Dīn Shāh Jūnā. In order to weaken the authority of Delhi, which was exercised through the governor in Multan, Bānbhnia aligned himself with the Mongols who were attacking Multan from the north. He also remained on the offensive internally against the Sūmarās who ruled eastern Sind (i.e. the territory to the east of the Indus). He finally attacked and killed Hamīr, son of Doda and last Sūmarā ruler, who was supported by the governor of Multan on orders from Delhi. In 1365 Sultan Firūz Sh āh of Delhi marched against Thatta, but a political settlement was reached when Bānbhnia surrendered in 1366. The sultan agreed that the Sammās could rule Sind as his vassals, but he held Bānbhnia and later his son Tamāchī as hostages in Delhi. On Firūz Sh āh’s death in 1388, however, Delhi lost control over the Sind province and an independent sultanate of Sind became a reality.

Beginning with Unnar, fifteen Sammā ‘community chiefs’ (jāms) ruled as sultans of Sind from Thatta.2 Tamāchī, who returned from Delhi in 1388 (Bānbhnia having died on the way), ruled with the title of Sultan Rukn al-Dīn Sh āh. The next illustrious ruler was Jām Tughluq Jūnā (1428–53), who, in order to counterbalance Delhi, entered into matrimonial relations with the neighbouring sultans of Gujarat. The alliance between the two littoral sultanates gave an impetus to maritime trade. Numerous allusions in the classical Sindhi poetry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries show that Sindhi merchants and mariners frequented Java and penetrated beyond Perlak, the capital of the Samundara state in eastern Sumatra. The last illustrious ruler of the line was Sultan Jām Niz ām al-Dīn Sh āh. During his long reign (1462–1508), education spread and commerce and agriculture progressed; and under the commander-in-chief Daryā Khan, a scion of the Lāshārī (Baluch) community, who enabled the bulk of the Baluch soldiery to become the backbone of the army, the sultanate became militarily strong.

The political events in Central Asia during the latter half of Sultan Jām Niz ām al-Dīn’s reign had an impact on the affairs of Sind. In the wake of the Thirty Years’ Rind- Lāshārī War, the Sind army had occupied Sibi while the Arghūns from Kandahar had reached Shal (Quetta) and had made incursions through the Bolan pass. The battle of Jālūgīr (in the Bolan pass), during which Muhammad Beg, brother of Shāh Beg Arghūn, was killed, proved decisive and the Arghūns never again attacked Sind during the lifetime of Sultan Jām Niz ām al-Dīn. After his death in 1508, however, the situation changed. Hard-pressed

2 See Baloch, 1954.
by Bābur in Kandahar, Shāh Beg Arghūn decided to attack Sind. After successful initial raids and the occupation of Sibi, Bakhar and Sehwan, he conquered Thatta in 1521. With Arghūn’s victory, the sovereignty of the Sammās in Sind comes to an end. The ruler Jām Fīrūz surrendered, but Arghūn allowed him to rule southern Sind from Thatta. In 1528, however, Jām Fīrūz fled to Gujarat and sought refuge with Sultan Bahādur Shāh.

THE BALUCH PEOPLE, THEIR MIGRATIONS AND THEIR PRINCIPALITIES (750–1500)

There are no written records concerning the origin of the Baluch people or the chronology of their migrations. Indirect evidence comes partly from the later histories but mainly from Baluch ethnography and their oral tradition, particularly as embodied in their classical poetry, although this imaginative material must obviously be used with caution.

The Baluch are not mentioned in Islamic geographic and historical sources until the tenth century, and then shortly afterwards, in Firdawsi’s Šah-nāma; they are usually linked with the Kūfīčis or Qufs as predatory peoples, apparently still pagan, living in the mountains of south-eastern Persia, from which they preyed on Muslim caravans. The Buyid and Ilyasid rulers of Fars and Kirman led punitive expeditions against them, and from then onwards they probably gradually became Islamized. In the eleventh century, they must have moved eastwards into what is now Baluchistan, doubtless after the stronger power of the Seljuqs took over Kirman and reduced the opportunities for raiding and banditry, i.e. after 1040. Since the central highlands of Baluchistan were by the eleventh century occupied by the non-Indo-Aryan, Dravidian Brahuis, the Baluch tended to bypass this region and make for the Indus valley, towards Sind, Multan and Panjab. Linguistic evidence shows that Baluch was originally a northern dialect of Iranian, placing the homeland of the Baluch people somewhere south of the Caspian Sea; their migrations into south-eastern Persia may have been due to pressure from the warfare of the later Sasanians with the Hephthalites which racked eastern Persia, although this is wholly undocumented.

The last phase of substantial Baluch migrations took place at the turn of the twelfth century and continued into the wake of the upheavals caused by the Turkish–Mongol invasions from Central Asia. According to one tradition, forty-four bālāks (clans) moved. In effect, this was a mass exodus, from Sistan and Kirman to their main concentration in Makran. On the one hand, the Baluch strength there became the backbone of the sultanate of Makran, and on the other, the increase of the Baluch population in Makran led to an extensive migration south-eastwards. According to tradition, five main sub-stocks from the progeny of Jalāl Khan, namely Rind, Lāshārī, Kora’ī, Hoat and Jatoi, became identifiable at
this stage, and from their power base of the sultanate of Makran they sought new pastures and new horizons.

THE PRINCIPALITY OF KALMAT

The Hoat, who were the first to leave, followed a twofold movement; those who went southwards, along the coastal belt, established their principality in the central littoral region, with Kalmat as their capital. They actively participated in sea trade, and Kalmat became a prosperous state and served as a supporting base for the onward advance of the later Kalmati group into the Habb and Indus valleys.

PRINCIPALITIES OF THE DERAJAT

The other Hoat sub-stocks of the Dodā’īs and the Chandīās, as also the Korā’īs and the Jatois, migrated north-eastwards. Avoiding the colder highlands of Kalat, they descended from the Mullah pass into the plains of Kachchi-Gandava and from Harbab and other passes into the Indus valley. The Dodā’īs, migrating further north, eventually reached and occupied the eastern slopes of the Sulayman mountains. By the end of the fifteenth century, under their chief Suhrāb Khan Dodā’ī, they were powerful enough to form the core of the military power of the Lāngāh sultanate of Multan (see above). They also vigorously developed the settled areas and founded the flourishing market towns of Dera Ghazi Khan (1494) and Dera Isma’il Khan, the capitals of their two principalities, which the Hoat-Dodā’ī clan ruled for some two centuries.

THE PRINCIPALITY OF KALAT

Leaving Makran a century after the Hoat, the clans of the Rind-Lāsharī confederacy reached central Baluchistan by the middle of the fifteenth century. Kalat was already a Baluch principality, having been conquered by the early migrating Baluch tribes. It was then ruled by Mīr ʿUmar, son of Miro of the Mirwarri dynasty of the Brahuis. When Mīr ʿUmar blocked the Rind–Lāshari advance, he was killed in the ensuing battle and Kalat was thus occupied and ruled by the Rind–Lāsharī confederacy. Because of its cold climate and meagre resources, inadequate to sustain the bulk of its people, the confederacy does not seem to have stayed in Kalat for long. The Rind and allied clans descended into the plains of Sibi through the Bolan pass, while the Lāsharīs and their allied clans, passing through the Mullah pass, spread into the plains of the Kachhi–Gandava country. There the Rinds, led by Mīr Chākar, and the Lāsharīs, led by Mīr Gwāhrām, quarrelled in a dispute concerning horse racing. This resulted in the long-drawn-out battles of the Thirty Years’ War, which became
the main theme of classical Baluch poetry. The Rinds sought help from the Timurids of Herat, and Mîr Chākar or his emissary is said to have visited the court of Sultan Husayn Bayqara (1469–1506). The Lāsharīs received support from the Sammā ruler of Sind, Jām Nizām al-Dīn (1462–1508), whose commander-in-chief Daryā Khan, alias Mubārak Khan, was a scion of the Lāsharī family. The Thirty Years’ War sapped the energies of the once powerful Rind-Lāsharī confederacy. The Aṛghūns, who ruled Kandahar on behalf of Herat and were supporting the Rinds, found it opportune to extend their power into the plains of Sibi and eventually into Sind. Under pressure, the Rinds and the Lāsharīs disengaged, the Lāsharīs going to Thatta and thence to Gujarat and Mîr Chākar leading his people to the Multan region.

Part Two

KASHMIR UNDER THE SULTANS OF THE ŠĀH MĪR DYNASTY (1339–1561)

(A. Q. Rafīqī)

It is probable that before the first Muslim sultanate – known as the Šāh Mīr dynasty – was established in Kashmir, Muslims had already settled the area, but the process only accelerated after the establishment of the dynasty in 1339. The Muslim invaders, first Arabs and then Turks, had invaded Kashmir on many occasions, but failed to conquer it. In 713, when the Arab general, Muhammad b. al-Qāsim, occupied Multan, he was said to have marched against ‘the frontiers of Kashmir, called Panj Nāhiyat’, but any putative threat to Kashmir was removed when Muhammad was recalled by the caliph al-Walīd I (705–15) to his court. Later, some time after 757, Hishām b. Amr al-Ṭaghlibī, the Arab governor of Sind, in vain attempted to conquer the valley of Kashmir.

Although the mountains proved barriers to would-be conquerors, they did not prevent adventurers and refugees from entering Kashmir. Āli b. Hamīd al-Kūfī, for example, states in the much later source of the Chach-nāma that Muhammad Alāfī, an Arab mercenary who had served Dāhīr (d. 712), the ruler of Sind, sought refuge in Kashmir. The ruler of Kashmir, Chandrāpīḍa, received him well and bestowed on him the territory of Shakalbar. After Alāfī’s death, his estate was inherited by one Jahm, who, according to al-Kūfī, built many
mosques there. This account, if true, would imply that there were a number of Muslims already in Kashmir by that time.

We do not, however, find concrete contemporary information regarding Muslim influence until the early eleventh century. Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna invaded Kashmir on two occasions, in 1014 and 1016, but his efforts to penetrate the valley were defeated by the strong fortresses of Loharkot and a timely snowfall. According to the Ghaznavid historian, Abu ’l-Fadl Bayhaqī, however, Mahmūd – while in pursuit of Narojaipāl (Trilochanpāl), who had received military assistance from Samgrāmrāja, the ruler of Kashmir (1003–28) – plundered one of the valleys to the south of Kashmir and converted a large number of its people to Islam. Kalhana’s twelfth-century metrical chronicle of Kashmir, the Rājatarangini, also describes this invasion, but does not speak of a conversion to Islam. The statement of Bayhaqī is doubtless an exaggeration.

It is, however, possible that some of Mahmūd’s soldiers, finding it difficult to cross the mountains towards the plains of India, stayed behind and settled in Kashmir. It is after these Turkish invasions that Kalhana refers, for the first time, to the presence of Turkish Muslim soldiers in Kashmir when describing the reign of Harsa (1089–1111); later rulers also employed Turkish mercenaries. From the account of the Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, it appears that by the end of the thirteenth century, there was a colony of Muslims in Kashmir, for he says, ‘The people of the province [Kashmir] do not kill animals nor spill blood; so if they want to eat meat they get the Saracens who dwell among them to play the butcher.’

The Hindu rulers of Kashmir seem to have been munificent and hospitable to the Muslim soldiers of fortune, who continued to enter the valley until the establishment of Muslim rule; it was one of these Muslim adventurers, Shāh Mīr, who established the first Muslim sultanate in Kashmir. The Kashmiri and Mughal historians recount different legends about the ancestry of Shāh Mīr. According to Jonarāja, Shāh Mīr was the descendant of Pārtha (Arjuna) of Mahābhārata fame. Abu ’l-Fadl ʿAllāmī, Nizām al-Dīn and Firishta also state that Shāh Mīr traced his descent to Arjuna, the basis of their account being Jonarāja’s Rājatarangini, which Mullā ʿAbd al-Qādir Badāʿūnī translated into Persian at Akbar’s orders. It is likely that either Jonarāja, in order to glorify the family of his patron (Zayn al-ʿĀbidīn, a direct descendant of Shāh Mīr: see below), or Shāh Mīr, after coming to the throne, worked out an apocryphal genealogy connecting himself with the legendary heroes of the past; this was a common practice with rulers and dignitaries of those days. According to some Persian chronicles of Kashmir, Shāh Mīr was a descendant of the rulers of Swat, but it is more probable that his ancestors were of Turkish or Persian origin and had

3 Yule and Cordier, 1903, p. 167.
migrated to Swat. Shāh Mīr arrived in Kashmir in 1313, along with his family, during the reign of Sūhadeva (1301–20), whose service he entered. In subsequent years, through his tact and ability, Shāh Mīr rose to prominence and became one of the important personalities of the time. Later, after the death in 1338 of Udayanadeva, the brother of Sūhadeva, he was able to assume the kingship himself and thus laid the foundation of permanent Muslim rule in Kashmir. Dissensions among the ruling classes and foreign invasions were the two main factors which contributed towards the establishment of Muslim rule in Kashmir. Because of the long period of weak reigns and internal troubles, the Lavanyas and Dāmaras (the local chiefs) had become the most powerful element in the valley; they continually rose in rebellion and prevented the growth of a strong centralized government. Sūhadeva seems to have played off these chiefs against each other and thereby established his authority over the whole of Kashmir. But at the same time, he alienated the Brahmans, the traditional class of officials, by imposing taxes on them.

Meanwhile, in 1320, Zuljū or Dhu ’l-Qadr Khan invaded Kashmir at the head of a large army. The sources regarding the origin of Zuljū are not unanimous. According to Jonarāja, he was a ‘commander of the army of the great King Karmmasena’ (who is unidentified). Elsewhere, however, Jonarāja calls Zuljū ‘the king of the mlechchhas’, meaning that he was a Muslim. The Mughal historian Abu ’l-Fadl ʿAllāmī holds that Zuljū was the ‘chief commander’ of the ruler of Kandahar, and Nizām al-Dīn and Firishta call him the mīr-bakhsh (paymaster-general) of Kandahar. The Persian chronicles of Kashmir assert that Zuljū was a Mongol from Turkistan, which could be correct since the Mongols had not only repeatedly invaded Kashmir prior to this time, but, if we believe Rashīd al-Dīn, had even succeeded in temporarily subjugating the country. The chiefs did not come to the aid of Sūhadeva and he was left alone to face the invader. He tried to save his kingdom by paying the Mongols a large sum of money to withdraw from the country; but Zuljū’s appetite for plunder merely increased. Sūhadeva himself fled to Kishtwar, leaving the people at the mercy of the invader. The Mongols plundered and enslaved the people, burnt down buildings and destroyed crops. After a stay of eight months, Zuljū left the valley through the Banihal pass, where he perished along with his prisoners in a heavy snowfall. Famine was the natural consequence of the wholesale destruction of the stores of grain and of standing crops by the invading army.

Zuljū’s invasion proved to be a turning-point in the history of Kashmir and contributed towards the establishment of Muslim rule there, for Rinchana rose to power in its aftermath. He was originally from Ladakh, where his father had been chief. Fearing an attack on his life, Rinchana had sought refuge in Kashmir, where he was employed by Sūhadeva’s commander-in-chief, who had shut himself up in the fort of Lar during Zuljū’s invasion.
After Zuljū’s departure, this commander, Râmchandra, tried to establish his own authority, but Rinchana treacherously had him murdered and his family imprisoned, and seized power himself.

The fact that Rinchana was able to rise from the position of a refugee to that of a sovereign clearly demonstrates the state of anarchy and discord which prevailed in Kashmir at the time. Rinchana, however, proved an able ruler and restored peace and prosperity to the country. The most important event of his reign was his conversion to Islam, which has been variously recorded. According to Jonarāja, Rinchana wanted to become a Hindu, but, on the grounds that he was a ‘Bhotta’ (Tibetan Buddhist), the Brahman Devavāmī refused to initiate him into Hinduism. This story seems to have been invented by Jonarāja, however, resentful that Rinchana had accepted Islam, for, if Rinchana had wished to become a Hindu, there should have been no difficulty for him, especially since he was a king. According to a popular version of the story, supported by most of the medieval Muslim scholars of Kashmir, Rinchana accepted Islam because of ‘divine grace’. It is said that after Rinchana came to the throne, he held discussions with both Hindu and Buddhist priests, in order to ascertain the ‘Truth’, but none could satisfy him. Finally, he decided to accept the religion of the first person whom he should see the next morning. That person was Sayyid Sharaf al-Dīn, a Suhrawardī Sufi saint, who at the time was offering prayers near the royal palace. Rinchana immediately went to him, and, after inquiring about his religion, accepted Islam.

In reality, it is more probable that Rinchana’s conversion to Islam was prompted by political reasons. In the absence of co-operation from the Hindus, only the Muslims in Kashmir would support Rinchana’s newly acquired kingdom. It is not, therefore, unlikely that Shāh Mīr, who, according to Jonarāja, was ‘a lion among men’, persuaded Rinchana to accept Islam. Abu’l-Fadl Ṭalāmī, who made a careful study of the history of Kashmir, confirms the fact that Rinchana accepted Islam because of his intimacy and association with Shāh Mīr, whom he appointed his minister. His decision to embrace Islam might also have been influenced by the penetration of Islam into the countries outside Kashmir, particularly with the conversion to Islam of the Mongol Il Khanid Ghazan Khan in Persia in 1295. Whatever the truth, Rinchana’s conversion to Islam must be seen in a wider context, and not just as the result of either a Hindu refusal to take him into their fold or of a chance meeting with Sayyid Sharaf al-Dīn. Rinchana (or Sadr al-Dīn, the Muslim name which he adopted) died in 1323. Soon after his death, Hindu rule was once again established in Kashmir under Udayanadeva, the brother of Sūhadeva, who nevertheless bestowed the territory of Kramarājya and other districts on Shāh Mīr’s two sons, Ṭalī Shīr and Jamshīd.

Meanwhile, Kashmir was once again threatened by a foreign invasion. According to Jonarāja, the invader was ‘Achala’, supported by ‘the lord of Mugdhapura’, whom it is not
possible to identify. The Persian chronicles assert, however, that it was an army of the Turks \((lashkar-i turk)\). Modern scholars have not identified the Turks of these chronicles, but it seems likely that they were Turco-Mongols who had previously, and on several occasions, invaded the valley. The incompetent Udayanadeva fled to Ladakh, leaving his wife Kotā Rānī to face the invader. With the help of Shāh Mīr and Bhikshana, a Hindu noble, she repulsed the enemy. After the enemy had withdrawn, Udayanadeva returned and regained the throne, but his cowardly flight had greatly impaired his prestige. His relations with Shāh Mīr did not remain cordial and he began to suspect his loyalty. Because of his heroic stand against the invader, Shāh Mīr had become exceedingly popular among the people. As a result, he became politically ambitious and, according to Jonarāja, he ‘did not deem the king even as grass’. He had already taken steps to win over the leading chiefs to his side. He bestowed on them his daughter and granddaughters in marriage and made large gifts to them, waiting for an opportunity to assume the kingship himself. It came soon, in 1338, as Kotā Rānī took the reins of government into her own hands after the death of Udayanadeva. Realizing the extent of Shāh Mīr’s ambition, she raised Bhikshana to prominence as a counterpoise to him and transferred the capital from Srinagar, where Shāh Mīr had a considerable following, to Andarkot.

The rise to power of Bhikshana was an open challenge to Shāh Mīr. He did not, however, make his feelings public, but feigned illness and soon removed his political rival by having him assassinated. Later, Shāh Mīr sent a proposal of marriage to Kotā Rānī, which she rejected, perhaps thinking it beneath her dignity to marry a man who had been in her service. After Shāh Mīr, with the help of the chiefs, successfully besieged her, however, she surrendered and accepted the proposal of marriage. Even so, as she had married him under pressure, Shāh Mīr suspected her loyalty and imprisoned her. He ascended the throne himself in 1339, under the title of Sultan Shams al-Dīn.

Shāh Mīr’s coup firmly established Muslim rule in Kashmir. The details of the administrative machinery that he created are not known, but drastic changes cannot have been made at that time. The Muslim community of Kashmir was a minority, with no outside contacts or support. Power remained, as before, in the hands of the Hindu chiefs, with whose help Shāh Mīr had established himself on the throne. In order to increase the number of his supporters and to check the ambitious chiefs, who had been the main cause of confusion and disorder in the preceding reigns, Shāh Mīr patronized the families of the Chaks and Magres, who were of indigenous origin. According to Jonarāja, Shāh Mīr made gifts to certain chiefs; it seems that, following the pattern of the Turkish sultans of Delhi, Shāh Mīr assigned \(iqtā\)s (land grants) to his supporters.
Shāh Mīr was succeeded in 1342 by his eldest son, Jamshīd, who had gained considerable experience in the art of administration during the reigns of his father and Udayanadeva. However, in the field of statesmanship he was no match for his younger brother, Ālī Shīr, who won over a number of important nobles and deposed him within a year (1343); he died two years later. Ālī Shīr styled himself Sultan Ālā’ al-Dīn. He ruled for about twelve years, but very little is known about his reign. From Jonarāja’s account, it appears that he was a just and able ruler. He founded the town of Ālā’ al-Dīnpura, now a part of Srinagar, and made it his capital. He died in 1355 and was succeeded by his son Shīvavamika, who assumed the title of Shihāb al-Dīn. Shihāb al-Dīn was one of the ablest rulers of the Shāh Mīr dynasty. From a military point of view, his reign has been described as the most glorious epoch in the history of Kashmir. He not only curbed the growing power of the feudal chiefs and consolidated his position, but also undertook military expeditions.

After Lalitāditya (724–61), Shihāb al-Dīn was the first ruler of Kashmir whose army campaigned outside the kingdom. Jonarāja and the Persian chronicles of Kashmir have given a highly exaggerated account of his conquests; the Kashmiri chroniclers implausibly attribute to Shihāb al-Dīn the conquest of territories such as Pakhli, Swat, Sind, Multan, Kabul, Ghazna, Kandahar, Badakhshan and some parts of Transoxania. It is much more feasible that he conquered and annexed to his kingdom (as is also claimed) Baltistan and Ladakh. His most memorable campaign, however, is said to have been launched against Fīrūz Shāh Tughluq of Delhi, with an encounter on the banks of the Sutlej in which neither side secured a decisive victory: the peace agreement allotted the territories from Sirhind to Kashmir to Shihāb al-Dīn, and the rest, lying to the east, to Fīrūz Shāh; and marriage alliances were also contracted. The Kashmiri chronicles do not corroborate, whether directly or indirectly, Shihāb al-Dīn’s supposed external conquests. Moreover, bearing in mind the geographic location of Kashmir and the limited resources and numerical strength of its army, such vast conquests were impossible. In fact, the chronicles magnified his military exploits, which must have been limited to Gilgit and Baltistan in the north, Ladakh in the east and Kishtwar, Jammu and other hill states in the south.

Shihāb al-Dīn was undoubtedly a great ruler who governed his kingdom efficiently. In 1360 the valley suffered badly from a devastating flood. The sultan provided prompt relief and, in order to prevent similar future calamities, built a new town on higher ground near Kohi-Maran, which he named Lakshminagar, after his queen Lakshmi. However, some of his measures were less conducive to the welfare of his people; thus he ordered hānjīs (boatmen) to serve him gratis for seven days every month. Towards the end of his reign he came under the influence of Lasa, the daughter of Queen Lakshmi’s sister, who succeeded
not only in alienating the sultan from his queen, but also managed to have the sultan’s two sons exiled. The last days of Shihâb al-Dîn were not happy and he died in 1373.

Shihâb al-Dîn was succeeded by his younger brother Qutb al-Dîn (Hindâl), who was an efficient and highly cultured ruler. It was during his reign that the great Persian saint and scholar Sayyid ʿAlî Hamadânî (1314–85) arrived in Kashmir in 1381 and was, with a large number of his followers, warmly received by the sultan. Sayyid ʿAlî travelled widely in the valley and asked a number of his prominent disciples to settle in places that were great Hindu centres of the time. These followers established khânqâhs (dervish convents), which led to the emergence of a whole network of centres for the preaching and teaching of Islam. Thus Sayyid ʿAlî’s arrival gave a great impetus to the spread of Islam in Kashmir. Because of their different attitudes towards non-Muslims, however, relations between Qutb al-Dîn and Sayyid ʿAlî did not remain cordial. At the time, the majority of the Kashmiri people were non-Muslims and high government officials were also Hindus. Thus political exigency demanded that the sultan should follow a policy of conciliation towards his non-Muslim subjects. The intransigent Sayyid ʿAlî did not approve of this, and finding that the sultan was not responsive to his teachings, left the valley in 1385.

Qutb al-Dîn died in 1389 and was succeeded by his son Sikandar (who was a minor), with the latter’s mother, Queen Sûra, acting as regent. She appears to have been a woman of courage and ability, but by the time Sikandar took over the reins of government, his chief minister Râî Magre had grown ambitious and powerful and soon openly challenged the authority of the sultan. However, the latter marched against him and Râî Magre was captured and imprisoned.

It was during Sikandar’s reign that another wave of Sufi saints and ʿulamâ’ arrived, headed by Mîr Muhammad Hamadânî (1372–1450), the son of Sayyid ʿAlî, who arrived in Kashmir in 1393. Mîr Muhammad’s arrival in Kashmir marked a turning-point in its history. In the early years of his reign, Sikandar had followed the policy of tolerance towards non-Muslims as practised by his predecessors, but after the arrival of Mîr Muhammad, his attitude changed and a strictly orthodox policy was introduced. The selling of wine, (public) dancing of women, music and gambling were prohibited and the jîzya (poll tax) on non-Muslims was imposed for the first time. Hindus were prevented from applying the tilak (religious mark) on their foreheads and the custom of sati (immolation of a Hindu widow on her husband’s funeral pyre) was banned. Thus Jonarâja writes, ‘The good fortune of the subjects left them and the king forgot his kingly duties and took delight, day and night, in breaking images.’

When Timur invaded India in 1398, however, Sikandar showed great maturity as a statesman. In order to avert the invasion of his kingdom, he sent an envoy to Timur
professing submission. Timur was satisfied with this and directed the envoy to ask Sikan-
dar to join him at Dipalpur. Accordingly, Sikandar left Srinagar, but upon reaching Jabhan,
Timur’s ministers demanded a contribution of 30,000 horses and 10,000 durusts of gold,
and he returned to Kashmir to collect the items demanded. When Timur came to hear of
this, he reprimanded his ministers for having demanded a tribute far beyond the capacity
of the Kashmiri ruler’s resources. He informed Sikandar that he should merely present
himself to the conqueror on the banks of the Indus. Upon receiving this message, Sikandar
again started out from Srinagar, but on reaching Baramulla, he learnt that Timur had
already crossed the Indus; hence he returned to Srinagar, providence having saved Kashmir
from a great scourge.

After the death of Sikandar in 1413, his eldest son Mîr Khan ascended the throne with
the title of ۚAlî Shâh. ۚAlî Shâh was ignorant of the art of government and was dom-
inated by his chief minister, Sûha Bhatta (Sayf al-Dîn), who had accepted Islam at the
hands of Mîr Muhammad during the reign of Sikandar. But Sûha Bhatta soon died in 1417
and shortly afterwards Shâhî Khan, ۚAlî Shâh’s younger brother, became chief minister.
Like his father, ۚAlî Shâh was very religious and decided to give up the throne to per-
form the pilgrimage to Mecca, entrusting the reins of government to Shâhî Khan. But upon
reaching Jammu, its ruler, who was his father-in-law, persuaded him to return to his king-
dom. In ۚAlî Shâh’s absence, Shâhî Khan had revealed his own ambition: he defeated ۚAlî
Shâh at Thana in 1420, and at Srinagar declared himself sultan, assuming the title of Zayn
al-ۚAbîdîn.

Zayn al-ۚAbîdîn was undoubtedly the greatest of all the Muslim sultans of Kashmir.
Although he followed his religious duties strictly and showed great respect for Muslim
saints and scholars, he did not allow this to interfere with the administration of the country.
Awe of that the government needed broad-based support, he allowed complete freedom of
worship to all his non-Muslim subjects. He offered high positions to able and meritorious
non-Muslims in the administration. He also celebrated the Hindu festivals and banned the
slaughter of cows. The jîzya, which had been imposed by Sikandar, was reduced from
2 pales to 1 nominal mîshâ and then dropped altogether. Other taxes which had been
imposed only on non-Muslims in previous reigns were also abolished. All Hindus who had
left the valley during the reign of Sikandar were encouraged to return to Kashmir and the
Brahmans were given rent-free lands. Zayn al-ۚAbîDîn thus proved to be the most tolerant
and benevolent Muslim ruler in the history of Kashmir. His concern for his people’s welfare
and development led him to lay out a large number of canals which helped not only to
reclaim marshy lands for cultivation, but also to provide irrigation facilities for parched
areas.
The sultan also reformed the administrative system. Corrupt judges were severely dealt with and venality among the officials was rooted out. Similarly, crime was ruthlessly put down. In order to prevent fraudulent property transactions, Zayn al-Ābidīn introduced a system of registration of important documents. He provided his subjects with a code of laws, which he had engraved on copper plates placed in villages and towns for the information of the general public. The prices of commodities were also inscribed on copper plates and placed in public markets. The sultan was a great patron of learning. He extended royal patronage to both Persian and Sanskrit scholars, establishing a translation bureau in which Sanskrit works were translated into Persian and vice versa. He took a keen interest in the spread of education. One of the famous centres of learning was the seminary of Shaykh Ismā‘īl Kubrawī, to which students came not only from India but also from Kabul and Transoxania. The sultan was a great builder: among his works were bridges and rest-houses, for the convenience of traders and travellers. His most magnificent edifice, however, was his palace at Rajdan (Nawshahr, in Srinagar), which, according to Mīrzā Haydar Dughlāt, had ‘twelve storeys, some of which contain fifty rooms, halls and corridors. The whole of this lofty structure is built of wood.’

It is, however, for Zayn al-Ābidīn’s encouragement of arts and crafts that his name has become immortal. He not only revived traditional arts and crafts, but also introduced a number of new ones, inviting teachers and craftsmen from Persia and Central Asia to train local artists and artisans. As a result of his liberal patronage, Kashmir became a ‘smiling garden of industry’. The country made significant progress in wood-carving, paper-making, papier mâché, and silk, shawl and carpet weaving. ‘In Kashmir one meets with all those arts and crafts’, writes Mīrzā Haydar, ‘which are in most cities uncommon . . . In the whole of Transoxania, except in Samarkand and Bukhara, these are nowhere to be met, while in Kashmir they are even abundant. This is all due to Zayn al-Ābidīn.’

The sultan had four sons. One of them, Ādam, had fallen out of favour when he revolted against his father in 1459; hence on Zayn al-Ābidīn’s death in 1470, another son, Hājjī Khan, ascended the throne with the title of Haydar Shāh. Haydar Shāh appointed his younger brother, Bahrām, as chief minister, and his own son, Prince Hasan Khan, as heir apparent. In order to strengthen his position, he married Prince Hasan to Hayāt Khātūn, the daughter of Sayyid Hasan Bayhaqī, a leading and powerful Sayyid. Yet Haydar Shāh soon succumbed to pleasure and drinking and neglected the administration of the kingdom. This resulted in internal unrest and the declaration of independence of the tributary states, such as Poonch, Rajauri and Jammu; Prince Hasan was asked to proceed against the rulers of these states and successfully subjugated them. In 1472, when Haydar Shāh died after a brief reign, the minister Malik Ahmad Yattū declared Prince Hasan as ruler, with himself
as chief minister. The new sultan (known as Hasan Shāh) began his reign well, but power struggles among the various groups of the nobility started as soon as he had come to the throne.

After the accession of Sultan Qutb al-Dīn in 1373, a large number of saints and scholars had started to pour into Kashmir from Persia and Central Asia. Warmly received by the rulers, these immigrants included the Bayhaqī Sayyids, who had arrived in Kashmir during the reign of Sultan Sikandar. The Hamadānī Sayyids – Sayyid Ālī and his son, Mīr Muhammad – and their disciples were mainly teachers and preachers and sought the help of the sultans and their nobles to spread the faith of Islam. But the Bayhaqī Sayyids generally focused their energy on establishing family ties with the ruling house and the high government officials; soon after their arrival in Kashmir, they made matrimonial alliances with the royal family, and with the help of these, they obtained important positions in the administration and also took an active part in the intrigues and rebellions which followed the death of Zayn al-Ābidīn.

Malik Ahmad Yattū, chief minister of Hasan Shāh, although very loyal to the sultan, was over-ambitious. He in time turned against the Bayhaqī Sayyids, who, because of their relationship with Hasan Shāh, had secured a commanding position in the state administration. But before taking on the Sayyids, Malik Ahmad Yattū strengthened his position by marrying his adopted son, Tāzī Bhatt, to the sister of Jahāngīr Magre, the commander-in-chief of the army; Tāzī Bhatt now became the leading figure in the anti-Sayyid campaign. The sultan, fearing an open revolt, exiled all the leading members of the Bayhaqī family, but eventually the Bayhaqī Sayyids were recalled from Delhi and Sayyid Hasan Bayhaqī became chief minister.

Like his father, Sultan Hasan Shāh was a heavy drinker. When the sultan died, on 19 April 1484, Sayyid Hasan Bayhaqī placed his own 7-year-old grandson, Muhammad Shāh (the son of Hasan Shāh and Hayāt Khātūn), on the throne. With the accession of Muhammad Shāh, Kashmir witnessed, on the one hand, a bitter struggle for power between the Kashmiri nobility and the Bayhaqī Sayyids, and, on the other, a civil war between Muhammad Shāh and a rival claimant, Fat’h Khan. For over a quarter of a century, complete confusion and anarchy, involving virtually the entire nobility, existed in the valley.

The Bayhaqī Sayyids, who now enjoyed absolute power, began to harass the prominent Kashmiri nobles. In retaliation, in 1484, the nobles made a surprise attack, killing fifteen Bayhaqī Sayyids, including Sayyid Hasan, the chief minister, who was now succeeded in this office by his son Sayyid Muhammad. The Kashmiri nobles soon reorganized and made another attack on the Sayyids, defeating them and forcing them to leave the country once again, but soon succumbed to internal discord with a series of intrigues and coups.
Eventually, Fat’h Khan (who ruled as Fat’h Shâh) became sultan of Kashmir, actually for the second time in 1505, and appointed Shams Chak as his chief minister. But rivals procured Shams Chak’s murder, making Müsa Raina chief minister in his place. Müsa Raina was an able administrator, but since he had been converted to Shi’ism by Mîr Shams al-Dîn Īrāqî, many Sunni nobles turned against him and he was killed while trying to flee from the valley. Thus religious differences were added to the mêlée of personal conflicts. In 1514 Fat’h Shâh was deposed and Muhammad Shâh came to the throne for the third time. He had only ruled for one year when the Chak nobles, headed by Kâji Chak, dethroned him and caused him to flee to Panjab. Fat’h Shâh now became sultan for the third time in 1515, but died in exile shortly afterwards. Muhammad Shâh, already on his way to Kashmir, was warmly received and declared sultan for the fourth time in 1517.

Although the civil war between Muhammad Shâh and Fat’h Shâh had thus come to an end, peace still eluded the country. Ambitious nobles continued to quarrel among themselves. Muhammad Shâh appointed Kâji Chak as chief minister. Disgruntled nobles used Fat’h Shâh’s three sons against Kâji Chak, but were unable to overthrow him. In 1528–9, Nâzûk Khan, the third and only surviving son of Fat’h Shâh, with the support of a Mughal army supplied by the emperor Bâbur, successfully invaded Kashmir and was briefly hailed as sultan. He only lasted until 1530, for Abdân Magre, the chief minister, released Muhammad Shâh from prison and enthroned him as nominal ruler again, with the leading nobles dividing the kingdom among themselves. The Mughals were given gifts and requested to leave.

Soon afterwards, Kashmir was attacked from the north-east by Mîrzâ Haydar Dughlât, who, in 1532, was deputed by Sultan Sa’îd of Kashghar to conquer Ladakh. Mîrzâ Haydar occupied Ladakh and then proceeded to Kashmir, entering it without much resistance in January 1533. For some three months the ravages of Mîrzâ Haydar’s army continued relentlessly until the ūlama’ encouraged the Kashmiris to defend themselves by issuing a decree which proclaimed that fighting against the invaders was not only permissible but obligatory. Their attacks soon wore down Mîrzâ Haydar and his troops: he made peace with the Kashmiri nobles and in May 1533 he left Kashmir by the same route as he had come.

In 1537 Sultan Muhammad Shâh died and his second son, Shams al-Dîn II, was enthroned. But once again power struggles between the different groups of the Kashmiri nobility began. Shams al-Dîn soon died and Ismâ’il, another son of Sultan Muhammad Shâh, became sultan. One group called for help from Mîrzâ Haydar, who had entered the service of Humâyûn after the death of Sultan Sa’îd. Since he had, in 1533, conquered Kashmir without much resistance, Mîrzâ Haydar prevailed on Humâyûn to let him proceed
to Kashmir once again. He entered Srinagar on 22 November 1540, without encountering any resistance, and Sultan Ismā’īl Shāh fled to seek help from Shīr Shāh Sūr in Delhi.

In the beginning, Mīrzā Haydar showed great respect for the Kashmiri nobles, especially the Chaks, who were mainly Shi‘ites. Out of regard for the Chak nobles, he visited the tomb of Mīr Shams al-Dīn Irāqī at Zadibal in Srinagar, but relations soon became strained. To uproot the influence of the Chaks, Mīrzā Haydar embarked upon an anti-Shi‘ite policy; the tomb of Mīr Shams al-Dīn Irāqī was razed to the ground and his son, Shaykh Dāniyāl, was beheaded on the grounds that he had reviled the first three caliphs. Mīrzā Haydar claimed that no one now openly dared to profess Shi‘ism as a result of his policy of persecution. Meanwhile, he began to neglect the local nobility and became increasingly dependent on the support of his own followers, whom he appointed to responsible positions in the administration. This led to a revolt in which he was killed in October 1551. There is no doubt that Mīrzā Haydar’s intolerant policies brought untold misery upon the people of Kashmir. However, he was not only a brave soldier but also a great patron of culture; he was largely responsible for the revival of arts and crafts, which had been languishing after the death of Zayn al-‘Abidīn; it was in Kashmir that he composed the most famous of his works, the Tārīkh-i Rashīdī, a history of the Mughals of Central Asia.

Mīrzā Haydar’s death did not bring an end to the scramble for power among the nobles. Nāzūk Shāh was allowed to continue as sultan, but the real power was in the hands of his chief minister. Dawlat Chak secured the ascendancy and in late 1552 deposed Nāzūk Shāh and enthroned Ibrāhīm Shāh, the son of Muhammad Shāh, for the second time. Although Dawlat Chak tried to win over other factions of the nobility, he managed to arouse jealousy within his own family, leading to his fall and blinding. Ghāzī Chak became chief minister, eliminated various members of the ruling dynasty and in 1561 himself assumed the title of Sultan Nāsir al-Dīn Muhammad Ghāzī Shāh, thereby laying the foundations of the Chak dynasty. After some 222 years, the rule of the Shāh Mīr dynasty had thus ended. After Zayn al-‘Abidīn, a succession of weak and worthless rulers had exposed the country to internal revolts and external invasions. The Shāh Mīr dynasty only paved the way for a powerful faction of the nobility, the Chaks, to unseat it and assume the reins of government.

During the period of the Shāh Mīr dynasty, changes of far-reaching significance took place in the life and conditions of the people of Kashmir. Many elements of Persian and Central Asian culture were introduced into the life of Kashmiris and the continuous waves of Muslim missionaries, artisans and fortune-seekers immigrating from Persia and Central Asia inevitably influenced Kashmiri society. Hindu influence, hitherto dominant in the court, now began to decline, with the place of the Brahmans taken over by newly arrived Muslims. Sanskrit, which had received royal patronage for many years, was replaced by
Persian. The Bayhaqī Sayyids, who wielded great influence in the court, ‘neglected men [who were] learned in the vernacular and in Sanskrit’, in the words of Srivara. However, Sanskrit continued to be the literary language of the Hindu élite, although non-Muslims found that their prospects of employment and promotion were enhanced by a knowledge of Persian and so started to learn it. Bhattavatara, a scholar of Zayn al-Ābidīn’s time, who was enamoured of Firdawsi’s Shāh-nāma, composed the Jainavilāsa, which contains the sayings of the sultan. Srivara translated Jāmī’s Yūsuf u Zulaykhā and entitled it Katha-Kautuka. Hence, in the course of time, Hindu society was split into two groups: the Persian-speaking Hindus, who were called Kārkun (the class of officials), and the Sanskrit-speaking Hindus, who included the Pandits (religious scholars). The families of Sanskrit-studying and Persian-studying Hindus did not intermarry, but formed endogamous groups.

The Persianization of the administration had a cultural counterpart. Although Sultan Qutb al-Dīn had refused to promote the missionary activities of Sayyid ĖAlī Hamadānī, he nevertheless followed his advice and gave up dressing in the Hindu fashion. From Jonarāja’s account, it appears that, by the time of Sikandar, Hindus too had adopted Muslim dress. Besides dress, the diet of the Kashmiris also underwent a change. Lamenting these changes, Jonarāja remarks, ‘As the wind destroys the trees, and the locusts the shali crop, so did the Yavanas [Sayyids] destroy the usages of Kashmira.’ Similarly, Srivara ascribes the misfortunes of the people of Kashmir to their acceptance of changes in their way of life. But these protests were in vain; the influence of Persian and Central Asian culture continued to increase day by day. The immigrants from Persia and Central Asia were also responsible for establishing madrasas, several of them in Srinagar, which encouraged the dissemination of Islamic spiritual and intellectual values.

On the whole, the attitude of the Shāh Mīr dynasty towards its subjects was one of consideration. Non-Muslims embraced Islam for various reasons and under various pressures, but the administration did not, in general, create a situation in which the people felt forced to abandon their former way of life. The intolerant attitudes adopted by Sultan Sikandar and Mīrzā Haydar Dughlāt were exceptional rather than usual for rulers in Kashmir. The period was, on the whole, one of peaceful change, from the ancient Hindu system to a Persianized form of Islamic society; as a result, culturally, Kashmir became part of the Persian and the Central Asian world.
CENTRAL ASIA UNDER TIMUR FROM 1370 TO THE EARLY FIFTEENTH CENTURY*

K. Z. Ashrafyan

Contents

Formation of Timur’s empire .................................................. 325
The Sarbadar movement .......................................................... 326
Balkh and Samarkand under Timur ......................................... 327
Reorganization of Timur’s army ............................................... 330
Timur’s military campaigns ................................................... 332
Socio-economic conditions under Timur .................................. 339
Urban development, crafts and trade ..................................... 342
Relations with west European rulers ...................................... 345
The succession struggle .......................................................... 346

One of the most extensive military empires in the medieval Islamic East was that of Timur, the fruit of his long years of campaigning and the resultant destruction of many towns and regions. Into this empire were incorporated, in addition to Transoxania and Khwarazm, the regions around the Caspian Sea, Iran, Iraq, part of the southern Caucasus, and the territory of present-day Afghanistan and northern India. The heart of the empire was Transoxania, incorporated after the death of Chinggis Khan, and under the terms of the arrangements made by him, into the appanage of Chaghatay.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, bitter disputes arose between the princes of the other territories of the former Mongol empire and the Chaghatay Khans. In their

* See Map 8.
struggle to increase their power, the Khans sought support not only among the leaders of the Mongol tribes and clans (leaders known as noyans in Mongolian, begs in Turkish), but also among the local feudal landowners and to some extent the urban notables. Kebek Khan (1318–26), settling, contrary to nomadic custom, in Transoxania, in the valley of the Kashka Darya river, built himself, at a distance of 2 farsaks (about 12 km) from Nakhshab (Nasaf), a palace (qarshi in Mongolian) around which the town of Karshi later grew up. The monetary system he introduced, in imitation of that of the II Khanid ruler of Iran, Ghazan Khan (1295–1304), of the house of Hülegü, was designed to extend trade relations and curb the abuses of officials and swindlers. In accordance with Mongol tradition, Kebek Khan divided Transoxania into military-administrative districts, or tümens (in Persian orthography, tūmān), that is, ‘10,000’ (the original meaning being a group of 10,000 fighting men or a territory providing that number of warriors). The holdings of many local landowners became tümens, and the landowners themselves hereditary governors.

An important step in the acceptance of local cultural tradition by some of the Mongols was the adoption of Islam by Tarmashīrīn (1328–34), brother and successor of Kebek Khan. This gave rise to a new wave of dissatisfaction on the part of the nomadic Mongols. Tarmashīrīn was killed and the headquarters of the Khanate was transferred to Semirechye. The upholder of the ‘settler tradition’, and the last Chinggisid of the Chaghatay ulus (domains in Mongolia), Kazan Khan, brought the seat of the Khanate back to Transoxania only to be killed in a battle in 1346 against one of the Mongol leaders, the amir Kazagan. Kazagan, not being a Chinggisid, did not assume the title of Khan, and ruled on behalf of the titular Khan of Chinggis’s line. Kazagan’s power did not extend beyond Transoxania. The remainder of the disintegrating ulus of Chaghatay (Semirechye and East Turkistan) came to be called Moghulistan; here the military-nomadic aristocracy of the Mongol tribes held undisputed sway, under the leadership of Khans of the Dughlat clan. In 1358 Kazagan was killed by one of the noyans of the Khan of Moghulistan, Kutlugh Timur. Transoxania was now divided into a few mutually hostile fiefs, belonging to the leaders of the Mongol and local nobility. Nizām al-Dīn Shāmī, author of the earliest of the better-known accounts of Timur’s life, the Zafar-nāma [Book of Victories] written on Timur’s instructions and during his lifetime, names some of them. Kazagan’s grandson Amir Husayn ruled part of the wilāyat (region) of Balkh, together with the town of Balkh. The remainder of this region belonged to the head of the Sulduz tribe. Kish and its region were under the sway of Hājjī Barlas. In Shiburghan, Badakhshan and Khuttalan, similar independent leaders established themselves. Their dissension and strife, according to the historian, sowed confusion in the affairs of Transoxania.¹

Formation of Timur’s empire

In 1360 and 1361 the Khan of Moghulistan, Tughluq Timur, campaigned in Transoxania. One of his followers was the future ‘conqueror of the world’, the ‘second Alexander’, as the authors of eulogistic histories dubbed their hero, Timur of the Barlas tribe. This Mongol tribe had settled as early as the beginning of the fourteenth century in the valley of the Kashka Darya, intermingling with the Turkish population, adopting their religion (Islam) and gradually giving up its own nomadic ways, like a number of other Mongol tribes in Transoxania.

The official histories of Timur – written at his command by Nizām al-Dīn Shāmī, by Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿAlī, the author of the Journal of Timur’s Campaign in India, and by the historian Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī, who lived at the court of Timur’s son and successor Shāh Rukh – say nothing about his early years, although it is known that he was born in 1336. According to Ruy González de Clavijo, ambassador of the king of Castile, who visited Samarkand, Timur’s capital, in 1404, the father of the ‘Emperor of Samarkand’ (el Emperador de Samarcante) was a notable personage (hombre fidalgo), but not wealthy, and had no more than 2 or 3 horsemen in his service. Timur had approximately the same number (‘4 or 5’) of hired horsemen. With their help he seized from his neighbours ‘one day a sheep, the next day a cow, and when he was able, he feasted with his followers’. Gradually, thanks to Timur’s bravery and ‘magnanimity’, a force of as many as 300 grew up around him, and with them ‘he began to scour the countryside, robbing and stealing all he could, for himself and his followers; he also travelled the roads robbing merchants’. The historian Ibn ʿArabshāh, who is extremely hostile to Timur, writes that his father was a shepherd.

After the attack on Transoxania, Tughluq Timur heaped ‘all manner of attentions and kindnesses’ on Timur. The Kashka Darya tümen of the fugitive Hājjī Barlas was bestowed on him in 1361. But Timur soon broke off relations with the Khan of Moghulistan and his son Ilyās Khūja, who had been left as ruler in Transoxania.

Now that he was a ruler and amir of a rich tümen, Timur made contact in 1361 with one of the pretenders to power in Transoxania, the chieftain of Balkh, Amir Husayn, sealing the relationship by marrying his sister Ulday Turkan-aga. At the head of their troops, the amirs carried out predatory raids on the territories of their neighbours. During one of these they were taken prisoner by the Javuni-Qurbani Turkmens and escaped by a lucky

---

2 Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿAlī, 1915, pp. 133, 139, 183.
3 Clavijo, 1881, pp. 238–9.
chance. In a later battle in Sistan – where the local prince had invited the amirs to help fight his enemies – Timur received arrow wounds in the arm and leg. Lamed for life, he was given the nickname Timur-Leng (literally ‘Iron Cripple’), rendered by European writers as Tamerlane.

The increase in power of amirs Husayn and Timur threatened Ilyas Khāja. Expelled from Transoxania after the death of Tughluq Timur, he was proclaimed his successor in Moghulistan and in 1365 reappeared in Transoxania with a large army. On the banks of the River Chirchik near Tashkent, a battle was fought that has gone down in history as ‘the battle in the mud’. Heavy rains had turned the ground into a bog, in which the horses of the allied forces stuck fast. But the Mongols spread large pieces of felt under their horses’ hooves, and their cavalry, manoeuvring freely, carried the day. The amirs fell back towards Samarkand and then retreated across the Oxus (Amu Darya).

The Sarbadar movement

Meanwhile, a host of jete (bandits), as the Mongol nomads were called in Transoxania, appeared in the vicinity of Samarkand. In those days, the city was unfortified and its capture was, it seems, inevitable. An active role in the organization of the defence of the city was played by the townspeople themselves, among whom the ideas of the Sarbadars had spread (see further, below). The Sarbadar movement, with its varied composition – it embraced artisans, the urban poor, peasants and small landowners and contained messianic Shiʿite elements – had originated in Khurasan. Having ousted Mongol power from a number of towns and districts, the Sarbadars in 1337 set up their own state with its centre at Sabzavar which survived until 1381. A Sarbadar state also sprang up in Mazandaran (1350–92). The ideas of the Sarbadars were evidently propagated secretly in Transoxania too; it is known that the ideologue of the Sarbadar movement, Shaykh Khalifa, won many adherents in Sabzavar and preached for some time not only in Khurasan but also in Central Asia. According to the fifteenth-century historian Hāfiz-i Abrū, author of the anonymous, no longer extant, History of the Sarbadārs, Sarbadar (in Persian, literally ‘head in the noose’ or ‘gallows-bait’) was the name adopted by the members of anti-Mongol popular movements who were ready to die in the cause of deliverance from tyranny. However, it is not impossible that participants in uprisings were called ‘gallows-bait’ by their opponents, who considered that the ‘rebels’ deserved the gallows.

The historians also gave the name ‘Sarbadārs’ to the citizens of Samarkand who had taken the control of the city into their own hands. Their leaders were the madrasa

---

student Mawlānā-zāda; the headman of the cotton-scutchers’ district Abū Bakr; and Mawlānā Khurdak-i Bukhārī, nicknamed ‘the archer’ and known as a brave man of respected lineage. Night and day, the citizens of Samarkand worked to fortify the alleyways of the town, erecting barricades and leaving only the main artery open to free passage. Entering by this route, the Mongol horsemen found themselves in a trap: the townsmen attacked them from all sides, showering them with arrows, stones and sticks. The Mongols, unused to street fighting, retired. On the following days they renewed their onslaught. Unable to claim victory, they dug in around the city for a long siege, but an epidemic broke out and many of their horses died. The Mongols were therefore compelled to leave the environs of Samarkand, where the conflict among the various social groups seems to have intensified.

It is not impossible that the Sarbadar faction (representing the democratic elements of the population) attempted to put into effect their doctrines, which were similar to those popular among the Sarbadars of Khurasan, i.e. equal rights to property and repeal of taxes that were contrary to the shariʿa. Hence, no doubt, the indignation of the historians at the actions of the Samarkand Sarbadars. In the words of Khwandamīr, the Sarbadars ‘followed the path of wickedness and sedition and laid avaricious hands on the property of the citizens’. ‘O God,’ implores Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī, ‘let not a beggar become a respected man.’

News of the retreat of the Khan of Moghulistan’s troops from Transoxania reached Timur, who hastened to inform Amir Husayn. But the allies did not march immediately on Samarkand, which remained in the hands of the Sarbadars, whose ‘extreme audacity’, in the words of Khwandamīr, alarmed them. Meeting at the village of Baghlan, the amirs worked out a plan of action. Through their agents they established contacts with the ‘Samarkand gallows-birds’, welcomed them with gifts and noble apparel and issued a document in the name of Amir Husayn recognizing the Sarbadar leaders as lawful chieftains. Only in the spring of 1366, several months after the Mongols’ departure from Transoxania, did Timur and Husayn march on Samarkand. Anticipating no easy victory, they resorted to treachery and invited the Sarbadar chiefs to meet them at the village of Kani Gil. On their arrival, bearing gifts, the Sarbadars were seized and put to death. If the historian ʿAbd al-Razzāq Samarqandī is to be believed, Timur interceded for Mawlānā-zāda and saved him from the gallows, but the others were executed.5

Balkh and Samarkand under Timur

Amir Husayn established himself in Samarkand, assuming the rulership of Balkh also. Timur took control of Kish (Shahr-i Sabz) and Karshi. Their alliance quickly soured and

turned to enmity. Each saw the other as the one resolved to strike the first blow. Timur besieged Balkh: the fortifications were breached and on 10 April 1370, the city was taken. Husayn tried to hide in one of the minarets beyond the fortress wall, but was captured and killed by one of Timur’s allies. It would seem that a contributing factor in Timur’s success was Husayn’s unpopularity with the inhabitants of his domains. In the words of Clavijo, ‘this king of Samarkand was not loved by his subjects, especially the ordinary people, the city-dwellers and some notables’. The fortress was demolished and the city sacked by the army, which also received a share of the rich treasury seized from Husayn. After the capture of Balkh, Timur summoned, in the city itself, a kurultay (meeting of the military chiefs and nobles of the tribes). To the title of amir was added the honorific Güregen, since Timur married one of Husayn’s widows, Mulk-khānum (Bībī-khānum), who was the daughter of the Kazan Khan, a descendant of Chinggis Khan.

In deference to Mongol tradition, Timur, in the words of Nizām al-Dīn Shāmī, handed over control of the state to the house of Chaghatay and restored their ‘rights’. He proclaimed Soyurghatmish, a descendant of Chaghatay, as Khan. After Soyurghatmish’s death in 1388, another Chinggisid, Sultān Mahmūd, was appointed titular Khan by Timur. When this Khan also died in 1402, Timur named no successor and continued to mint coins bearing the name of Sultān Mahmūd; his name was also commemorated in the khutba (Friday worship oration), and the signature of the Khan appeared on the yarlıghs for raising armies and announcing campaigns.

In 1370 Timur made Samarkand his capital, ‘the residence of the sultans, home of the Khans, dwelling of the saints, homeland of the dervishes or Sufis and capital of the learned’. He ‘brought under his sway the whole of Transoxania’ and ‘set in order the affairs’ of the region so that ‘there was no room for rebellion there’. ‘The people became prosperous, and, it seems, both the nobility and the mob were pacified under the generous and kindly protection of the Khan.’ In these words, the historian-panegyrist tells how Timur became the sole ruler of Transoxania.

The main prop of Timur’s administration was the warlike nomadic and semi-nomadic Mongol nobility of Transoxania (particularly the Barlas). These tribes were called Chaghatays, since they inhabited the ulus of Chaghatay, although they did not belong to

---

7 Clavijo, 1881, p. 240.
9 Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿAlī, 1915, pp. 54, 55, 125, 126.
10 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
his house, as Clavijo correctly notes. The Mongols’ contemptuous name for them was qaraunas (half-breeds). According to Clavijo:

These Chaghatays are especially favoured by the king [Timur]; they can go everywhere they want with their herds, graze them, sow crops and settle anywhere they wish, winter or summer; they are free and pay no tribute to the king, for they serve him in war when he calls on them. And let it not be thought that they leave their wives, children and herds anywhere; they take with them everything they have, whether they go to war or move from place to place.

Conscious of the need to broaden his social base, Timur sought the support of the local landowning nobility, the urban notables and the Muslim clergy. This trend was reflected in his predilection for Islam and the sharī'a even to the detriment of the Yasa of Chinggis Khan. It is not by chance that the historians portray Timur as an enthusiastic defender of Islam (which quite possibly he was not), a ghāzī (fighter for the faith).

It is well known that Timur was generous to the representatives of the Muslim clergy, even in conquered countries. When he sacked a town, he forbade the pillage of the property of Muslim religious institutions and severely punished anyone guilty of it. As his spiritual adviser he chose the descendant of the Prophet Muhammad, Sayyid Baraka, who, legend has it, foretold his victories.

Nevertheless, in Timur’s kingdom, where Islam held undisputed sway, neither paganism nor Mongol custom was completely superseded. To orthodox Muslims, Timur’s Chaghatay soldiers, wearing their pigtails, seemed kāfirs (unbelievers, hence ‘savages’). At Timur’s court, contrary to Muslim law, feasts were held with copious entertainment, wine and merriment; princesses and queens were present at the banquets, and sometimes gave banquets themselves. On the walls of Timur’s court at Samarkand, Köksaray, Clavijo saw cornices with representations (contrary to the precepts of the sharī'a) of figures from Timur’s victories, his sons, grandsons and amirs. At the weddings of princesses only a few elements of Mongol ceremony were observed (for example, cups of koumiss, or fermented mare’s milk, were served). Official correspondence was carried on in Persian, but among the clerks whom Timur kept by him there were ‘some clerks, who read and can write in Mongol characters for all his purposes’.

11 Clavijo, 1881, p. 214.
13 Ghiyāth al-Dīn Ālī, 1915, pp. 153 et seq.
15 Clavijo, 1881, pp. 289–90.
16 Ibid., p. 201.
Reorganization of Timur’s army

Timur saw in the waging of uninterrupted wars of conquest the principal means of increasing his power. ‘Not the whole inhabited part of the world is valuable enough to have two masters’ are the words attributed to him by the historian Sharaf al-Dīn ʿAlī Yazdī. In these wars – a source of wealth and booty – the military nobility of the tribes, and the tribes themselves, were deeply involved in support of Timur. But the purpose of the war was not only to win booty but also to gain control of the major trade routes linking Europe and western Asia to India and China. Both the tribal military nobility and the urban patricians – the local landowning nobility who were engaged in trade and the town’s leading traders and money-lenders – took part.

The instrument of conquest was the army. Its basic striking force was the cavalry, recruited from the tribal population. The infantry was recruited from the settled peoples (tājīks), who were assigned to work the catapults, battering-rams and other siege-engines used in the storming of cities. To defend themselves against the enemy, the foot-soldiers would form up in front of their troop, dig ditches, build defensive shields and screens, and under cover of these would shoot arrows and throw spears at the foe.

The basic weapons of pitched battle were bows, both large and small (the arrows being kept in quivers of plate metal). For close combat the soldiers used swords, curved sabres (shamshīrs), throwing spears, and clubs. By the second half of the fourteenth century, firearms began to make their appearance in the Near East, but nothing is known of their use in Timur’s armies. The soldier’s equipment included shield, body armour and helmet.

On the occasion of Timur’s triumphal entry into his Samarkand palace (el castillo), Clavijo saw carried in front of the amir, at his command, all the weapons and armour used during the time he had been away from the town. Among other items there were ‘3,000 suits of body armour, decorated with fine cloth, of very fine workmanship; though they do not make them strong enough and do not know how to temper iron [properly]’. There were also many helmets ‘round and tall’. Attached to the helmet was a plate, two fingers in breadth, that descended to the wearer’s brows and protected the face against sideways strokes. At that time Timur gave out armour and helmets to ‘knights and other individuals’ (a los caballeros y otras personas). The coat of mail – an expensive article – was obviously worn only by the amirs and Timur himself. More popular, but still only affordable by the captains, was the kayak, a protective cloak of velvet, lined with close rows of metal

17 Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿAlī, 1915, pp. 168, 212.
19 Clavijo, 1881, p. 293.
plates, fastened in such a way that the cloak retained its elasticity and did not hamper the wearer’s movements.

When fortifications were to be stormed, siege-engines were used, and by means of catapults or ballistas breaches were made in the walls, tunnels were dug under them and fires started in the tunnels. To storm fortress walls, the warriors used siege-ladders and ropes, which they threw over the projections of the walls. They were skilled at building pontoon bridges, which after the river had been crossed were usually demolished. Before battle was joined, the king’s great drum and the war drums were beaten, the kettledrums sounded and the trumpets blown. The air reverberated with the soldiers’ war cries. The kalima, ‘There is no God but Allah’, was heard and the thunderous cry of ‘Allah is great’ ‘made the hearts of the huge lion and the mighty elephant shrink’. 

20

The decimal system traditional among the Mongols was adopted by Timur also. The army was divided into tumens (‘ten thousands’); mingliks (in Mongolian) or hazārs (a Persian word that came into use early among the Mongols and Türks), that is to say, thousands; yüzlüks (hundreds); and onluks (tens). Small formations (up to 500 men) were called khoshuns in Transoxania. The yüzlüks and the mingliks were commanded by yüzbashis and minbashis. The larger formations were commanded by amirs and princes (mūrzās). Those dispatched to raise armies in the provinces were known as the tavachis; they had other important functions as well, for example, the division of spoils among the warriors, the assignment of sectors for digging of defensive ditches around the camp, and so on.

The army had two wings, the centre (here, as a rule, was to be found the headquarters, or borgah) and a vanguard, surrounded by outposts (kanbuls), which were often the first to engage the enemy. The various formations had different coloured clothing, red, white, blue, etc. Scouts (khabargīrs) reported on enemy movements. The army was accompanied by porters (kachars). The army camp, if it was pitched close to the enemy’s position, was surrounded by entrenchments, and large defensive works (chapars), as well as mobile towers, were erected. In extreme cases, linked carts (arabas) were also used as well as screens.

The sources give inflated numbers for Timur’s army; Sharaf al-Dīn Ālī Yazdī says that there had not been so large an army since the days of Chinggis Khan. In the campaign against China in 1404, the army allegedly numbered 200,000 fighting men. It was encumbered by a large baggage-train, as the fighters were accompanied by their families. ‘These folk,’ says Clavijo, ‘wherever they are called to war by their king, set off immediately with all their belongings, their flocks, their wives and children.’

21 Clavijo, 1881, p. 191.
In the baggage-train were the *yurtechis*, whose task it was to set up the yurts and lay out the encampment ‘in accordance with accepted rules’, and a whole ‘army’ of traders and artisans. According to Clavijo:

*In this horde [of Timur’s] there are always butchers and cooks, selling boiled and roasted meat, and others who sell barley and fruit, and bakers, who set up their ovens, knead and sell bread. Whatever artisans or craftsmen are needed can be found in the horde, all located in their separate streets. And that is not all; wherever the army goes they take with them baths and bath attendants, who set up stalls, build houses for the iron, that is, hot baths, with cauldrons inside for storing and heating water, and everything needful.*

Because of this cumbersome baggage-train, the army moved slowly, especially when it had to transport booty and drive along captives. The soldiers therefore carried out raids lightly burdened, leaving the baggage-train behind.

Timur, though mainly continuing Mongol military traditions, introduced certain innovations in the dispositions and tactics of his army. According to Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī, when Timur was preparing for his decisive encounter with Toktamïsh in 1391, he disposed his forces (seven traditional *kuls*, or corps) ‘in such a way that no one had ever seen or heard the like’. Timur’s regular inspections of the army helped to maintain the men’s fighting spirit and tighten up discipline, qualities that were responsible for the success of many of their military undertakings.

**Timur’s military campaigns**

Believing two rulers for the inhabited world to be one too many, Timur devoted his own time as ruler to constant and pitiless wars of conquest. The Turco-Mongol military chiefs who were Timur’s mainstay were the chief beneficiaries of the seizures of ever more lands and riches, while the local magnates of Transoxania were also drawn into supporting him by the prospect of the advantages to be gained. No sooner had Timur consolidated his hold on Samarkand than he advanced against the White Horde, which occupied the territory from the region of Yangi-Talas to the borders of Kashghar. The White Horde formed part of the *ulus* of Jöchi (the eldest son of Chinggis Khan), the other part of which consisted of the Golden Horde. This division stemmed from the way in which the Mongol forces had originally been organized: the Golden Horde manned the right flank, the White Horde the left. As time went by, the White Horde broke away and came under the rule of its own Khans, who were constantly raiding Turkistan and Transoxania. Urus Khan (1364–83) became so powerful that he attempted to unite both parts of the *ulus* of Jöchi under his

---

own authority. This was of great concern to Timur, who fought repeatedly against the White Horde. ‘He [Timur] frequently did battle with them [the Mongols] of the White Horde, until finally they chose the right path and accepted the role of cringing servility and expressions of submission.’

In 1372 Timur launched a campaign against Khwarazm. The Sūfī dynasty of the Kun-grat tribe, which had joined forces with the White Horde, had made Khwarazm its base in the 1350s and early 1360s. The pretext for the campaign was the seizure by Husayn Sūfī, the founder of the dynasty, of Khiva and Kath in southern Khwarazm, which formed part of the ulus of Chaghatay. Timur, who laid claim to the whole ulus of Chaghatay, demanded the return of the captured territories. When this was refused, he advanced into Khwarazm. Kath was captured and Husayn Sūfī shut himself up in the fortress of Urgench, where he soon died. His successor, Yūsuf Sūfī, entered into peace talks with Timur but after the latter had left Khwarazm, he retook Kath. Timur mounted a second campaign against Khwarazm (1373–4), but no actual fighting took place because Yūsuf Sūfī offered his apologies. Southern Khwarazm passed into the hands of Timur. In 1388, however, the ruler of Khwarazm led a revolt stirred up by Toktamīš. The son of an amir of the White Horde who had ruled over Mangi’shlak and was slain by Urus Khan for insubordination, Toktamīš, with Timur’s support, had succeeded after several reverses in routing Urs Khan and gaining control of the White Horde in 1379.

In 1380–1 Toktamīš was victorious over Mamai, the Khan of the Golden Horde (who had just been defeated by Prince Dimitri Donskoy of Moscow at the battle of Kulikovo), thus uniting the White and Golden Hordes under his own rule. Timur had been hoping to establish a vassal relationship between himself and Toktamīš, but found in him a strong and wily adversary. In 1387–8 Toktamīš invaded Transoxania, acting in collusion with the ruler of Khwarazm, who withdrew his allegiance to Timur. Timur seized Urgench, the capital of Khwarazm, in 1388 and overthrew the Sūfī dynasty. He ordered the inhabitants to move to Samarkand and had the plundered and devastated city razed to the ground and its site sown with barley. Only a handful of fine buildings remained of what had been a great city. In 1391 Timur ordered the restoration of Urgench, but only one part of the city was rebuilt. As a result of the subjugation of Khwarazm, all the lands of Central Asia with the exception of Semirechye and the lower reaches of the Syr Darya fell into the hands of Timur.

In 1381 Timur unleashed his forces on the Kart principality in northern Afghanistan. The founder of this local dynasty was Rukn al-Dīn (d. 1245), who had been appointed ruler

---

25 Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī, 1972, p. 32.
of Ghur by Chinggis Khan. In 1248 Herat had become the capital of the much strengthened principality of the Karts. When the II Khanids established themselves in Iran, the Kart rulers, who had previously been subordinate to the Great Khans in Karakorum, became vassals of the II Khanids. The collapse of the II Khanid state shortly after the death of Abū Sa’īd (1318–35) enabled the Karts to gain their independence. After the havoc wrought by the Mongols, irrigation systems were gradually restored and towns and villages rose again from the ruins. Herat at that time was a major trading and crafts centre. In early 1381 Timur’s forces appeared beneath its walls. Having cut it off from Ghur and other Kart possessions, they proceeded to besiege it. The ruler of Herat, Ghiyāth al-Dīn Pīr Āfī, withdrew into the citadel, but the townsfolk did not support him and took no active part in the defence of the city – no doubt because of Timur’s promise to spare the lives and property of those who did not resist.26

Although, realizing his helplessness, the ruler came to Timur’s tent and threw himself on his mercy, the same fate befell Herat as other captured towns. A heavy tribute was imposed on it and many leading citizens were deported to Transoxania. Timur confirmed Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s position as ruler of Herat, but it was a nominal appointment only, since he had to remain in constant attendance upon Timur, at the latter’s insistence. Shortly afterwards he was executed on Timur’s orders even though he had made no attempt to forswear his allegiance.27

Such was the oppression imposed by the conquerors that in 1382–3 the citizens of Herat rose in rebellion. They were led by a native of Ghur, nicknamed Ghūrībachcha (Son of Ghur), and their rebellion was supported by strong detachments of fighting men from Ghur. The officials appointed by Timur to administer Herat were driven out and the troops garrisoned there were slaughtered. Timur entrusted the task of putting down the revolt to his son Mīrnāshāh, who routed the contingent from Ghur at the battle of Herat and overran the city.28 Taking the bulk of his army with him, Timur left Herat for Kalat in Khurasan. The rulers of Kalat, Merv and several other cities, terrified by Timur’s successes, submitted to him.

Timur now turned his attention to subduing the Sarbadarid amirate, whose spiritual leaders were Shaykh Khalīfa and subsequently his pupil Hasan Jūrī. Concealed beneath the mystical doctrine – with Shi‘ite overtones – that they preached was a call to throw off the yoke of the II Khans and the powerful Iranian nobles who supported them. The followers of this teaching called themselves the Sarbadars (see above). An uprising broke

28 Bartol’d, 1918, p. 29.
out in 1337 in Bashtin (Khurasan) under the leadership of a follower of Hasan Jūrī, a local landowner called ʿAbd al-Razzāq. The punitive expedition mounted by the Il Khanid wazīr of Khurasan was defeated by the rebels, and the wazīr was captured and put to death. The uprising spread to other towns and villages of Khurasan. Sabzavar, which was taken by the Sarbadars, became their headquarters. In 1338 Wājih al-Dīn Masʿūd, the successor of ʿAbd al-Razzāq, assumed the title of sultan.

Towards the middle of the fourteenth century, under their ruler Yahyā Qarābī, the Sarbadars wrested Tus and Mashhad from the Mongols and on 13 December 1353, invited by Tughay Timur Khan to his encampment at Gurgan, they took control of the Mongol camp and executed the Il Khan. As time went by, there were increasing divergences between the radical wing of the Sarbadar movement, represented by craftsmen, town-dwellers and the peasantry of the surrounding countryside, and such moderate elements as small local landowners. As the struggle for power intensified, one ʿAlī Muʿayyad laid claim to the supreme authority. Seizing power in 1364, he inflicted a crushing defeat on the Sarbadars representing the rank and file of the population. The loss of their support weakened his own position, however. In the war with the Kart ruler he lost the eastern lands of the Sarbadars, including Nishapur. From the west he was threatened by one of the Mongol amirs, Wali, who had consolidated his position in Astarabad.

In the conflict between ʿAlī Muʿayyad and Amir Wali, the fortunes of war fluctuated. There were even periods when the adversaries became allies, as a result of the revolt of the radical wing of the Sarbadars in Sabzavar in 1378, under the leadership of the Darvīsh Rukn al-Dīn. In alliance with Amir Wali, ʿAlī Muʿayyad put down the revolt, but enmity soon sprang up again between them. Amir Wali besieged Sabzavar, whereupon ʿAlī Muʿayyad took a step that was to prove fatal. In 1381 he appealed for help to Timur, who was quick to take advantage of this convenient pretext for interfering in the affairs of the Sarbadarid state. ʿAlī Muʿayyad met Timur in Sabzavar as his humble vassal. He was allowed to retain his title, but was invited to the conqueror’s headquarters, while one of Timur’s lieutenants was appointed to Sabzavar. Shortly afterwards, ʿAlī Muʿayyad was stealthily slain on the orders of his new overlord.

Two years later, in 1388, an uprising against Timur took place in Sabzavar and the surrounding area under the leadership of Shaykh Dāwūd Sabzavārī. It was mercilessly put down; the town’s fortress was demolished and, on the orders of Timur, 2,000 people were walled up alive in the towers. That same year, having pacified the ‘rebels’ of Sabzavar, Timur annexed Kandahar and a number of other towns and districts in Khurasan and Afghanistan. The following year, he conquered Gurgan, thereby putting an end to the reign of Amir Wali.
Between 1386 and 1404 Timur’s hordes repeatedly raided the Trans-caucasian countries from northern Iran. The kingdom of Georgia, which had gained its political independence after the death of II Khan Abū Sa‘īd in 1335, was witnessing a period of economic and cultural expansion. Georgia put up a stiff resistance to Timur, who crossed its borders with his troops seven times, but Tiflis fell to him and in 1404 King George VII was compelled to acknowledge Timur’s suzerainty. Armenia, which had lost its own statehood and become part of the Jalayirid principality, had gone into decline under the rule of Turk and Kurd nomadic tribal overlords and Timur’s invasion proved to be a fresh calamity for the country. An eyewitness describes events as follows: ‘By hunger, the sword, captivity, indescribable tortures and inhuman treatment they [Timur’s hordes] turned the populous Armenian province into a desert.’

In 1386 Timur captured Tabriz in southern Azerbaijan, a city that had been laid waste by Toktamïsh the previous year. Sultan Ahmad Jalāyir, the ruler of the Jalayirid lands, which comprised the bulk of Persian Iraq with the cities of Hamadan, Qazvin and Sultaniyya, as well as Kurdistan, southern Azerbaijan, Karabagh, Armenia and Arabian Iraq, fled, leaving his domains to their fate. Timur’s next victims were the Muzaffarids (1313–93). In 1387 Timur captured their capital Isfahan. The exactions of the tax-collectors appointed by him caused the city to rebel. The main insurgents were the craftsmen and the poor, led by a blacksmith. They were mercilessly suppressed: historians recount that Timur’s soldiers received orders to deliver a prescribed number of severed heads, and minarets were built with the heads of 70,000 slaughtered citizens. The struggle with the Muzaffarids in southern Iran continued until 1393. By 1392 Timur’s hordes had conquered the Sayyid state in Mazandaran, which had come into being in the 1340s during the mass uprising against the Mongols. Its ruler was Sayyid Qawām al-Dīn, and in social structure and ideology it differed very little from the Sarbadars.

The conquest of Iran was completed by 1393 and the country was divided into two vicegerencies. Timur’s son Shāh Rukh was made vicegerent of the region, comprising Khurasan with Gurgan, Mazandaran and Sistan, with its centre in Herat, while his brother Mirānshāh became the vicegerent of western Iran, including Azerbaijan and Armenia, with its centre in Tabriz. Turkic-speaking nomadic tribes were brought in from Central Asia to settle in northern Iran and Azerbaijan.

The purpose of Timur’s conquests was not merely to acquire loot but to gain control of the lucrative major international trade routes. The Golden Horde, subordinate to Toktamīsh, was stationed astride the trade routes leading from Europe and Asia Minor to

29 Thomas of Metsop, 1957, p. 58.
Central Asia, Iran, Mongolia and China. After seizing control of the Golden Horde in 1381, Toktamïsh put an end to the rivalries that had torn it apart. He put a great deal of effort into maintaining the Horde’s dominion over the Russians. His chief adversary was Prince Dimitri Donskoy, whose policy consisted in unifying the Russians around Moscow. Toktamïsh succeeded in winning over the princes of Nizhniy Novgorod and Ryazan to his side and in 1382 attacked Prince Dimitri, laying waste north-eastern Russia. As the chronicler Nikon records, Moscow, at that time ‘a great and wondrous city at the height of its wealth and glory’, was captured by Toktamïsh and put to the torch. Dimitri Donskoy was forced to pay tribute to the Khan.\(^{31}\)

The struggle between Timur and Toktamïsh was a long and stubborn one. It was only after three major campaigns, in 1389, 1391 and 1394–5, that the Golden Horde was finally crushed. During the last of these campaigns Timur destroyed Astrakhan and other towns along the Volga, including Berke Saray, the capital of the Golden Horde, and ravaged the Crimea with fire and the sword. Toktamïsh fled to Bulghar on the Volga and, after Timur’s departure, fought with other contenders for the throne of the Golden Horde until his death in 1406 or 1407. The defeat inflicted on the Golden Horde by Timur was a blow from which it never recovered. For the next three decades or thereabouts, trade between the Mediterranean and Asia was confined to routes passing through Iran, Bukhara and Samarkand, which were controlled by Timur and the Timurids.

Towards the end of the fourteenth century, the Delhi Sultanate, once a powerful state, entered a period of decline. Following the death of Sultan Fîrûz Shâh Tughluq (1351–88), the heirs of the house of Tughluq battled successively for the throne. In 1394 Nâṣîr al-Dîn Mahmûd was put on the throne by one of the noble factions, but his real power extended no further than the district round the capital and some adjacent regions (see above, Chapter 14, Part Two). Timur’s Indian campaign was heralded by the appearance under the walls of Multan of the forces commanded by his grandson, Pir Muhammad, who overran and looted this wealthy city. In September 1398 Timur himself crossed the Indus. Reducing towns and fortresses to ‘heaps of ashes and debris’ as they went, his forces headed for the capital, Delhi. Before the decisive battle on the banks of the Jumna (17 December 1398), Timur ordered the execution of all prisoners held by his armies – the sources speak of 100,000 captives – fearing that they would side with the Sultan of Delhi during the fighting.

The battle for Delhi was bloody: ‘The battlefield was piled high with mountains of dead and wounded . . . blood flowed in streams.’\(^{32}\) Sultan Nâṣîr al-Dîn Mahmûd fled to Gujarat. On 18 December the khutba was read out in the mosques of Delhi, mentioning Pir

\(^{31}\) Nasonov, 1940, p. 136.

Muhammad by name. The inhabitants of the city resisted the intruders, who were looting and pillaging, seizing prisoners and killing: ‘Hindu heads were piled as high as they could go and their bodies became food for wild animals and birds.’ It took several days to escort the captives out of the city; among them were several thousand master craftsmen, including stonemasons whom Timur intended to use for the construction of mosques in Samarkand. On 1 January 1399 the warriors began to leave the city. They overwhelmed and pillaged several further provinces and towns in north-western India, including Mirath (Meerut) and Kangra. Timur recrossed the Indus in March 1399 and had soon left India behind. As his vicegerent over Multan, Lahore and Dipalpur he appointed Khidr Khan Sayyid, who mounted the throne in ruined Delhi in 1414 and founded the short-lived Sayyid dynasty.

While his Indian campaign was in progress, Timur lost many of the cities he had previously seized, including Baghdad and Mosul. In September 1399 he rode out of Samarkand at the head of his armies on a new western campaign. Leaving Transoxania by northern Iran, he led his horde across the Trans-caucasus, ravaged Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia and made for Syria, which together with Egypt was ruled by the Mamluk sultans. Factional strife among the latter prevented the military forces of the two provinces from uniting, with the result that only the amirs of Syria opposed Timur. They were defeated in battle near Aleppo, which was captured and laid waste. After taking several more Syrian cities, Timur laid siege to Damascus in January 1401. Failing to receive assistance from the Mamluk sultan Faraj (1399–1412), Damascus threw itself on the conqueror’s mercy. It was sacked and set on fire. Timur did not stay long in Syria, but left the province in a ruinous and devastated condition so that it was several years before the land recovered, while the Mamluk state became weakened by factional strife between the sultan and the great amirs. Timur, meanwhile, in 1401 turned eastwards to deal with the Jalayirid capital Baghdad, besieging the city for six weeks and sacking it savagely.

Heading northwards, Timur entered Asia Minor. As a result of the wars of conquest of the Turkish sultans Murâd I (1361–89) and his son Bâyazîd I (1389–1402), nicknamed Yîldîrîm (‘the Thunderbolt’) because of his lightning military successes, the Ottoman state had become the most powerful in Anatolia and the Balkans by the beginning of the fifteenth century. Bâyazîd I had completed the subjugation of Macedonia, Bulgaria and Asia Minor (except Cilicia and the Greek empire of Trebizond), but Timur’s hordes, having been triumphant in Syria, turned northwards, invaded Asia Minor and reached Ankara. Timur demanded the sultan’s submission. In response, Bâyazîd marched against him. In the decisive battle of Ankara on 20 July 1402, the betrayal of the sultan by the levies from

33 Ibid., pp. 127–9.
the former Asia Minor amirates (which had been defeated by the Ottomans and incorporated into their sultanate) tipped the balance. The Ottoman army was routed and Bāyazīd sought safety in flight, but he was taken prisoner together with his two sons. In the spring of 1403, learning that Timur intended to carry him off to Samarkand, he took his own life. The invasion by Timur had serious consequences for the Ottoman state. In order to weaken it, he dismembered it, restoring the independence of seven out of the ten amirates of Asia Minor, while the territory that remained in the possession of the Ottomans was divided up among Bāyazīd’s four sons, among whom internecine warfare soon broke out; the fall of Constantinople to the Ottomans was thus postponed for half a century.35

Timur’s last great military undertaking was to have been his projected campaign against China, but this was interrupted by the death of the ‘conqueror of the world’ in 1405, aged 70.

**Socio-economic conditions under Timur**

Timur’s empire was a conglomeration of states and tribal territories. The peoples inhabiting them belonged to a variety of civilizations and represented various stages of socio-economic evolution. Well-developed relationships of dependence existed side by side with disintegrating tribal ones; the traditions of centuries-old Islamic Persian government structures with loose Turco-Mongol systems of state organization in the process of growth; and regions of ancient urban and farming culture with the nomadic life of the steppe. The nomadic way of life showed remarkable stability. Clavijo writes:

> These folk, who live in tents and other shelters, possess only their tents and they wander summer and winter over the plains. In summer they go where water is to be found, and they sow their grain and cotton . . . and the king with his whole army wanders the plains summer and winter alike.36

Timur, a tribal chieftain, became the ruler of a great empire of which the component parts possessed no uniformity of economic and cultural life. This in turn prevented the growth of a centralized system of government and the establishment of effective control by the state over the territories included within its boundaries. Instead it gave rise to the extremely widespread practice of bestowal as soyurghals of regions and districts upon members of the ruling house, the sons and grandsons of Timur, his retainers and military commanders, as well as those common soldiers who had distinguished themselves in war.

The soyurghal (in Mongol, literally ‘gift’ in the widest sense of the word, viz. gifts of clothing, weapons, money, rank, privilege) in the form of a grant of land, in exchange for

36 Clavijo, 1881, p. 190.
service (often military) to the state, was analogous to the later *iqṭāʾ* of the Mongol period. From being, in the pre-Mongol period, a non-hereditary ‘grant of support’ or tenure of land with the right to appropriate a part of the taxes due to the state, the *iqṭāʾ* no later than the beginning of the fourteenth century became de facto a military fief, linked to the hereditary ownership of lands and irrigation installations; the owner enjoyed immunity from taxation. These rights were enjoyed by the holder of the *soyurghal* not only de facto but de jure, that is, with the sanction of the state in fifteenth-century documents, particularly the 1417 charter of the Ak Koyunlu Kara Yūsuf given in the *Sharaf-nāma* chronicle.\(^{37}\)

Unfortunately, not a single document attesting to a grant in *soyurghal* by Timur has been preserved. Nevertheless, to judge from narrative sources, such grants were quite frequent in his time and the recipients enjoyed the rights enumerated above. Individuals enjoying tax exemption were known as *tarkhāns*. Nizām al-Dīn Shāmī reports that in 1390–1, at the time of the campaign in the Dasht-i Kūchak against the Golden Horde, Timur singled out, favoured and rewarded all those who had displayed bravery and ordered them to be exempted from taxes. The order was given:

> that they be not hindered from approaching his greatness, that they and their children be immune from prosecution for up to ten misdemeanours, that their horses be not taken for fulfilment of transport obligations (*ulagh*) and that they be considered exempted and discharged of all obligations (*takalluf*).\(^{38}\)

Yet in spite of the substantial rights enjoyed by the holders of *soyurghals*, they remained a form of servile landholding under the aegis of the state, in its capacity as the supreme proprietor of the lands conveyed. In addition to these lands, the state and the sovereign had at their disposal state or crown lands (*khālisa-yi mamlaka*).

In the second half of the fourteenth century and the early part of the fifteenth, appreciable landed properties remained at the disposal of private individuals and represented their private holdings (Arabic-Persian *mulk*, pl. *amlāk*). In Transoxania, as in other neighbouring lands, *amlāk* were both peasant (i.e. based on private labour) and landlord holdings. Unlike the *soyurghals*, the *amlāk* were generally subject to state taxation and were divided, according to their area, into *kharāj* (land tax) and *cushr*. It was only at the end of the Timurid period that the ‘unencumbered’ *mulk* (i.e. the *mulk* exempt from taxes, known as *mulk-i hurr, mulk-i khālis* or *mulk-i hurr wa khālis*) became widespread.\(^{39}\)

Under Timur, practices of land transfer inherited from the past were preserved, as was the other form of ownership of the *waqf* type by the Muslim religious foundations –

---

mosques, madrasas, mazārs (burial shrines), and so on. At times of political instability, one of the most widespread types of waqf was the waqf-i awlādī (family or hereditary waqf), when those in whom the waqf was vested collected their share from the property conveyed as waqf. The only document of Timur’s reign that has come down to us, however, is a waqf conveyance drawn up, in the opinion of its editor, O. D. Chekhovich, no later than 1383. Under Timur, the waqfs evidently enjoyed tax exemption, but under his successors a different practice obtained.

Of peasant ra‘iyyat (land tenure) in the time of Timur, little is known from authentic sources. From indirect data it may be assumed that there already existed in Transoxania a rural community, known in the Muslim East by the Arabo-Persian name of jamā‘at, and communal institutions. In the waqf deed mentioned above, the donor names, among the lands bordering on the landed properties being transferred in the waqf, ‘the land of a specified community’ (zāmīn-i jamā‘at-i mu‘āyyan) and ‘land at the disposal of a village’.  

Slave labour for cultivation, as well as in the trades, though practically extinct in the pre-Mongol period, obtained a new lease of life during the Mongol conquest and the conquest by Timur. Tens and hundreds of thousands of prisoners (bardas) were enslaved. In India, in particular, after Timur’s capture of Delhi, prisoners continued to be led out of the city gates for several days: ‘Each warrior led out of the city 150 men, women and children, considering them [his] prisoners, so that the least of the soldiers found himself with 20 captives.’

We do not know to what extent the Yasa of Chinggis Khan forbidding the nomads to leave the il (large tribal grouping) of their leader spread among the settled population of Transoxania. It is known from Clavijo’s journal that, at the passage across the Oxus (Amu Darya), the frontier guards demanded a certificate showing whence and for what purpose the traveller was leaving the confines of ‘the kingdom of Samarkand’. Entry into the capital area was free, since Timur made every effort to populate that region. Nevertheless, serfdom, in the sense of a legally sanctioned peasant status, was unknown in Transoxania, as in many other countries of the East, possibly because of the absence of private estates of great landowners. However, the peasants were bound to the land by the burden of taxation.

The basic tax was the land tax, māl or kharāj, but nothing is known of any government rescripts fixing its level. A kharāj at the rate of one-third (two dāngs, or two parts in six) was levied, according to Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī, in Iraq and Azerbaijan, which in Timur’s time were governed by his son Mirānshāh. This appears to have been the officially established rate in Timur’s empire. In addition to the kharāj, the peasants paid other

40 Chekhovich, 1951, p. 59.
41 Ghiyāth al-Dīn Ṭūl, 1915, p. 129.

341
taxes, considered to be formally ‘illegal’ since they were not prescribed by the *sharī’a*. Fifteenth-century writers refer to levies by a whole army of officials – the *dābitān*, the *muḥassilān*, the *dārūghān*, the *muṣrifān* and others. Other taxes that seem to have been levied were a capitation tax (*dūdī*) and a poll tax (*sār-shumār*); a particularly heavy burden was the *ulagh* (literally ‘beast of burden’), the obligation to provide government couriers with relay horses and also to furnish heavy transport.

Clavijo was witness to the cruel treatment of the population by the knights (*caballeros*) accompanying the embassy of the king of Castille:

Those who saw them on the road and realized that they were royal servants, and guessing that they were the bearers of some royal command, would take to flight, as if pursued by the devil; and those who were in their shops selling their wares, hid them and also fled, locking themselves in their houses, and passers-by would say to one another, *elchi*, which is to say, envoys, for they knew already that with the coming of envoys black days were in store for them; and they would flee as if the devil were at their heels... They act thus not only towards (foreign) ambassadors, but also whenever anyone is on royal business; for whatever someone on royal business does, everyone must keep silent, and raise no objection...; for that reason the emperor (*Señor*) is so feared throughout the whole country, that it is a marvel.42

The jurisdiction of the central *diwān* (council) extended only over Transoxania. The rulers appointed by Timur in the conquered regions had their own staff of officials.

Timur could not but be aware that the volume of revenue collected by the state was directly dependent on the condition of agriculture. This was the reason for the measures taken during his reign for the repair and construction of irrigation works. Extensive irrigation works were carried out on the Mughan steppe and in the Kabul valley.43 The fifteenth-century historian and geographer Hāfiz-i Abrū gives a list of twenty canals, nine of which bore the names of high officials of Timur’s government, perhaps the builders of the canals in question.

**Urban development, crafts and trade**

The huge receipts flowing into Timur’s treasury from taxes in Transoxania, the more or less regular inflow of tribute from the conquered territories governed by his deputies, the heavy taxes laid upon the subject populations and, finally, the undisguised robbery that followed his conquests enabled him to spend large sums on the beautification of his capital, Samarkand, to which were relocated, in addition to material wealth, craftsmen and scholars, poets and painters. Samarkand became a great centre of craftsmanship and trade,

42 Clavijo, 1881, pp. 189, 190.
43 Bartol’d, 1914.
medieval learning and culture, and surrounding settlements were drawn upon to enhance the greatness of the capital. The fortress of Samarkand was completed, palaces surrounded by immense gardens were erected in the town and its environs and work was started on the construction of the Shah-i Zinda necropolis, a complex of mausoleums of the feudal aristocracy and the family of Timur.

Across the whole city was laid ‘a very wide street’, with shops on either side; at fixed intervals reservoirs were situated. According to Clavijo, the builders worked in relays, so that the work went on uninterruptedly day and night:

Some broke down houses [i.e. those situated on the roadway], others levelled the ground, still others did the building, and all made such a noise day and night that they seemed very devils. In less than 20 days so much had been done that it was a marvel.

Construction also began on several other cities of Transoxania. In particular, Urgench, destroyed by Timur in his battle with the Khan of the White Horde and sown with barley, was restored. In Kish, the mosque and palace of Ak-Saray were built. Clavijo considered the interior apartments of the palace, finished in gold and azure and faced with glazed tiles, to be ‘astonishing work’. ‘Even in Paris,’ he adds, ‘where there are past masters, this work would be considered very beautiful.’

Essential to the growth and productive activity of the cities was a rich agricultural hinterland:

This land [writes Clavijo of the region around Samarkand] is rich in all things: grain, fruit and various meats … bread is as cheap as it could possibly be, and there is no end to the rice available. So rich and abundant are the town and its surroundings that one can only marvel.

To the city from its hinterland came not only foodstuffs but also industrial crops, especially cotton, which served as the raw material for weaving, the most important branch of urban handicrafts. The towns produced a variety of metal articles: weapons, all kinds of implements, copper vessels, and so on. There was a widely varied production by wood-workers, leather-workers, potters, jewellers; in the towns lived and worked cotton-carders, stone and alabaster carvers, carpet-makers, bakers, cooks, confectioners and other tradesmen.

The craftsmen were a heterogeneous group, since many of them hailed from distant towns and countries and had been brought to Transoxania as captives. The employment of artisans from a variety of countries for building work contributed in no small degree to the blending on Transoxanian soil of the artistic and architectural styles of the various peoples of the East. The bulk of urban craftsmen were free tradesmen. They were organized in guilds and worked in their own shops, with the help of apprentices and members

44 Clavijo, 1881, pp. 209, 279
of their families. For heavy or dirty work, the craftsmen might engage ancillary workers. There were also craftsmen of royal workshops (kārkhanahs), especially armourers. In Köksaray, one of the villages on the outskirts of Samarkand, surrounded by a deep ditch and to all intents and purposes impregnable, Timur kept his treasury. Here ‘the emperor kept about 1,000 captive craftsmen, making armour, helmets, bows and arrows, working the year round’.46

Samarkand and a series of other Transoxanian towns became major centres of international trade. Through them passed the most important trade arteries, linking China and India with Europe and the Near East. The development of the external caravan trade involved not only merchants but the Turco-Mongol nomadic and semi-nomadic tribal nobility and many representatives of the local landowning aristocracy, among them the Muslim clergy. To Samarkand came ‘from Rush [Rus] and Tartary hides and linen, from China silken stuffs, which in that country are made better than anywhere else; and especially satins, considered to be the best in the world’; from India were brought spices, nutmeg, cloves, cinnamon and ginger. If Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿAlī is to be believed, the trade routes, which had previously been ‘impassable’ because of ‘the depredations of thieves and bandits’, during Timur’s reign were made safe and merchants traversed them freely.47

Despite the high level of development of their craftsmanship and trade, the cities of Transoxania remained completely in the power of the ruling lords. These owned houses, lands, caravanserais and other lucrative property. Shīhnas (municipal officials with specific police powers as well as other functions) were appointed by Timur himself or his local representatives. The craft and trade guilds, though they took decisions in matters relating to production and some everyday social questions concerning their members, had no political rights whatever. Their headmen, who were responsible for the collection of taxes and the discharge of obligations, were often subjected to physical coercion and other forms of oppression on the part of the ruling powers. Representative institutions of citizens and a civil law, which had grown up in Europe, were non-existent in Transoxania. Cities and country localities alike were handed over by the monarch as gifts to the princes and amirs.

The power of the ruling interests was especially manifested in a variety of levies upon the trading and artisan population. A special tax levied on craft and trade was the tamgha, which in the Mongol period came to replace the zakāt, the sharīʿa-sanctioned tax traditionally levied in Muslim countries on such activities. Tolls were exacted from travelling merchants at river crossings and in mountains passes; ‘a great revenue’ was derived from

46 Clavijo, 1881, pp. 289–90.
47 Ghiyāth al-Dīn ʿAlī, 1915, p. 28.
the tolls at the famous ‘Iron Gates’ on the caravan route from India to Samarkand. The arbitrariness of the authorities was a source of great distress to the townsfolk. An example was the laying, by Timur’s order, of a commercial highway from one end of Samarkand to the other. The princes (mîrzâs) in charge of the project:

started the works and began to demolish the houses, to whomever they might belong, situated in the places where the sovereign (Señor) had ordered the road to be laid; so that the owners, seeing their houses being demolished, collected up their goods and everything they had and fled.

The expense of building the trade road was, apparently, laid on the townsfolk themselves. At all events, Clavijo states that ‘the people working here received payment from the town’. As the fancy took him, Timur would force the townsfolk to take part in the triumphal celebrations he held.

Relations with west European rulers

Timur’s wars of conquest drew the attention of west European rulers, for they saw of the ‘Tartar conqueror’ a possible counterpoise to the growing military strength to the Ottoman Turks, who as early as 1389, after winning a victory on the plain of Kosovo in Serbia, seized that country along with Bulgaria and were threatening Hungary and Constantinople. The emperor of Byzantium, the Genoese ruler of Galata (the Frankish suburb of Constantinople) and the French king Charles VI Valois appealed to Timur for help against the Turks. For his part, Timur sent an embassy (its details are unknown) with gifts to Genoa and Venice. After his victory over Sultan Bâyazîd in 1402, he informed Charles VI in a letter of 1 August 1402 of the ‘deposition’ of the sultan and proposed that merchants from the realms of both rulers should visit each other’s countries, ‘for peace is strengthened by trade’. A letter in like vein was addressed by Timur to the English king Henry IV. In reply, the king wrote that the news of the victory over Bâyazîd, ‘our enemy and yours’, ‘aroused in us a feeling of great solace and great joy’. However, this correspondence did not lead to the establishment of systematic diplomatic relations. One reason for this was the death of Timur and the incipient feudal quarrels among his successors, together, of course, with the great distances involved.

Timur’s warlike activity was attentively observed by Henry III, king of Castile, who as early as 1402 sent envoys to the East with orders to collect information ‘about the mores, customs, religion, laws and strength of these far-off nations’. This embassy was received

48 Clavijo, 1881, pp. 201, 204–5.
49 Ibid., pp. 278–9.
50 Umnyakov, 1969, pp. 179 et seq.
by Timur during the festivities held by him to celebrate his victory over Bāyazīd In 1402. The amir lavished gifts on the envoys. ‘Mahomet al-Kazi’, as Clavijo calls Timur’s envoy, was sent back to Spain with them to deliver the letter from ‘Lord Tamurbeg’. A return embassy led by Clavijo left Spain by sea on 25 May 1403 for Constantinople and Trebizond, whence they travelled overland through Iran to Samarkand. On 8 September 1404 they were received by Timur. The envoys were shown marks of respect, but there quickly came an order for them to quit Timur’s court and return to their country. This unexpected turn of events was brought about by the start of preparations for a new invasion, this time of China, where Timur’s army arrived on 27 November, just a few days after the departure of the Spaniards from Samarkand.51

The great army raised by Timur set out, but the severe winter of 1404–5, proved fatal for the aging conqueror and, on arrival at Utrar in February 1405, he suddenly died.

The succession struggle52

After Timur’s death, conflict broke out among the members of his house, the rulers of the state domains and the provincial governors. They refused to accept Pīr Muhammad, Timur’s grandson, who had named himself Timur’s successor. The empire, lacking a single economic base and resting on the sole authority of Timur as military leader and on his despotic power supported by methods of terror, quickly began to disintegrate. Shāh Rukh (1405–47) declared himself an independent ruler, governing a large domain that included Khurasan and the Herat region.

A serious rival to Shāh Rukh appeared in the person of Khalīl Sultān (Timur’s grandson and the son of Mīranshāh), the former ruler of Tashkent. He had the support of several powerful amirs and grandees of Samarkand, who handed over to him the keys of the city, the fortress and Timur’s rich treasury. Mīranshāh, with the intention of supporting Khalīl Sultān, marched on Samarkand from Iran at the head of his army. Khalīl Sultān’s position was made more complicated by raids by the Khans of the Golden Horde, who had taken Khwarazm and marched as far as Balkh. Nevertheless, in February 1406 he managed to defeat, in a battle fought near Karshi, the army of Pīr Muhammad and Ulugh Beg (son of Shāh Rukh), who had concluded an alliance against him. Several months later Pīr Muhammad died at the hand of an assassin.

Meanwhile, the position of Khalīl Sultān in Samarkand had appreciably worsened and he did not have enough troops to undertake further military conquests. The advancement

52 For the chronology of the Timurids, see Bosworth, 1996, pp. 270–2.
of new men under his rule annoyed Timur’s amirs. One of them, Khudaydād, took Khalīl Sultan prisoner and occupied Samarkand. Shāh Rukh marched on Samarkand. Learning of his approach, Khudaydād left the city, taking Khalīl Sultan with him. On 13 May 1409 Shāh Rukh entered Samarkand and dealt severely with the amirs of the warring groups there. Leaving the city, he appointed Ulugh Beg ruler of Samarkand and another of his sons, Ibrāhīm Sultan, as ruler of Balkh. Other Timurid princes also received fiefs in Transoxania from Shāh Rukh. In the spring of 1410, unwilling to recognize the authority of Ulugh Beg, they raised a rebellion and, to the west of Samarkand near Kūzīl Arvat, they defeated Ulugh Beg and his regent, Amir Malik Shāh. Returning to Transoxania, Shāh Rukh put down the rebellion. Ulugh Beg (1409–49) became in effect the sole ruler of Transoxania, although at the demand of Shāh Rukh he contributed troops to his campaigns, and on the coinage and in the khutba Shāh Rukh’s name appeared along with that of Ulugh Beg.

In western Iran and Azerbaijan, governed in Timur’s reign by his son Mīranshāh (killed in battle in 1408), the Jalayirids established themselves in power with the help of the Kara Koyunlu (the ‘Black Sheep’ Turkmens). But it was only in 1410 that the Jalayirid Sultan Ahmad died in battle against his former allies. Power over Azerbaijan, Armenia and Arab Iraq then passed into the hands of the Kara Koyunlu dynasty. Shāh Rukh, whose effective power extended over Khurasan and Gurgan, Mazandaran, Sistan and the region of Herat, Kandahar and Kabul, waged several wars against the Kara Koyunlu. His next campaign in 1435 brought him victory and Jahānshāh Kara Koyunlu (1436–67) acknowledged himself to be Shāh Rukh’s vassal.

A series of military operations by Shāh Rukh were directed against two nomadic states that had sprung up to the north and north-west of Timur’s disintegrating empire. A considerable threat was posed by the Uzbek nomads, whose state arose out of the fragments of the Golden and White Hordes; the Uzbeks carried out predatory raids against Transoxania, Gurgan and Astarabad. The Chaghatayid Khans of Moghulistan, although occupied with internal disturbances, strove to take control of Ferghana and Turkistan. From time to time, the Afghan tribes rebelled; their subjection to Shāh Rukh was in many cases purely nominal.

Shāh Rukh’s efforts were also directed against the rebellious scions of the house of Timur, his own grandsons, to whom he had granted fiefs in soyurghal. They were allowed to keep their own courts, but had to hand over part of their revenues to Shāh Rukh and fulfil certain other feudal obligations on pain of punishment. In 1414–15 Shāh Rukh’s grandson Iskandar was deprived of his soyurghal that included Isfahan, Hamadan, Luristan and Fars; in 1414 Husayn Bayqara was evicted from Qum, Kashan and Rayy. In 1446 Shāh
Rukh mounted what was essentially a punitive expedition against his grandson, Sultan Muhammad (son of Baysunqur), to whom he had once awarded a large fief.

In his efforts to increase his power, Shāh Rukh relied for support mainly on the settled Tajik Persian landowning nobility, particularly the civil bureaucracy. He had close ties with the Muslim clergy, particularly the shaykhs of the Sufi order of the Naqshbandiyya. To this, he owed the reputation of being the ideal Muslim ruler. At the same time he was severe with his amirs. Some of them, including several of the most prominent, he put to death for a variety of offences against his authority. The customs and standards embodied in the Mongol Yasa and observed in Timur’s time were, in Shāh Rukh’s reign, relegated to oblivion and the law of the shari‘a achieved unconditional supremacy.\(^5\)

During Shāh Rukh’s reign, his capital Herat became a great centre of commerce, crafts and culture. Many outstanding poets and painters, scholars and historians lived and worked there. Their activities were encouraged by Shāh Rukh’s son and effective co-ruler, Baysunqur (d. 1433), who officially occupied the post of chief wazīn. Through his efforts, the library was founded there. In it worked scholars and philologists, calligraphers, miniaturists and bookbinders. Herat was embellished by architectural monuments bearing the stamp of the influence of Samarkand at the end of Timur’s reign. To Herat came not only merchants from many countries, but also foreign embassies, most notably from China. In return, in 1420 Shāh Rukh sent to China envoys of his own, among whom was the artist Ghiyāth al-Dīn. His diary of the journey to China was used by the historian Hāfiz-i Abrū. In 1441–2 Abu al-Razzāq Samarqandī went to India on Shāh Rukh’s orders. In his historical work he describes the route from Hurmuz to India and gives a vivid account of many cities in the south Indian state of Vijayanagar. Its ruler sent a return embassy to Herat, with a view to increasing trade between Transoxania, Khurasan and India.

Under the outward brilliance of the state, however, one can discern clear signs of weakness. Although Shāh Rukh’s historians describe his reign as a time when the ra‘īyyats (peasants) were ‘freed from cares’ and found ‘tranquillity’, this conflicts with the known facts, above all the growth of popular rebellion. As early as 1405 a Sarbadar uprising took place in Sabzavar and was suppressed by Shāh Rukh. In the following year, a similar uprising engulfed Mazandaran. The peasants and craftsmen failed to make common cause with the small local landowners, as had happened in the fourteenth century. The ideological underpinning of their action was provided by the doctrines of the ‘extremist’ Shi‘ite sects, who preached, in particular, the common ownership of land and other property and a Utopia of social equality. On 21 February 1427, in the Friday mosque of Herat, an attempt was made on the life of Shāh Rukh, who was gravely wounded in the stomach. The attacker was

\(^5\) Bartol’d, 1914, p. 32.
a pupil of Fadl Allāh Hurūfī, the founder of one of the extremist Shiʿite sects in Khurasan, the Hurūfiyya; Fadl Allāh Hurūfī had earlier been banished by Timur to Azerbaijan, where Timur’s son Miranshāh had put him to death with his own hands.

Towards the end of Shāh Rukh’s reign, his state presented a picture of political fragmentation. In Khurasan alone, says ʿAbd al-Razzāq Samarqandi, were there ‘several pādishāhs’; the pādishāh (king) of Azerbaijan and both Iraqs, Jahānshāh Kara Koyunlu, seized the region of Astarabad and Sabzavar.
The great empire of Timur had been maintained by force of arms and by Timur’s skill as a ruler and military leader. With his death in February 1405, the unity of the realm collapsed. Timur’s sons and grandsons who had governed the provinces strove for independence; attempts to lead the realm by Timur’s grandson Pīr Muhammad (designated by his grandfather as his successor) failed. In 1406 he was killed. The representatives of former dynasties, overthrown by Timur, were not slow to take advantage of the situation.

* See Map 8.
As a result of a long struggle in Azerbaijan, Armenia and western Persia, the state of the Kara Koyunlu (1410–68) was established; its rulers pursued a policy hostile towards the Timurids. Only later, in 1435, did Shāh Rukh make their ruler his vassal (see above, Chapter 16).

A bitter struggle raged throughout Transoxania. Samarkand was seized by Khalīl Sultān (Timur’s grandson and the son of Mirānshāh; 1405–9), but in fact he did not control even the whole territory of Transoxania: the steppes and Sawran were in the hands of Amir Berdi Beg; Tashkent, Khujand and Ferghana were in the hands of Amir Khudāydād. From late 1405 to early 1406, Khwarazm was ruled by Edigü of the Golden Horde, later by the Uzbek sultans; Khurasan with its adjacent regions was ruled by Shāh Rukh (1405–47), who had constantly to put down the revolts of governors. In May 1409 he was able to occupy Samarkand; his nephew, Khalīl Sultān, who had been captured by Khudāydād some time earlier, was made to surrender.

The rule of Ulugh Beg

Shāh Rukh handed over the government of Turkistan to Ulugh Beg (1409–49), his eldest son, then aged 15, and appointed Shāh Malik (d. 1426) as his tutor. However, at Ulugh Beg’s insistence, the power-loving Shāh Malik was recalled to Herat in 1411. Some time later, Khwarazm was handed over to him as a soyurghal (land grant). Ulugh Beg’s real name was Muhammad Taraghay, but from his youth he had been called Ulugh Beg (Great Prince) and it is under this name that he has gone down in history. Like his grandfather, Ulugh Beg had the title of Güregen because he was the Khan’s son-in-law and under him there remained some Chinggisid fainéant Khans to whose names labels were issued. The name of the sovereign Shāh Rukh was mentioned in the khutba, and money was also coined in his name. The most important questions were solved by Ulugh Beg only with the consent of his father. When, in 1427, he mounted a campaign against the Dasht-i Kïpchak and suffered a defeat, Shāh Rukh temporarily debarred him from the government of Transoxania. Nevertheless, Ulugh Beg mainly pursued a policy that was independent of Herat. According to Dawlat Shāh, ‘Ulugh Beg ruled independently over Samarkand and Transoxania for forty years.’

Ulugh Beg made a number of attempts to unite the separate areas of the Timurid realm. He was able to banish Ahmad b. Ḥumayd b. Timur (who had ruled over Ferghana) and, at some time, with the assistance of his father, to recall this same Ahmad from Kashghar (where he had tried to consolidate his power) to Herat. Thus Ulugh Beg assumed power over Ferghana in 1414 and Kashghar in 1416. He also tried, by diplomatic means,
but un成功地，defend his territories from raids by the nomadic tribes. Shortly after having come to power with Ulugh Beg’s support, these tribal rulers became his political opponents, not infrequently unifying with forces hostile to both Ulugh Beg and Shāh Rukh. For example, the rulers of Moghulistan,\(^1\) struggling against Ulugh Beg, more than once formed a unified front with the rulers of Badakhshan, who refused to recognize the supreme power of Shāh Rukh.

In February 1425 Ulugh Beg, at the head of a force assembled at Tashkent, departed on a campaign against Moghulistan. The campaign was successful and a record of it was inscribed at the Jilanut gorge. On their way home, the participants in the campaign loaded special carts with pieces of nephrite which Timur had previously tried to bring back and, having delivered them to Samarkand, used them for Timur’s tomb. But as noted above, Ulugh Beg was unable to establish good relations with the nomads of the steppe bordering the northern regions of his domains. Baraq Khan, one of Urus Khan’s grandsons, who with his support had been enthroned in the ulus (domain) of the Dasht-i Kïpchak, laid claim to the towns along the Syr Darya, alleging that before Timur’s time these areas had belonged to Jöchi’s descendants. Hence in 1427 Ulugh Beg, having consulted with his father and received his support in the person of his brother Jūqī (d. 1444–5), embarked on a campaign to the north. However, at Sïgnak his army was crushed. Pursuing the Timurid army, the conquerors penetrated into Transoxania and ravaged many towns and villages. The defeat at Sïgnak, together with an attempt to close the Samarkand gates to Ulugh Beg and his temporary removal from power, played a decisive part in his subsequent political activity. From that time onwards he never again mounted a campaign in person, although troops belonging to the chiefs of nomadic Uzbeks and amirs of Moghulistan more than once attacked the areas subjected to him. During Ulugh Beg’s last years, the Moghuls were able to attack Andijan and Kanibadam with impunity.

According to the historian ʿAbd al-Razzāq Samarqandī, when Shāh Rukh handed over the government of Transoxania to Ulugh Beg, he advised him to protect landholders from violence and unfairness and to keep the army ready for action, paying the soldiers’ wages on time. Meanwhile, in order to protect villagers and town-dwellers alike, to maintain the irrigation system, to prevent officials from robbing the subjects and to guard the boundaries of the realm, it was necessary to establish a strong central government. Despite the attempts of various amirs to increase their own power, Ulugh Beg’s forty-year reign was marked by a relative stability that contributed to the economic growth of his state.

Ulugh Beg took measures to develop both domestic and foreign trade, with India and China in particular. His monetary reform of 1428 played a role in encouraging internal

\(^1\) The north-eastern part of the Chagatayid ulus, separated from it in the mid-fourteenth century.
trade. His reform of the coinage and organization of the circulation of copper money resulted in a ban on the old coins in 1420, and the putting into circulation of new ones; the weight of the new coins was also altered in order to regulate the circulation of money. Bukhara was later granted the monopoly of striking copper coins, though at the end of Ulugh Beg’s life, there was a clear decentralization of the minting of coins.2

It was in the time of Ulugh Beg that the Registan Square, lying at the crossing of the six main roads through Samarkand, was laid out. Hundreds of local master craftsmen and workers, as well as those who had been collected by force from all regions at the time of Timur’s reign, erected madrasas, mausoleums (including the mausoleum of the astronomer Qâdî-zâde Rûmî, d. 1437), trading premises, bath-houses and bridges at Samarkand, Bukhara and Ghijduwan. On Ulugh Beg’s orders, a garden was laid out. In it there was a pavilion: ‘the whole lower part of its walls was made of china. It was called chînhîkâna. The china was delivered from China by one man.’3 After 1427 Ulugh Beg mainly gave himself up to scientific studies. Samarkand became a centre of scientific thought and here, at the observatory built under his guidance, worked Qâdî-zâde Rûmî, Ghiyâth al-Dîn Jamshîd, Mu’âin al-Dîn Kâshânî and Ālâ’ al-Dîn Abû ’l-Hasan Ālā Qûshchî. Literary figures such as Lutfî, Saqqâqî, Khayâlî and others wrote their works there – Ulugh Beg was fond of poetry and music.

The power struggle following Shâh Rukh’s death

After Shâh Rukh’s death in 1447, the heir apparent Ulugh Beg won the dynastic struggle but, unable to consolidate his power in Herat, was forced to return to Samarkand. Shâh Rukh’s body, brought back by him, was buried in Timur’s mausoleum. The power struggle in Herat contributed to the breaking-off of relations between Ulugh Beg and his son Ābû Abd al-Latîf. In autumn 1449 at Dimashq, near Samarkand, there was a battle between the two men; Ulugh Beg’s army suffered a defeat and, on the orders of Ābû Abd al-Latîf, he left for the pilgrimage to Mecca. On his way, near Samarkand, he was killed on 25 (or 27) October 1449 at the instigation of Ābû Abd al-Latîf, who went down in history as a patricide; he himself was to reign for only six and a half months.

Subsequently, the struggle for succession raged mainly between Ābû Abd Allâh b. Ibirlâhim b. Shâh Rukh and Abû Sa’d (son of Mirânschâh; 1451–69). In 1451 Abû Sa’d, supported by the forces of Abu ‘l-Khayr Khân, leader of the nomadic Uzbeks, crushed Ābû Abd Allâh’s army and seized Samarkand. Mainly with support from the tribal chiefs, Abû Sa’d then

2 Davidovich, 1965, p. 298.
3 Bâbur, 1905, p. 10a.
struggled against various pretenders, among whom was Sultan Husayn Bayqara, a future ruler of Khurasan (see below). Abu Sa’id tried to consolidate his power through gaining the support of the religious classes: under his rule, great influence was exerted on state affairs by the Shaykh al-Islam of Samarkand, who subsequently had to yield his position to Ubayd Allah Khaja Ahrar (1404–90), leader of the Naqshbandiya Sufi order and later a powerful political figure. In 1454 and 1470 Khaja Ahrar organized the defence of Samarkand; he was the initiator of a peace deal at Shahrukhiyya between Sultan Ahmad, Umar Shaykh b. Timur and Mahmoud Khan b. Yunus Khan (d. 1487), who had all been at war with each other.

Abu Sa’id was able to seize Khurasan twice. After the second conquest in 1458–9, he made Herat the capital of his realm and assigned Transoxania to his eldest son, Sultan Ahmad (d. 1494). According to the agreement with the ruler of the Kara Koyunlu, Jahanshah (1436–67), the great central Persian desert (Dasht-i Kavir) was recognized as a border between their realms. Thus Transoxania and Khurasan with the adjacent provinces formed the Timurid realm, without Abu Sa’id, however, being able to achieve his aim of the formation of a centralized state. Afraid of increasing the power of the Ak Koyunlu, who had replaced that of the Kara Koyunlu, Abu Sa’id mounted a campaign into Azerbaijan early in 1469, but this ended in the defeat of his forces, his capture and execution. Subsequently, some disgraced Timurids sought the protection of the rulers of the Ak Koyunlu.

### The realm divides

With Abu Sa’id’s death, the Timurid realm finally split into two sections, Khurasan and Transoxania, with their adjacent provinces. Power in Khurasan, with Herat as its capital, went to Sultan Husayn Bayqara (1469–1506), Mansur’s son, and the great-grandson of Umar Shaykh b. Timur; he ruled the country, with a few intervals, for nearly forty years. Sultan Ahmad Mirza was considered the nominal governor of Transoxania. For some time, he was able to subjugate Tashkent, Sayram, Khujand and Ura-tübe. But though he held power for twenty-five years, ‘his will was in the hands of the Beg’. Under him, Samarkand was not the recognized capital of Transoxania; almost every town with its province had its own independent governor. Sultan Ali Mirza (killed in 1501) was in Bukhara; Ferghana, with the towns of Andijan, Ush, Marghelan, Isfara, Khujand, Askhi and Kasan, was assigned to Umar Shaykh, the fourth son of Abu Sa’id, and Khujand (attributed by some historians of that time to Ferghana), was also part of his dominions; Tashkent, with its

---

4 Babur, 1905, pp. 19a, 24a.
surrounding area, was ruled by the Khan of Moghulistan. The rulers of these provinces were often at war with each other.

The lands along the upper Oxus (Amu Darya) – Hisar, Termez, Chaghaniyan, Khuttalan, Qunduz and Badakhshan – were assigned to Mahmūd Sultān (d. 1495), another of Abū Saʿīd’s sons, even during the reign of his father. However, the local amirs of these provinces also pursued an independent policy. After Sultān Ahmad’s death, Mahmūd Sultān moved to Samarkand and reigned there for some five or six months, reportedly attempting to regulate the collection of taxes and strengthen his army. But with the deaths of Ahmad, Mahmūd and ʿUmar Shaykh, all occurring during the space of a year, civil strife intensified. The richest amirs tried to make use of the child Timurids, preferring to enthrone the weakest of them. The young Timurid Baysunqur Mīrzā’s coming to power in Samarkand roused the governors of other provinces. Sultan Alī Mīrzā left Bukhara on a campaign against Samarkand, but the inhabitants of the city put up a fierce resistance. In the spring of 1497 Baysunqur Mīrzā engaged in a counter-attack against Bukhara. When Sultān Alī learned of this action, he went towards Baysunqur Mīrzā at the head of an army. Meanwhile, the Andijan Begs decided to take advantage of the situation. Putting the young Bābūr at the head of their forces, they set off to conquer Samarkand; having occupied the surrounding mountains and valleys, they bided their time. Khōja Ahrār’s sons, Khōjagī Khōja (Khōja ʿAbd Allāh) and Khōja Yahyā, took an active part in the struggle for Samarkand, leading local groupings competing among themselves for power.

At the end of the fifteenth century, the Tarkhan Begs came to exert a great influence upon state affairs. Struggling to gain influence over the Timurids, they opposed the old aristocracy, including Ahmad Khōja Beg (who protected ʿAlīshir Nawāʾī when the latter was in Samarkand), Abū ʿl-Makārim and Khōjagī Khōja b. Khōja Ahrār. In 1496 the Tarkhan Begs suffered a defeat, but continued to play a decisive part in state affairs until Shaybānī Khan’s seizure of power in 1500. The resultant wrecking of the economy and the destruction of the foundations of the state were noted by contemporaries; starvation and poverty, and the deaths of many of the poor, contrasted sharply with the nobles’ splendid garments, gold and silver plates and dishes, and seemingly infinite numbers of sheep and thoroughbred horses.

Internecine wars had been occurring in the south as well, with opposition against Sultān Masʿūd, the eldest son of Sultān Mahmūd Mīrzā: his most powerful opponent was Khusraw Shāh, the ruler of Qunduz. Although power was more centralized in Khurasan, Sultān Husayn Bayqara also had to restrain his sons’ aspirations for independence, most notably his eldest son Bādiʿ al-Zamān. Objecting to a redistribution of lands in 1497, Bādiʿ al-Zamān came out against his father. Sultān Husayn was compelled to cede Balkh and the
territory from the Oxus to the Murghab to him; in those towns (Qunduz, Baghlan, Termiz, Hisar, Qubadiyan, Khuttalan and Badakhshan) controlled by Khusraw Shāh, the name of Badi‘ al-Zamān was included in the khutba and inscribed on coins.⁵ In 1498 the other sons of Sultān Husayn rose against him. A significant role in the restoration of peace between Sultān Husayn and his sons, Badi‘ al-Zamān in particular, was played by the great author Alīshīr Nawā’ī.

On the whole, in the fifteenth century and early in the sixteenth, the weakening of central power and the breaking down of the realm into separate domains were clearly discernible processes. The attempts by some Timurids to consolidate the central power had no lasting success and merely stimulated further internecine warfare which eventually resulted in the conquest of Transoxania by the Shaybanids.

Agriculture, livestock and hunting

Farming in the Timurid realm, as elsewhere in the East, was based on artificial irrigation. The main provider of irrigation was the state, so that the proper functioning of the irrigation system and the good state of farming were dependent on the vitality of the central authority; with the break-down of the state and the increased frequency of nomadic raids, agriculture also declined.

The Zarafshan valley was the main farming region of Transoxania. Corn, fruit and vegetables were also grown in the fields of Ferghana, the Tashkent oasis, the Surkhan Darya and Kashka Darya regions. Khuttalan (Kulab) and Hisar were famed for their rich harvests of corn and melons. Melons from Khwarazm and Bukhara enjoyed special fame. Wheat, barley, millet and maize were grown and vast areas were sown with lucerne. The manufacture of various cotton fabrics in all areas led to the spread of the cotton plant; a sixteenth-century document mentions ghuza-puli, monetary taxes on cotton. Suburban gardens sprang up all around Samarkand and Tashkent. Special varieties of grapes, apples and plums, exported to other regions, were prized. In former times, the ‘golden peaches’ of Samarkand had been sent to the Chinese emperor. Plants from which dyes (madder, henna etc.) were obtained, as well as herbs, also deserve mention. The leaves of the mulberry tree served as food for silkworms. Among the various branches of stock-raising, sheep-breeding was especially developed. There were many varieties of sheep; the Hisar meat and suet sheep enjoyed special renown. Karakul pelts were exported from the Bukhara and Karshi regions. The great number of horses, used in war, shows the level of horse-breeding; camel-breeding was also widespread, especially in the Karshi region.

⁵ Khwāndamir, 1857, p. 286.
The Timurids and their retinues took a great interest in hunting. According to Bâbur, in the region adjacent to Kabul there lived a detachment of slaves who were hunters, together with 2–300 of their families; one of Timur’s descendants had brought these slaves from the environs of Multan. Their main task was to care for the hunting birds, of which the most powerful amirs kept several hundreds. A famous Bâqi Tarkhân who ‘grew up among the nobility and rich’ kept 700 such birds. In honour of the nobles who set out on the hunt, ghazals (poetry) were written and inscribed on the kettledrums; Ulugh Beg’s setting out on the hunt is mentioned in the writings of his contemporaries.

Landownership and taxation

Property in land was divided into three main categories: state, waqf and mulk. The revenues from state lands went to the maintenance of the administrative machinery and the army and for rewarding amirs for their service, for the most part military; they received lands for guarding the frontiers, participation in wars and the subjugation of rebellious lords.

Under the Timurids, one of the forms of transferring state lands into conditional grant lands, the soyurghal, became widespread (see above, Chapter 16). They were granted, as a rule, to members of the ruling dynasty, statesmen of high rank and military leaders. Thus Shâh Rukh transferred Hisar-i Shadman to Muhammad Jahângîr; Kabul, Kandahar and other provinces of Afghanistan to Muhammad’s son, Sind-Qaydu-Bahâdur; and the province of Shiraz to Ibrâhim Sultân. He also granted soyurghals to many military leaders. Ulugh Beg gave Balkh as a soyurghal to Ābd al-Latîf. Sultân Husayn Bayqara also widely practised the granting of soyurghals. In almost all cases, such grants included the instruction to use profits received from a province for the maintenance of the armed forces and for preserving order. Soyurghals were often transferred from one province to another. Ulugh Beg, for example, before he received Transoxania, was twice granted a soyurghal in different provinces of the realm. Some of the holders of soyurghals simultaneously possessed tarkhân charters, which gave them a right to privileges additional to tax immunity. At the same time, the older term iqtâ‘ continued to be used in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in the realm of the Shaybanids and Astrakhanids with the meaning of soyurghal.

Another conditional land grant was the tuyûl. A tuyûldâr gained the right to acquire tax receipts, collected by officials from the population of a locality and having been transferred into tuyûl, but he had no right to govern them. A tuyûl was usually allotted to military leaders in lieu of pay for their services. According to a waqf charter, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the right to the revenues from land made into a tuyûl belonged to a group of tax-collectors, the yasâkiyân.6

6 Mukminova, 1966, p. 287.
The personal estates of a sovereign and the members of a ruling dynasty were defined by the term *injü*; their vassals and servants, who lived there, were also included in this category. The profits derived from the *injü* lands went to the maintenance of the court. People, with their lands, frequently passed under the patronage of a ruler or high-ranking amir. Information given by Ālīshīr Nawā’ī shows that in Khurasan in the late fifteenth century, juridically free people tried to save themselves from extortion and plunder by entering into *injü* relationships. It should be noted, however, that the sources seldom define the Timurids’ own domains as being in the category of *injü*, possibly because a sovereign and the members of his family came to regard what belonged to the treasury as their own property. As a result, by the end of the fifteenth century, the difference between state lands and *injü* lands had disappeared.

The *mulk* lands belonged, in the main, to landed proprietors. A certain part of the land, in the form of small plots, was in the hands of peasants. In the first case, these were the lands with leaseholders; in the second case, lands directly cultivated by their owners, that is, *mulkdārs* – in essence, these were two different categories of land. Under the last Timurids, there was a concentration of *mulk* plots and villages in the hands of both secular and clerical landowners. Among them was Kökeltash, who had lands even outside the Timurid realm. Ābāy Allāh Khōja Ahrār was a large landlord; as a contemporary notes, ‘his lands, fields and estates, as well as herds of livestock and other movable and unmovable personal property, were extraordinarily great and incalculable’. In the Samarkand region alone, he possessed 30,000 *tanaps* of *uşhr* lands.  

In Transoxania in particular, *tarkhān* holdings – that is, freedom from taxation for the holder of *mulk* lands if he held a *tarkhān* charter, and the granting to him a number of other privileges – became widespread in the last quarter of the fifteenth century. A *tarkhān* was released from punishment for up to nine offences, and only after the ninth was he punished. He also enjoyed free access to the Khan. To enjoy the privileges of a *tarkhān* was recognized as conferring high status. Many *tarkhāns* were connected with the Timurids by family ties. Under Sultān Ahmad Mirzā, the greatest amir in the state was considered to be Darwīsh Muhammad Tarkhān. In 1496 Abd al-Ālī Tarkhān was appointed a *hākim* (governor) of Bukhara, with Bukhara, Karakul and Karmina designated as his *soyurghal*; the fate of the last Timurids often depended on this ‘authoritative, cruel, lewd and haughty’ person. Ultimately, the transfer of state lands into *soyurghals* and the spread of the immunity of *tarkhān* holdings led to a loss of revenues to the treasury and to the decentralization of the realm. The Timurids’ attempt to halt this process of disintegration gave only

---

7 Ivanov, 1945, pp. 11–13.
8 Bābur, 1905, p. 22a.
temporary results; on the whole, the trend of the transformation of conditional land grants into hereditary holdings continued.

_Waqt_ lands were formed as a result of donations in favour of religious, charitable and other institutions. In theory, they were considered inviolable and hence, in comparison with the other forms of landownership, had a more firm juridical basis. They were cultivated by peasant leaseholders, who paid rent. According to a contract concluded with the _mutawalli_ of the _waqt_, tax-farmers received the right to collect the tax over a fixed period; needless to say, there were many abuses.\(^9\) Property of different types and extents was made into _waqfs_. In 1420 Ulugh Beg allocated in favour of the _madrasa_ in Samarkand, built by his own order, lands, crops and irrigation canals; the income they brought ‘exceeds many times the expenses of the _madrasa_.’\(^10\) According to a document of 1464, half of the village of Saray Malik – with its adjacent lands, as well as 20 pairs of oxen used for the cultivation of the land, 32 slaves, 12 camels and other types of property – was transferred to a _waqt_ for the tomb of Abū Saʿīd’s daughter, Khwānd Sultān Bika. Khāja Ahrār transferred to a _waqt_ about 400 plots, as well as 64 villages and 30 country gardens; and property endowed by him also included 11 houses with gardens, some tens of trading and handicraft establishments, bath-houses, and mills in Samarkand, Bukhara, Tashkent and the Kashka Darya provinces and in Afghanistan.

Peasants constituted a major part of the population; they were usually defined by the term _raḍiyyat_, although they were not a homogeneous socio-economic grouping. The most widespread form of exploitation of the peasants was métayage, and the typical peasant-leaseholder was a métayager who cultivated state, _waqt_ and _mulk_ lands belonging to well-to-do landowners. The cultivation of land on the base of métayage rent (in most cases, through an intermediary) served a number of peasants as the main, and in some cases the only, source of income; only a small part of the rural population constituted peasant-owners of _mulk_ lands. Some land was occupied by nomadic cattle-breeders. The specific character of their economy demanded annual migrations to seasonal pastures. Close contacts with the settled population brought about interaction between the two ways of life.

Taxes from the peasants constituted the foundations of the state’s income. The chief land tax was the _kharāj_, levied from a part of the harvest mainly in kind, with rates that usually exceeded the fixed norms. Constant military action absorbed the treasury’s receipts. Under the Timurids, the repeated levy of the _kharāj_ was practised, especially at times when there were frequent changes of ruler. Thus after Shāh Rukh’s death, the _kharāj_ was collected from the population of Herat in favour of Shāh Malik’s court, and then again when he was

\(^10\) cAbd al-Razzāq Samarqandi, 1941–9, p. 421.
removed in favour of Mīrzā Ibrāhīm; kharāj was collected for the third time when Abū Saʿīd captured Herat. In 1458, when the power of Mīrzā Ibrāhīm was restored for a short time, he ordered the collection of the kharāj for that year; and in the same year, it was collected for the second time on the orders of Jahānshāh Kara Koyunlu, who had captured Khurasan.11

Besides the kharāj, there were many other taxes – ‘permanent’, ‘legal’ and ‘extraordinary’ – which sprang up in periods of decentralization of power. Among them there were: āwārizāt, levied for the defrayment of extraordinary expenses; dārughān, a tax in favour of the head of the local aristocracy; dūdī, a hearth tax; sar-shumār, a poll tax; and pīshkash (formally voluntary, but in fact obligatory), gifts to high-ranking officials. Presentation of the pīshkash was considered an acknowledgement of supreme power; Sultān Mahmūd (the ruler of Khuttalan) and Saray Khūja Khalīl (the ruler of Salī) demonstrated their obedience to Shāh Rukh by sending him pīshkash. There were many taxes designated for the maintenance of tax-collectors and officials of the taxation apparatus (mushrifān, muhassilān, dābitān, etc.), the irrigation administration, messengers and so on, as well as for the provisioning and regular maintenance of the army, which were levied in some cases even in times of peace. The enforced conscription of ordinary inhabitants to local levies was practised. When Bābur found he had too few soldiers, he ordered people from the suburbs of Andijan to be taken, using ‘kindness or violence’.

Handicrafts and market trading taxes constituted a significant part of the treasury’s income. According to the author of the sixteenth-century Matlab al-tālibīn, the sum of the state revenues received from Samarkand constituted 1,600,000 tamghas. The tax from urban handicrafts and urban business, as well as domestic and foreign trade, was defined by this term tamgha. In the fifteenth century, the tamgha collected from the large trading and handicraft centres of Transoxania, in particular from Samarkand, brought in good returns to the treasury. The word tamgha was also used in the collective meaning of various taxes. At the same time, road taxes and taxes for crossing the rivers had their concrete denominations: rāḥdārī, kishtibānī, etc. Mention of the terms bāj and rāḥdārī in one and the same nishān allows us to see these two taxes as different kinds of road duties.

The tamgha related to taxes was not specified in Muslim law, the sharīʿa, and the Muslim clergy declared the abolition of the tamgha to be a deed that was pleasing in the sight of God. In 1460–1, at Khāja Ahrār’s request, the tamgha was abolished by Abū Saʿīd in Samarkand and Bukhara. In order to encourage the development of handicrafts, and domestic and foreign trade, the Timurids abolished the tamgha several times; however, the high returns from the tamgha did not allow them to renounce it wholly and its collection

11 c Abd al-Razzāq Samarqandi, 1941–9, pp. 107–8, 148, 286.
was always resumed. Collection of the *tamgha*, as of some other duties, was farmed out as *muqāṭa‘a* (tax-farming), in which the *tamgha* was usually levied at a rate exceeding the fixed norm. Some Timurids let influential local lords have the *tamgha*. For example, Bāqī Beg Chaghāniyānī, brother of the independent prince Khusraw Shāh (killed in 1506), received all the *tamgha* of Kabul, though the sovereign of that province was nominally considered to be Bābur. Part of the above-mentioned taxes was levied in cash. The documents mention taxes thus levied, judging by their denominations: *ghuza pulī* (cotton tax), *pillya pulī* (cocoon tax), *kuknar pulī* (poppy tax), *sabzī pulī* (carrot tax), *kharbuza pulī* (water-melon tax), and so on.

Even in the years of relative centralization of the realm, it was common for the normal rate of tax-collection to be exceeded. A convincing example is given in ʿAbd al-Razzāq Samarqandi’s *Matla‘ al-sa‘adayn*: the taxable population was to bring to the treasury one hen instead of one egg, one sheep instead of one *manā* of meat, ten *manās* of barley instead of one *manā*, one *kharwār* instead of one sack of straw. The author notes that, in that year (1407–8), these products were priced excessively high.

**Towns, handicrafts and trade**

Progress in the manufacture of handicrafts could be observed in Herat and Samarkand, the capitals of the two realms (although they were in fact independent from each other). According to Bābur, fifteenth-century Samarkand was a well-built town, with such handicrafts as weaving, garment-making, dyeing, pottery, the processing of metals and paper-making. Some towns specialized in certain wares. Samarkand, for example, was famous for its high-quality paper and *kermezi* velvet, which was exported to other towns and countries. Bābur notes, ‘This town has one peculiarity seldom met in other towns: every handicraft has its own market and they do not mix with each other. This is a good custom.’

Bukhara was similar. Antony Jenkinson, an English envoy and the representative of a trading company, wrote in the middle of the sixteenth century: ‘every handicraft has its special place here and a special market’. He reported that in Bukhara there were ‘many stone houses, temples and structures luxuriously built and gilded’. By the end of the fifteenth century the role of Tashkent had grown significantly and it produced metalware, earthenware, fabrics and articles of leather, the development of many of these handicrafts being largely conditioned by trade with the neighbouring steppe nomads. In Shahr-i Sabz, Termez, Andijan, Khujand and Hisar, a lively trade was carried on, as well as between the towns and local

---

12 Bābur, 1905, p. 159a.
13 Bābur, 1905, p. 47b.
14 Jenkinson, 1886.
villages. Herat, as a capital, played a major role in the political and cultural life of the area, and handicrafts and trade flourished. According to Bābur, in every branch of the arts, all the residents of Herat sought to perfect their work. Jāmi, ʿAlīshīr Nawā’ī and Bihzad all composed their literary and artistic works in Herat at this time. Meanwhile, the ruler Husayn Bayqara ‘occupied himself only with having a good time, day and night’. 15

The urban craftsmen used raw and semi-finished materials delivered from landowners and the stock-breeding regions. Some kinds of semi-finished products were brought from more distant countries. The handicrafts of the period were characterized by the division of labour and a small commodity production which can roughly be divided as follows: articles intended to satisfy the needs of the numerous local urban inhabitants; articles for sale in the adjacent villages and nomad encampments; goods for the narrow aristocratic circle (such as costly fabrics, jewellery, some kinds of weapons and metal goods, rich clothes, splendid manuscripts, etc.); and products exported to foreign countries as well (fabrics, writing paper, weapons, ready-made clothes). Under the Timurids, measures were taken to improve the condition of the roads, and trading houses, bridges and caravanserais were also built. Shāh Rukh considered guaranteeing the safety of the caravan routes as one of the duties of the owners of soyurghals.

In the fifteenth century, Samarkand was the largest Central Asian trading town and played a major role in the circulation of goods between East and West. By the ancient highways of the Great Silk Route came the most varied assortment of goods, such as articles made by Transoxanian skilled craftsmen from raw and semi-finished materials. Via Samarkand came goods from other towns: the Bukharan alacha bows (the ‘Bukharan yellow bow’ is even mentioned in the Buryat epic); wines, considered the strongest in Transoxania; dried plums, used as a purgative; the Shahr-i Sabz (Kish) unbleached calico; koshma, a kind of salt known for its specific quality; light-blue and grey astrakhan and the black astrakhan from Karshi and Karakul; and sal ammoniac and santonica (used as a medicament) from Tashkent. As in earlier times, sandanachi fabric (senden) was exported as far as Novgorod. From this point, traders of the Teutonic Knights’ Order brought it to the towns of Europe, where it was considered one of the most serviceable fabrics for common citizens. Thoroughbred horses, including ‘Turkic horses’, were sent to Khiva from Transoxania; Ulugh Beg presented a Chinese emperor with ‘a black horse having white legs’. From one country to another, tree seedlings were delivered; both fresh and dried fruit was exported, with Samarkand apples enjoying particular fame.

Contemporary documents testify to a high level of trade. For example, the largest towns had sarrāf-khānas (houses for the exchange of foreign currency) and the sarrāfs

15 Bābur, 1905, p. 166a.
(money-changers) also issued cheques. Relationships were established between the various trading companies, and by means of a cheque issued in one town a person could draw money in another. Subsequently, the Eastern (originally Arabic) word ‘cheque’ became widespread in the commercial world of western Europe. There are also references in the sources to the street of the sarrāfs, the Chaharsu-i Sarrafan, and to a mosque and a bath-house of sarrāfs. Although this information relates to Bukhara in the sixteenth century, such establishments had certainly existed in Bukhara and Samarkand at an earlier period. According to Badr al-Dīn Kashmirī, the Bukharan sarrāf-khāna was ‘well-known and famous’. There existed, moreover, the practice of giving capital for investment (mudāraba) that was legalized by an act made before the qādī. The Timurids, including Mirzā Ulugh Beg, themselves took part in such trading. Ulugh Beg gave money to merchants who, in their turn, gave it back to him with a share of their profit. On Ulugh Beg’s orders, a caravanserai named the Mirzāī was built in Samarkand; the income received from it was applied to Ulugh Beg’s madrasa.

During the fifteenth century, particularly in the first quarter, there were extensive commercial and diplomatic relations with China. Khalīl Sultān, Shāh Rukh, Ulugh Beg and even their provincial governors fitted out caravans whose journeys lasted, on average, some nine months. Silk fabrics including kim-khāb (kamkā), atlas and taffeta were brought from China; porcelain, silver, mirrors and paper were also brought from China, though in Herat and Samarkand in particular, paper of high quality was manufactured locally. Wares brought to China from adjacent countries were also called ‘Chinese’; they included sandalwood, Tibetan musk and other wares carried along the Silk Route. Timurid merchants in their turn dispatched locally made fabrics, horses and camels to China. Bābur reports on the mutual advantages derived from the trade between the two countries. Their respective rulers were both concerned about political conditions in the neighbouring countries; a letter of 1412 to Shāh Rukh, in which the Chinese emperor advises him to patronize his nephew Khalīl Sultān, shows that the emperor was aware of the succession struggle in the Timurid realm.

Trade connections with India were also close, according to Bābur:

On the way between Hindustan and Khurasan there are two trading towns: one is Kabul, another is Kandahar. The caravans from Ferghana, Turkistan, Samarkand, Bukhara, Balkh, Hisar and Badakhshan arrive in Kabul, and caravans from Khurasan arrive in Kandahar. Kabul province lies halfway between Hindustan and Khurasan. It is a very good trade market. Seven, eight or ten thousand horses are brought to Kabul every year. Ten, fifteen or twenty thousand merchants lead caravans from lower Hindustan. From Hindustan there are delivered slaves,

16 Mukminova, 1966, pp. 95–103.
white fabrics, sugar, dyestuffs and medicaments. Many merchants are not satisfied with the profit of thirty for ten or forty for ten.

Bābur also describes the foreign trade of Kabul: ‘In Kabul you can find wares from Khurasan, Iraq, Rum and China; it is as if it were the entrepôt of Hindustan.’\textsuperscript{17} From Kashmir came locally woven cloth (\textit{shaki}), which subsequently became famed in Europe, and medicinal herbs; from Azerbaijan, mineral oil; from the Arab countries, prayer rugs, special towels and toothpicks; from Egypt, fabrics; from Turkey, weapons; and from the Kazan Khanate, leather. In the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, merchants from Bukhara, Samarkand and Herat visited Moscow. Several goods were imported from European countries: white and coloured \textit{farangs}, woollen stuffs from England, and spectacles intended for \textasciitilde{}Abd al-Rahmān Jāmī, are mentioned in the sources.

Revolts

In the fifteenth century, a number of local revolts took place in Khurasan and Transoxania. The impact of the Sarbadar movement of the previous century was still felt (see above, Chapter 16). On the whole, these revolts were distinguished by their religious and mystical overtones, but they were also connected with the propagation of ideas concerning communal landownership and utopian ideals of social equality. In 1427 a clandestine Hurūfū group organized an attempt on Shāh Rukh’s life. Social oppression, the transfer of the right to land rents from the ruler’s treasury to local landed magnates, and the more frequent raids by nomads, all led to an increase in internal population migrations. Mass riots in Samarkand, Bukhara, Karshi and Shah-i Sabz are noted in the sources for the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth; but such actions were mainly localized and dispersed, and were of a spontaneous, non-organized character.

The Dasht-i Kipchak at the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the sixteenth

The region north of Transoxania, the Dasht-i Kipchak or Kipchak steppe, containing the realm of Abū ’l-Khayr Khan (1428–69), also included towns such as Sīgnak, Yasa, Uzgend, Arkuk and Ak-Kurgan. In this steppe, a leading position among the military-nomadic ruling class was occupied by the chosen Khans, Chinggis Khan’s descendants, who controlled the winter and summer pasture grounds:

\textsuperscript{17} Bābur, \textit{1905}, p. 129a.
In all of these families there are many respectable Khans; every family of the great and eminent descendants of Chinggis Khan had sultans and the most notable of them was called Khan, that is, the supreme sovereign.\footnote{Fadl Allâh b. Rûzbihân Khûnjî, 1976, p. 22.}

A significant role was also played by the tribal nobility of the Begs of non-Chinggisid origin, who during the fifteenth century sought to control handicraft and trading centres. At the call of the leader of the ulûs, the nomads would depart on campaigns of plunder, a large part of which came to the sultans and tribal chiefs. The historian Muhammad Sâlih describes expensive Altai squirrel and ermine fur coats which the Dasht-i Kîpchak amirs wore at the time of one of the campaigns into Moghulistan. Cattle-breeding was the main occupation of the Dasht-i Kîpchak tribesmen, and wealth was reckoned by the numbers of sheep and cattle, as well as horses.

From early times, the trade routes connecting Central Asia with eastern Europe – the Volga Bulghars and their successors and Russia in particular – and the roads to China passed through the Dasht-i Kîpchak. There was consequently a symbiosis between the nomadic tribes and the neighbouring sedentary peoples who supplied them with numerous manufactured products. The same demand for handicrafts, and cloth in particular, led the steppe inhabitants to raid the settled regions when these last were undergoing periods of internecine war, with the resulting interruption of trade connections.

The population living along the river valleys was occupied in farming, but campaigning raiders usually went along these valleys and damaged the local economy. There is, for example, a report of the forced collection of foodstuffs by Shaybânî Khan’s soldiers among the inhabitants of the Arkuk fortress in 1509:

In spite of the fact that it was the middle of the winter, the time of the highest price of bread and scarcity of food products, innumerable forces ... settled around the area of the fortress and with haste made their way into the houses of the town for the collecting of foodstuffs and everything that was necessary for the forces ...\footnote{Fadl Allâh b. Rûzbihân Khûnjî, 1976, p. 70a.}

Attempts by nomadic forces from the steppes to conquer the settled regions increased under Muhammad Shaybânî, Abû ’l-Khayr Khâñ’s grandson (b. in 1451; killed 1510). In many years of wandering, he and his soldiers had served different rulers, taking advantage of the conflicts between the rulers of Transoxania, Moghulistan and Khurasan. Sometimes serving the Samarkand ruler as commander of a hired detachment, sometimes acting as a vassal of the Khan of Moghulistan, Muhammad Shaybânî gradually rose to the position of a Khan of the ‘Turkistan realm’. In 1486, during one of his campaigns, he captured (and held for a period) some fortresses of Khwarazm. According to an anonymous author,
Sultan Husayn Bayqara, whose territories included Khwarazm, sent women’s veils to the amirs of Urgench after the defeat.

As the sources attest, numerous tribes took part in the conquest of Transoxania by Shaybani Khan: they included the Qushchi, Naiman, Uighurs, Ichki, Durman, Kayat, Tuman, Manghit, Kungrat, Khitay, Tangut, Tatar, Jalayir, Karluk and Sulduz. According to Muhammad Sâlih, the core of the tribes surrounding Shaybâni Khan was formed by the Shaybâns, stemming from the former ulus of Shaybân. The number of Uzbek forces who participated in the campaign against Transoxania reached several thousand. According to Muhammad Haydar, before the conquest of Bukhara and Samarkand, Shaybâni Khan had only 2–3,000 men, but after the occupation of these towns their number rose to 56,000.

After the Shaybanid conquest of the towns of Transoxania, the Timurid amirs are mentioned among the forces, though their role was now diminished. The Timurids had been unable to oppose the forces of the Dasht-i Kipchak rulers, and with internecine warfare and mutual distrust, no power was able to present a united front against the invaders. Hence by 1503 Shaybâni Khan’s forces had seized Samarkand, Bukhara and Tashkent. In 1504 Ferghana and Khusraw Shâh’s domains were conquered, followed by Khwarazm in 1505. Husayn Bayqara’s death favoured the subsequent success of the Shaybanids. In 1506 Balkh was occupied and Herat in 1507. Thus the realm of the Shaybanids now included Transoxania, the towns of Khwarazm through which passed the trade routes to the lower Volga and further on to Russia, and Khurasan, with its transit trade routes to western Persia and north-western India.
Some of the popular movements which made their appearance in the early Islamic period had political objectives that were camouflaged by religious masks; others had religious objectives but were expressed through forces of political discontent (for a consideration of these movements in early Islamic Persia and Transoxania, see above, Chapters 1 and 2).

Religious groups of the Middle East in early Islamic times

From the point of view of the origin of sects in Islam, the crystallization of religious attitudes, the codification of law and the development of Islamic religious sciences, the Central Asian region was of great significance. At least two of the most important collections of the traditions of the Prophet Muhammad – the Sahih of al-Bukhārī and the Sahih of Muslim – were compiled there. One of the most eminent commentators on the Qur’an,
al-Zamakhshārī (d. 1143), also produced his work there. As a result of the transmission of Greek science by the Nestorian Christians, the development of philosophical trends in Islam and the reaction to Greek thought found an echo in Central Asia; thus the theologian Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī worked in Transoxania, Khwarazm and Afghanistan.

With the arrival of the Mongols in Central Asia and Persia, the II Khans in general became supporters of the sunna once they had converted to Islam. Ghazan Khan (1295–1304) took a keen interest in the family of the Prophet and made substantial waqf endowments to help the sayyids (descendants of the Prophet). It is said that clashes between the two main Sunni schools in the East – the Shāfīʿis and the Hanafīs – drove some people to Shiʿism, while others became disillusioned with Islam altogether. Disgusted with the quarrel between some Hanafi scholars and the Shāfiʿī Qādi Nizām al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Malik of Maragha at the court of Öljeytū, the Mongol amir Kutlug Shāh is said to have turned to another Mongol amir and said, ‘Why have we abandoned the Yasa of Chinggis Khan and the religion of our forefathers and accepted this religion of the Arabs which is divided into so many sects?’\(^1\) It was also during the II Khanid period that the theology of the Ithnā ʿAsharī (Twelver) Shiʿites was further elaborated; Nasir al-Dīn Tūsī (d. 1274) and his disciple al-ʿAllāma al-Hillī (d. 1326) played an important role in the consolidation of Shiʿite canonical law.

THE NESTORIAN CHRISTIANS

The Nestorian Church was the main bearer of Christianity in Persia, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Its head was known as ‘Patriarch of the East’ and his followers engaged in extensive missionary activity in the region. The Nestorians consequently became the most widespread of all the Christian churches in the East. Under the ʿAbbasids, the Nestorians enjoyed protection and peace. Under the Catholicos Timotheus I (780–823), a contemporary of Hārūn al-Rashid (786–809), their church extended its sphere of influence and activity. The Nestorian patriarch was given the right of residence in Baghdad, a privilege denied to the Jacobites. In 762 the Nestorians had moved their see to Baghdad, where a Christian quarter, known as Dār al-Rūm (‘abode of the Greeks’), grew up. Under the Catholicos’ jurisdiction there were seven metropolitans, each with two or three bishops under him, in order to look after the religious needs of the Christians. The patriarch-elect received his investiture from the ʿAbbasid caliph, who recognized him as the official head of all Christians in the caliphate.

The Nestorians were the first to promote Greek science and philosophy by translating Greek texts into Syriac and then into Arabic. They were also the first to introduce Greek medicine into Baghdad and most of the personal physicians of the ʿAbbasid caliphs were Nestorians. It appears that religious debates took place between Nestorians and Muslims at the ʿAbbasid court. Al-Kindī’s famous Risāla [Treatise] contains an account of a debate held in about 819, before al-Maʾmūn (813–33), on the comparative merits of Islam and Christianity. The text of an apologia for Christianity delivered by a patriarch of the Nestorians in 781 before al-Mahdī (775–85) has also come down to us. There is a story (totally unproven and highly improbable) that a certain Ahmad b. ʿAbd Allāh b. Salām translated the Bible into Arabic during the time of Hārūn al-Rashīd. Al-Muqtafī (1136–60) granted a charter of protection to the Nestorians in 1138. The Nestorian Church made notable conversions among the Turkish tribes and among the Mongols in the latter’s first advances westwards, and in the late thirteenth century there was even a Mongol Catholicos. The church generally prospered until the fall of Baghdad to the Mongols in 1258; subsequently, the Catholicos left Baghdad and settled in northern Iraq. But after 1295, when the Mongol Khan became a Muslim, the Nestorian Church rapidly declined; its missionary activity among the Mongols, the Turks and the Chinese also came to an end.

MANICHAEISM

Manichaeism, the doctrine professed by Mani, originated in the first half of the third century in Mesopotamia, a region where a number of different religions and philosophical schools, notably Christianity, Judaism and Zoroastrianism, were present. Among the practical writings of Mani was the Khwāstwanīft, a handbook of formulas for the confession of sins, which has come down to us in both Sogdian and Uighur versions from Central Asia. Al-Yaʿqūbi, al-Ṭabarī, al-Masʿūdī, al-Birūnī and others refer to this faith in their writings. In the beginning, Islam was tolerant of Manichaeism. Later, ʿAbbasid persecution pushed the Manichaean westwards, in the direction of Transoxania; hence it was in Khurasan, Khwarazm and Sogdiana that the Manichaean faith gathered strength, and Sogdiana became an outpost for the dissemination of Mani’s gospel as far as northern China and Central Asia. The Uighur Turks accordingly adopted Manichaeism as their official religion in 763, but in 840, with the fall of the Uighur empire, the role of Manichaeism received a set-back in Central Asia. However, it was to survive alongside Taoism and Buddhism until the fourteenth century.
ZOROASTRIANISM

Under the āAbbasids, Zoroastrianism (or Mazdaism) continued to survive and it was in the reign of al-Ma‘mūn that the most important Pahlavi work on Zoroastrian theology, the *Dēnkard*, was composed. Under the strongly orthodox al-Mutawakkil (847–61), the situation changed and Zoroastrians were persecuted, so that many of them emigrated to India. Indeed, the Arab conquest of the seventh century and the subsequent spread of Islam in Iran adversely affected the fortunes of Zoroastrianism in general. From being in Sasanian times the proud masters of society, the Zoroastrian priests became inferiors on the defensive. Also, certain aspects of Zoroastrianism were attacked in some of the socio-religious uprisings in which Islamic and Manichaean elements joined hands.

JUDAISM

Judaism developed freely in the territories under the caliphs and there was a large Jewish colony in Baghdad. In 1164 Benjamin of Tudela visited this colony, where he noticed ten rabbinical schools and twenty-three synagogues; the exilarch (leader of the Jewish community in exile) exercised control over the Jews of the region. When Benjamin was on his way to an audience with the caliph, a herald marched ahead of him making the announcement, ‘Make way before our lord the son of David.’

In the eighth and ninth centuries a new power, that of the Turkic Khazars, rose to prominence north of the Caspian and the Black Sea. Judaism became the official religion of the Khans and the nobility of this state, but large numbers of Christians (both Greek and Syrian, including Jacobites) and Muslims also lived there. There were said to be thirty mosques in the town of Itil. Situated between the worlds of Islam and Christianity, Khazaria developed an international trade network. Rome, Antioch and Byzantium were the great silk repositories of the Mediterranean world, but a certain amount of raw silk came from Central Asia via Khazaria. At these times, all along the Silk Route, Nestorian, Jacobite and Muslim communities flourished.

The rise of Sufism and the Sufi orders in Central Asia

In the tenth and eleventh centuries, the majority of the Turkic Karluk and Oghuz peoples were converted to Islam and they founded the Karakhanid and Seljuq empires respectively. During the Karakhanid period, the Hanafī school of law and the Māturīḍī school of theology were established in Transoxania, and a new Turkish literature inspired by

---

2 Benjamin of Tudela, 1841.
Persian Islamic literature gradually came into being (see above, Chapter 6). The Karakhanids encouraged the diffusion of Islam from Transoxania into the Tarim basin and towards the northern steppes. Sufi preachers such as Shaykh Ahmad Ata Yasawī (d. 1166) played an important role in spreading Islam among the nomadic peoples.

The widespread dislocation – social, moral and political – which followed the irruption of the Oghuz and Mongol tribes was profoundly disturbing for mystically inclined people and a trend to transform the individualistic approach of the Sufis into a wider movement was discernible. In the eyes of the great thirteenth-century poets Sa'dī, Rūmī and Amīr Khusraw, humanity was suffering: ‘Men were multiplying but humanity was languishing,’ they lamented. The mystics were determined to resuscitate society, check its moral degeneration and awaken people’s moral sensibilities. They pressed into service the mystic concept of walāyat (spiritual jurisdiction assigned to a mystic deputy) and tried to concentrate spiritual and moral forces in order to deliver vast regions, area by area and unit by unit, from intellectual anarchy and moral chaos. Significantly, the ‘extremist’ Shī‘ite Ismā‘īlīs had also worked out a programme of sending dā‘īs (propagandists) to different areas specifically assigned to a worker to propagate their dogmas. But while the dā‘īs worked secretly, the Sufi teachers established open contact with the people. The organization of silsilas (chains of spiritual authority) in the Central Asian regions transformed mystic activity into a powerful movement there. The eventual conversion of the Mongol rulers, as well as the change in the religious demography of the region, was largely due to the efforts of Sufis belonging to different silsilas – the Khwājaqān, the Qādiriyā, the Kubrawiyya and, at a later date, the Naqshbandiyā. The Chishtiyya – so-named after the place of origin of its founder in Chisht on the Hari Rud in Afghanistan – developed in India and played an important role in the cultural life of the country. Some disciples of Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī also came to India from Iraq and organized the order there. It was probably under Sufi influence that the Hindu Bhakti movement (see below) appeared in the subcontinent and had an effect on the religious life of the lower classes of society.

Of the saints who played an important role in the religious life of Central Asia, the names of Shaykhs Abū Sa‘īd b. Abī ‘l-Khayr, Yūsuf Hamadānī, Ahmad Ata Yasawī, Ābd al-Qādir Gilānī, Shihāb al-Dīn Bākharzī, Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband and Ābd al-‘Abbās Allāh Khūja Ahrār deserve special mention. Naqshbandi pilgrimages – particularly those of Khwāja Bahā’ al-Dīn and Jāmī – awakened religious feelings and fervour all along the route they travelled. The sermon meetings of Ābd al-Qādir Gilānī attracted large numbers of people to his mystic fold, while Ahmad Ata Yasawī’s Turkish verses became known throughout

---

3 For the silsilas, see Trimmingham, 1971.
Central Asia, so that the activities of the Sufi saints gave a new impetus to spiritual life in the region.

**SUFI TEACHERS**

Abū Saʿīd b. Abi ʿl-Khayr (d. 1049) was born at Mayhana, a small town between Abiward and Sarakhs. A contemporary of Abu ʿl-Qāsim al-Qushayrī, Ibn Sīnā (Avicenna) and Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna, he had to elaborate his mystic principles at a time of socio-religious turmoil. Besides leaders of other faiths – Zoroastrians, Christians and Jews – he came into conflict with the ‘ulamāʾ of Nishapur, the followers of the Hanafi and Shāfiʿī schools, the Shiʿites and the Karrāmi preachers. The ʿulamāʾ of Nishapur allegedly approached Sultan Mahmūd for a religious decree ordering the shaykh and all his followers to be hanged in the market-place of Nishapur, but they did not succeed. Instances of his having allegedly converted his Zoroastrian physician and a rich Jew are recorded in his later hagiographic biography, the *Asrār al-tawhīd*. Shaykh Abū Saʿīd kept an open house and an ever-ready table and entertained people lavishly and on a large scale. He was sometimes in debt on account of his extravagant expenditure. His visitors included people from all walks of life, rich and poor, and two Seljuq leaders, Toghrīl and Chaghri Beg, allegedly attributed their rise to his blessings. The shaykh believed that nothing ensured greater rewards on the Day of Judgement than bringing happiness to the hearts of men; hence he returned evil with good and treated friend and foe alike. Fond of *samāʿ* (mystic songs), the authenticity of his quatrains – which were very popular in medieval khānaqāhs (dervish convents) – has been questioned, though in Delhi these verses were recited by eminent saints as his genuine compositions. He was endowed with great intuitive intelligence (*firāsa*), which helped him to extend his influence over people of all sorts; in India, his views were cited in mystic circles with great approbation.

Yūsuf Hamadānī (d. 1140), another dynamic Sufi of the period, inspired many founders of mystic *silsilas*. The spiritual mentor of Ahmad Ata Yasawī and Khwāja ʿAbd al-Khāliq Ghujuwānī, it was he who encouraged ʿAbd al-Qādir Gīlānī to preach in public. He worked at Merv and Herat for more than sixty years to propagate Sufi principles, distinguishing himself in both *fiqh* (Islamic law) and philosophy.

Ahmad Yasawī (d. 1167) was the founder-saint of the Yasawiyya. Such was his popularity among the Turks of Central and South-East Asia that people reverentially called him ‘Ata’ (father). His claim to descent from the ʿAlid Muhammad b. al-Hanafiyya, although

---

4 See Nicholson, 1921, pp. 1–76; Bosworth, 1984, pp. 79–96.
5 See, e.g., Amir Khwurd, 1885, p. 411.
6 *EF*. 

---

372
certainly spurious, further added to his prestige.\(^7\) His dīwān (collection of poems) and his hikam (aphorisms), which breathed inspiring mystic sentiments, were extremely popular in what is now Uzbekistan; the twelfth-century Sufi poet Farīd al-Dīn Êttār refers to him as ‘Pūr-i Turkistān’.\(^8\) His tomb at Yasi was built by Timur, who had great faith in his continuing spiritual powers. It is said that it was through his long and sincere effort that many Turks were converted to Islam; according to al-Wāfiz, he was the chief of their saints and many of their mashāyikh (spiritual leaders) traced their spiritual pedigree to him.\(^9\)

\(^{c}\)Abd al-Qādir Gilānī (d. 1166) was a very prominent figure in the annals of Islamic mysticism.\(^10\) Endowed with rare powers of persuasion and eloquence, he attracted thousands of people to his sermon meetings, which were held outside the city due to the lack of space for the huge crowds that flocked to listen to him. According to \(^{c}\)Abd al-Haqq, as many as 400 people would sit in his meetings recording his discourses with pen and paper.\(^11\) Gilānī spoke in both Arabic and Persian. He relied on a madrasa to impart knowledge and a ribāt (hospice) to provide spiritual training. In Ghur, Gharchistan, Bamiyan and Khurasan, where the Karrāmiyya dominated the religious scene, his teachings paved the way for the rejection of their allegedly anthropomorphic ideas. He is reported to have converted large number of Jews and Christians to Islam and to have reformed thousands of people who held heterodox or heretical views.\(^12\) To strive for the welfare of society was, in the eyes of the shaykh, a religious and spiritual obligation. ‘Whoever fills his stomach while his neighbour starves is weak in his faith,’ he declared. He considered service to humankind an act of spiritual value and all people to be ‘the children of God on earth’. His philanthropic spirit attains sublimity when he says that he ‘would like to close the doors of hell and open those of paradise to all mankind’. His Ghunya is imbued with a spirit of deep humanism and concern for society. He gave a wide berth to the rulers of his day; the Seljuq Sultan Sanjar allegedly offered the province of Sistan to cover the expenses of Gilānī’s khānaqāh, but the shaykh refused to accept it.\(^13\)

\(^{c}\)Abū Najīb \(^{c}\)Abd al-Qāhir Suhrawardī (d. 1168), an erudite scholar who for some time taught at the famous Nizāmiyya madrasa of Baghdad, laid the foundations of the Suhrawardī order and explained in his Ādāb al-murīdīn the principles which should determine the teacher-disciple relationship.\(^14\) His nephew Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī (d. 1234),

\(^7\) Sharaf al-Dīn Yazdī, 1885–8, pp. 9–10.
\(^8\) Êttār, 1297/1879, pp. 182–3.
\(^12\) Ibid., p. 13.
\(^13\) Ibid., p. 198.
\(^14\) See Hasan Miyān, 1911.
spiritual mentor of the great Persian poet Sa`dī, extended the order’s sphere of influence. He was responsible for laying down the principles for the organization of *khānaqāhs* in his famous practical manual, the *Awārīf al-ma`ārīf*, which was imparted by Sufi teachers to those disciples who desired to establish independent *ribāts* and to concentrate on disseminating Sufi principles; thus the Indian mystic Farīd Ganj-i Shakar of Pakpatan taught it to his disciples and also prepared a summary of it. Suhrawardī’s other work, the *al-Nasā‘īm al-īmāniyya wa-kashf al-fadā‘īh al-yūnāniyya*, contains a critique of Greek philosophy.  

`Abd al-Qādir Gīlānī considered him the last of the great thinkers to come from Iraq.  

Bahā’ al-Dīn Naqshband (d. 1390), founder of the Naqshbandī order, was born near Bukhara. He visited many contemporary centres of culture, including Bukhara, Samarkand and Nasaf, as an itinerant Sufi. It was due to his efforts that the order eventually became popular in Central Asia and thousands of people were attracted to his mystic fold; he advised his followers to act upon the *shan‘a* and to hold fast to the *sunna* of the Prophet. His life and teachings are recorded in the *Anīs al-talibīn*, and according to the Hungarian traveller Vambéry, as late as the nineteenth century people still came from long distances to visit his tomb.  

`Ubayd Allāh Khūja Ahrār (d. 1490), one of the most distinguished saints of the Naqshbandī order, was born at Chach (Tashkent). His teachings had a profound impact on the people of Central Asia, and the Timurid princes and the Shaybanid Uzbeks, as well as the common people, held him in high esteem. Bābur himself, his maternal uncle, Yūnus Khan Moghul, and others belonged to the order, and Bābur turned the saint’s *Risāla-yi Wālidiyya* into Turkish verse. Khūja Ahrār believed in combining political prestige with spiritual excellence. Jāmi, Mīr `Alīshīr Nawā‘ī and other eminent figures of the age belonged to the Naqshbandiyya.  

Najm al-Dīn Kubrā (d. 1221) was another seminal figure of the period; his influence extended from Khwarazm up to the Aral Sea, so that the Kubrawi order became a factor of great significance in Central Asian life. Born in 1145 in Khiva, Kubrā received instruction in the Suhrawardī order from Shaykh Rūzbihān al-Wazzān al-Misrī and `Ammār b. Yāsīr al-Bīdīṣī. At the instance of Rūzbihān, he worked in Khwarazm, and on account of his qualities as a mystic teacher became known as *wālī tarāš* (‘designer of saints’). He left a number of treatises on mystic principles and practices, the most important being the *Fawā‘īh al-jamāl wa-fawā‘īth al-jalāl*, which deals with the ecstatic experiences of a mystic. Among his successors, the names of Majd al-Dīn Baghdādī, Bahā’ al-Dīn

---


Majd al-Dīn Baghdādī (d. 1219) came from a village in Khurasan, while Bahā’ al-Dīn Walad, the father of Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī, was born at Balkh in c. 1145. The Mongol threat drove Walad westwards and he travelled extensively until he reached Anatolia. A compilation of his discourses, the Ma’ārif, has survived, which reveals many aspects of his influence on the thought and style of Rūmī.

Najm al-Dīn Dāya Rāzī (d. 1256) came to Khwarazm from his native city of Rayy and joined the discipline of Najm al-Dīn Kubrā. In 1221 he moved to Asia Minor, from where he is reported to have undertaken a diplomatic mission for the Abbasid caliph with the aim of encouraging various Muslim rulers to put up a concerted resistance against the Mongols. He is the author of the Bahr al-haqā’iq [Ocean of Divine Realities], a commentary on the Qur’an, and the Mīrṣād al-‘ibād min al-mabd’ā ila ‘I ma‘ād [The Path of God’s Servants from the Beginning until the Return to Him], which deals with mystic ideals and gnosis.

Two other Kubrawī saints who exercised a great influence on contemporary Muslim society were Sayf al-Dīn Bākharzī and his grandson Abu ‘l-Mafākhir Yahyā. Bākharzī had a khānaqāh at Bukhara; Berke, the Khan of the Golden Horde, embraced Islam at his hands and Ibn Battūta heard Persian and Turkish Sufi poems being recited at his khānaqāh. Yahyā expounds his mystic principles in his Fūsūs al-adab [Bezels of Refinement].

Ālā’ al-Dawla Simnānī (d. 1336), a disciple of Nūr al-Dīn Isfarā’īnī, was born at Simnan in northern Persia in 1261. His khānaqāh, which was known as Sūfī-ābād-i Khudābād, became a lively centre of mystic activity in the region. Simnānī criticized the idea attributed to Ibn Ārabi of wahdat al-wujūd (‘the unity of being’); however, in his Chihil majlis he approvingly quotes Sa’d al-Dīn Hamūya’s remark that Ibn Ārabi was a ‘boundless ocean’. Besides his own contribution to exegetic studies, Simnānī completed the unfinished commentary of Najm al-Dīn Kubrā.

Sa’d al-Dīn Hamūya (d. 1253) and his disciple Āziz al-Dīn Nasafī were Imāmī Shi‘ites, with Hamūya having his khānaqāh at Bahrābād in northeastern Persia. Nasafī was the author of a treatise entitled Insān-i kāmil [The Perfect Man].

A branch of the Kubrawīyya even reached India, where it gained fame as the Firdawsiyya. One of Sayf al-Dīn Bākharzī’s successors was Bādr al-Dīn Samarqandī, whose disciple Najīb al-Dīn Muhammad (d. 1300) migrated to Delhi and set up a Firdawsi centre there. Shaykh Sharaf al-Dīn Yahyā Mānērī (d. 1371) popularized the silsila in Bihar; his letters contain a lucid exposition of mystic ideas and his Malfūzāt [Table-talk] has also been preserved. Also connected with Ālā’ al-Dawla Simnānī was Sayyid Ālī Hamadānī

(d. 1385) (see above, Chapters 10 and 15), who arrived in Kashmir in 1380 with several hundred disciples. His commentary on the *Fusūs al-hikam* of Ibn ārabi, his views about the obligations of rulers as contained in *Dhakhīrat al-mulūk* and his *Risāla-i Futūwwatiyya* provide valuable information for students of religious history. Sayyid Muhammad b. ābd Allāh (d. 1464), known as Nūr-bakhsh, a disciple of Hamadānī’s disciple Khwāja Is’hāq of Khuttalan, founded the Nūrbakhshi order, although Timur’s son Shāh Rukh thrice threw him into prison for his heterodox views; he claimed to have received the esoteric teachings of ālī through Imām Ja’far al-Sādiq. Among various works, he wrote *al-Risāla al-Fīqādiyya* in support of his religious concepts. The Nūrbakhshiyya was introduced into Kashmir by Shams al-Dīn ārāqī, who adopted secret methods of propaganda like those of the Isma‘ilis. Amir Mīrzā Haydar Dughlāt first tolerated, but later persecuted, the sect for its heterodox views.

Socio-religious and politico-religious movements

** ĀYYĀR ACTIVITY**

Paramilitary vigilante groups known as āyārs arose in many parts of the Eastern Islamic lands during this period. Sometimes they appeared as ghāzīs (fighters for the faith), at others they formed a disruptive element in towns and usurped power when the government was weak. Often they degenerated into bands of robbers who indulged in terrorist activities, making the richer sections of the population targets of their brigandage. The *Qābūs-nāma* ranks soldiers, āyārs and the people of the bazaar as the last groups of people to possess futuwwa (chivalry).

The perfect soldier [remarks Kay Kāwūs] is like the perfect āyār, but generosity, hospitality, probity should be greater in a soldier . . . obedience and humility are a virtue in a soldier, [but] a fault in an āyār.19

As noted in Chapter 2 above, Ya‘qūb b. Layth, the founder of the Saffarid dynasty, was originally an āyār. The āyārs were active in various cities of Central Asia, although Baghdad and Persian towns like Nishapur were the main centres of their activity; in 1154 the Oghuz rebellion in Khurasan provided the āyārs with an opportunity to ransack and plunder Nishapur.

19 Kay Kāwūs b. Iskandar, 1951, p. 143.
THE SARBADAR UPRISING

During the Il Khanid period, the Sarbadar uprising created great unrest in Khurasan and the adjacent regions. Although it was principally a revolt against fiscal burdens, Shi‘ite, Sufi, Mahdist, Messianic and chiliastic concepts all went into its making. The obligation to billet officials (nuzūl) – which meant the duty to take into one’s house military personnel, officers and their staff, and to feed and entertain them – had been abolished by Ghazan Khan (1295–1304), but during the time of his descendant Abū Saʿīd (1316–35) the obligation reappeared. The uprising of the Sarbadars in Khurasan in 1337 was provoked by the unbridled licence of a Mongol messenger who stopped for lodgings at a village of Bashtin and demanded wine and a woman. According to Rashīd al-Dīn Fadl Allāh, the obligation had assumed such dimensions that people purposely kept their houses in a dilapidated state in order to escape it. The rioters murdered the official and rebellions subsequently broke out at a number of places. The Sarbadars continued in western Khurasan until 1381.

Two extreme views have been expressed about the role of the Sarbadars. Petrushevsky considers them a social revolutionary movement, while others see them as ‘a robber state’. They doubtless included elements of both. It is said that some of them made contributions to the architecture of Sabzavar, including a Friday mosque and a warehouse affording work for artisans. According to Scarci Amoretti:

The Sarbadār opposition comprehended many kinds of heterogeneous elements; there were not only peasants and plebeians from the towns, but also members of the local landed gentry, who provided the first two military leaders of the movement . . . ‘Abd al-Razzāq and Mas‘ūd . . . These non-plebeian and essentially Iranian elements, faithful to the Firdawsian traditions, did what they could to provide an opposition to the administrative aristocracy.

Certain Sufi orders seem to have been linked with the Sarbardar movement, including the Shaykhiyya and the Jūriyya in Khurasan. The Shaykhiyya were followers of Shaykh Khalīfa (killed in 1335), who was a Mazandaranī by origin and a disciple of ‘Alā‘ al-Dawla Simnānī. At Sabzavar in Khurasan, Khalīfa founded a silsila which many people of the town joined. The Sunni jurists considered them heretics; they implored the Il Khan Abū Sa‘īd to get rid of the shaykh and he was secretly murdered. Hasan Jūrī, who succeeded Khalīfa, was of peasant origin and he gave the movement a more markedly Shi‘ite and militaristic character. He had large numbers of supporters in Nishapur, Tus, Khabushan, Abiward and other places and joined forces with the Sarbadars in helping to create the curious Shi‘ite ‘republic of Sabzavar’; but he was arrested in 1338 and died shortly afterwards (see further, above, Chapters 16 and 17).

Mir Qiwām al-Dīn Marʿashī of Mazandaran and his followers were inspired by the Shaykhiyya–Jūriyya tarīqa (Sufi order) to found another order. Hasan Jūrī had granted the title of ‘shaykh’ to Marʿashī’s father, ʿIzz al-Dīn Sujandī, but the latter died while returning from Sabzavar to Mazandaran and his son succeeded him as head of the Mazandarani branch of the tarīqa. Marʿashī became the head of a mass movement at Amul and founded a miniature Shiʿite state; his order, like the Shaykhiyya–Jūriyya, had definite Shiʿite overtones.

SOME OTHER MOVEMENTS

At some time during the years 1283–9, a maker of sieves, Mahmūd by name, appeared in the village of Tarab (near Bukhara), claiming that he possessed magical powers to cure the sick and that he received messages from the spirits. Mahmūd Tārābhī (as he was known) occupied Bukhara with the help of the peasants and artisans and, according to Juwaynī, his adherents included nobles and learned Muslims; the Chaghatayid Mongol Khans had to send a force to quell this rebellion (see further, above, Chapter 13). Another movement which had subversive social ideas was that of the pīr (mystical guide) Yaʿqūb Baghbānī and Shaykh Habīb. ‘Under a veil of mysticism, coupled with reported stories of miracles and the apparitions of angels, prophets and saints, there lay concealed’, alleges Rashīd al-Dīn, ‘the ancient way of the thinking of Mazdak.’ The conspiracy was discovered and its leaders were executed.

The activities of some heterodox sects and groups in northern India during the fourteenth century are referred to by Firūz Shāh Tughluq (1351–88) in his Futūḥāt. About the Shiʿites, otherwise called Rāfidīs, invited people to [their] cult and wrote treatises and books . . . They openly reviled . . . the Rightly Guided Caliphs and ʿĀʾisha Siddīqa, [and] the great Sufis . . . and committed pederasty and called the Holy Qurʾan the Mulḥaqat-i Uthmānī . . . When it was established that they were leading others astray, . . . I inflicted capital punishment on them and . . . burnt their books in public.

Firūz Shāh goes on to refer to antinomians and libertines (ibāhatīs), and their alleged incestuous practices; he ordered that their leaders be beheaded. One Ahmad Bihārī became the focus of another heterodox movement and his followers deified him; Firūz Shāh punished both him and his followers. A man called Rukn declared in Delhi that he was the promised Mahdī, but was executed along with his followers.

In Persia, the Hurūfī and the Nuqtawī sects appeared and attracted many intellectuals. 21 Fadl Allāh Astarābādī (d. 1394) founded the Hurūfiyya, claiming to be the sāhib al-zamān

(Lord of the Age), and he held that the word ‘Allāh’ is written on the human face. A number of Hurūfī tracts – the Ādam-nāma, the Kursīnāma, etc. – reveal the aberrant nature of their beliefs. Hurūfī ideas later reached Turkey and influenced the mystic thought of the Bektashīs. The Nuqtawī sect was founded by Mahmūd Pasikhānī Gilānī (d. 1428). He considered an atom of dust (nuqta-yi khāk) to be the origin and the first element of human life; all other elements rose out of it. The Nuqtawīs looked upon their leader as the Mahdī and called him insān-i kāmil (the Perfect Man). In India a century and more later, Akbar and Abu ’l-Fadl ʿAllāmī, among others, were much impressed by Nuqtawi ideas.22

Sufī orders in India

Many of the Sufi orders which subsequently flourished in India had connections with the Central Asian lands. As noted above, the founder of the Chishtī order came from Afghanistan; the Shattārī silsila was brought to India from Persia by Shaykh ʿAbd Allāh Shattārī (d. 1465); and Khwāja Bāqī Billāh came from Kabul and introduced the Naqshbandī order into India during the closing years of Akbar’s reign.

Muʿīn al-Dīn Hasan Sijzī introduced the Chishtī order into India before the Ghorids occupied the country.23 He had travelled widely in Central Asian lands and at Kharvan, in the district of Nishapur, he met Shaykh ʿUthmān and decided to join his discipline. For twenty years he accompanied him on his arduous mystic journeys, coming into contact with saints like ʿAbd al-Qādir Gilānī, Najm al-Dīn Kubrā and Najīb al-Dīn ʿAbd al-Qāhir Suhrawardī. Having roamed all over the Eastern Islamic lands, parts of which had not yet recovered from the aftermath of the Kara Khitay and Oghuz invasions and were soon to be ravaged by the Mongols, he turned to India and settled at Ajmer, then a citadel of Rajput power. His concept of religious devotion and his pantheistic approach established ideological bridges between Islam and Hinduism; the highest form of devotion in his eyes was ‘to redress the misery of those in distress, to fulfil the needs of the helpless and to feed the hungry’. He therefore advised his followers to ‘develop river-like generosity, sun-like affection and earth-like hospitality’.24 His profound humanism thus provided the motive power behind the Chishtī organization.

Five saints of the first cycle of the Chishtī silsila – Qutb al-Dīn Bakhtiyār Kākī, Farīd al-Dīn Ganj-i Shakar, Nizām al-Dīn Awliyā’, Muʿīn al-Dīn Chishtī and Nasīr al-Dīn Chirāgh – carried the message of the order far and near. Kākī was immersed in pantheistic philosophy. His presence in Delhi helped the cultural development of the newly established capital

of Irano-Turkish power there. Shakar’s *ribāṭ* in Ajodhan – a meeting-place of several trade routes – attracted high and low alike to his fold and a number of backward tribes of the region embraced Islam as a result of his teachings. Nizām al-Dīn Awliyā’, who lived and worked in Delhi for more than half a century, spread the Chishtī order throughout India and sent several hundred of his *khaliṣas* (deputies) to different parts of the country; his successors established *ribāṭs* in Bengal, Gujarat, Malwa and other places.25 He taught the sublimation of desire through nourishing cosmic emotion and was a believer in pacificism and non-violence, preaching patience, tolerance and forgiveness.26

The Suhrawardī order was established in India by Shaykh Bahā’ al-Dīn Zakariyyā’ of Multan, a disciple of Shaykh Shihāb al-Dīn Suhrawardī, many of whose disciples had migrated to India.27 Shaykh Jalāl al-Dīn Tābrīzī, Qādī Hamīd al-Dīn Nāgawrī, Sayyid Nūr al-Dīn Mubārak Ghaznawī, Bahā’ al-Dīn Zakariyyā’, Mawlānā Majd al-Dīn Hājjī and Shaykh Diyā’ al-Dīn Rūmī were among his celebrated representatives there. Tābrīzī established his *khānaqāh* in Bengal and attracted non-Muslims to his fold; the devotion of a section of Hindus to him is clearly evinced in the Sanskrit work the *Shakasubhodaya*. Nāgawrī’s erudition and learning were widely recognized in academic circles, but the ecstatic element so dominated his life that he preferred to pass his time engaging in mystical songs and dances rather than in attempting the arduous task of organizing a spiritual order. Ghaznawī delivered sermons on the duties of a Muslim ruler at the court of the Delhi sultan Iltutmish.28

As mentioned above, Bahā’ al-Dīn Zakariyyā’ (d. 1262) set up the Suhrawardī order in India and founded a large *khānaqāh* at Multan. His mystic ideology differed from that of the Chishti in certain respects. He believed in keeping sufficient material resources in the *khānaqāh* and also maintained contact with the state; succession in his *khānaqāh* was determined on the basis of heredity.29 His descendants Sadr al-Dīn Ārif and Rukn al-Dīn Abu ’l-Fat’h increased the area of their influence, but the *silsila* remained confined mainly to Panjab and Sind. Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Surkh Bukhārī (d. 1291) established a strong Suhrawardī centre at Uchch. A native of Bukhara, he was attracted to Multan by the reputation of Bahā’ al-Dīn Zakariyyā’; many tribes of Uchch claim that he was responsible for their conversion to Islam. His grandson, Sayyid Jalāl al-Dīn Makhdūm-i Jahāniyān (d. 1383), made the Suhrawardī order a factor of great importance in the life of Sind; his

29 Nizami, 1957, pp. 109–49.
Malfūzāt [Table-talk], contained in the Sirāj al-hidāya and Jāmī al-ʿulūm, throws light on his mystic ideals and instructional methods.

The Shattārī order was introduced into India by Shāh ʿAbd Allāh Shattārī (d. 1485), a saint of strange ways. He used to put on royal dress, while a huge retinue of his disciples followed him in military attire, carrying banners and drums and announcing in every village and town that they happened to visit, ‘Is there anyone who wishes to be shown the way to God?’ He settled and later died at Mandu in Malwa, but his work was continued by his successors, particularly Muhammad Ghawth of Gwalior, who was held in high esteem by Bābur and Humāyūn; the latter was introduced to several astrological and occult sciences, particularly those concerning the heavenly bodies, by Ghawth. He wrote the Jawāhir-i khamsa, Kalīd-i makhzan, Damāyir, Basāʾir, Kanz al-tawhīd and Bahr al-hayāt, and had close contact with Hindus; Tansen, the most famous Hindu musician of the age, was among his disciples. In his Bahr al-hayāt, the Persian translation of a Sanskrit work the Amrit Kund, he presented Hindu mystic concepts in Muslim terminology.30

The activities of these orders paved the way for the rise of the Hindu Bhakti movement in India during the fifteenth and the sixteenth centuries.31 Saints of the Bhakti school visited Sufi centres and exchanged views with them, leading to the emergence of new attitudes. The movement spoke out against the prevailing vices of society, religion and the state; its devotees emphasized the unity of the godhead, rejected ritual and ecclesiastic formalities, threw open the doors of religious education to all irrespective of caste, colour or creed, and treated all human beings as made of the ‘self-same clay’. The opening of the door of divine communion for all people, particularly those to whom this had long been denied by the caste-ridden Hindu society, was a revolutionary step imbued with great possibilities for spiritual regeneration. In fact, many of the saints of the Bhakti school came from the class of weavers, cobbler, tanners, carders, and so on; the poet Kabīr was a weaver by trade, Saʾīn a barber, Raidās a leather-worker and Dādū a cotton-cleaner.

Apart from the fact that the Bhakti saints – like Kabīr, Nānak, Chaitanya, Rāmdās, Rāmananda and Dādū Dayāl – had come into contact with the Sufis and were influenced by their teachings, study of the themes of the literature left by the Bhakti saints reveals the impact of Persian mystic literature, language and ideas; thus the Bhakti saints adopted Sufi terminology and drew inspiration from the works of Ṭattār, Saʿdi and Rūmī. The Guru Granth of the Sikhs contains scores of Persian and Arabic words, and it seems that Guru Nānak, the founder of Sikhism, had come to acquire a knowledge of many subtle concepts of Islamic mysticism, including the teachings of Shaykh Farīd al-Dīn Ganj-i Shakar.

30 Nizami, 1950, pp. 56–70.
31 Nizami, 1985, pp. 295–304.
The Mahdawī movement

The Mahdawī movement in India was a powerful expression of Messianic expectations. Sayyid Muhammad of Jawnpur (d. 1504) declared himself to be the promised Mahdī. Unable to settle permanently at any one place due to the fierce opposition to his views, he travelled to many areas throughout India and Central Asia, including Kabul, Badakhshan, Andkhud, Herat, Kandahar, Baluchistan and Makran. He finally settled at Farah in Afghanistan, where he died, and there sprang up a colony of Mahdawīs around his tomb. Sayyid Muhammad was deeply disturbed at the moral and spiritual decline of Muslim society. He preached the rejection of material lust (tark-i dunyā); resignation to the will of God (tawakkul); frequent repetition of the names of Allāh (dhikr); and migration (hijrat) from place to place as an antidote to materialist attractions. The Mahdawīs set up their community centres, known as dā’iras, and carried on their missionary activities with great zeal; Sayyid Muhammad’s successors included Shaykh ʿAlāʾī and Miyān Mustafā.32

SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT:
FOOD AND CLOTHING IN EASTERN IRAN
AND CENTRAL ASIA

N. Kasai and S. Natsagdorj

Contents

THE EASTERN ISLAMIC LANDS, FROM IRAN TO THE FRONTIERS WITH CHINA .................................................. 384
Food and diet ................................................................. 384
Dress ........................................................................... 388
MONGOLIA ................................................................... 390
Shelter, crafts and dress .................................................. 390
Food and diet ................................................................. 393
Information regarding food and clothing can only be gleaned from sporadic mentions in the Arabic and Persian sources and, for the later period, from details gathered by European envoys and travellers like Clavijo and Marco Polo.

Food and diet

The accounts of Islamic geographers mention the existence of markets and the varied products of the cities. Khurasan, for example, is described as a region with good weather, fertile land, green plains, numerous sheep, delicious fruit, and a wide variety of foodstuffs. With its markets and bazaars of shoemakers, drapers, craftsmen and so on, Nishapur was well known as a commercial centre and had every sort of fruit, vegetable, cereal, meat and bread. Tabaran, the district’s main town, was famous for its abundance of fruit and cheap food. Abiward gained recognition for its fertile soil and other blessings and Khawaran was known for its salted meat. Balkh was considered incomparable among the Persian cities: all kinds of fruit (including citrus fruit and grapes), cereals such as wheat, rice and barley, and walnuts, almonds and vegetables were grown there. Thus it was known as the granary of Khurasan and Khwarazm. Of the adjacent regions, Qumis was noted for its pomegranates, Damghan for its red apples, Sistan for its meat, fruit and saffron and Tabaristan for its various kinds of fruit, grains and cereals, its wild birds and seafood, its pickles and jams.

Khwarazm, celebrated for its hospitable people, was also noted for its cuisine. The region had an abundance of fish oil, nuts, honey, jujube, large raisins, sesame and milk products (mainly a kind of cheese called rahbīn), meat, frozen fish and a famous variety of watermelon, which was placed in ice-filled lead containers and exported as far as Baghdad and the caliphal court. The Khwarazmian bāranj melon was famous for its sweetness and...
taste. As long as the caliph al-Ma’mūn (813–33) lived in Khurasan, these melons were brought to him by courier. The dried melons of Merv were also well known and were exported, as were the dried plums of Khwarazm. Transoxania was famed as the only land that never faced famine. Its cotton, wool and silk cloth, and cloaks made out of fox, sable and grey squirrel fur, were exported to other countries. The district of Bukhara was so fertile that 1 acre (0.405 ha) was able to provide the livelihood of an entire family. Much of its agriculture depended on irrigation, by means of which rice, corn and much cotton was grown. Its sister city Samarkand was rebuilt and embellished after the Mongol devastations. The Spanish envoy Clavijo, who visited it at the beginning of the fifteenth century, during the time of Timur, praised it for its green fields, wide squares and extensive markets, full of a great variety of foods, including raw and cooked meat.

Staple items in the diet of the ordinary people included bread made with kneaded flour of wheat, barley, millet, maize or rice. Some parts of Khurasan, especially Merv, were noted for their bread. In addition to bread made from wheat flour, there was a type using flour, raisins and a mixture of fruit, that was exported to other regions. The most popular bread was made from wheat, as recommended by ancient physicians; barley bread was mainly the food of the deprived, and a sign of poverty.

The most commonly eaten meat in these regions was mutton. Alone or mixed with other foods, whether fresh or salted, it could be served cooked, grilled or broiled. As eating meat was not against the law, a great variety of domestic and wild animals were raised. In Turkistan, fish was a popular dish. Khwarazm was noted for its frozen fish, called *sbargh*; Bukhara for its fresh and salted fish; Bayhaq for its plump poultry; Sarakhs for its camel meat; and Tabaristan for its numerous domestic and predatory animals and its great variety of poultry, wild birds and fish. The salted fish, *rubaytha*, was exported from Iraq to Khurasan. Many people appreciated poultry such as chicken and pigeon; the rich served broiled pheasants and partridges at their parties. Chicken was also among the medicinal foods prescribed by doctors. It was quite common to breed hens, pigeons, partridges and many other birds for their eggs and flesh.

The Turks of the Central Asian steppes ate the meat from their sheep and from the wild animals they hunted, while the Mongols ate, both cooked and raw, the meat of various domestic and wild animals, including horses, donkeys, dogs, cats, pigs, wolves, foxes, snakes and rats. Both the meat and the milk of mares were considered excellent dishes. The Mongols sometimes cut the flesh of horses and sucked their blood in an emergency. Non-Muslims killed animals by spearing their chest and shoulders. The Great Khan Ögedey’s enforcement of this law was so severe that no Muslim could slaughter an animal for four successive years.
A favourite dish consumed by all classes was harīsa; it was prepared with fatty meat, rice, millet or husked wheat and sugar. Merv was known to have an especially good kind. Another favourite, surkha-bā, made with meat, crushed grain and vinegar, spread from Persia to Iraq, where it was popular and known as sīkbāj. Bazmāward, another Persian dish, made with cooked meat, eggs and leeks rolled in a thin sandwich of bread, was supposedly popularized in Baghdad by the Persian Barmakids. Cheese and other milk products such as yoghurt were consumed everywhere.

Cooking flavourings and spices included pomegranate juice, sour grapes, dried lemons, lemon juice, vinegar and sour as well as sweet herbs; these were used in soups, various kinds of cooked rice and in cooked, grilled and broiled meat. Jams, pastries, candies, dates, rhubarb, pistachios, shelled almonds, walnuts, seeds and dried fruits were other items that either accompanied meals or were eaten together with dried nuts and seeds between meals. Edible earth found in Zuzan, Kuhistan and Nishapur was among the rare and valued products which were exported to distant places and offered at the courts of kings.

Drinking has a long history in Persia and many Persian, Turkish and Mongol rulers were wine-bibbers. Devout Muslims avoided drinking wine, but medical texts praised its medicinal use. The Mongol Khans were particularly addicted to drinking wine at festivals and parties. In 1241 excessive wine caused the death of Ögedey. The Il Khan Abaqa, who was mentally disturbed, also drank himself to death. During ceremonies at the court of Qubilay Khan, a large golden barrel full of wine was placed on a big chair, encircled by smaller pitchers full of mare’s or camel’s milk and ordinary wine. Both male and female guests drank the wine. In the homeland of the Khitay, at the time of the Mongols, a type of wine was made by fermenting rice and adding seasoning; when heated, it was particularly intoxicating. At the time of the Il Khanids, even when they became Muslims, wine was so widespread among all classes that Ghazan Khan was forced to forbid drinking in public places. He ordered, ‘Whoever is found drunk in cities and bazaars must be arrested and punished.’

Fuqqā (beer) was made from malt or dried grapes; a non-alcoholic version was prepared from sugar, honey, syrup of sugar and ice. Nabīdh (date wine) was made of dates or raisins and drunk by all classes in society. According to the historian Ibn Isfandiyār:

In Tabaristan there are colourful wines of yellow, white and red colours as if they were fenugreek, ruby or rose-water. They are nutritious, useful, good-smelling and without causing any headache or troubles after intoxication.

It seems that these drinks were non-alcoholic and made of various plants and fruits of the region.
Milk, mainly from sheep, cows and camels, was the main drink not only of the nomadic peoples, but also of villagers and city-dwellers. Mongols and Turkic nomads liked mare’s milk best. Dūgh (yoghurt diluted with water) was an everyday drink served with meals. There were various colourful dishes, fruits and drinks used to welcome guests and messengers on happy occasions and at parties. Accustomed to their own local foods or from fear of being poisoned, most of the great men took their personal cooks with them on trips and missions. The Saffarid ruler of Sistan, Ya‘qūb b. Layth, ate plain, ordinary food, mostly barley bread, leeks, onions, fish and a little rice with a sort of cream or starch jelly. In his kitchens, 20 sheep were slaughtered every day and put in 5 big copper pots to cook. Ya‘qūb himself ate from this food and divided the rest among his servants, army commanders and friends. It was he who told the envoy of the Abbasid caliph that while he (Ya‘qūb) was satisfied with a piece of dried bread and a slice of onion, he would never make compromises where the caliph was concerned. Āmīr b. Layth, Ya‘qūb’s brother and successor, had so many kitchen utensils that 300 camels and horses could hardly carry them. But at the time of his captivity in the camp of Amir Ismā‘īl Sāmānī, his ration was just a daily piece of meat which a dog reputedly once snatched out of his hands.

During festivities at the court of Mas‘ūd of Ghazna, a vast array of dishes was set out on tablecloths – meat from birds and wild animals, fish, pickles, jams, thin bread and wine. The great quantity of food consumed at the court of the Seljuq Sultan Sanjar in Merv required the Oghuz Turkmens to bring 24,000 sheep to the kitchens every year. When Ibn Battūta visited the court of the Khans of the Golden Horde in Khwarazm in the fourteenth century, the dishes were as follows: broiled chickens, crane, young pigeons, a kind of buttered bread called kelīcha or kāk, and sweet paste; there were also many kinds of fruit, such as grapes, excellent melons and pomegranates, served in silver as well as gold containers. Many of the Mongol rulers favoured horse meat, especially chopped tripe, and the whole head of a sheep. Flesh of predatory animals and birds was another dish of Mongol commanders. In the autumn of 1222, when Chinggis Khan spent the winter in Samarkand, his sons Ögedey and Chaghatay went bird-hunting near the mouth of the Zarafshan and sent 50 camel-loads of various kinds of hunted birds to him every week.

Sufi mystics avoided the usual types of food and drink, and were content with a bare minimum; they lived mainly on broad beans and bread with salt or olive oil, and, as an ascetic exercise, went for long periods without eating meat. The diet of the masses was restricted and often inadequate. Grain and cereals, such as wheat, rice barley, vetch, lentil and beans, were cooked with the cheap meat of camels or cows and made into soup; broad beans were also common among the lower classes of society. Barley bread and millet were
the food of the poor. Dates, aubergines, onions, carrots, potatoes, green vegetables, maize and millet bread were common foods among villagers.

As to eating habits, most people would simply put out all the kinds of food together so that family and guests could eat whatever they liked; but in general, there was only one cooked dish with bread. At court or in hostels, however, the dishes were not all put out at once. Instead, a list of available dishes was offered and each person ordered what he wanted. Upper-class people had their own containers or bowls for eating, while the common people usually shared a bowl or tray. The ‘tablecloth’ was a piece of cloth or leather, or a big copper or wooden tray. The Mongol way of eating was crude. At parties and receptions everyone was given a slice of meat which was eaten without being cut – cutting meat was not allowed, even when it was offered to a guest by the host. The leftover meat was kept, inside a skin, for use at the next meal. Meal times were usually as follows: breakfast in the morning, lunch at noon and supper in the early evening, to allow the food to be digested before sleeping. People were advised to eat warm food only twice a day in order to keep fit and healthy.

Contemporary works on ethics describe the correct manners when eating. They include washing one’s hands and saying *bismillāh al-hamdu lillāh* before and after every meal; stopping eating before one is stuffed; beginning and ending a meal with some salt; taking small pieces of bread from a dish, taking care to chew them well; not opening one’s mouth wide; not licking one’s fingers; and sipping water rather than drinking it all at once. People were expected to eat in a happy mood, to speak of topics of common interest and to talk about righteous people, rather than remaining silent. Attending parties without an invitation, going towards the table, looking at friends and at the dishes while eating, leaving the table before the dishes have been collected, and a host ending his meal before his guests, were all considered impolite. Regarding the order of courses at the end of a meal, fruit was eaten first, as physicians considered it better for the digestion, then pastries; and finally cold water was drunk.

### Dress

In this region of vast lands, varied climate and diverse products and ways of living, class differences had a great effect on people’s clothing. Governors, officials, soldiers, aristocrats, scholars, judges, craftsmen, farmers, and so on, each had their own dress; religious affiliation and national and ethnic differences were also a major influence on the type or style of clothing. However, because of the exiguous sources, especially about the regions with which we are concerned, a survey of dress is difficult. The works of writers such
as Dozy regarding Islamic dress are mainly concerned with clothing in the Abbasid and Fatimid lands, essentially Iraq, Syria, Egypt, Africa and Spain. Nevertheless, geographers and travellers of the Eastern Islamic lands give some useful information about styles of dress in such regions as Khurasan, a flourishing centre of silk, wool and cotton textile manufacture of the time.

Nishapur was noted for its various kinds of cloth and clothing, exported to far-off regions, where kings and great men chose them for their attire. The city’s products included white cloth, various kinds of turbans, scarfs, silk undershirts and other types of hair and cotton cloth which were exported as far as Iraq and Egypt. Most towns had their own specialities, such as mulham, the half-silk cloth of Merv. Bukhara produced various kinds of silk cloth and had famous weaving factories. Most of Bukhara’s taxes were paid to Baghdad in this cloth. The types of cloth known as Bukharī, which were heavy and strong, were bought by Arabs in great numbers. Carpets, rugs, silk cloth, bedding, mats and prayer rugs were exported from Bukhara to other regions, and especially to Iraq. In Khwarazm, sable and grey squirrel furs, goat skins, carpets, bed coverings, silk, silk caps and cotton robes were produced in large numbers and the surplus was exported. Samarkand was noted for its tents, silk, wool and furs; its robes were exported to Turkistan. In Tabaristan, many kinds of wool, silk, linen and cotton robes were found. Sistans wore three or four turbans on their heads in red, yellow, green or white, mostly of silk. The people of Sogdiana wore skilfully ornamented silk waistcoats and jackets, boots, and hats with sharp brims. In the tenth century, the people on the northern frontier regions of Transoxania dressed like the neighbouring Turks.

The oldest piece of silk from this region dating back to the Islamic era, now to be found in the Louvre in Paris, belongs to the Samanid period and was woven c. 985 for a ruler in Khurasan. White robes and other silk articles of clothing, together with precious head coverings, were among the tribute sent from Khurasan to the court of Hārūn al-Rashīd (786–809) in Baghdad. The successors of Chinggis Khan wore gold-woven robes; the Mongols’ dress had previously consisted mainly of animal skins. Soon afterwards they took to a sack-like garment that was loose on the left side; the right side was tied at the shoulder (see further, Part Two below).

Il Khanid dignitaries in Persia wore furs and leather hats. Ghazan Khan gave orders for turbans to be worn, on religious grounds, but was unsuccessful in enforcing this measure. Mongol women wore long trousers under their sack-like garments and tall, basket-like hats covered with a piece of cloth. In an attempt to curb the nobles’ luxurious lifestyle, the Il Khan Gaykhatu forbade the wearing of gold-woven garments. Nevertheless, dignitaries wore new robes at parties and festivities. The furs of sables, grey squirrels, ermines and
other animals were essential materials for the garments of the Mongols and the Turks of the steppes. At his birthday festivities, the Great Khan Qubilay donned gold-woven garments; 20,000 of his courtiers attended the ceremony, wearing golden and brightly coloured garments made of costly silk ornamented with pearls and gold. Timur, however, wore a plain silk robe and a long white hat with a Badakhshan ruby on its top, surrounded by precious pearls and jewels.

During the ninth century, great merchants wore the *taylasān* (a head-shawl whose end did not fall below the chin). The lower classes, however, did not wear this garment. Cooks wore garments resembling boiler-suits, servants carried napkins and towels, water-carriers wore short trousers, meat-roasters wore a loincloth or napkin, while traders and artisans wore loose-fitting garments and farmers wore thick cotton dresses and colourful turbans. *Muhtasibs* (municipal inspectors) watched over the type and the state of cleanliness of craftsmen’s dress.

The choice of colours for flags, government dress and badges usually had political significance. Thus the caliph al-Ma’mūn changed the traditional black of the ābāsids to the green of the ālāds when he chose āli al-Riḍā as his heir, but later returned to the ābāsid black. In these as in other parts of the Islamic world, black garments were traditionally used for mourning ceremonies, but in some quarters white was the symbol of mourning. When mourning the death of the ābāsid caliph al-Qādir (991–1031), Masʿūd of Ghazna wore a white robe and turban and all the court retainers and chamberlains also attended in white dress.

**Part Two**

**MONGOLIA**

*(S. Natsagdorj)*

**Shelter, crafts and dress**

The Mongols’ nomadic existence necessitated dwellings that could easily be dismantled. The yurt, a felt-covered framed structure, fulfilled these needs. John of Plano Carpini, who
travelled through the region in the mid-thirteenth century, describes the Mongol yurts as follows:

Their shelters are round, shaped like tents and made of twigs and thin sticks; at the top in the centre is a circular window that admits light and lets out the smoke, for there is always a fire in the middle. The walls and roofs are covered with felt, and the doors are also made of felt. Some of the shelters are large; others are small, according to the people’s wealth or poverty.

Certain yurts, permanently mounted on wagons and unable to be dismantled like the normal kind, were called ger-tereg, or ‘wagon-yurt’. The yurts varied in size: whereas just 1 ox was needed to transport a small yurt, 3 or more were required for a large one. Khans and noyans (chiefs) had special wagon-yurts (ord-ger tereg = ‘palace wagon-yurt’); measuring up to 9 m in width, they were drawn by 22 oxen.

In addition to the yurt, conventional dwellings and public buildings (temples, monasteries, etc.) had been known to the population of Mongolia for some time. These structures were built of a variety of materials. In the wooded areas of northern Mongolia, for example, timber was used, evidence of which is provided by the remains of beams found in the Kitan settlement in Khentei. In steppe areas, there were frame-and-post structures with various types of filling, structures of sun-dried brick with foundations and occasionally walls of stonework. In settlements dating from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries or earlier, we find the remains of buildings where a large, flat, fired grey brick was used in the construction of extensions. Grey, flat, broad brick has been found in the Kitan settlements of Mongolia (tenth and eleventh centuries).

Crafts played a significant part in the economy and culture of the Mongolian nation. There were several stages in the development of Mongolian crafts; and in the course of these, Mongolian craftsmen assimilated new methods and a certain amount of specialization thus took place. Workmen who fashioned a variety of objects from wood and iron were called darhan. According to the references in The Secret History of the Mongols, the darhans were divided into tergech, craftsmen specializing in the construction of wagons, and modoč, who specialized in woodwork. Huyagiin darhuul, who specialized in the manufacture of weapons for the Khans, resided permanently at their courts.

The abundant metal deposits in the Mongol lands encouraged the development of a knowledge of the physical properties of ores and metals and the skill of processing them for specific purposes, attested by literary and archaeological finds. The results of the excavations at Karakorum and other Mongol settlements confirm the existence of specifically Mongol crafts and trades, including the casting of iron and bronze; other workshops were principally concerned with the production of various types of weaponry. The stamped bronzeware, silverware, ornaments from horses’ harnesses and bronze mirrors found at
Karakorum testify to the skill of the Mongol smiths, metalworkers and jewellers. The high level of metal production there is confirmed by the technical analysis of some of the articles found; analysis of samples of white cast iron and steel shows that the white iron melted at a temperature of 1350 °C. Experts believe that it would have been impossible to achieve this temperature by hand-operated bellows; a motor force would have been necessary, and was probably provided by water power reaching Karakorum from the Orkhon river.

In terms of their development, Mongol crafts and trades may largely be described as a dependent sector of the Mongols’ economic activity, on the level of cottage industry. Given their economic system, the herders generally only made products and household items to meet the vital requirements of their nomadic life. The various products obtained from the livestock long remained the principal raw material for the craft industries. Sheep’s wool was used to manufacture felt; belts, harnesses, various types of vessels, clothing, headgear and footwear were made from the skins of domesticated livestock.

The making of clothing required particular skills, such as the ability to process the hides and manufacture thread and a knowledge of stitching techniques. The Mongols’ main item of clothing was the deli, a robe with seamless shoulders. Mongolian delis of the tenth to the thirteenth century were very different from the modern versions. Collarless and open from top to bottom, they wrapped over at breast level and fastened with three clasps on the right and a single clasp on the left, where they were slit as far up as the sleeve. Married women wore a kind of kaftan (nemreg) that was extremely wide and slit in front down to the ground; they also wore a headdress known as a bogtog. Mongols in the thirteenth century, as now, wore a soft material belt wrapped tightly around the waist. A belt of this sort served as a kind of unstiffened corset, to make long journeys on the hard Mongol saddles more bearable and to help riders maintain their posture.

Differences in the finish, style and quality of materials were apparent in the clothing of the rich and the poor. Rich people wore clothes made of silk and wool and expensive furs brought from various foreign countries. They lined their robes with silk floss, which is extremely soft, light and warm. The poor made their heavy outer coats from dog or goat skins, lining their clothing with linen or cotton. They used felt to make cloaks, saddle-cloths and rain hats.

The footwear of the Mongol peoples had a number of characteristic features; the cut and assembly were common to all groups. Mongol boots (tenth to the eleventh century) had tops which enclosed the entire shin and were the same width at top and bottom. The sole was thick and inflexible with felt padding. The rigid toe was turned upwards. This boot was designed specifically for standing in stirrups and riding in a hard saddle at a quick gallop.
Thus the Mongols’ traditional clothing was influenced by the nomadic population’s adaptation to the natural environment. It fulfilled its principal utilitarian function; it was simple, and it provided excellent protection from the sharp variations in temperature, from the wind and from the large number of insects which were always present around the livestock as they grazed.

**Food and diet**

The basis of the Mongols’ diet consisted of milk and meat, but the milk products were varied in composition and mode of preparation. The milk of all sorts of livestock – cows, sheep, goats, camels, mares – was used. All types, apart from mare’s milk, were boiled in a cauldron before use. The unboiled mare’s milk was turned into koumiss (airak), a fermented, foaming drink, made by whisking the milk for a long period. The various products obtained from the boiled milk were either consumed fresh or conserved and stored for the winter. Fresh milk products included taraq (soured milk), byashlaq, a type of cheese made from unsalted curds, and örume, a thick cream cheese formed by boiling milk for a long time in a cauldron over a slow fire. Conserved milk products included aaruul (dried curds); when dried in the form of little balls, it was called grut, which was firmer than aaruul and could be kept for a long time. Aaruul and grut had the same importance in the life of the Mongol population as bread has in the lives of farming peoples.

Meat was mainly consumed in winter. The livestock raised by the Mongol peoples may be divided into two categories: ‘livestock with hot breath’, i.e horses and sheep; and ‘livestock with cold breath’, i.e. cattle, goats and camels. Meat from all types of domestic livestock formed part of the diet. In summer and autumn, game such as antelope, Mongolian gazelle and Siberian marmot was added. The Mongols preserved meat by drying it; the dried meat was known as borts. Summer borts differed from winter borts in that it dried more quickly and turned dark in the sun. Winter sun-dried borts became lighter in the sun and was more highly valued. Borts was made from all types of meat. According to *The Secret History of the Mongols*, an ancestor of the Mongols named Bodonchar prepared borts from the flesh of wild duck, which he hung on trees. In winter, meat was not only dried but also frozen. The chilled carcasses were jointed, wrapped in a skin and placed in a cart, where they were kept throughout the winter. The fresh meat of cattle and other livestock was boiled for consumption, whereas game was usually roasted. The practice of cooking the meat of hunted animals goes back, of course, to antiquity. Among the Mongols, the earliest known techniques of food preparation, i.e. roasting over a fire or using red hot stones, were still in use in the tenth and eleventh centuries. Various seasonings were
used in their food: wild onions, wild roots and grasses, caraway seeds, rhubarb and *sarana*. Although the Mongols’ diet also included farinaceous foods, these were not as varied as those found in the diet of settled agricultural peoples.

The nomads’ livestock-breeding activities shaped their spiritual life and their ethics. The various genres of popular oral works formed a major element in the culture of the Mongolian peoples, reflecting the characteristics of the surrounding landscape, economic activity and mores of these nomadic herders. Thus Mongolian folklore was deeply rooted in the life of these pastoral people of the steppes.
20

COINAGE AND THE MONETARY SYSTEM

E. A. Davidovich and A. H. Dani

Contents

CENTRAL ASIA .............................................. 395
Coinage and the circulation of money from the eighth to the tenth century .......... 396
Coinage and the circulation of money from the eleventh century to the beginning of the thirteenth ................................................................. 403
Coinage and the circulation of money under the Mongols (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries) ................................................................. 408
Coinage and the circulation of money in Transoxania under Timur and the Timurids (late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries) ......................... 412
AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN AND NORTHERN INDIA .................................. 417

Part One

CENTRAL ASIA

(E. A. Davidovich)

The minting of coins and the circulation of money in the major sub-regions of Central Asia in all the periods between the eighth and the fifteenth century show both similarities and differences. Local variations in the composition and supply of currency were due to a number of factors (economics, politics, traditions, the psychology of the people), among
which state borders were no longer the most important. For example, even in the relatively
centralized Samanid state (late ninth and tenth centuries) there existed a number of variants
in monetary circulation. The local variants cannot all be compared on equal terms, both
because of constraints of space and because of the differing degrees to which these variants
have been studied. We shall thus concentrate on one sub-region, that of Transoxania. For
other regions, the main differences vis-à-vis Transoxania will be noted.

Coinage and the circulation of money from the eighth
to the tenth century

After the conquest of Central Asia by the Arabs, the local mints started issuing gold, sil-
ver and bronze coins inscribed in Arabic on both sides. These coins came to be known
technically as ‘Kufic’, from the type of Arabic script used for their legends. Kufic gold
coins (dinars) were not minted regularly or on a large scale in Transoxania. Under the
Tahirids (821–73), dinars were minted periodically in Samarkand and Chach (Tashkent).
Even under the Samanids (tenth century), whose capital was Bukhara, the issue of dinars
in Bukhara, Samarkand and Chach remained only occasional. Samanid dinars were minted
on a markedly larger scale beyond the borders of Transoxania, particularly in Nishapur
and Muhammadiyya (Rayy). Hoards of gold coins found in Transoxania consist mainly of
externally minted Samanid dinars (mostly from Nishapur).

There was clearly more than one legal standard of fineness for dinars.¹ The bulk of the
Samanid dinars from Nishapur are of the highest standard (93–98%, and usually 96% fine
gold). Muhammadiyya issued dinars both of that high standard and of lower standards.
The official weight-standard of the dinar is known (4.26 g) and the mean weight of 4.2 g
corresponds to this. Noteworthy, however, are a significant number of coins that exceed the
weight requirement.

Tenth-century Arab geographers such as al-Istakhri and Ibn Hawqal point out that gold
coins fulfilled different functions in the various regions of the caliphate. In some (e.g. Jibal
and Tabaristan), dinars were the medium of exchange; in others (e.g. Kirman, Fars and
Transoxania), they were not. When describing the money of Bukhara, al-Istakhri notes,
‘Dirhams are their coinage; they do not deal among themselves in dinars, which they treat
as goods.’² The geographer and traveller Yaqūt explained this matter in more detail for
the enlightenment of his thirteenth-century contemporaries: ‘In the time of the Samanids,
the inhabitants of Bukhara used dirhams for trading purposes and did not deal among

² Al-Istakhri, 1927, p. 314.
themselves in dinars. Gold was just another commodity.\footnote{Yaqūt, 1866–73, p. 519.} Gold coins were, until the tenth century, clearly used in Transoxania for rewards or gifts alone. They served as treasure and universal currency but not as a medium of exchange in domestic trade. This is attested by the composition of the hoards, the well-preserved state of the coins, the peculiarities of their real weights and the fact that the local mints of Transoxania issued dinars only periodically.

Monetary circulation in the territory of Transoxania was marked by the long coexistence of two groups of quite dissimilar dirhams: the Kufic and what are termed the Bukhār Khudāt dirhams. The Bukhār Khudāt dirhams were modelled on the drachm of the Sasanian king Bahram V (420–38). The representation in the eighth century of the monarch’s crowned bust (obverse) and fire-altar and two guards (reverse) was quite different from the fifth-century design, the former being schematized and executed in dots and dashes. The Pahlavi inscriptions on both sides of the coin have disappeared (with only the rudiments left), but what remains is something that was featured earlier on the obverse in front of the face of the monarch, namely a Sogdian inscription (three words), and in one issue it is replaced by a shorter (one-word) inscription. Behind the monarch’s head, the rudiments of a Pahlavi inscription have been changed into four barbed spikes (Fig. 1:1 – see p. 444). In the second half of the eighth century, these rudiments were replaced in some issues by Arabic inscriptions (Fig. 1:2–4). In the final quarter of that century the Bukhār Khudāt coins were called ‘Mahdiyya’ after the caliph al-Mahdi (775–85). Manuscript sources do not record this name but it occurs in coin inscriptions. The Mahdiyya dirhams were of a high standard (over 70% silver). All or most were nummi subaerati (fine silver coating on a copper core). The mean weight (3.2 g) of the eighth-century Bukhār Khudāt dirhams shows that they were minted in accordance with the local weight-standard. They were issued by three mints: those of Bukhara, Samarkand and Chach.\footnote{Davidovich, 1979, pp. 92–117.}

In the eighth century there was an abundance of Kufic dirhams of the Umayyads (Fig. 1:6) and early ‘Abbasids in the territory of Transoxania, minted in many cities beyond its borders. The hoards pertaining to the late eighth century include both Bukhār Khudāt and Kufic dirhams. The latter were minted from very high-standard silver and their official weight-standard was 2.97 g. An unpublished hoard found near Samarkand contains, together with Kufic and Bukhār Khudāt dirhams, a number of drachms of the Sasanians. Late Sasanian drachms were probably still to be found in the markets of Transoxania in the eighth century.
It might have been expected that, in the ninth century, when the local minting of Kufic dirhams in Samarkand, Chach and Bukhara became fairly regular and abundant, these Muslim coins inscribed with quotations from the Qur’an would have supplanted the Bukhār Khudāt dirhams with their pre-Islamic legends. In fact, the opposite happened since the position of the Bukhār Khudāt dirhams became consolidated in the ninth and tenth centuries. Written sources from those centuries distinguish three types of Bukhār Khudāt coins: Musayyabī, Muhammādī and Ghitrīfī dirhams. The tribute received by the caliphate from various cities and regions of Transoxania was initially reckoned in silver, but in the first quarter of the ninth century it was recalculated in terms of these dirhams. It is particularly interesting that the recalculation was carried out in a particular form for each region. The table below summarizes the data provided by Ibn Khurradādhbih for the year 826:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Musayyabī (total annual production: just under 755,500)</th>
<th>Muhammādī (total annual production: 1,417,000)</th>
<th>Ghitrīfī (total annual production: 1,189,200)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chach</td>
<td>Chach with mines, Khujand, Urushana (partial), Turk cities on the Syr Darya (partial)</td>
<td>Sogdiana (Samarkand), Buttam and Kash with mines, Nasaf, Ferghana, Urushana (partial)</td>
<td>Bukhara</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

What, then, was the difference between Musayyabī, Muhammādī and Ghitrīfī dirhams? This question has occupied many numismatists and historians, all reckoning the distinction to lie in the Arabic inscriptions on the obverse, but this has proved a blind alley for research since no account was taken of the pattern of monetary circulation, the clear information provided by some written sources and the mistakes of others, compared with numismatic facts. The distinction has proved to lie not in the inscriptions but primarily in the metal, together with weight, dimensions and appearance.

In the last quarter of the eighth century, the Bukhār Khudāt dirhams underwent two local reforms. The first concerned their issue in Samarkand and Bukhara, with a reduction in their silver content, weight-standard and size. The reformed dirhams – also nummi sub-aerati but with two coatings – were no more than 40% silver. These were to be the Muhammādī dirhams, some issues of which later bore the name ‘Muhammadiyya’. The second reform was conducted in Bukhara alone and legend ascribes it to Ghitrīf b. Āṭā’, governor of Khurasan in 792–3. Tradition has it that the inhabitants of Bukhara presented him with the clear task of giving the market a coinage that would not circulate beyond the city limits.

---

5 The findings are, not unnaturally, contradictory. Dirhams with the legend ‘al-Mahdī’, for example, have been identified by some as Musayyabī, by others as Muhammādī and by still others as Ghitrīfī.

6 Davidovich, 1966, pp. 49–125, 131.
This was the origin of the Bukhār Khudāt dirhams of copper or non-precious alloys with no silver at all. These copper coins came to be called Ghitrīfī (although this name did not appear on the actual coins), and in the ninth and tenth centuries they were only minted in Bukhara. The Musayyābī dirhams, the highest standard of the Bukhār Khudāt coins, were in fact the direct successors of those pre-reform dirhams of the eighth century containing over 70% silver. The most detailed description of the Muhammadī dirhams is given by al-Iṣṭakhri, according to whom they were minted ‘from various metals: from iron, copper, silver and others’. In other words, the Muhammadī were low-standard silver coins, as confirmed by assaying (over 40% silver). Concerning the Ghitrīfī dirhams, all sources agree that they were made of an alloy of non-precious metals and resembled copper coins minted from various sorts of copper or from copper with an admixture.

Alongside the Bukhār Khudāt dirhams, the late eighth century saw the start in Transoxania of the systematic issue of locally minted Kufic coins. The Samanids struck particularly regular and abundant quantities of Kufic dirhams there. These were named Ismāʿīlī after the Samanid amir Ismāʿīl b. Ahmad (892–907). The hoards of Kufic dirhams found in Transoxania do not just consist of local coins, however; and similarly, the hoards found beyond its borders in other regions of the Muslim East contain a fair number of dirhams from Samarkand and Chach. The most important feature of the period, however, was the fact that the bulk of Kufic dirhams (including Samanid coins) circulated well beyond the limits of the Muslim East, so that hundreds of hoards of Kufic coins have been discovered in Europe.

Ismāʿīlī dirhams are of a high standard. The real standard has been studied by means of two methods: atomic absorption spectrometry (6 specimens) and quantitative chemical analysis (104 specimens). Samanid policy regarding the official standard of fineness clearly underwent changes. The silver content of the bulk of dirhams of the early group (Samarkand and Chach coins) fluctuates within the 89–96% range; lower-standard (owing to the presence of lead) and higher-standard specimens are exceptions. The official standard of fineness was no less than 92.5%. Characteristic of the later group is a general lowering of the standard, coupled with a wider range of fluctuation and more random...
deviations from even those limits. The real standard of the late Samanid dirhams has not
been studied, but outwardly they look to be of even lower standard.

The average weight of the early Ismā‘īlī dirhams corresponds to the official standard
of 2.97 g, but there was a gradual increase in the range of variations. In addition to whole
coins, the sources make mention of fragments. The composition of the hoards found in
Transoxania is specified as follows: the dirhams were split not only in Samarkand and
not only ‘into basic fractions’ (i.e. halves and quarters). The hoards contain a great many
fragments of the most varied sizes, shapes and weights, including very small ones. Clearly,
the splitting of Ismā‘īlī dirhams into fractions answered two purposes: the pieces stood for
lower denominations than the face value and were added to full dirhams as makeweights,
sometimes making good a substantial difference between their actual and their official
weight. Clearly, too, the question of the circulation of Ismā‘īlī dirhams as monetary units
or by weight cannot yet be resolved unequivocally. It is more plausible to speak of the
coexistence of these two forms and the preponderance of one form within different time
spans. In the early decades, dirhams clearly circulated as whole coins (which did not rule
out weight checks, especially for large sums). The criterion of weight became prevalent
later – hence the accumulation of small fragments, which in some hoards far outnumber
whole coins.

The coexistence and differing functions of the four groups of coins designated for sil-
ver circulation (Kufic Ismā‘īlī; and Bukhār Khudāt Musayyabī, Muhammādī and Ghitrīfī)
were determined to a great extent by the financial and fiscal policy of the state, which
rested both on objective market requirements and on a knowledge of the people’s psy-
chology. An important component of this policy was the recalculation of the kharāj (land
tax) into Bukhār Khudāt coinage and the firm establishment of the extent of the kharāj
in each region of Transoxania, either in Ghitrīfī dirhams (Bukhara), Muhammādī dirhams
(Samarkand, Ferghana, etc.) or Musayyabī dirhams (Chach, Khujand, etc.). Another impor-
tant ingredient was the free exchange of Bukhār Khudāt for Kufic dirhams. The exchange
value of the Bukhār Khudāt coins fluctuated, but by the ninth century it was usually higher
than that of the Kufic dirhams. In 835, for instance, 100 fine-silver Kufic dirhams weighed
out were worth at most 85 Ghitrīfī dirhams despite the fact that the latter contained no silver
at all. The rate for Muhammādī and Musayyabī coins was higher still. The public consid-
ered the Bukhār Khudāt coins to be more stable, less susceptible to market fluctuations,
and therefore preferred them for domestic trading purposes to the Kufic dirhams.

A certain demarcation of functions occurred that provided the best response to both the
domestic and the external trading requirements of Transoxania. The Kufic dirhams fulfilled
all monetary functions, but the universal currency function prevailed and, as a result, the
bulk of them ended up in Europe, beyond the bounds of Central Asia. The Bukhār Khudāt coins were not involved in this flow, which would have hurt the local population (since their exchange value exceeded the silver rate), and they would in any case have been unusable for trading with Europe on account of their metal content. In other words, the Bukhār Khudāt dirhams did not possess inherently the function of a universal currency but served the needs of domestic commerce, the overriding function being that of a medium of exchange.

Under the Samanids, outsize Kufic dirhams were minted beyond the bounds of Transoxania. They differed from Ismāʿīlī dirhams in weight, thickness, size, standard of fineness, and aspect. Their weight was very variable (usually falling within the 10–13 g range) and they were struck from an alloy of silver (about 70%) and copper. With the large size of the coins, the inscriptions occupy only part of their field, leaving a free strip round the rims. These outsize coins occur in hoards found in the territory of Transoxania, which means that they entered into the province’s monetary circulation.

A considerable place in monetary trading was occupied by copper coins (fulūs, sing. fals), which were issued in markedly increased numbers under the Samanids (Fig. 1:7). In retail trading, fulūs predominated, as Ibn Hawqal (mid-tenth century) particularly emphasizes. Under the Samanids, fulūs were as a rule issued in two denominations, the basic unit being called an ʿadli, which divided into pāshīz. Copper coins were struck in many cities of Transoxania, being intended for trade within the cities and the province, but the composition of hoards indicates that fulūs crossed the borders of their regions. At the same time, a particular feature of the circulation of copper coins was that local fulūs and those from other cities (whether always or at specific times is not known) were at different parities. In Bukhara in 921, for example, a fine-silver dirham fetched 24 Bukhara fals but 36 Samarkand fulūs. In other words, in Bukhara a fals from another city was worth two-thirds of the local fals.

The circulation of money in other sub-regions of Central Asia differed from the variants that had arisen in Transoxania. The main difference lay in the Bukhār Khudāt dirhams of the province. Furthermore, in some sub-regions the general level of trading and monetary relations was different. In northern Tukharistan, for instance, Kufic dirhams and even copper coins were struck only occasionally, as borne out by the number of coin finds. In overall terms of trading and monetary relations, northern Tukharistan lagged behind Transoxania.

Coinage and the circulation of money from the eleventh century to the beginning of the thirteenth

The ‘silver coin crisis’ (the causes of which are not examined here) relates to a situation that studies have already confirmed regarding the minting and circulation of coins in the Muslim East from the eleventh to the thirteenth century. The situation displays general features over the whole of that immense territory, and local features in various regions and sub-regions. The general features of the silver coin crisis are: the debasing of silver dirhams with alloys (even involving various copper or non-precious metal alloys); the activation of gold coins even in regions where they had previously played no significant role in monetary circulation; and the persistence of this situation for some 200 years. Local variants are characterized, first, by the variable duration of the silver coin crisis and by the time taken and the means employed to overcome it; and, second, by the differing composition of the money supply as regards both silver and gold circulation, not only in different states but in individual sub-regions of one and the same state. The composition of the money supply depended primarily on the kinds of debasement of silver dirhams and the technical methods used, and the time of introduction and organization of the circulation of silver substitutes. It also hinged on disparities in the minting of dinars (gold coins of different standards of fineness and gilded silver coins). Local variants of the silver coin crisis stemmed from interaction between the local level of trading and monetary relations and the socio-political situation, the status of silver reserves and the possibilities of replenishing them, the monetary and fiscal policy of the state (and sometimes of particular rulers) and social psychology (in particular, the solidity of the traditions of monetary circulation in the preceding period).

Transoxania, as part of the state of the Karakhanids, continued to display an extremely original variant of minting and monetary circulation.14 Typical here are three features, whose combination seems on the face of it paradoxical. The first is the lack, for a century and a half, of any regular minting of gold coins; the second is the maintenance of the positions of Bukhār Khudāt coins; and the third is the fast pace and variety of methods used for debasing the Karakhanid Kufic dirhams.

The Karakhanid silver coins were, from the technical point of view, debased in two ways. In some cases, a hardener (usually copper) was added to the alloy, and in others, nummi subaerati (consisting of a copper core and coatings of silver) were issued. A quantitative chemical analysis of a few dozen coins of different periods from hoards found in

Transoxania makes it possible to trace the course of changes in the standard of fineness of Karakhanid dirhams.

In the first and early second decade of the eleventh century, dirhams were still of a high standard. For example, in the dirhams of Ferghana (minted in the cities of Akhsikat and Uzgend) there was a copper admixture of about 12%. In addition to locally minted dirhams, Karakhanid coins minted in Kashghar and Yarkand were in wide circulation in Ferghana. The early Kashghar dirhams were also of high quality, but the copper content increased later. It is noteworthy that the dirhams of Kashghar in 1019–20 and of Yarkand in 1026–7 belong to the nummi subaerati category. The silver coatings are worn (in some instances to the point of transparency) and in places they have come off altogether. Hence an analysis of the silver has indicated a considerable spread in the 40–60% range. No less than 30% of copper had thus been added. In the Chaghaniyan dirhams of 1034–5, the amount of copper reached 73–75%, and later (1041–2) more than 80%. In the chronologically close Samarkand coins (minted in 1046–7 under the Karakhanid Ibrāḥīm Tamghach Khan) the respective proportions of copper and silver were 80% and 15–16%, but the coins were nummi subaerati, so that the silver content was originally somewhat higher.

In the mid-eleventh century, dirhams were minted from a copper and lead alloy in many cities of Ferghana. After the conquest of Ferghana by Ibrahim Tamghach Khan, the circulation of copper and lead dirhams was banned in the region and they were replaced by fresh dirhams bearing the name of the conqueror. The new coins were minted from a silver and copper alloy (specimens analysed from 1061 and 1067–8 contain 18–23% silver and 70–72% copper). Low-standard dirhams continued to be issued in the twelfth century. For example, two dirhams of Masʿūd b. Hasan minted in Samarkand around 1166–70 proved to be 22–25% silver.

The exchange rate of Karakhanid Kufic dirhams depended on their standard of fineness. It was therefore customary for documents to contain detailed descriptions of them, making it quite clear which particular coins were concerned. In one of the waqf documents of Ibrāḥīm Tamghach Khan, for example, his Samarkand dirhams are described thus: ‘muʿayyadī ʿadlī dirhams of the established model, liquid assets [i.e. legal tender – Ed.] in the district of Samarkand’ and ‘47 dirhams [are equivalent] to 1 mithqāl of pure, high-carat gold’ at the time of establishment of that waqf.15 Had silver circulation consisted solely of low-standard Karakhanid Kufic dirhams, this would certainly have prompted the regular minting of gold coins in Transoxania (a province with highly developed trading and monetary relations) and their use in monetary commerce. However, the feature of central Transoxania up to the mid-twelfth century was the already familiar Bukhār Khudāt

---

dirham. Of these, the Muhammadi dirhams (*nummi subaerati*, over 40% silver) began to drop out of circulation over several decades of the eleventh century, often together with Karakhanid dirhams of differing standards. Ghitriffi dirhams (of copper or non-precious alloys) remained legal tender and the recommended medium of exchange until the mid-twelfth century. As previously, the parity of the Ghitriffi dirhams fluctuated but was usually either equivalent to or above the rate for fine silver. This particular point was noted with some surprise in the mid-eleventh century by the historian and polymath al-Biruni.

Silver was expensive at that time. In 1128, for instance, the ratio of gold to silver was 1:7.5. Yet in that same year, 100 dirhams by weight of fine silver were worth no more than 70 or 72 Ghitriffi copper dirhams.\(^{16}\) Significantly, the area of circulation of the Ghitriffi dirhams had increased in comparison with the previous period. Under the Karakhanids, these dirhams went beyond the bounds of the Bukhara region and became the official medium of exchange in many regions of the state. Such an established situation, coupled with the high exchange value of the Bukhar Khudat copper Ghitrif, was secured by deep-rooted tradition and the monetary policy of the Karakhanids that was built upon it.

Major changes took place in the mid-twelfth century, with the start of regular issues of gold coinage. The low-standard Karakhanid Kufic dirhams were replaced by dirhams minted without any silver at all, and with just the amalgamation of a thin silver film on the surface. These silver-coated copper dirhams were large, handsome coins (Fig. 2:1–4) issued in many cities, including Samarkand, Bukhara, Uzgend, Kasan, Marghinan, Binakat and Utrar. Some cities minted silver-coated copper coins of two values (distinguished by size, weight, outward aspect and sometimes inscriptions). Like any tokens of value with an imposed exchange rate, the silver-coated copper dirhams often suffered inflation, against which the financiers of the time had two weapons: one was economic (reducing the money supply through prohibitions and exchanges) and the other was psychological (increasing the weight of new coin issues). A particularly vivid picture of frequent inflation and such fiscal measures is provided by the coins of Ferghana in the second half of the twelfth century.\(^{17}\)

The policy with regard to the minting of gold coins followed by the Ghaznavids, the Great Seljuqs, the Khwarazm Shahs of Anushhtegin’s line, and the Ghurids, who ruled over various parts of eastern Iran and Central Asia, was quite different. The Seljuqs, for example, began issuing gold dinars even before the decisive victory in 1040 over the Ghaznavids at Dandanqan. After 1040, the issuing of both high- and lower-standard gold coins, and subsequently gilded silver dinars, was put on a regular footing.

---

\(^{16}\) Davidovich, 1960, pp. 93–8.

Fig. 2. Drawings of silver-coated copper dirhams from the end of the twelfth century to the beginning of the thirteenth. 1–3: Karakhanid dirhams, from Uzgend, A.H. 594; from Marghinan, A.H. 602; from Binakat, A.H. 602. 4: dirham from Uzgend, A.H. 609, with the names of the Karakhanid Mahmūd b. Ahmad and the Khwarazm Shah Muhammad b. Tekish. 5–6: dirhams of Muhammad b. Tekish, from Termez, A.H. 617. 7: dirham from Samarkand, 622/1225.

Let us take a closer look at the initial stage of the emergence of the ‘Ghaznavid variant’ of the silver coin crisis. In every way (size, thickness, style of inscriptions, decorative motifs), the Ghaznavid coins differed from the Karakhanid Kufic coins. The debasing of
silver dirhams also proceeded more slowly than in the state of the Karakhanids. In the Ghaznavid dirhams of Sultan Masʿūd I (1030–41), the silver content was thus over 70% and the admixture of copper did not exceed 25–27%. At that time, dirhams were still being issued at an official standard of fineness equivalent to ‘nine-and-a-half tenths’, i.e. 95% silver. In modern southern Tajikistan, some hoards of Ghaznavid coins have been found from the first half of the eleventh century (including local dirhams from the mint of Khuttalan). A tangible sign of their circulation is the fact that the hoards contain not only whole coins but fragments of differing sizes, shapes and weights. Together with small Ghaznavid silver dirhams, outsize heavy coins remained in circulation (with a broad free field around the centrally placed inscription) and the series was still in use under the Samanids.

The Ghaznavids at once began regularly issuing gold coins as well, at various standards of fineness. For instance, the dinars of Nishapur maintained their high standard (most of those assayed being 93–96% gold), while the dinars of Herat were no more than three-quarters gold (the assay results being in the 67–75% range). Dinars of various standards were variously named. For instance, Bayhaqī and al-Birūnī refer to both the Nishapur and the Herat varieties, which bears out the above factual data on the difference in their standards of fineness. However, the mere fact of minting gold coins gives no idea of their functions and place in monetary trading (cf. dinars under the Samanids). Crucial material for understanding the objective changes in the position of Ghaznavid gold that began in the eleventh century is provided by the historian and official Bayhaqī. An examination of actual instances of purchases and sales, gifts and recompenses, supplies sufficient evidence that, even in the second quarter of the eleventh century, the value-measurement function was still fulfilled by silver dirhams, but gold dinars were already in use as a medium of circulation and payment.18

The Khwarazm Shah Ė Alāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad b. Tekish (1200–20) attached great importance to the political aspect of minting money. Coins were issued in his name from many mints of conquered territories, including Khwarazm itself, Bukhara, Samarkand, Uzgend (?) and Farab (Utrar); and, in the south, Tirmidh (Termez), Chaghaniyan and Wakhsh. However, Muhammad b. Tekish did not abolish the monetary systems established before him in various states and provinces, though the geographic limits of the variants sometimes shifted. In central Transoxania, the basis of the monetary system was, as before, the coexistence of gold dinars and silver-coated copper dirhams (Fig. 2:5–6). Tukharistan happened to be in the area of minting and circulation of those coins. We know of the many issues of silver-coated copper dirhams in Termez and Chaghaniyan (modern southern Uzbekistan) and hoards of such coins have been recorded in southern Tajikistan. In the territory of the

former Ghurid empire, gold dinars and silver dirhams of various standards were issued in the name of Muhammad b. Tekish, but they retained their traditional appearance. There was no break in the tradition of also issuing fulūs – copper coins for retail trading – in a number of cities.

A considerable number of hoards have been found in Central Asia, consisting basically of gold dinars of Muhammad b. Tekish. They usually come with a small admixture of gold coins of other rulers and dynasties. These mixed hoards include, as a rule, not only whole and fragmented dinars but pieces of coin varying in size and weight. Clearly, gold coins (whose weight from the outset, at the time of minting, fluctuated markedly) could not circulate simply as coins. Weight checking at the time of payment required makeweights, the number of which increased in the process of gold circulation. It is no coincidence that some hoards contain more assorted fragments of dinars than whole coins.

Coinage and the circulation of money under the Mongols (thirteenth and fourteenth centuries)

The Mongol conquest, accompanied as it was by the destruction of cities and the devastation of entire regions, with the consequent reduction and ruin of the population, also did great harm to monetary trading. The changes in the minting of coins, the composition of the money supply and monetary circulation need to be divided into four stages.

The first stage (second quarter of the thirteenth century) is marked by a sharp drop in the number of mints, irregular issues of coins and a monetary circulation crisis. The coins of Samarkand provide a particularly vivid picture of the development and specific nature of the crisis. In Samarkand, gold dinars (both anonymous and bearing the name of Chinggis Khan) and silver-coated copper dirhams were at first minted – a system inherited from pre-Mongol times. But a change came about in the language and substance of the inscriptions. The outsize silver-coated copper dirhams (weighing about 6 g) started bearing non-standard inscriptions in Persian. First, they assure the inhabitants of Samarkand that the coins have been specially minted for them and so deserve their trust. In 622/1225 we find, ‘This money is for circulation in Samarkand and its district’ (Fig. 2:7). A repeated statement comes in 624/1226–7 that the money is for local circulation, but there is additional psychological pressure in the legend: ‘Chinggis currency’, ‘Khan’ and once more the name of the fearsome conqueror ‘Chinggis Khan’. Clearly, the ‘prompting’ was to no avail since in 1232–3 and 1233–4 the inscription became admonitory: ‘Non-acceptance of this currency in Samarkand and its district shall be a criminal offence.’ As a result, there

was no inflation, but a deeper crisis when the population would have nothing to do with the money. However, the threats made no impression and, as a result, the minting of silver-coated copper dirhams had to be halted in Samarkand. The minting of small silver coins in 1236–7 did not improve the situation since they promptly disappeared, and Samarkand entered its moneyless decades. In Bukhara, the minting of small silver-coated dirhams was also discontinued. In other cities of Transoxania, none were issued at all. This means that, to begin with, commerce within cities and within the region (the volume of which certainly fell) was mainly based on barter.

The situation in the eastern part of the possessions of Chaghatay (Chinggis Khan’s son) was somewhat different, but for special reasons. The Mongols had brought in a number of craftsmen from Transoxania, and Chaghatay had his summer residence near the city of Almalïk, where commerce thrived. High-standard silver dirhams and copper fulūs were regularly minted in Almalïk.

The second stage (up to 1270)20 was marked by the regular minting of gold coins throughout the empire and of silver-coated copper dirhams in the north-east. At the kurultay (general council) of 1251, Möngke (Mengü) was elected chief of the Mongols. The new leader proclaimed a comprehensive reform in order to stabilize the situation. One of its points was the cash payment of a standard per capita tax, the qubchur, which Möngke ordered to be collected annually in gold dinars. In Khurasan, ruknī dinars were in circulation at the time and their standard of fineness was equivalent to 4 dāngs (four-sixths, i.e. two-thirds fine gold). The qubchur was recalculated in ruknī dinars. However, since there were no gold coins in Transoxania to comply with Möngke Khan’s command, it became urgent to start minting them. Masūd Beg, a merchant governing Transoxania and other regions of Chagatay’s realm, succeeded in this task. Many mints (in Bukhara and Samarkand, in Khujand and Utrar, in Urdu al-Azam, Almalïk, Shafurqan and elsewhere) started minting small, slim dinars of low-standard gold (about 60% gold and 40% alloy). The weight-standard was not strictly laid down. Not only whole coins but halves and small fragments of various weights were in circulation. Because of the low standard and the existence of fragments, the gold dinars practically supplanted the silver coinage by meeting the requirements of the various levels of monetary trading. The gold coins thus made their appearance among the population and the qubchur was recalculated in them (by weight).

A further sign of the revival of monetary trading in the second stage was the renewed minting of silver-coated outsize copper dirhams. In Utrar they were struck annually starting in 1251–2, and they were used for commerce not just in Utrar but in the whole of Ferghana and the Tashkent region. Ferghana (i.e. the city of Khujand) subsequently, in 1264–5

and 1266–7, issued its own coins of this type. The minting was resumed of silver-coated copper dirhams even in Bukhara and from 1261–2 this was done on a regular basis. Only Samarkand had not recovered from the crisis affecting the silver-coated copper dirhams. When such coins were finally issued there in 1264–5, they once more bore admonitory inscriptions (but this time in Turkish). No further attempts were made, for in Samarkand nobody was any more willing than before to deal in silver-coated copper dirhams.

The third stage (starting in 670/1271–2)\textsuperscript{21} begins with the monetary reform of the governor Mas\textsuperscript{ū}d Beg, who banned the further circulation of silver-coated copper dirhams, put an end to the minting of gold dinars and organized the issue of high-standard silver coins in many cities. This was one of the most difficult reforms in the whole history of Central Asia. For over two and a half centuries, there had been no regular minting there of high-standard silver coins and isolated attempts to overcome the silver coin crisis had come to grief. It took Mas\textsuperscript{ū}d Beg two decades of systematic effort to succeed with the reform. In Almalïk, as already noted, silver coins were issued in the first and second stages, but this was an exceptional occurrence. Mas\textsuperscript{ū}d Beg began the reform in 1271–2, which was the very year when silver dirhams were first issued in Utrar. By the following year, 1272–3, the silver coins were already being produced by five mints, those of Utrar, Kanjida, Taraz, Burkhan and Almalïk.

There was an increase in the number of mints and the reform achieved its greatest success in the course of the second decade (the 1280s), when at least fifteen mints were in operation. In the north-east and east of Central Asia, silver coins were minted in Utrar, Taraz, Kanjida, Burkhan, Almalïk and Bulat. In Ferghana, dirhams were issued by the cities of Khujand, Marghinan, Andijan and Ush. The single mint in the Chach region had three names: Chach, Binkath and Tashkent. The Mongols repeatedly sacked Bukhara in 1263, 1273 and 1276, massacring its population. The city stood empty. By 1283 Mas\textsuperscript{ū}d Beg had retaken Bukhara and forthwith organized the minting of silver dirhams there. At the same time, the Samarkand mint started operating (Fig. 3:1–2). An important ingredient of Mas\textsuperscript{ū}d Beg’s reform was the unification of the weight-standard (2.1 g) and the standard of fineness (approximately 80% fine silver) for all the mints. These small, high-standard silver coins circulated at the same parity throughout the province, regardless of the place of issue. The silver coin crisis in Central Asia lasted longer than in the other regions of the Near and Middle East. The consistent and firm policy of Mas\textsuperscript{ū}d Beg helped to stabilize and somewhat stimulate domestic trade and the life of the cities in general. The monetary reform, restoring silver coinage to the market, was a key component of his policy.

\textsuperscript{21} Davidovich, 1972, pp. 51–114, 141–51.
Fig. 3. 1–2: Chaghatayid silver dirhams after the reform of the third stage: Andijan, Bukhara (enlarged). 3–7: Timurid silver tanga, fifteenth century (3–6: Shâh Rukh from Abarkuh, Samarkand, Herat and Sabzavar; 7: ʿAbd Allâh from Samarkand, 854/1450–1). 8–14: anonymous copper coins from the reform of Ulugh Beg (8: one coin from a series dated A.H. 832; 9–14: coins from Bukhara, Samarkand, Karshi, Andijan, Shahrukhiyya and Termez).
A fresh reorganization of the minting of silver coins was carried out by Kebek Khan (1318–26). This was the fourth stage of the circulation of money in the Chaghatay ulus (domain). Kebek’s reform repeated the system introduced much earlier in Persia by Ghazan Khan (1295–1304). The basis of the system was the outsize silver coin (dinar), equivalent to six small silver coins (dirhams). Under Kebek, the dinar weighed just over 8 g and the dirham therefore about 1.4 g. The dinars were dubbed kebeks and the name stuck. Kebek’s reform obviously prohibited further circulation of the anonymous dirhams of the third stage, whose weight-standard (2.1 g) did not fit into the new scale of values.

Coinage and the circulation of money in Transoxania under Timur and the Timurids (late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries)

Surprisingly, the minting and circulation of gold and silver coins during this period have not attracted the attention of numismatists and historians. No study has even been made of such basic ingredients of monetary policy as official weight-standards and standards of fineness of gold and silver coins. The scientific literature contains only isolated observations, and, in essence, all writers on the subject repeat Vasmer’s notion regarding the weight of silver coins: in approximately 1390, in Transoxania and eastern Iran, Timur began minting tangas of about 6.0 g and 1/4-tangas (dirhams) weighing some 1.5 g. Under his son and successor Shāh Rukh (1405–47), the weight of the tanga dropped to 4.72 g. Meanwhile, there is information in the written sources indicating the existence of at least five weight-standards. Some are expressed in eastern units of weight and others are compared with the weights of non-Muslim coins. A comparative analysis of all these data enables five weight-standards to be singled out, both in eastern units of weight and in grams: the Timur tanga, equivalent to 1 mithqāl and 2 dangas of a mithqāl (6.4 g); the Shāh Rukh tanga, equivalent to 1 mithqāl and 1 1/2 dangas (6.0 g), to 1 mithqāl and 1 danga (5.6 g), to 1 mithqāl and 1/2 danga (5.2 g); and the post-Timurid tanga, equivalent to 1 mithqāl (4.8 g) (Fig. 3:3–7). Other weight-standards were quite possibly used as well. The early coins of Timur, for instance, were probably minted in accordance with a higher weight-standard. The underlying trend of the changes was clearly in the direction of a lowering of the weight-standard. It is not clear, however, what the general policy was regarding the weight of silver coins and whether the weight-standards applied to the entire province or were regional. To resolve this question,

it would be necessary to study the real and mean weight of a large number of coins from each major mint separately.

Under Timur and the Timurids, besides silver coins of the basic face value, fractions of that value were issued. In Samarkand under Timur, for instance, small coins worth 1/4 tanga, called mīrī (their weight-standard being 1/3 mithqāl, i.e. 1.6 g), were minted in vast quantities. In Khurasan under the last Timurids, the small coins worth 1/3 mithqāl (1.6 g) and 1/6 mithqāl (0.8 g) were called kebekī dinars and ʾadlī kebekī.24 Halves and other fractions were minted. The silver coins of Timur and the Timurids were of a high standard. In a number of fifteenth-century wathiqas (deeds of purchase), the standard of fineness of the coins is defined as dah dahi (‘ten-tenths’, i.e. 100% silver), as reckoned at the time. Many coins are overstruck with small cartouches bearing an inscription (rulers’ names, cities, words). Coins so modified were worth more than the plain version.

Particularly noteworthy are copper coins, since their importance in monetary trading grew steadily throughout the fifteenth century. Four names were in use for the copper coins: fulūs, ʾadlī, dīnār and dāngī.25 In coin inscriptions and legal documents (wathiqas, waqf documents, etc.) they occur sometimes in isolation and more often in a variety of combinations. The term fulūs lost its plural sense and in the fifteenth century was applied to any copper coin regardless of its value. If the terms ʾadlī or dāngī (fulūs-i ʾadlī, fulūs-i dāngī) were added to the term fulūs, this meant that the basic face value was implied in the copper issue. In the second half of the fifteenth century, the term dinar became the principal name of the basic face value and in order to distinguish the copper dinar from the silver and gold dinars, epithets were added to it. The most common epithet became the term fulūs. Dinār-i fulūs was thus a ‘copper dinar’. Local epithets were also used, like the harawī dinar, the tabrīzī dinar and so on. The early copper coins bear the names of Timur and his first heirs, Jahāngīr and Khalīl Sultān. Subsequent issues are anonymous and most of the inscription space is taken up by the name of the mint, the date of minting and words.

Examination of the many hoards of fifteenth-century copper coins has made it possible to pinpoint periods of inflation, crises, reforms, general development trends regarding the minting and circulation of copper coins, the period of the maximum production of consumer goods and of retail trading, the features of tax policy, and much else. Because of the way the changes took place, the minting and circulation of copper coins in the dominion of Timur and the Timurids must be split up into five stages.26

25 Ibid., pp. 32–57.
26 Ibid., pp. 129–322.

413
The first stage (until 832/1428–9) was marked by a growing number of mints and an increase in the money supply. Basic denomination copper coins were issued in Samarkand, Bukhara, Karshi, Shahr-i Sabz (central Transoxania), Termez and Khuttalan (in the south), Utrar and Shahrukhiyya (in the north) and Andijan (Ferghana valley). The biggest issue was that of 823/1420, the average weight being approximately 4.4 g. No importance was attached to accuracy regarding the weight of individual coins as the variance on either side of the mean was considerable.

The second stage (starting in 832/1428–9) was the monetary reform of Ulugh Beg (1409–49), on whom his father Shāh Rukh had bestowed a huge appanage, essentially an entire province with Samarkand as its capital. The main aim of the reform was to give the market a constant and stable copper coin for retail trading and, at the same time, to increase revenue from the minting of such coinage. The reform worked. In 1428–9, many mints produced coins that were identical as regards design, content and the layout of the inscription (Fig. 3:9–14). Their mean weight was one and a half to twice that of the pre-reform coins of 823/1420. The ‘old’ coins were prohibited and new ones offered in exchange. The terms of the exchange are not known but they were evidently not ruinous for the population since the operation went ahead smoothly. After the massive exchange, the minting of copper coins in many cities was centralized in Bukhara and serialized. This means that for several decades, identical coins were minted in Bukhara, without even any change of date in the legend, since they all read 832/1428–9 (Fig. 3:8). Coins of this series found their way into every corner of Central Asia and were used in all markets. In addition, their centralized minting certainly increased Ulugh Beg’s revenue many times over.

Some features of the reformed minting also paved the way for inflation. In the first place, the mean weight of the reform coins was repeatedly lowered. Over a few decades, this led to the accumulation of coinage that was too divergent in weight, with coins of the main denomination ranging from 1.8 to 8.6 g. Secondly, the total volume of such coin issues was far in excess of market demand. The third stage was the elimination of inflation. The usual method was to withdraw current copper coins and substitute specially minted new ones, but the minting of new coins for a complete exchange is a costly and lengthy operation. During the third stage the problem was overcome in another way, by means of overstriking. Circulating coins of the series were for several years overstruck in many cities. The overstrike was a square cartouche with the inscription of the name of the mint (Samarkand, Bukhara, Karshi, Termez, Hisar, Khuttalan, Andijan, Shahrukhiyya, etc.) and the word dāngī, the latter indicating that only coins with this overstrike had acquired the basic face value. The market also received halves of the main denomination by means of another overstrike: in a lenticular cartouche the name of the mint (Samarkand, Bukhara, Karshi, Termez, Andijan,
Shāh Rukh (??) and the word nīmdāngī (1/2 dāngī) were inscribed. Coins without overstrikes were not withdrawn but served as the smallest fractions of the main denomination. The market received copper coins of three denominations, which testifies to the expansion of retail trading. The transformation of part of the coins of the series into lesser fractions of the main denomination reduced the volume of surplus money. Inflation was thus eliminated or checked. There was one miscalculation, however, in the overstriking operation: no selection by weight was made, and the coins of the main denomination (with the dāngī overstrike) continued to be extremely variable in weight. This was one of the causes of the destabilization of monetary circulation.

The most conspicuous signs in Transoxania of the fourth stage (final decade of the fifteenth century) lay in the change of policy regarding the weight of copper coins and the range of values. Copper coins were for the very first time subjected to a definite weight-standard (first, 1 mithqāl and 2 nukhuds, i.e. 5.2 g; later, 1 mithqāl and 1 nukhud, i.e. 5.0 g) with a very small tolerance. The regular minting in Samarkand, Bukhara and other cities, starting in 897/1491–2, of new coins of a fixed high weight, coupled with the large-scale withdrawal of the coins of dissimilar weights struck in the second and third stages (i.e. coins of the 832/1428–9 series with and without overstriking), reduced and renewed the money supply and created the important sensation of solidity. A no less perceptible sign was the increase in the range of values. Instead of copper coins of two or three denominations (the usual pattern of the previous period), the market received coins of five or six denominations of distinct weights and sizes. In Samarkand, for instance, copper dinars were issued in 1 1/2-, 1- and 1/2-dinar pieces, together with coins worth two-thirds and one-third of a copper dinar.

The situation was quite different in another district, that of northern Tukharistan. The local minting of copper coins (in Hisar) was of secondary significance since it accounted for only a small part of the district’s money supply. The main feature was the long-term and repeated overstriking of the copper coins of Transoxania, which indicated a change of coinage. For the sake of convenient and full exchange, temporary mints were even opened in small cities and population centres. During one of the overstriking periods, lasting a number of years, exchange mints were opened in nine centres of the relatively small territory of northern Tukharistan. Each new overstrike invalidated the previous one, and only coins with the new, most recent modification were accorded full-dinar status. On each occasion, the holders of the old coins forfeited part of their assets, and there were at least seven such operations in the course of the decade. At the beginning of the sixteenth century, the circulation of copper coins and retail trading in northern Tukharistan was consequently
in a crisis situation, with the prices of staples and commodities constantly rising and the effectiveness of such a fiscal policy decreasing as far as the revenue was concerned.

The year 907/1501–2 marked a political watershed and the start of a new, fifth stage in the minting and circulation of copper coins. In that year, Muhammad Shaybānī Khan (1500–10), the founder of the new dynasty of the Shaybanids, definitively conquered Samarkand. Northern Tukharistan, however, still belonged to the Timurids and was the scene, in 907/1501–2, of a far-reaching monetary reform. It bore the stamp of a talented, albeit anonymous, financier who grasped the extent and danger of the current monetary circulation crisis, together with the need to take account of the psychology of the populace in overcoming it, but did not overlook considerations of public revenue. The success of the reform required a clear and universally comprehensible divide between old and new, past and future, plus a range of denominations that would not ignore the steady increase in prices. To begin with, all the old discredited coins were withdrawn. In other words, the past was ‘closed down’. In their place, the market was supplied with coins of three denominations which differed in every respect (legend, language, image, weight, size, thickness) from those withdrawn. On the 1- and 2-dinar pieces, the inscriptions were in the Persian familiar to the local population, with the value of the coin also stated in Persian: ‘1 dinar’, ‘2 dinars’. The 2-dinar pieces were larger and thicker, and their mean weight was twice that of the single dinars. A particularly noteworthy point is that the reform determined that the basic coin would be not the single dinar but the 2-dinar piece, since it tallied better with the steady increase in prices. The 2-dinar pieces depicting a gazelle and bearing a Persian inscription constituted a series issued without any change for a number of years by three mints, those of Hisar, Qunduz and Termez. The population at last had a steady and enduring currency for retail trading, and the public coffers were swelled considerably by its production.
The first series of new coins found in this region belongs to the Arab caliphate – the Arab-Sasanian coins, found in southern and western Afghanistan.\(^{27}\) Together with Arab-Byzantine coins, they have also been recovered in excavations at Banbhore, a port town on the Arabian Sea coast in Sind (Pakistan). The town is generally identified with Daybul, the city captured by the Arab general Muhammad b. al-Qāsim in c. 711. One gold coin of the caliph al-Wāthiq (842–7) has been recovered.\(^{28}\) The second site, al-Mansura, was established as a mint town by the Arab governors. Here the coins were minted by the Habbārī rulers, such as al-Mansūr b. Jumhūr al-Kalbī and his successors. Copper coins minted at Banbhore have also been found in large numbers. However, the most remarkable is the local coin type of the caliph al-Muqtadir (908–32), a silver dirham, copying the bull-and-horseman type of the Shāhi rulers of Kabul. The obverse shows the figure of the caliph on horseback and the reverse has a recumbent bull with his name above it. The Kabul ruler is taken to be Spalapati Deva, now assigned to the Turk-Shāhīs and possibly defeated by the Muslims in the time of al-Ma’mūn (813–33).\(^{29}\) This type is later found also in the coins of Muhammad and Mas'ūd I, the two sons of Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna. The coins continued the older design, fabric and weight-standard of the Shāhī originals. The type reaffirms the continuity of monetary tradition.

The Ghaznavid rulers, initially as governors of the Samanid amirs of Bukhara, introduced the coin types of the Samanids. Alptegin’s coins are known only from the Andarab mint,\(^{30}\) but Sebūktegin issued coins from Ghazna in 969, recognizing Mansūr I b. Nūh as his overlord. The coins of Sebūktegin, who acknowledged Nūh II b. Mansūr as his overlord, were struck in Balkh, Bamiyan and Farwan. But those minted at Bamiyan vary

\(^{27}\) Walker, 1941.
\(^{28}\) Khan, 1969, p. 43.
\(^{29}\) See Abdur Rahman, 1979, Ch. 6.
\(^{30}\) Thomas, 1848b, p. 295.
considerably from the currency of his Samanid masters, and approximate in weight and
to the local coinage of the Hindūshāhīs of Kabul.

More varieties are seen in the coins of Sultan Mahmūd (998–1030), who struck coins
in Nishapur, Herat, Farwan and Ghazna. His coins come in the same category as those
of Sebūkṭegin, though his Nishapur mint coins differ materially from others in form and
value. Mahmūd’s coins began with displaying the simple title of sayf al-dawla, conferred
on him by Nūh II b. Mansūr in 994, but in 998 he broke away from the Samanid amirs when
he assumed for himself on his coins the fully independent titles of al-amīr and al-sayyid.
To these were added the titles of yamin al-dawla and amīn al-milla, conferred on him by the ʿAbbasid caliph al-Qādir (991–1031), duly recognized on his coins. Later, he assumed
the titles of nizām al-dīn and also malik al-mamālīk and malik al-mulūk.

A special bilingual variety of Mahmūd’s coins is worth noting. The obverse shows the
usual kalima and ruler’s name with his titles in Arabic, while the reverse has the Sanskrit
legend in Nāgari showing an attempt to translate the kalima. The margin names the coin
as a tankā and the mint as Mahmudpur.31 The translation of the kalima is not exact, but is
understandable in the local philosophical concept. The words avyaktam-eka (Invisible and
the One) stand for ʾāl ilāhā ʾāl Allāh and avatāra (Incarnate) stands for rasūl (Messenger).

The two contending successors of Mahmūd continued his types and, as mentioned ear-
dlier, they also copied the bull-and-horseman type. Muhammad first gave the name and titles
of his father on the obverse before he issued his own coins. Masʿūd first called himself walt
al-cāḥd (heir) before issuing his own independent coins.32 He later started a new type of
brass coin, weighing 60 g and with the titles of al-sultān al-muʿazzam malik al-ʿālam, these
titles apparently in imitation of those of the Seljūq sultan, who called himself al-sultān
al-muʿazzam shāhanshāh Toghril Beg Abū Tālib.33 It is from the time of Masʿūd’s son,
Mawdūd (1041–8), that we find another type in silver and copper with the name and titles in
Arabic on the obverse, thus replacing the horseman, but the reverse has the bull and Nāgari
name Śrī Sāmanta Deva.34 The mint name Lahore given in his coin35 should be identified
with Salature in the Swati tahsil (subdivision) of the modern North-West Frontier Province.
Ībrāhīm b. Masʿūd (1059–99) assumed still greater titles of al-sultān al-aʿẓam, qāhir al-
mulūk and sayyid al-salātīn. The title al-sultān henceforth became common and was used
in the coins of Masʿūd III and Malik Arslān. But the two subsequent rulers, Bahrām Shāh

32 Thomas, 1848b, p. 335, No. 58.
33 Ibid., p. 337.
34 Ibid., p. 349, No. 91.
35 Ibid., No. 92.
and Khusraw Shāh, though calling themselves al-sultan al-adżam, also acknowledged as their suzerain the Seljuq Sultan Sanjar on their coins.

The economic influence of the dynastic change on currency is not difficult to infer. The gold currency of the time was based on that of the Arab caliphate – on the dinar in standard and value – but the silver and copper currency adopted the local weight-standard, thus continuing the older exchange relationship.

The succeeding dynasty of the Ghurids followed this practice. However, the type was now different. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muhammad b. Šām (1163–1203) has the horseman on the obverse and his own name and titles in Arabic on the reverse. His brother Muṣizz al-Dīn Muhammad (1173–1206), the conquerer of northern India, shows new varieties and the adoption of the coin types of the Rajput rulers. The fundamental change in his gold currency is noticeable in the unusual appearance of the Hindu goddess Lakshmī on the obverse, with his name and title Śrī mad Hamīr in Nāgarī on the reverse. This type, as Nelson Wright pointed out, was based on a local standard of 72 grains (or 40 rattis) and differed from the Ghazna gold issues.\(^\text{36}\) The sultan also inaugurated a new ‘Indian gold tankāh’ of double the weight but following the same standard, having a Chawhān horseman on the reverse and his name and title in Arabic on the obverse. His billon coins show the bull-and-horseman type with the name and title written in Nāgarī. Sometimes the bull is replaced by the name in Arabic. They are based on a 32-ratti standard, different from the standard known in Ghazna and the sultan’s northern territories.

In Ghazna and other parts of Afghanistan, the local currency was continued, even after the death of Muṣizz al-Dīn Muhammad, by his son and successor Mahmūd b. Ghiyāth al-Dīn Muhammad and even by the Ghurid slave commander Tāj al-Dīn Yildiz, with the latter’s new mint possibly at Karman or Kurraman (near Parachinar in the modern North-West Frontier Province), showing a standing bull in silver and copper coins. In Ghazna, Yildiz gave his own name on the margin and that of his late master’s name on the obverse as al-sultan al-shāhīd Muhammad b. Šām on the gold coins. Later, when the Khwarazmian sultans advanced south of the Hindu Kush, they copied the local gold and silver coin types from the mints of Farwan, Bamiyan and Ghazna. The silver and copper coins of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad show the horseman type with the name and titles in Arabic, while another variety adds the title of Sikandar al-thānī, and on the reverse either a bull with Nāgarī legend or a horseman with the Nāgarī title Śrī Hamīr.\(^\text{37}\) His son Jālāl al-Dīn Mingburni also copied the horseman type. Later, when the Mongol conqueror Chinggis Khan advanced to Ghazna and the Indus, he continued the local silver and copper currency with Arabic

\(^{36}\) Wright, 1907, p. 7, Nos. 1–3.

\(^{37}\) Thomas, 1848, p. 383, Nos. 15 and 16.
In northern India, the reign of the Delhi Sultan Shams al-Dīn Iltutmish (1211–36) marks a period of political consolidation and, as Wright observed, it ‘stands out as a landmark in the coinage of Delhi’. After refuting the earlier views of Edward Thomas, Wright claimed to have correctly established the value of the silver *tanga* of Iltutmish, which was equal to 1 *tolā*, i.e. 12 *māshā*, each *māshā* having 8 *rattis*. Hence the *tolā* was equal to 96 *rattis*, a weight-standard that has continued up to our own time in the case of the Indian rupee.

The second innovation was the introduction of the *jital* in the billon currency of the time, replacing the old *dehliwal*. Wright argued that 48 *jitals* made 1 *tanga*, i.e. 1 *jital* was equal to 2 *rattis*, and thus he succeeded in relating both *tanga* and *jital* to the prevalent *māshā* and *ratti* weight-standard of gold that had been in use in northern India until the decimal system was adopted in our own time.\(^{38}\)

One may,\(^{39}\) however, differ from Wright in attributing Iltutmish’s horseman type of gold currency to Bengal, in which Iltutmish assumed the title of *al-sultān al-mu‘azamm* and called himself al-Qutbī.\(^{40}\) This type is hardly known in Bengal and even the reading of the mint name Ba-Gawr is not above doubt. It could also be Nagawr in northern Rajasthan, to which region the coin type really belongs. If this is acceptable, Iltutmish’s horseman type of silver coins needs not be attributed to Bengal either, because it bears Nāgarī letters, a script that was hardly in use in Bengal. His use of the names of three Abbasid caliphs, al-Nāṣir, al-Zāhir and al-Mustansir, may be connected with his investiture by the caliph, as this was relevant to the political conditions of the time. However, it is difficult to make a distinction of grades of exaltedness in the use of the titles *al-mu‘azamm* and *al-a‘zam*. Iltutmish’s billon coins show many varieties in Nāgarī legends; one remarkable variety gives the name of the defeated Hindu ruler Śrī Chāhāda Deva.

The coins of the four sons and one daughter of Iltutmish all continue his silver, billon and copper currencies on the same standard, although types are restricted. The first three sons, Rukn al-Dīn Firūz Shāh, Jalāl al-Dīn Radiyya and Mu‘izz al-Dīn Bahrām Shāh, are not known to have issued gold coins. The first two keep their father’s name on the coins. The new mint of Lakhnawti appears on the coins of Radiyya. Alā‘ al-Dīn Mas‘ūd and Nāṣir al-Dīn Mahmūd restarted the gold currency. In the time of Mas‘ūd, the name of the new caliph al-Mustaṣsim (1242–58) occupies the place of al-Mustansir (1226–42). Mahmūd’s gold coins have greater artistic merit and their counterpart in silver

\(^{38}\) Wright, 1936, p. 72.
\(^{39}\) See Dani, 1955.
\(^{40}\) Wright, 1936, pp. 15–16.
is also known. A new mint of Badāʿūn appears in his time. The billon coins of these rulers continued the jital varieties of bull-and-horseman, but sometimes the bull is replaced by a name in Arabic, while the reverse has the Nāgarī name. Mahmūd also issued tiny silver māshās and half-pieces of billon currency.

Ghiyāth al-Dīn Balban (1266–87) continued the gold and silver issues and struck at mints other than the capital, viz. Alwar, Lakhnawi, Sultanpur and Fakhrabad. He was the last to use the horseman type in billon, but he inaugurated a new bilingual type in mixed metal. He also revived the 40-ratti piece of copper so popular in the time of Ilutmish. While his successor Kay Qubād continued the gold coinage, he also issued 2- and 4-māshā pieces of silver coins. The copper issues of the next sultan, Kayūmarth, continued the 40-ratti standard which was passed on to the Khaljis. Another change from the time of Balban was in the reference to the caliph in the legend. Earlier, it used to be fi ʿahd al-imām al-mustaʿsim, but after the latter’s murder by the Mongols in 1258, the legend came to be simply al-imām al-mustaʿsim.

Jalāl al-Dīn Firūz Khaljī (1290–96) continued the gold and silver tanga and also billon and copper of Balbanid times. His son Rukn al-Dīn Ibrāhīm used his own name on the obverse and that of his father on the reverse of silver coins. It is from the time of ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Muhammad Khaljī (1296–1316) that there was an abundance of gold and silver tangas because of his conquest of the Deccan. He started the new mint of Deogir. Old Delhi was called Dār al-Islām. All reference to the caliph’s name was given up, but he himself assumed the titles of Sikandar al-thānī, yamīn al-khilāfa and nāsir amīr al-muʾminīn. He was the first to issue square forms of coins. In copper, 40-ratti fulūs were the principal coins. The coinage of Qutb al-Dīn Mubārak Khaljī (1316–20) is remarkable for the variety of inscriptions. He usurped for himself the position of khalīfat allāh and designated himself as al-imām al-dāʿ zam khalīfat rabb al-ʿālamīn. On the reverse of his coins he called himself Sikandar al-zamān, yamīn al-khilāfa and nāsir amīr al-muʾminīn. From his time, the square form of coins in gold, silver and billon become more common. Among the mints, we find the addition of Qutbabad fort and the practice of recording Hazrat Dihli, or Hazrat Dār al-Khilāfa or Hazrat Dār al-Mulk. Qutbabad has been identified with Deogir. Nāsir al-Dīn Khusraw continued all the three currencies and adopted the title of wali amīr al-muʾminīn.

The coinage of the Tughluqids makes an interesting study. The gold and silver tankās continued the older tradition by Ghiyāth al-Dīn Tughluq (1320–25), but the obverse of his coins has for the first time the title of al-sultān al-ghāzi. After the conquest of Telingana, a commemorative medal gives the mint as Mulk-i Telingānā. The second commemorative medal was issued by him as suzerain of Bengal, in which the name of the sultan on the

41 Wright, 1936, pp. 58–63, 80–1.
obverse has the title of *al-sultān al-ā'zam*, while the reverse gives to the local ruler of Bengal, Nāṣir al-Dīn Ibrāhīm Shāh, the title of *al-sultān al-muʽazzam*. Ghiyāth al-Dīn’s billon coins have bilingual legends in Arabic and Nāgarī.

Muhammad b. Tughluq (1325–51) has been designated as the ‘prince of moneyers’ because of the variety of his coins and the great interest that he took in their minting. No less than fifty-one different types of his coins have been described. These are subdivided into four classes: (a) those struck in memory of his father and recording only the latter’s name, i.e. commemorative issues; (b) those issued in his own name, i.e. normal issues; (c) the forced currency, i.e. copper or brass token issues; and (d) those recording only the names of the caliph, i.e. caliphal issues.

In class (a), the title of the late sultan is given as *al-sultān al-sayyid al-shahīd al-ghāzi*. In one coin, the mint is read as Mulk Ma‘bar. In class (b) coins, the obverse has the *kalima* and the reverse shows the title of the ruler as *al-mujāhid fī sabīl allāh*, and its margin has the names of the first four caliphs, i.e. Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān and ʿAlī. The significant feature of this period was the assimilation of South India into the monetary system of the Tughluqids. For this purpose, special types of coins were issued, e.g. the coin of the Ma‘bar mint with an extraordinary weight of 245 grains, which is said to represent a 4-pagoda piece, well-known in the fourteenth century in the kingdom of the Hoysalas of South India. Muhammad b. Tughluq’s novel issues include one 16-*rattis* (i.e. one-sixth) higher in weight in gold, called *dīnār*, and the other 16-*rattis* or one-sixth lower than the *tanga* in silver, called *cadlī*. He also issued a dumpy type of coin having traces of South Indian influence at a time when the capital was transferred to Deogir (or Dawlatabad).

The silver coins of Muhammad b. Tughluq are scarce. He commenced his reign with a single billon type of 32-*ratti* weight and the title of *al-mujāhid fī sabīl allāh*. He is known to have issued 4-*jital* pieces (known as *chawghānī*) and also 8-*jital* pieces (*hashtgānī*). But from a numismatic point of view, the most important is the introduction of 80-*ratti* billon in 1326, a mixed-metal currency probably issued as a regular currency for the Deccan, and an issue to replace the original silver *tanga*. According to Wright, this was the first step in the degradation of the silver *tanga* of Iltutmish.

There are several other varieties of billon issues of Muhammad b. Tughluq, but his copper currency is scarce. This experiment in debasement probably led to the issue of copper or brass forced currency – class (c) – in 1329, with the name of the coin given as *tankāh-i-panjāhgānī, dīrhmān-duvazdihgānī, hashtgānī* and *dūgānī*, thus fixing the value by law (*sharʿī*). It appears that this novel experiment aimed at bringing into line the different monetary systems that then prevailed in northern India and the Deccan, but the attempt collapsed because of market forgery, so that the token currency failed. It was withdrawn,
and the value was paid by the government, proving that the experiment was not due to lack of gold reserves but for some other reason; the chief aim might have been to balance the monetary standard throughout the empire. The last class of Muhammad b. Tughluq’s – coins class (d) – are the caliphal issues, in which he acknowledged the Abbasid shadow caliphs in Mamluk Cairo, first al-Mustakfi and later al-Hakim, after he received the patent and insignia, thus assuring his legal sovereignty.

Firuz Shah Tughluq (1351–88) continued the name of the caliph on his gold coins right up to 1383, recording the name of Abu l-Abbās Ahmad, then of Imām Abu l-Fat’h and finally Abū ʿAbd Allāh. We also have his gold and silver coins without the name of the caliph, in which he called himself nāʿib amīr al-muʾminin. Firuz Shah also associated his sons with himself and allowed them to issue coins, first Fat’h Khan, then Firuz Shah Zafar and finally Muhammad Shāh. Gold and silver tangas of the earlier time continued in this period, though silver was rare. The most popular coin was the 32-ratti billon. However, it seems that Firuz Shāh further debased the tanga and his new standard was maintained by his successors right up to the time of Sikandar Lodi (1489–1517).

Firuz Shāh’s subordinate rulers and successors included his three sons and five grandsons: Fat’h Khan (d. 1371) and the latter’s son Ghiyath al-Dīn Tughluq II; Firuz Shāh Zafar, who probably issued coins after the death of Fat’h Khan, and his son Abū Bakr, who succeeded his father in 1389; and finally Muhammad the third son. Muhammad had two sons: Sikandar, who ruled for a few days; and Mahmūd, who had a long reign (1394–1412), with the interruption of Timur’s invasion, and a rival in Nusrat Shāh, a second son of Fat’h Khan. All of them issued gold and billon coins except Sikandar Shāh, whose gold coinage is not known, while Muhammad and Mahmūd also issued silver coins. Mahmūd’s stormy period of rule, because of the conflict with his cousin Nusrat Shāh, led to a weakening of the empire. After Timur’s invasion of 1398–9, in particular, there was a depletion of the state treasury and of precious metals, hence a hiatus in the issue of gold and silver currency. For ten years, the government was left in the hands of leading nobles, who refrained from issuing coins in their own name. Before the time of Timur, the normal gold to silver ratio was 1:10, i.e. 10 silver tangas exchanged for 1 gold tanga, and the copper to silver ratio was 80:1, but later the value of silver to copper fell.

When Mahmūd died in 1413, his successors continued to issue the old currency of Firuz and Mahmūd posthumously until, in 1429, Mubārak Shah Sayyid initiated a coinage of his own. There was no change in the gold, silver and copper currency of this period, but gold and silver became scarce right through the time of the succeeding Lodi rulers. Eighty-ratti billon became common from the time of Bahlūl Lodi, a revival of the currency from the

42 Wright, 1936, p. 219.
time of Muhammad b. Tughluq; it is this currency which came to be known as Bahlūlī. In the time of Sikandar Lōdī, it was the billon that remained common, but by this time its silver metal content was reduced. Twenty of these were equivalent to a 180-grain silver coin of the time of the Sayyids. It is the Bahlūlī and Sikandarī tangas that were available in large quantities in the time of the last Lōdī ruler, Ibrāhīm b. Sikandar (1517–26), and this monetary system was passed on to his successors.
The end of our period, i.e. the fifteenth century, can be seen in retrospect to mark a profound change in the balance of power between the sedentary peoples and cultures of Central Asia and Inner Eurasia and the nomad elements there. Previously, the advantage had lain with the latter, for the steppe peoples had a comparative lack of interest in settled life and agricultural activity in the settled lands, and therefore a superior mobility, enabling them to raid into the lands of ancient culture – those of China, Afghanistan and India, and of the Middle East – with little hindrance. Mass incursions by elements from Inner Eurasia virtually ceased with the Mongols, for Timur’s military following in the later fourteenth century was basically not a tribal one and his focus of interest was in the settled lands of the Middle East rather than the steppes and forest lands of Inner Asia.

With the advent of the sixteenth century, powerful states arose along the western and southern fringes of Islamic Central Asia: the Christian Muscovite principality, the Muslim Uzbek Shaybanids in Transoxania, the Safavids in Iran and the Mughals in northern India. The acquisition of firearms by these new powers meant that the ancient superior mobility of the steppe peoples was effectively counteracted. Hence great movements of peoples from the heart of Asia outwards into the settled lands of Western Asia, South Asia and China largely ended. Instead, a reverse process now began, whereby militarily superior outside forces started to affect the general political, cultural and ethnic situation of the Asian heartland, seen, for example, in Imperial China’s extension of its authority westwards towards Xinjiang in the eighteenth century (a process already begun under the early Ming emperors three centuries before). Imperial Russia, by now free from the remnants of control by the Turco-Mongol Golden Horde and its epigoni, began in the seventeenth century to expand across Siberia to the Pacific coast and subsequently into Turkistan as far as the Pamirs. Only such inward-looking and less accessible regions as Mongolia and Tibet were to remain immune from such pressures. All these events will, however, be treated in Volumes V and VI of this History.
N.B. Modern cities such as Tehran, Ashgabat, Dushanbe, Islamabad, Bishkek, Almaty and Ulan Bator are inserted in order to give some guidance as to the administrative geography.

MAP 1a. Central Asia in the early Islamic period (c. 800).
MAP 2. The Uighur Khanate (745–840) and its neighbours.
MAP 3. The Samanids of Transoxania and Khurasan and their dependants (c. 970).
MAP 4a. The empire of the Ghaznavids (c. 1030).
MAP 5a. The Ghurids and their conquests and the Khwarazm Shahs (c. 1200).
MAP 5b. (Continued.)
MAP 6a. The Mongol empire in the thirteenth century.
MAP 6b. (Continued.)
MAP 7. Northern and central India under the Delhi Sultans and the western Himalayan states.
MAP 8a. The Middle East, Central Asia and northern India at the time of Timur’s rise to power (c. 1370).
MAP 8b. (Continued.)
BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES

ABBREVIATIONS

AEMAe = Archivum Eurasiae Medii Aevi, Budapest
AOHung = Acta Orientalia Academiae Scientiarum Hungaricae, Budapest
APAW = Abhandlungen der Preussischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin
AÜDTÇFD = Ankara Üniversitesi Dil-Tarih-Çografya Fakültesi Dergisi, Ankara
CAJ = Central Asiatic Journal, The Hague
EI². 1960– = The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., Leiden
EW = East and West, Rome
IC = Islamic Culture, Hyderabad, Deccan
IQ = Islamic Quarterly, London
Isl. = Der Islam, Berlin
JA = Journal asiatique, Paris
JASB = Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Calcutta
JNES = Journal of Near Eastern Studies, Chicago
JRAS = Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, London
JSFOu = Journal de la Société Finno-ougrienne, Helsinki
KSIIMK = Kratkie soobshcheniya Instituta Istorii Material’noy kul’tury, Moscow
MDAFA = Mémoires de la Délégation archéologique française en Afghanistan, Paris
MSFOu = Mémoires de la Société Finno-ougrienne, Helsinki
MW = Muslim World, Hartford, Conn.
NC = Numismatic Chronicle, London
SBAW = Sitzungsberichte der K. K. Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vienna
SI = Studia Islamica, Paris
SPAW = Sitzungsberichte der Preussischen Adademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin
TP = T’oung-Pao, Leiden

439
UAI = Ural-altäische Jahrbücher
ZDMG = Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft, Leipzig/Berlin/Wiesbaden

CHAPTER 1

——. 1968. Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion, 3rd ed., with an additional ch. tr. T. Minorsky,
ed. with further addenda and corrigenda by C. E. Bosworth. London.
ey Azii. Leningrad.
Minneapolis/Chicago.
EF², arts. Khwarazm; Khurāsān; Kutayba b. Muslim; Mā warāʾ al-nahr.
Elr, art. Central Asia. iv. In the Islamic Period up to the Mongols.
KADIROVA, T. 1965. Iz istorii krestyanskikh vosstaniy v Maverannahre i Khorasane v VIII-
nachale IX veka. Tashkent.
MOTTAAHEDEH, R. 1975. The ‘Abbāsid Caliphate in Iran. In: The Cambridge History of Iran,
Vol. 4, pp. 57–89.
NARSHAKHI. 1954. Tārīkh-i Bukhara. English tr. and commentary R. N. Frye, The History of
SKRINE, F. H.; Ross, E. D. 1899. The Heart of Asia. A History of Russian Turkestan and the
Central Asian Khanates from the Earliest Times. London.
SPULER, B. 1952. Iran in frühislamischer Zeit. Politik, Kultur, Verwaltung und öffentliches Leben
zwischen der arabischen und seldschukischen Eroberung 633 bis 1055. Wiesbaden.
Arab Kingdom and its Fall. Calcutta, 1927.
ZARRINKUB, ʾABD AL-HUSAIN. 1975. The Arab Conquest of Iran and its Aftermath. In: The
Cambridge History of Iran, Vol. 4, pp. 1–56.

CHAPTER 2

481–519.


EI², arts. Iṣmāʿīliyya; Khurramīyya; Mā warāʾ al-nahr.

Efr, arts. ʿAbbasid Caliphate in Iran; ʿAlīs of Tabarestān, Daylamān, and Gifān; Bābak Korramī; Carmathians.


CHAPTER 3


MARWAZĪ. 1942. Sharaf al-Zamān Tāhir Marvāzī on China, the Turks and India. Ed. and English tr. V. Minorsky. London.


CHAPTER 4


CHAPTER 5


MINORSKY, V. 1942. Sharaf al-Zamān Tāhir Marvażā on China, the Turks and India. London.

——. 1931. The Life and Times of Sultan Mahmūd of Ghazna. Cambridge.


Parts 1A, 1B. MDAFA, Vol. 18.


CHAPTER 6

BARTHOLD, V. 1928. Turkestan down to the Mongol Invasion. 2nd ed. tr. from the original Russian and revised by the author with the assistance of H. A. R. Gibb. London.


CHAPTER 7

1. Original Sources


2. Studies


EI², arts. Alp Arslan; Berk-Yaruk; Ghaznavids; Ghûrîds; Ilekh-Khāns; Kara Khîtay; KhWârazm-Shâhs; Malik Shâh; Muhammad b. Malik Shâh; Nizâm al-Mulk; Ra’î’s. 2. In the Sense of ‘Mayor’ in the Eastern Islamic Lands; Saljûqs; Sandjar.
EIr, arts. Âl-e Borhân; Çagêr Beg.


447

CHAPTER 8

—. 1961. The Early Islamic History of Ghūr. CAJ, 6, pp. 116–33.
Ef², arts. Ghūrids; Karrāmiyya. 
Ed. K. A. Nizami.

CHAPTER 9


MINORSKY, V. 1942. Sharaf al-Zamân Tâhir Marvâzî on China, the Turks and India. London.

Literature in Japanese
TORU, H. 1931. Seiki bunmeishi gairon [An Historical Outline of the Western Region]. Tokyo.
Literature in Chinese


——. 1983. Weiwuerzu gudai wenhua he wenxian gailun [An Introduction to the Ancient Culture and Literature of the Uighurs]. Urumchi.


LI TAO. 1881. Sequel to the Annals of Chinese History, Published by the Zhejiang Publishing House in the Seventh Year of the reign of the Emperor Guang Xu.


SHI JINBO. 1986. The Culture of the Western Hsia Dynasty. Changchun.


WANG CHENG. 1787. A Concise History of the Eastern Capital, Published in the Year of Yimou of the Emperor Qian Long.


ZENG GONG. 1784. Long Ping’s Collection, Published in the Forty-Seventh Year of the Reign of the Emperor Kang Xi.


CHAPTER 10


DREW, F. 1877. The Northern Barrier of India. London.


LEITNER, G. W. 1868-73. Results of a Tour in Dardistan, Kashmir, Little Tibet, Ladak, etc. London.


STEIN, Sir Aurel. 1899. The Ancient Geography of Kashmir. JASB.


CHAPTER 11


MINORSKY, V. 1942. Sharaf al-Zamân Tāhir Marvāzī on China, the Turks and India. London.


**CHAPTER 12**

E viết. Čingiz-Khân; Čingizids; Mongols.

**CHAPTER 13**


EI², arts. Čaghatay Khân: Čaghatay Khânate.

EI², art. Central Asia. v. In the Mongol and Timurid Periods.


CHAPTER 14


EI², arts. Dihlī Sultanate; Ghaznavids; Ghūrīds; Hind. IV. History; Khalṣūs; Lōdīs; Sayyids; Sūrīs; Tughluks; Djiwnpūr; Gudjarāt; Ma’ bar; Mālwā; Sharkīs.


HABIBULLAH, A. B. M. 1945. The Foundation of Muslim Rule in India. Lahore.


HUSAIN, AGHA MAHDI. 1938. Rise and Fall of Muhammad bin Tughluq. London.


CHAPTER 15


456


EI2, arts. Balūčistān; Hind. IV. History; Kashmīr; Kusdār; Makrān; Multān; Sind; EĪ Suppl. arts. Bayhaḵī Sayyids; Čaks.


CHAPTER 16

1. Sources


2. Studies


BARTOL’D, V. V. 1914. K istorii orosheniya Turkestana. St Petersburg.


EF, arts. Karts; Sarbadārs; Soyurghal; Timūr.

Elr, arts. Central Asia, V, In the Mongol and Timurid Periods.


MANZ, B. FORBES. 1983. The Ulus Chaghatay before and after Temür’s Rise to Power. The Transformation from Tribal Confederation to Army Conquest. CAJ, Vol. 27, pp. 79–100.


CHAPTER 17

1. Sources

[Sources are listed with their respective authors, titles, publication years, and locations.]

2. Studies

[Studies are listed with their respective authors, titles, publication years, and locations.]

459


CHAPTER 18

1. Sources


AMĪR KHURD. 1885. Siyar al-awliyā’. Delhi.


2. Studies


EI², art. Ahmad Yasawī.


——. 1985. State and Culture in Medieval India. Delhi.
CHAPTER 19

Part One
As noted in the text, material on food and clothing in the Islamic East and Central Asia can only be pieced together from mentions in the historical and geographic works of medieval Islamic authors such as Narshakhî, Abu ‘l-Fadl Bayhaqî, Gardîzî, Juwaynî, Rashid al-Dîn, etc. There are no specific studies. In general, however, reference may be made to the chapters ‘The Standard of Living’ and ‘Land Products’ in A. Mez, *The Renaissance of Islam*, tr. S. Khuda Bukhsh, Patna, 1937, and to sections on food and clothing in B. Spuler, *Die Mongolen in Iran*, Leipzig, 1939, pp. 442–6, and idem, *Iran in früh-islamischer Zeit*, Wiesbaden, 1952, pp. 508–18, whilst the *EI* articles Ghīdā (M. Rodinson) and Libās. iii. Iran (Y. K. and N. A. Stillman) and ‘Libās. iv. Turkey’ (T. Majda) provide detailed information about types of food and cooking and about different garments and headgear in medieval Islamic times.

Part Two

CHAPTER 20


463
ajam (non-Arabs)
alba (in Mongolian, tribute)
älchi (lower rank)
’amid (governor, secretary)
’amid al-mulk (chief secretary)
‘ard (military review)
‘ārid-i lashkar (inspector-general of the army)
atā (father)
atābeg (tutor)
aymak (district in Mongolia)
‘ayyār (band of urban rowdies and vigilantes)
barāt (assignment of revenue)
barda (slave captive, prisoner of war)
barīd (courier and postal service)
batā‘ī (taxation taken as a 3e of the produce of the land in India)
bīgār (corvé labour)
borgah (headquarters of the Mongol army)
būlak (Turkish or Turco-Persian clan)
dā‘ī (propagandist)
dargāh (royal court)
dārīghān (Mongol tax-collector, governor)
dībqān (landowner)
dīwān (council, government office; collection of poems)
dīwān-i aʿlā (Supreme Ministry)
dīwān-i ‘ard (department of the army)
dīwān-i barīd (postal service and intelligence department)
dīwān-i wizārat (revenue department)
dādī (in Turco-Mongol usage, capitation tax)
farsakh (measure of length, a league = approx. 6 km)
fat'h-nāma (announcement of victory)

fatwā (legal opinion)
fiqh (Islamic law)
futuwwa (chivalry)
ghazal (lyric poetry)
ghāzī (fighter for the faith)
ghulām, pl. ghilmān (slave soldier)
ghulāmān-i sarāy (palace guards)
ghulāt (radical Shi’a ‘ites)
hadīth (Muslim tradition)
hājīb (Muslim tradition)
hākim (governor)
hisba (market control)
il (large Turco-Mongol tribal grouping)
inghā‘ (correspondence, secretaryship)
iqtā (land grant, revenue assignment)
jāgīr (assignment of land in Mughal India)
jihād (holy war)
jīza (poll tax on non-Muslims)
kachar (porter)
kāfīr (infidel, unbeliever)
kalāntar (in Persia, head of the local community)
kalīma (the word of god)
kārīz see qanāt
kārkhānā (workshop)
kātib al-inshā‘ (chief secretary)
kesik, pl. kesigten (protective guard in Mongolia)
khālīfa (deputy)
khālisa (state-administered lands)
khānaqāh (convent or retreat house for dervishes)
khārāj (land tax)
khāss (crown domains)
khatīb (preacher at the Muslim worship)
khutba (Friday worship oration)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>kūriyen</td>
<td>(or ‘circle’, community of clans in Mongolia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kurultay</td>
<td>(meeting of the military chiefs and nobles of the tribes among the Mongols and Turco-Mongols)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kāt</td>
<td>(superior rural class in India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>laqab, pl. alqāb</td>
<td>(honorable title or nickname)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>madhhab</td>
<td>(law school)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>madrasa</td>
<td>(Islamic college)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>malik al-nashriq wa ’l-magrib</td>
<td>(King of the East and West)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>manshīr</td>
<td>(patent of authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mard-bīgārī</td>
<td>(corvée)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mashāyikh</td>
<td>(Sufi spiritual leaders)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mawāli amīr al-mu ’minīn</td>
<td>(Clients of the Commander of the Faithful)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mazār</td>
<td>(burial shrine)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>milk</td>
<td>(private property)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mīrāzā</td>
<td>(prince, in Persian and Perso-Turkish usage)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>muqta’r</td>
<td>(holder of an iqtā’, hence local governor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>murābitūn</td>
<td>(dwellers in ribāts and frontier fighters)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mushrif</td>
<td>(overseer, inspector)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nā’īb-i mamlakat</td>
<td>(viceroy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>namāzgāh</td>
<td>(area for ceremonial acts of worship)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>naqqāsh</td>
<td>(artist, painter)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nasab</td>
<td>(good birth)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>nawbat</td>
<td>(military band salute)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>noyan</td>
<td>(commander in the Mongol army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ordo, urdu</td>
<td>(military camp)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pargana</td>
<td>(group of villages in India)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pīr</td>
<td>(Sufi mystical guide)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>pīshṭāq</td>
<td>(fore-porch)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qādī</td>
<td>(judge)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qanāt (= kārīz, subterranean irrigation channel)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qarshi</td>
<td>(palace, in Mongolian)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qasīda</td>
<td>(ode or eulogistic poem)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>qasim amīr al-mu ’minīn</td>
<td>(Partner of the Commander of the Faithful)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rabad</td>
<td>(suburb)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ra’īs, pl. ru’asā’</td>
<td>(headman, town chief, mayor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ra’īs al-ru’ asā’</td>
<td>(head of of the townnotables)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rasā’il see risāla</td>
<td>(fortified outpost, caravanserai; hospice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>risāla, pl. rasā’il</td>
<td>(epistle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rubā’ī (quatrain)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>rukn al-dawla</td>
<td>(Pillar of the State)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sadr, pl. sudīr</td>
<td>(lit. ‘eminence’ leader of the Muslim religious classes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sāha</td>
<td>(banker)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>samā‘</td>
<td>(mystical songs)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sarrāf</td>
<td>(money-changer)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sayyid</td>
<td>(descendant of the Prophet)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sharī’a</td>
<td>(divinely ordained Islamic legal and theological sciences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shihna</td>
<td>(military governor)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>shōlen</td>
<td>(in Turkish, feast)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>silsila</td>
<td>(chain of spiritual authority)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sipāhsālar</td>
<td>(commander-in-chief)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>siyāsa</td>
<td>(secular law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>soyurghal</td>
<td>(land grant, lit. ‘gift’)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-sultān al-‘azam</td>
<td>(Supreme Sultan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>al-sultān al-mu’azzam</td>
<td>(Exalted Sultan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sultān al-salātn</td>
<td>(sultan of sultans)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ta-chiang-chün</td>
<td>(in Chinese, Grand General)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ta-hsiang</td>
<td>(in Chinese, Grand Minister)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tamgha</td>
<td>(tax levied on craft and trade)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tariqa</td>
<td>(Sufi order)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>tughrā‘</td>
<td>(official insignum on documents)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘ulama‘, sing. ‘ālim</td>
<td>(scholars learned in the Islamic legal and theological sciences)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ulus</td>
<td>(domains in Mongolia and the Mongol conquered lands)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wakīl</td>
<td>(intendant)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>walāyat</td>
<td>(spiritual jurisdiction of a Sufi leader or saint)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wālī al-‘ahd</td>
<td>(heir apparent)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>waqf</td>
<td>(endowment for pious purposes)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>wazīr</td>
<td>(vizier)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>yarghuchi</td>
<td>(in Mongolian, Supreme Justice)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yeke yasa</td>
<td>(among the Mongols, The Great Law)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yüan</td>
<td>(in Chinese, The Origin)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zakāt</td>
<td>(alms-tax)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

465
INDEX

Abū Hāshim ʿAbd Allāh, 51
Abū Hafs, 100, 270
Abū Muslim, 30, 32–34, 36–39, 41, 43, 50, 52–56
Abaqa, 268, 386
ABBASIDS, 27
ABBASIDS, 30
Abbasiyya, 52, 54, 63
Abd Allāh b. Muʿāwiya, 31, 34
Abd Allāh b. Muʿāwiya, 52
Abyward, 91, 372, 377, 384
Affī, 289
Advasiyab, 93
Ambar, 291
Amr b. Layth, 387
Amul, 29, 34, 91, 378
Andpāl, 303
Andarkot, 314
Andijan, 268, 270
Andkhud, 191, 382
Arabshāh, 325
Arslan Hājjīb, 185
Arslan Khan, 209
Ashā‘ira, 58
Aufī, 192, 305
Azāriqa, 50
Bābur, 190, 296, 308, 320, 374, 381
Bārbak Shāh, 305
Bāyāzīd I, 338, 345, 346
Bāyāzīd Jalāyīr, 271
Ba‘dun, 292–295
Badghis, 53, 56
Baghatur, 251, 253
Baghdad, 40, 41, 43, 56, 63, 64, 91, 186, 275, 298, 338, 368–370, 373, 376, 384, 385, 389
Bahādur Khan Nuhānī, 296
Bahlūl Lōdī, 290, 293
Bahrām Shah of Ghazna, 186
Bahrabad, 375
Bahrain, 62
Bakhar, 306, 308
Balasaghun, 91, 130, 131, 133, 139, 242, 244, 245, 247
Bal’ami, 103
BALUCHISTAN, 297
Baluchistan, 298, 300, 308, 309
Balıqçık river, 198
Baraq Khan, 265
Barchkent, 265
Barchuk Art Tegin, 208
Barlas, 271, 272, 324, 325, 328
Barmakids, 386
Bashkirs, 247
Bawandids, 59
Bay Balıq, 198
Bayan Chur, 197
Baydar, 268
Bayhaqı Sayyids, 319, 322
Baysunqur, 348
Begtuzun, 129
Benakat, 90
Berke, 266, 268, 375
Beshbalıq, 43, 208, 209, 211
Bhattavatara, 322
Bhikshana, 314
Bihäfaridiyya, 53
Bilge Kaghan, 198, 201, 236
Binakat, 146, 147, 265
Binkath, 147
Bodonchar, 260
Borjigids, 249, 252, 253, 256
Brahmans, 289, 312, 317, 321
Brahuis, 308
Bumin Kaghan, 197
Buqqu Khan, 233
Burqan Qaldun, 251
Buyids, 59, 60, 65

Carmathians, 60, 62, 188, 303
Chāhamanidas, 188, 190
Chach, 36, 45, 88, 90, 91, 129, 130, 147, 374
Chaghaniyad, 88, 98, 135, 140, 189, 271
Chaghatay, 262, 265, 266, 323, 324
Chaghrı Beg, 372
Chak dynasty, 321
Changshi, 271
Chapar, 268
Chin state, 217, 239
Chishtiyya, 24, 371
Chitor, 278
Chunyu, 219
Cutch, 306
Dādū, 381
Dāmaras, 312
Dânkard, 370
Dabusiyya, 30, 90, 91
Dandānqan, 134
Dangxiang, 213
Darband, 266
Daryā Khan, 310
Dawlat Chak, 321
Dawlat Khan, 291
Daylaman, 63
Daylamites, 59
Deccan, 23, 274, 278, 286–288, 290
DELI SULTANATE, 273, 284
Delhi Sultanate, 275, 277, 283, 285, 289–291, 293, 294, 296, 305, 306
Deming, 214, 215
Deogir, 278, 286
Dera Ghazi Khan, 309
Devavamū, 313
Doʿab region, 287
Dodāʾis, 309
Dughlāt clan, 324
Duwa Khan, 268–271, 278
Dwarsamudra, 278
Farīdun, 184
Farah Rud, 182
Faraj, 338
Fatʿh Khan, 319
Fatimids, 301–303
Ferghana, 28, 30, 36, 39, 43, 45, 88–90, 101, 128, 130, 133–137, 140, 142, 146, 147, 149, 217, 268–271, 347
Firdawṣi, 94, 97, 98, 100, 308, 322
Firdausiyya, 375
Firishta, 311, 312
INDEX

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Page</th>
<th>Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>Jehol,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>61,  62</td>
<td>Jibal,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>42</td>
<td>Jibrā‘īl b. Yahyā,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>212, 215</td>
<td>Jiqian,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>Ju dynasty,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207</td>
<td>Jujia of Jincheng,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>215, 217, 219, 239, 265</td>
<td>Jurchen,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>265, 266, 332</td>
<td>Jöchi,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>Kājī Chak,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Ka‘ba,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>298</td>
<td>Kachh,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>141, 142</td>
<td>Kadir b. Ibrāhīm,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>311</td>
<td>Kalhana,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258</td>
<td>Kalka,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>309</td>
<td>Kalmati,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247</td>
<td>Kalmucks,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>274, 292, 302</td>
<td>Kanawj,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>KARA KHITAY,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22, 138, 139, 141–143, 146, 190, 191, 237, 239, 240, 242–247, 257, 259, 265, 270</td>
<td>Kara Khitay,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347</td>
<td>Kara Koyunlu,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>336</td>
<td>Karabagh,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>198, 202, 205, 236</td>
<td>Karabalghasun,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>KARAKHANIDS,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65, 85, 88, 126, 127, 129–148, 152, 208, 243, 244, 270, 371</td>
<td>Karakhanids,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>207, 211</td>
<td>Karashahr,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28, 36, 39, 42, 43, 139, 140, 184, 197, 208, 242, 243, 370</td>
<td>Karluk,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>270, 271</td>
<td>Karmina,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183, 195, 373</td>
<td>Karrāmiyya,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>43, 126, 129, 130, 132, 133, 138, 139, 143, 242, 245, 246, 265, 270, 320, 332</td>
<td>Kashghar,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>310</td>
<td>KASHMIR,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>286, 310–313, 315–322</td>
<td>Kashmir,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>Katahr,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272</td>
<td>Kattakurgan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>376</td>
<td>Kay Kāwūs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>277</td>
<td>Kay Qubād,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272</td>
<td>Kaykhusraw,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48, 51, 54, 57, 60</td>
<td>Kaysāniyya,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>271</td>
<td>Kazaghan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>137, 205</td>
<td>Kazakhstan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267, 269, 271, 324</td>
<td>Kebek Khan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>240, 251, 253, 254</td>
<td>Kerait,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>266</td>
<td>Kerulen,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>377</td>
<td>Khabushan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>346</td>
<td>Khalīl Sultan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>183, 188</td>
<td>Khalaj,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275, 277, 285, 293</td>
<td>Khaljis,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>264</td>
<td>Khanbalik,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31–33, 35, 44, 49, 52, 56, 64, 300</td>
<td>Kharjījites,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92, 370</td>
<td>Khazaria,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>370</td>
<td>Khazars,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251, 258</td>
<td>Khentei mountains,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>53</td>
<td>Khidāshiyya,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>338</td>
<td>Khidr Khan Sayyid,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>233, 256</td>
<td>Kheingan mountains,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>190, 292</td>
<td>Khokars,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>246</td>
<td>Khubilay,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>347</td>
<td>Khudāydād,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139, 243, 265, 268, 270, 271</td>
<td>Khujand,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>125</td>
<td>KHURASAN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187</td>
<td>Khusraw Malik,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>371</td>
<td>Khwājagan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>327</td>
<td>Khwāndamīr,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22, 29, 30, 91, 96, 97, 142, 144, 266, 269, 271, 333, 346, 368, 369, 374, 384, 387, 389</td>
<td>Khwarazm,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28, 125, 141, 189, 190, 193, 257, 265</td>
<td>Khwarazm Shahs,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>Kimek,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>187, 301, 308</td>
<td>Kirmān,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>37, 41, 90, 129, 140, 271, 324, 327, 343</td>
<td>Kish,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>312, 315</td>
<td>Kishtwar,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>232</td>
<td>KITAN,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>205, 213, 215–217, 233–244, 247, 260, 261, 391</td>
<td>Kitan,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28, 208, 211, 212, 236, 238, 241</td>
<td>Kocho,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>314</td>
<td>Kotā Rānī,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>134, 147, 270</td>
<td>Kuba,</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

469

Copyrights
Kubrawiyya, 371, 375
Kufic script, 148
Kuhistan, 63, 191, 386
Kutlugh Bilge Kül Kaghan, 197
Kutlugh Shâh, 368
Kutlugh Timur, 324
Küchlug, 141
Kîpchak, 24, 28, 258, 340
Kîzîl, 210, 347
Köksaray, 329, 344
Köl Tegin, 235
Küchlüg, 142, 143, 245, 246, 265
Lâshârî, 307, 308
Lakhnawti, 190, 192
Lakshminagar, 315
Lalitâditya, 315
Lanzhou, 213
Lavanyas, 312
Li Chiang, 202
Li Deming, 213
Liao dynasty, 208
Mîr “Umar, 309
Mîr Gwâhrâm, 309
Mîrânshâh, 346, 347, 351
Mîrzâ Haydar, 318, 320–322
Ma’bar, 285, 286, 290
Mahârâj, 300
Mahmûd of Ghazna, 131–133, 144, 238, 299, 303, 311, 372
Mahmûd Tarâbî, 266, 270, 271
Mahmûd Yalavach, 266, 267, 269–271
Malik Ahmad Yattû, 318, 319
Malik Kâfur, 279
Malik Mubârak, 290
Malik Shâh, 65
Malwa, 189, 278, 290, 292–295, 380, 381
Mamai, 333
Mamluks, 287
Maragha, 368
Marco Polo, 23, 262, 311, 384
Marghizhan, 134, 135, 146, 147, 270
Marwar, 306
Mas’ûd b. Hasan, 139, 140
Mas’ûd Beg, 266, 267, 269, 270
Mas’ûd Mîrzâ, 292
Mas’ûd of Ghazna, 184, 387, 390
MASHKEY, 301
Hashkey, 299, 300
Mazandaran, 59, 326, 336, 347, 377
Mazdakites, 29, 52, 54, 55
Meerut, 189, 338
Melkites, 29
Merkit, 251, 253
Mewat, 292
Ming dynasty, 220
Mogholistan, 22, 271, 272, 324, 325, 327, 347
MONGOLS, 248
Mubârak Shâh, 267, 268, 271
Mubarakabad, 292
Mu’în b. Ahmad, 300
Mudar b. Rajâ’, 301
Mughîra b. Ahmad, 300
Mughals, 320, 321
Muhammad b. Tughluq, 285, 288, 307
Muhammad Bakhtiyâr Khaljî, 189
Muhammad Beg, 307
Muhammad Ghawth, 381
MULTAN, 302, 304
Multan, 298, 299, 302, 303, 305, 337
Muzaffar I, 292
Muzaffarîds, 336
Möngke, 255, 259, 264, 266–270
Nânak, 381
Nâsirîyya, 60
Nâzûk Khan, 320
Nûrbakhshiyâ, 376
Nâiman, 141, 245, 246, 272
Naqshbandiyya, 24, 348, 371, 374
Narоjaipâl, 311
Nasa, 34, 44, 91, 142
Nasrid, 187
Nawrûz, 304
Nestorian Church, 368, 369

470
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contents</th>
<th>INDEX</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nizāmīyya, 373</td>
<td>Qutula, 251, 254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizārī Isma‘īlīs, 62</td>
<td>Rā‘ī Magre, 316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nizhniy Novgorod, 337</td>
<td>Rāmananda, 381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Ch’i dynasty, 235</td>
<td>Rāmdās, 381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oghul Qaymish, 267</td>
<td>Rāwandīyya, 38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oghuz, 28, 140, 186, 187, 190, 192, 235, 236, 304, 370, 376, 379, 387</td>
<td>Rūdakī, 94, 97, 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Öljeytü, 368</td>
<td>Rajah Mān Singh, 295</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ordos, 213</td>
<td>Rajasthan, 292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ostiaks, 247</td>
<td>Rajputs, 274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pārtha, 274</td>
<td>Rayy, 34, 37, 55, 56, 58–61, 347, 375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pahlavi, 199, 370</td>
<td>Renxiao, 218, 219</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakpatan, 374</td>
<td>Rinchana, 312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panipat, 296</td>
<td>Rinds, 309</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Panjikent, 97, 98</td>
<td>Süff dynasty, 333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pratīhāras, 274</td>
<td>Süha Bhatta, 317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prithvi Rāja, 188</td>
<td>Sa‘īn, 381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qādiriyya, 24, 371</td>
<td>Sabzavar, 326, 335, 348, 377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qāsimiyya, 60</td>
<td>Sā‘dī, 371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qabācha, 275, 304</td>
<td>Saffarids, 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qabul Khan, 251, 253</td>
<td>Samanids, 60, 61, 64, 85, 87, 88, 92, 97, 103, 127, 129, 143, 144, 147, 184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qara Hūlegū, 267</td>
<td>Samgrāmrāja, 311</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qatwan steppe, 139, 243</td>
<td>Sammās, 306, 308</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qaydu, 264, 268, 269, 271</td>
<td>Sanjar, 139, 142, 187, 270, 373, 387</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qazvin, 336</td>
<td>Sarbadars, 326, 327, 334–336, 377</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qinghai, 214</td>
<td>Sayyid Baraka, 329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qiuci, 206</td>
<td>Sayyid ‘Alī Hamadānī, 316, 375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qubāwī, 147</td>
<td>Sayyid dynasty, 291, 293</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qubilay Khan, 264, 386</td>
<td>Sayyid Khidr Khan, 291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qum, 58, 61, 347</td>
<td>Sayyid Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allāh, 376</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qunduz, 270</td>
<td>Sebüktegin, 144, 184, 195, 301, 303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qur‘an, 31–33, 90, 189, 289, 367, 375, 378</td>
<td>Seljuqs, 65, 138, 139, 144, 190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qurayshite, 299, 302</td>
<td>Semirechye, 39, 126, 130, 245, 246, 324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shīr Shāh Sūr, 321</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shāfī’is, 195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shāh Beg Arghūn, 307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shāh ‘Abd Allāh Shattārī, 381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shāh Hasan Arghūn, 305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shāh Husayn, 305</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shāh Mīr, 310, 311, 313–315, 321, 322</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Shāh Rukh, 291, 292, 325, 336, 346–348, 376</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

471
Shams Chak, 320
Shanxi, 213
Sharqi sultans, 290
Shaykh Ahmad Ata Yasawi, 371
Shaykh ‘Ala’i, 379
Shaykh ‘Abd Allah Shattari, 379
Shaykh ‘Ala’ti, 382
Shaykh ‘Uthman, 379
Shaykh Dawud Sabzavari, 335
Shaykh Habib, 378
Shaykh Ismail Kubrawi, 318
Shaykh Khalifa, 326, 334, 377
Shaykh Ismail Kubrawi, 318
Shaykh Khalifa, 326, 334, 377
Shaykhiiya–Juriyya, 378
Shen Zong, 213
Shiburghan, 324
Shira Muren, 233
Shughnan, 85, 89, 189
Sichern, 212
Sigi Qutuqu, 255
Sikandar, 295, 296
Sikhs, 381
Simnan, 34, 375
SIND, 297, 306
Sind, 188, 274, 277, 286, 288, 298, 299, 302, 304, 305, 307, 310, 315, 380
Singu Sali, 211
Siraji, 304
Siwalik, 188
Siwistan, 306
Siyawush, 98
Sogdians, 98, 199, 201
Soyurghatmish, 328
Srivara, 322
Suhrawardiyya, 24
Suizhou, 214
Sulayman mountains, 309
Sulduz tribe, 324
Sultan Husayn Bayqara, 354
Sultan Shah, 187, 190, 294
Sultan Shah Lodji, 294
Sunbadh, 37, 55
Sung dynasty, 208, 209, 212, 235
Sunnis, 49, 113
Syr Darya, 29, 30, 43, 135, 147, 265, 266, 268, 333
Signak, 265
Suebetey, 258
T’ang dynasty, 209, 235
T’ien Shan, 23, 206, 209
T’ung Hu, 232
Tatar Khan, 305
Tazi Bhatt, 319
Tabghach, 232
Tahirids, 57, 60, 63
Talaqan, 34, 61
Tang Taizong, 209
Tangut Toba clan, 212
Tatars, 240, 247
Tatutungha, 255
Tayang Khan, 245
Tekish, 141–143, 187, 190
Tha’alaiba, 50
Thankar, 189
TIMUR, 323
Timurids, 310, 337
Tirmidh, 29
Toghril Khan, 253, 254
Toktamish, 332, 333, 336, 337
Toluy, 262, 265–267
Toluyids, 264
Tonyuquq inscription, 236
Toqashi, 267
Trebizond, 338, 346
Tughluq Timur, 325
Tughluqids, 284, 292
Tuukharistan, 34, 89, 129, 185, 189
Tun Bagha Tarkhan, 199, 201
Tunguz, 233, 239
Turkistan, 22, 23, 28, 125, 133, 134, 241, 243, 257, 267, 269, 271, 312, 324, 332, 347, 385, 389
Turkmens, 139, 325, 347, 387
Tuyuhun state, 212
Turkistan, 34, 89, 129, 185, 189
Tun Bagha Tarkhan, 199, 201
Tunguz, 233, 239
Turkistan, 22, 23, 28, 125, 133, 134, 241, 243
Tuyuhun state, 212
Turkistan, 34, 89, 129, 185, 189
Tun Bagha Tarkhan, 199, 201
Tunguz, 233, 239
Turkistan, 22, 23, 28, 125, 133, 134, 241, 243, 257, 267, 269, 271, 312, 324, 332, 347, 385, 389
Turkmens, 139, 325, 347, 387
Tuyuhun state, 212
Turkistan, 34, 89, 129, 185, 189
Tun Bagha Tarkhan, 199, 201
Tunguz, 233, 239
Sung dynasty, 208, 209, 212, 235
Sunnis, 49, 113
Syr Darya, 29, 30, 43, 135, 147, 265, 266, 268, 333
Signak, 265
Suebetey, 258

472
Urus Khan, 332, 333
Ush, 147, 270
Usrushana, 87–91, 99, 101
ʿUthmān, 29
Utrar, 142, 146, 148, 265, 268–270, 346
Uzgend, 130, 133–135, 140, 142, 143, 147, 270

Vijayamandirgarh, 189
Vijayanagar, 290, 348
Voguls, 247

Wakhan, 85
Wakhsh, 135, 189
Wang Yande, 210
Wayhind, 303
White Horde, 268, 332, 333, 343
William of Rubruck, 23, 268

Xianbei, 212
Xining, 214

Yaʿqūb b. Layth, 50, 64, 184, 376, 387
Yadavas, 278
Yaghlakar, 202
Yahyā Qarābī, 335
Yāṣa, 329, 341, 348
Yasawiyya, 24, 372
Yenisei, 205, 236, 257
Yesū Mōngke, 267
Yesūgey, 251–253
Yeti Su, 265, 267
Yuan Hao, 215, 217
Yüan empire, 264

Zafar Khan, 290, 292
Zahāk, 99, 184
Zakariyyā Rāzī, 95
Zarafshan, 29, 88, 89, 93, 101, 387
Zayd b. ʿAlī, 59
Ziyād b. Sāliḥ, 36
Zuljū, 312
Zuzan, 53, 386
History of civilizations of Central Asia

Volume I
The dawn of civilization:
earliest times to 700 B. C.

Volume II
The development of sedentary and nomadic civilizations:
700 B. C. to A. D. 250

Volume III
The crossroads of civilizations:
A. D. 250 to 750

Volume IV
The age of achievement:
A. D. 750 to the end of the fifteenth century:
Part One
The historical, social and economic setting
Part Two
The achievements

Volume V
Development in contrast:
from the sixteenth to the mid-nineteenth century

Volume VI
Towards contemporary civilization:
from the mid-nineteenth century
to the present time

Cover: Figure of a horseman on the inner surface of a twelfth century Persian lustre ware bowl, outside diameter 35 cm. Rayy or Kashan (Iran). Courtesy of M.I. Mochiri.